IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA19-24
Filed: 1 October 2019
Vance County, No. 07 CRS 50717, 50725
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
RODNEY MCDONALD WILLIAMS
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 13 June 2018 by Judge Henry W.
Hight Jr. in Vance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4
September 2019.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General M.A.
Kelly Chambers, for the State.
Marilyn G. Ozer for defendant-appellant.
TYSON, Judge.
Rodney McDonald Williams (“Defendant”) appeals from judgments entered
after a jury’s verdict found him guilty of first degree murder and guilty of attempted
murder. We find no error.
I. Background
Ms. Shirley Venable (“Venable”) was awakened to someone calling her name
outside her home during the early morning of 27 February 2007. Venable testified
she heard Defendant say “Ma, open the door.” Venable is Defendant’s mother. When
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Opinion of the Court
Venable opened her door, a friend, Leo Ziegler, Jr., (“Ziegler”) ran inside her house.
Defendant stood at the doorway and began firing a handgun. Venable was shot in
her left side and Ziegler was shot in the chest.
Venable and Ziegler attempted to flee through the house, but Venable was shot
again in her left hip and Ziegler was shot in the back of his head. Ziegler’s head
wound was fatal. After Venable was shot in her hip and fell to the floor, Defendant
shot Venable a final time in her right leg. Venable was able to wrestle the gun from
Defendant.
Defendant fled Venable’s home. First responders arrived and found Venable
covered in blood at her backdoor and Ziegler’s body in the kitchen. Officers found
Defendant hiding under a nearby automobile and arrested him.
On 1 March 2007, the trial court determined Defendant needed emergency
medical care for mental illness and issued a safekeeping order. On 12 March 2007,
Defendant was indicted on one count of first degree murder of Ziegler and one count
of attempted murder of Venable.
A. Dr. Williams’ Evaluation
Dr. Alton Williams (“Dr. Williams”), (no relation to Defendant), first
interviewed Defendant on 3 July 2007. Dr. Williams conducted follow up interviews
with Defendant on 7 January 2008 and 10 April 2008. In preparing his report, Dr.
Williams also reviewed 190 documents related to Defendant. During these
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interviews, Defendant told Dr. Williams he considered deceased Ethiopian leader,
Haile Selassie, to be a god and Defendant wanted to be his right-hand-man.
Defendant insisted his deceased father had connections to rap music artists and
producers. He also discussed his imaginary girlfriend, Champagne.
When Dr. Williams inquired about the pending charges, Defendant stated the
worst outcome of his case would be the death penalty, but because of his pending tort
claim he would not receive a death sentence because it was an act of Congress.
Defendant explained the current charges were a prerequisite for him to prevail in the
tort claim. Defendant stated he would be receiving his money from his tort claim any
day and would be going home.
Dr. Williams reported Defendant began using marijuana at age 16, smoking
six to seven “blunts” daily. Defendant “first used alcohol at seven or eight years old,
but became a regular drinker when he was 16 years old.” Defendant reported he
would drink “four to five 40 ounce beers a day.” Defendant self-reported he used crack
cocaine twice a week from 2005 through his arrest.
Defendant testified that while incarcerated for a prior conviction, he purchased
a state tort claim for $5.00 from another inmate named Lock Jordan. Defendant
asserted his tort claim was against the State, but required federal government
assistance to succeed on his claim. Defendant also stated he received money from a
rap music “record deal.”
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On 7 July 2008, Dr. Williams submitted a forensic psychiatric evaluation. Dr.
Williams diagnosed Defendant with schizophrenia, paranoid type and substance
dependence. Dr. Williams concluded that Defendant exhibited deficits, which
impaired his ability to rationally and factually understand the trial process.
Specifically, Defendant’s delusion that his current criminal charges were related to a
tort claim against the State. Dr. Williams further concluded Defendant “does not
have the capacity to assist counsel in preparing and implementing a defense.”
B. Dr. Vance’s Evaluation
In September 2008, Defendant was evaluated by Dr. Charles Vance, M.D.,
PhD. (“Dr. Vance”). Defendant continued to assert his beliefs in his tort claim and
added that other patients were “messing” with him and that he could hear whispered
threats. Dr. Vance reported that on one occasion Defendant became violent with
hospital staff. On 30 October 2008, Dr. Vance concluded Defendant was not
malingering and he met the criteria for a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Dr.
