MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 17 2019, 10:20 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John R. Worman Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Evansville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Lauren A. Jacobsen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
R.P., July 17, 2019
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-JV-329
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier,
Appellee-Petitioner. Judge
The Honorable Renee A.
Ferguson, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause Nos.
82D04-1811-JD-2051
82D04-1811-JD-2094
82D04-1901-JD-78
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-329 | July 17, 2019 Page 1 of 6
Statement of the Case
[1] R.P. (“R.P.”) was adjudicated to be a delinquent child for committing acts that
would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement;1 Class B
misdemeanor disorderly conduct;2 and two counts of Level 4 felony child
molesting3 if committed by an adult. The trial court awarded wardship of R.P.
to the Department of Correction (“the DOC”). R.P.’s sole argument is that the
trial court abused its discretion by committing her to the DOC. Finding no
abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by committing R.P.
to the DOC.
Facts
[3] In November 2018, fourteen-year-old R.P. admitted to committing acts that
would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement; Class B
misdemeanor disorderly conduct; and two counts of Level 4 felony child
1
IND. CODE § 35-44.1-3-1.
2
I.C. § 35-45-1-3.
3
I.C. § 35-42-4-3.
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molesting if committed by an adult. R.P. specifically admitted that she had: (1)
forcibly resisted a Vanderburgh County Deputy Sheriff; (2) engaged in fighting
and/or tumultuous conduct; and (3) fondled or touched two children with the
intent to arouse or satisfy her sexual desires. The two children lived with R.P.
in her guardian’s home. One of the children was nine years old and the other
was eleven years old.
[4] The trial court found R.P. to be a delinquent child and ordered her to stay at the
Indiana Youth Care Center (“the IYCC”) for an evaluation pending the
disposition of her case. During her stay at the IYCC, R.P. hit a corrections
officer in the face and kicked her in the back. R.P. subsequently admitted
committing acts that would be Level 6 felony battery of a public safety official if
committed by an adult.
[5] At the January 2019 disposition hearing, Mr. Cook (“Cook”) from the
Vanderburgh County Probation Department recommended that R.P. be placed
in a “sexually maladaptive youth program.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 29). According to
Cook, Gibault was the only Indiana facility that offered such a program for
females and it had a waiting list that was “a few months out.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at
29). Apparently, the DOC has such a program as well, and Cook
recommended that R.P. “be committed to [the DOC] to receive the treatment
that she needs for the [sexually maladaptive youth] treatment[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at
29). According to Cook, the typical DOC program for sexually maladaptive
youth takes six to nine months to complete, and if R.P. had to wait five months
for a bed at Gibault, that could double the amount of time that she would be
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detained. Cook also explained that she could not return to her guardians
pending the availability of treatment at Gibault because two of her victims lived
in the guardians’ home. The State asked the trial court to follow Mr. Cooks’
recommendations. Defense counsel responded that R.P. did not want to go to
the DOC because there was “a certain stigma associated with that.” (Tr. Vol. 2
at 32). R.P. had also “made it very clear [to defense counsel] that she [did] not
want to wait at [the IYCC] for five months not getting any treatment.” (Tr.
Vol. 2 at 33). Defense counsel essentially asked the trial court to release R.P.
until a bed became available at Gibault.
[6] The trial court explained that it did not want R.P. “to sit at the [IYCC] not
receiving the appropriate treatment.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 34). The court further
explained that DOC’s program for sexually maladaptive youth was the same as
Gibault’s program and that there was no reason to delay R.P.’s treatment.
Thereafter, the trial court issued an order granting wardship of R.P. to the
DOC. R.P. appeals her commitment to the DOC.
Decision
[7] R.P.’s sole argument is that the trial court abused its discretion by committing
her to the DOC. The purpose of the juvenile process is vastly different from the
adult criminal justice system. R.H. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010). Specifically, the goal of juvenile proceedings is “rehabilitation so that the
youth will not become a criminal as an adult.” Id. (emphasis in original). To
facilitate this goal, courts have a number of options available for juvenile
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placement, including, a private home in the community, a licensed foster home,
a local juvenile detention center, and State institutions. Jordan v. State, 512
N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. 1987).
[8] To assist juvenile courts in selecting amongst the available placement
alternatives, the Indiana Legislature has provided guidance regarding the option
selected for any particular child:
If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of
the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:
(1) is:
(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most
appropriate setting available; and
(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest
and special needs of the child;
(2) least interferes with family autonomy;
(3) is least disruptive of family life;
(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the
child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; and
(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child’s
parent, guardian, or custodian.
IND. CODE § 31-37-18-6. Within those parameters, a juvenile court has
discretion in choosing the disposition appropriate for each juvenile delinquent.
D.E. v. State, 962 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We review a court’s
disposition for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 97. An abuse of discretion occurs
if the court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
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circumstances before it, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be
drawn therefrom. Id.
[9] Here, our review of the record reveals that the State recommended that R.P. be
placed in a sexually maladaptive youth treatment program. The DOC program
was available immediately, and the Gibault program was not. In light of R.P.’s
serious history, which included sexual acts committed against young children
who lived with her, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that
that was no reason to delay R.P.’s treatment and awarded wardship of her to
the DOC.4 Accordingly, we affirm the court’s commitment of R.P. to the
DOC.
[10] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
4
The trial court also stated that its dispositional order was entered, in part, because R.P. had already
participated in inpatient and outpatient services in Arkansas.
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