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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DAWONTAY DAWOND BATES :
:
Appellant : No. 133 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 19, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-SA-0001893-2018
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 13, 2019
Dawontay Dawond Bates appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas following his
conviction for driving with a suspended license, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1).
We affirm.
On March 14, 2018, Bates was charged with one count of driving on a
suspended license following a conviction for driving under the influence
(“DUI”) and was subsequently adjudicated guilty of a summary offense1 before
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1 While subsections (i) and (ii) of 1543(b)(1) are summary offenses,
subsection (iii) constitutes a misdemeanor. The parties do not specify in their
briefs which subsection of 1543(b)(1) Bates was convicted of violating. Nor
does the citation or written sentencing order. However, Bates indicates in his
statement of matters complained of on appeal that he is appealing from a
conviction of 1543(b)(1)(i), and the trial court reiterates this subsection in
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a magisterial district court judge. After a summary appeal, the case proceeded
to a de novo bench trial at which both parties stipulated to the facts of the
case, including the fact that Bates was driving and that Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”) records showed that Bates’ license
was suspended at the time. Further, the parties stipulate that the suspension
was the result of a DUI. Based on the stipulation, the trial court found Bates
guilty and sentenced him to sixty days’ house arrest and a fine of five hundred
dollars. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Bates presents the following question for our review:
Was the evidence at trial insufficient because the Commonwealth
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had
actual notice that his driver’s license was suspended at the time
of the offense.
Appellant’s Brief, at 5.
Our standard of review in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain an appellant’s conviction is as follows.
The standard we apply … is whether viewing all the evidence
admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner,
there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the
above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts
and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
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their opinion without dispute. See Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement, at 1; see
also Trial Court Opinion, at 3. Further, our review of the Commonwealth’s
brief, the transcript cover page and trial court dockets indicate that this was
an appeal from a summary conviction. Finally, the sentence imposed, sixty
days’ house arrest plus fines, is consistent with a summary conviction.
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defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier
of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d, 108, 109-110 (citation omitted).
In order to establish a prima facie case under section 1543(b)(1), the
Commonwealth must establish that Bates drove a motor vehicle on a highway
or traffic way in the Commonwealth while his operating privilege was
suspended pursuant to a DUI violation. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1).
Additionally, “the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant had
actual notice that his license was suspended.” Commonwealth v.
Brewington, 779 A.2d 525, 527 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation and footnote
omitted).
However, the Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant was
aware that the suspension was still in effect when she was found operating a
motor vehicle. See Commonwealth v. Baer, 682 A.2d 802, 806 (Pa. Super.
1996).2 This is due to the fact that “[d]riving while one’s operator’s license is
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2 Baer concerned a conviction for violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a), a
summary offense. See id., at 804, 806. We conclude that the reasoning
employed in Baer is equally applicable to violations of section 1543(b)(1) that
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suspended … is an absolute liability offense that does not require that the
accused act knowingly.” Id. As result, the Commonwealth need only prove
that a defendant received actual notice of the suspension. See id.
Bates asserts the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he had actual notice of the suspension, and since actual notice is
an element of the offense, the evidence is insufficient to convict him. Bates
claims he only stipulated to the fact that he was driving a vehicle and that
PennDOT’s records indicated he was DUI suspended at the time he was driving
a vehicle, but did not stipulate to the fact that he had actual notice. However,
the record belies his claim.
When asked whether he was “stipulating to what happened,” counsel
for Bates responded generally “Yes, Your Honor.” N.T., at 3. The court then
remarked “It sounds to me there is no contest that he was driving while under
suspension and the suspension was DUI-related, is that correct?” Id., at 3-4.
Counsel for Bates clarified the stipulation by responding:
Essentially, Your Honor, he could have had a license had he filled
in the paperwork and sent it to PennDOT at the conclusion of his
DUI suspension. Which could have been sometime ago. He
unfortunately was unaware that he had to do that. He completed
the term of the suspension. He thought he was good to go. He
thought he had a license again and began driving. He was
then subsequently pulled over by Officer Dengler.
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are graded as summary offenses. See Baer, 682 A.2d at 806 (observing that
culpability requirements are not applicable for summary vehicle code
violations).
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Id., at 4 (emphasis added).
It is clear from the transcript that counsel for Bates admitted that Bates
had been aware of the suspension but merely was mistaken about the fact
that his license was not simply reinstated at the end of the suspension period,
and that he had to actually obtain restoration of his operating privilege.
Our review of the record demonstrates that Bates stipulated to the facts
necessary to convict him of the instant offense. The testimony, along with the
stipulation, was sufficient to permit a reasonable inference, upon which the
trial court properly could have based its verdict, that Bates had knowledge of
his license suspension. Therefore, we find a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence based on the Commonwealth’s failure to prove the element of actual
notice is without merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/13/2019
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