Vance further concluded Defendant’s ability to participate meaningfully in trial “was
substantially impaired by his ongoing mental illness.”
On 22 December 2008, the court found and concluded Defendant did not have
the legal capacity to assist counsel in preparing and implementing a defense to the
pending charges. On 8 September 2009, the trial court issued an order finding
Defendant incompetent to stand trial. The following day, Defendant’s counsel and
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Opinion of the Court
the State entered into a stipulation that Defendant was incompetent to proceed to
trial.
C. Dr. Messer’s Evaluation
In late September 2009, Defendant’s competency to stand trial was reassessed.
Dr. Julia Messer, Ph.D (“Dr. Messer”) examined Defendant and prepared the report.
Again, she diagnosed Defendant with paranoid schizophrenia. Defendant told the
staff that strangers could “derail his lawsuit by standing too close to him and
sneezing.” Defendant further reported that former President George W. Bush, then
President Barack Obama, and talk show host, Oprah Winfrey, were aware of his
situation. Defendant felt his mother may have been a “witch at various times in the
past.”
Defendant reported having the following hallucinations: seeing shadows that
were always present, hearing his deceased father breathing heavily in his closet, and
seeing a “big parrot made out of fog.” Defendant also maintained his belief that in
order to sue the State he had to kill somebody. On 7 October 2009, Dr. Messer found
Defendant’s test scores and behavior were consistent with paranoia, and not attempts
to feign or exaggerate mental illness. She concluded Defendant was not competent
to stand trial.
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On 9 October 2009, the State dismissed the charges with leave, due to
Defendant being incapable of proceeding to trial. On 10 March 2014, the State
entered a Notice of Reinstatement of Charges.
D. Dr. Vance’s Re-Evaluation
In October 2015, Defendant reported thoughts of hanging himself because
purportedly “the devil told him to hurt himself.” Defendant was prescribed
olanzapine, an antipsychotic medication, which appeared to alleviate his psychotic
symptoms. Dr. Vance re-evaluated Defendant. During this examination, Defendant
did not raise his “tort claim” as a reason for his current legal situation. Defendant
stated “it ain’t related” to his current pending criminal charges.
Dr. Vance reported Defendant appeared embarrassed by and dismissive of his
past claims. Dr. Vance found Defendant’s “presentation during this current
evaluation was wholly unexpected.” Dr. Vance further found Defendant “completely
disavows those previous psychotic beliefs and shows a very good orientation to the
reality of the case, even though he is [presently] receiving lower dose of antipsychotic
medication.” Dr. Vance issued a report concluding Defendant was competent to
proceed at trial on 4 November 2015. On 4 February 2016 the State entered another
Notice of Reinstatement of Charges.
E. Dr. Blanks’ Evaluation
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Opinion of the Court
On 21 July 2016, Dr. Richard Blanks, J.D., M.D., an Adult and Forensic
Psychiatrist, (“Dr. Blanks”) met with Defendant at the Craven Correctional
Institution. Dr. Blanks sent a letter to Defendant’s counsel stating that he had also
found Defendant was competent to stand trial on 10 October 2016. Upon joint
motions regarding Defendant’s competency from Defendant’s counsel and the State,
the trial court issued an order finding Defendant competent to stand trial on 23
October 2016.
On 9 November 2016 Defendant was found in need of protective custody, due
to being an escape risk with anger problems. As the Vance County jail did not have
proper facilities to take care of him, a safekeeping order was issued. On 7 December
2017 a further safekeeping order was issued on the grounds that Defendant required
mental health treatment, psychiatric care and medication. On 20 April 2018, another
safekeeping order was issued due to Defendant’s unpredictable outbursts including
violent assaults.
Defendant was tried 13 June 2018 through 14 June 2018. Defendant testified
and offered evidence at his trial. The jury returned a verdict and found Defendant
guilty of first-degree murder and attempted murder. Defendant was sentenced to a
mandatory life sentence without parole for the first-degree murder conviction of
Ziegler, and not less than 480 months and not more than 585 months for attempted
murder of Venable. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal from both judgments.
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Opinion of the Court
II. Jurisdiction
This Court possesses jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b) and
15A-1444(a) (2017).
III. Issue
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal asserts the trial court erred by not sua
sponte ordering a competency assessment to protect his constitutional rights to due
process.
IV. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
“[A] person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with
counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.” Drope
v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 112-113 (1975). “[T]he conviction of
an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process[.]” State v.
Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 410, 259 S.E.2d 502, 505 (1979) (citations omitted). “The
standard of review for alleged violations of constitutional rights is de novo.” State v.
Graham, 200 N.C. App. 204, 214, 683 S.E.2d 437, 444 (2009) (citation omitted).
B. Competency
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Defendant asserts the trial court’s failure to sua sponte order a competency
evaluation violates his constitutional right to due process. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1001(a) (2017) provides:
No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished
for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is
unable to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation
in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense
in a rational or reasonable manner.
“The question of the capacity of the defendant to proceed may be raised at any time
on motion by the prosecutor, the defendant, the defense counsel, or the court. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1002(a) (2017).
In State v. Badgett our Supreme Court held:
under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution,
a criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent. As
a result, a trial court has a constitutional duty to institute, sua
sponte, [a] competency hearing if there is substantial evidence
before the court indicating that the accused may be mentally
incompetent. In enforcing this constitutional right, the standard
for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.
State v. Badgett, 361 N.C. 234, 259, 644 S.E.2d 206, 221 (2007) (alteration in original)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
This Court has stated, “a trial judge is required to hold a competency hearing
when there is a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competency even absent a
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Opinion of the Court
request.” State v. Staten, 172 N.C. App. 673, 678, 616 S.E.2d 650, 654-55 (2005)
(citation omitted). “Failure of the trial court to protect a defendant’s right not to be
tried or convicted while mentally incompetent deprives him of his due process right
to a fair trial.” State v. McRae, 139 N.C. App. 387, 389, 533 S.E.2d 557, 559 (2000)
(citations omitted). “Evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at
trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant to a
bona fide [sic] doubt inquiry.” Id. at 390, 533 S.E.2d at 559 (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
The transcript and record indicate Defendant did not behave inappropriately
or otherwise disrupt the trial court’s proceedings. The facts and Defendant’s conduct
before, during, and after trial are contrary to this Court’s holdings in State v. Mobley,
State v. Whitted, and State v. Ashe cited by Defendant. In Mobley, the defendant was
heavily medicated for serious psychiatric and physical diseases, was unable to remain
awake during trial, and was incapable of consulting with his attorney or participating
in his defense. State v. Mobley, 251 N.C. App. 665, 795 S.E.2d 437 (2017). In Whitted,
the defendant uttered strange outbursts during trial, did not want to come into the
courtroom, had to be forcibly brought into court sessions, while reciting incoherent
prayers. State v. Whitted, 209 N.C. App. 522, 705 S.E.2d 787 (2011).
In Ashe, this Court held the trial court erred when it failed to act sua sponte
and order a competency hearing. State v. Ashe, 230 N.C. App. 38, 43-44, S.E.2d 610,
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623 (2013). This Court held substantial evidence the defendant was incompetent due
to defendant’s extensive mental illness, the trial court’s and defense counsel’s
concerns about the defendant’s ability to control himself during the proceedings, and
defendant’s actual conduct during trial. Id.
In McRae, our Court considered the appeal of a defendant who suffered from
schizophrenia and psychosis. McRae, 139 N.C. App. at 387, 533 S.E.2d at 587. The
defendant underwent six or more psychiatric evaluations over a seventeen-month
period with differing conclusions of whether the defendant was competent to stand
trial. Id. at 390-91, 533 S.E.2d at 560. Following a mistrial, the court did not conduct
another competency hearing and subsequently retried the charges five days later. Id.
at 391, 533 S.E.2d at 560. The defendant was reported to have a high “risk of relapse.”
Id. at 390, 533 S.E.2d at 559. This Court noted the defendant’s history of not taking
his medication as prescribed. Id. at 392, 533 S.E.2d at 561.
Here, using the framework set forth in McRae, the trial court was presented
with substantial medical evidence, a joint motion by counsel, and Defendant’s own
statements establishing that he was competent to stand trial at the time trial began.
The trial court considered the independent opinions of two medical experts, who both
had concluded Defendant was competent to stand trial. According to those records,
Defendant had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic with substance abuse
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issues. Defendant had consistently been found incompetent to stand trial for over
nine years.
Following significant changes in Defendant’s behaviors, statements, two
evaluations finding Defendant capable to stand trial, and joint motions attesting that
Defendant was capable to stand trial, the trial court questioned Defendant and
proceeded to trial. While Dr. Vance’s competency evaluation noted he was surprised
to see the changes in Defendant’s condition, he made no mention of Defendant’s risk
to relapse, only that he could not assure the court Defendant’s “improved mental
status will persist indefinitely.”
Unlike McRae, where the defendant’s competency was dependent upon
medication to attain competency, Defendant was noted by Dr. Vance to be “receiving
a lower dose of antipsychotic medication” when Defendant was found competent to
stand trial. Here, Defendant, once found competent, was not further found to be
incompetent.
In State v. Chukwu this Court found irrational beliefs and nonsensible
positions were not grounds by themselves to raise a bona fide doubt about the
defendant’s competency. State v. Chukwu, 230 N.C. App. 553, 749 S.E.2d 910 (2013).
The defendant held himself out to be a Nigerian diplomat and had refused to
cooperate with his attorney believing she had a “hidden agenda.” Id. at 563, 749
S.E.2d at 917. Here, Defendant participated in his own defense, made trial decisions
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regarding having Dr. Vance testify, and took the stand to testify on his own behalf
after making a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to not testify.
On the morning before the second day of trial, Dr. Vance spoke with Defendant
before Dr. Vance testified at Defendant’s request. Dr. Vance required Defendant’s
permission to testify about prior competency evaluations. Dr. Vance testified he
believed Defendant was competent to provide informed consent to his testimony
about Defendant’s prior medical history.
Defendant argues his trial testimony describing his delusions, under which he
conducted the murder, and the testimony of Venable concerning Defendant shows
substantial evidence of his incapacity to proceed. Our examination of the record does
not indicate Defendant still asserted these delusions nor was unable to assist his
attorney at trial. “So long as a defendant can confer with his or her attorneys so that
the attorney may interpose any available defenses for him or her, the defendant is
able to assist his or her defense in a rational manner.” State v. Shytle, 323 N.C. 684,
689, 374 S.E.2d 573, 575 (1989). The transcript and record reflect Defendant
responded to all inquiries and was an active, willing, and lucid participant in his trial.
Defendant further argues that his own testimony, Venable’s testimony, and
the testimony of the medical experts show substantial evidence of his incompetence.
This Court has held a defendant, who had been diagnosed with dementia, and
appeared to ramble on the stand through his testimony, did not show substantial
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evidence he was mentally incompetent at trial. State v. Coley, 193 N.C. App. 458, 464,
668 S.E.2d 46, 51 (2008).
Defendant asserts his own testimony was “jumbled and disorganized” and
demonstrated at the time of trial he still believed the government involvement with
the lawsuit was “somewhere around here now.”
At trial, Defendant testified his father was deceased. Defendant testified
Champagne was someone he saw modeling in a magazine and wrote letters to, but
received no reciprocal attention from her nor had ever met her in person. In
evaluating Defendant’s testimony, we conclude when discussing his delusions at the
time the murder occurred, Defendant speaks using the past tense and not the present
tense.
With regard to the testifying medical experts, Drs. Vance and Messer,
Defendant argues their testimony was substantial evidence demonstrating his
incompetence. Both experts testified Defendant had suffered from schizophrenia.
Both testified Defendant no longer believed that the purported civil lawsuit had
impacted his criminal conduct or charges or that he was a famous rap musician.
Dr. Vance testified no cure exists for schizophrenia and that treatment needs
to be continued for the patient’s lifetime. Defendant continues to receive treatment,
Defendant was found to be competent to stand trial by both doctors, and both doctors
testified Defendant had not been “aggressive or agitated here in the courtroom.” The
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record indicates neither expert testified Defendant was still incompetent prior to
trial, during trial or at sentencing.
1. Venable’s Testimony
Venable testified she had little contact with Defendant when he was
incarcerated at Central Prison. Her only contact with Defendant came when he was
housed at Dorthea Dix Hospital and later Central Regional Hospital. Venable further
testified that she noticed a difference in Defendant’s mental health after he had been
to Central Regional Hospital, and believed his improvement occurred because he was
no longer “drinking and drugging.” Venable said that Defendant had gone “off the
deep end” after being in solitary confinement. Venable further testified to the
following:
[Venable]: For real, now, yes. He’s – he’s saying he’s got
this big lawsuit, he’s saying he’s getting a lot of money.
And nobody won’t even tell him that he’s not getting no
money and stuff.
That’s why he taking this jury trial, because he been saying
they just gonna let him get out so he can spend his money.
He think he got all this money and stuff. He think he got
record deals, he think he got money.
[Prosecutor]: Now, how do you know that?
[Venable]: He writes me. I talks to him. He called me
yesterday on the phone.
Venable never stated that Defendant had told her recently or “yesterday” that he was
still under these delusions. These delusions occurred in the past. Venable did not
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Opinion of the Court
testify Defendant currently suffered these delusions. While Venable is a victim of
one of the incidents Defendant was tried for, she is also Defendant’s mother, who was
testifying as a witness for her son, who had plead Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
to both the first degree murder of Ziegler and the attempted murder of her.
Venable further testified:
[Prosecutor]: Had you every heard him talking about
Champagne?
[Venable]: All the time. He still talk about it right now. He
write me about it.
[Prosecutor]: What does he write you?
[Venable]: Have I seen her. Is anybody taking care of her.
They gonna get married.
Again, Venable did not state any time frame when these purported delusions
had occurred or when the letters were written. Given her relationship with
Defendant, his plea during this trial, and her limited contact with Defendant since
his incarceration and institutionalization after his arrest, her testimony does not
raise “substantial evidence” of Defendant’s incompetence to stand for and participate
at trial. See Young, 291 N.C. at 567, 231 S.E.2d at 581.
Our Court recently interpreted State v. McRae in the case of State v. Hollars.
In finding evidence of a bona fide doubt of the defendant’s competency to stand trial,
this Court reviewed seven prior forensic evaluations with differing results opining to
the defendant’s competency. State v. Hollars, ____ N.C. App. ____, ____, ____ S.E.2d
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____, ____, 2019 WL 3558770, *5 (2019). The Court also looked at a forensic
psychologist’s report finding “It is also possible his condition may deteriorate with the
stress of a trial so vigilance is suggested if his case proceeds in a trial.” Id. at *2.
Furthermore, in Hollars the defendant’s competency hearing occurred five months
after the defendant’s last forensic examination. Id. at *5. The Court noted there was
no extended colloquy between the defendant and the trial court, and the defendant
never testified in a manner to demonstrate he was competent to stand trial.
2. Defendant’s Testimony
Here, and unlike the facts in Hollars, Defendant engaged in two lengthy
colloquies with the trial court and later waived his right not to testify, took the stand
and testified lucidly and at length on his own behalf. This last factor leads to the
Court’s analysis in State v. Staten.
We find the factors in State v. Staten to provide the most guidance. In Staten,
the defendant wanted to testify on his own behalf. Staten, 172 N.C. App. at 679, 616
S.E.2d at 655. The trial court conducted the following colloquy to determine the
voluntariness of the Staten’s testimony and his understanding of possible outcomes:
[The Court]: All right. Mr. Staten, you have talked to your
attorney concerning the question of whether or not you
should testify or not in this case?
[Defendant]: Yes Sir.
[The Court]: And you understand that if you do testify the
State can ask you a lot of questions on cross-examination
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about your prior record and things of that nature?
[Defendant]: Yes sir.
[The Court]: And you understand that may sway the jury
somewhat? Sometimes it does. And it could be that it
doesn’t work out to your advantage.
[Defendant]: Yes sir.
[The Court]: Are you telling me now that even though you
understand the consequences of your decision to testify you
still want to go through with it?
[Defendant]: I want to testify and tell everybody like came
[sic] behind me and testified after I already testified and
say something about me and I want to testify again to clear
up what they have said like we did the last time.
Id. at 679-80, 616 S.E.2d at 655.
The Court found “the defendant’s replies were lucid and responsive,
demonstrating his desire to testify and displaying his understanding of the
consequences of doing so.” Id. at 680, 616 S.E.2d at 655. These factors demonstrated
the defendant was competent to stand trial. Id.
Here, two similar colloquies between the trial court and Defendant occurred.
The trial court inquired about Defendant’s permission for his counsel to admit to the
jury he had initiated and participated in the death of Ziegler and the injuries to
Venable as a part of his insanity plea. The following colloquy occurred:
[The Court]: Mr. Williams, if you’ll stand, please, sir. I just
want to talk to you about some things. You’ve entered a
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity in this case, you
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understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
[The Court]: Your attorney needs your permission if he’s to
admit to the jury that you, in fact, participated in the death
of Mr. Ziegler and the wounding of your mother, Ms.
Venable; do you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
[The Court]: In giving that permission, he’s written down
something that would—you will—you may, if you would
want to, stipulate to – or, that is, stipulate to by giving him
permission to argue to the jury or make this concession on
your behalf.
And that is, “Rodney McDonald Williams does hereby
authorize his attorney, Larry Norman, to state that he
fired the weapon that caused the death of Leo Zielger and
wounded Shirley Venable on October 27, 2007.” And you do
authorize your attorney to state that on your behalf during
your trial; do you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
[The Court]: Now, I want to go over one or two things with
you. You understand that you’re charged with First Degree
Murder; do you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
[The Court]: And that the maximum penalty for that is life
in prison, do you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
[The Court]: And you’re charged with Attempted First
Degree Murder: do you understand that?
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[Defendant]: Yes sir.
....
[The Court]: The maximum sentence you could receive on
that offense would be 483 months and – minimum, and a
whole lot of other things, maximum; I haven’t figured that
out. Do you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
[The Court]: Now, knowing that, do you give your
permission to your attorney to make these arguments to
the jury that you and I went over – or make these
admissions?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
[The Court]: Has anyone threatened you, promised you
anything, coerced you in any way to get you to give your
attorney these –
[Defendant]: No, sir.
[The Court]: -- this authorization?
[Defendant]: No, sir.
[The Court]: And you find it to be in your best interest for
your attorney to be able to make these admissions to the
jury on your behalf; is that correct?
[The Defendant]: Yes, sir.
[The Court]: Do you have any questions you want to ask me
about making – or giving your attorney the authorization
to make those admissions on your behalf?
[The Defendant]: No, sir.
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[The Court]: And as you stand right now, you’re satisfied
with your lawyer’s legal services?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
[The Court]: And you and he have discussed the possible
defenses you might have to these charges, and the insanity
defense is one that you’re comfortable with and you’re
satisfied with; is that correct?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
Later, the trial court inquired into Defendant’s desire to testify:
[The Court]: Mr. Williams, have you had a chance to talk
to Mr. Norman about whether to testify or not?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
[The Court]: And have you come to a decision satisfactory
to yourself, with nobody forcing you or promising you
anything in any way was to what you think your best
interest is?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
[The Court]: And what have you decided to do?
[Defendant]: I’d like to go forward with the trial, sir.
[The Court]: Well, we’ll go forward with the trial, but the
question is whether or not you want to testify or not?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir, I want to testify.
[The Court]: Okay. That’s fine.
Like the exchanges in Staten, these colloquies and Defendant’s answers to the trial
court’s questions also demonstrate and support Defendant’s competence. Defendant
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engaged in a lengthy colloquy with the trial court, Defendant’s responses were “lucid
and responsive,” and his testimony was rational concerning his present beliefs and
desire to participate in and testify at his trial. See Staten, 172 N.C. App. at 679-84,
61 S.E.2d at 655-58. Defendant’s arguments are overruled.
V. Conclusion
Defendant has failed to demonstrate substantial evidence tending to show
Defendant’s incompetence at any time during his trial. We hold the trial court did
not err by not sua sponte ordering a further competency hearing.
Defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial errors he preserved and
argued. We find no error in the jury’s verdicts or in the judgments entered thereon.
It is so ordered.
NO ERROR.
Judges DIETZ and YOUNG concur.
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