MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2020 ME 9
Docket: Aro-19-110
Submitted
On Briefs: December 17, 2019
Decided: January 23, 2020
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.1
STATE OF MAINE
v.
P.S.
MEAD, J.
[¶1] In this consolidated appeal, P.S. challenges the disposition imposed
by the District Court (Fort Kent, Soucy, J.) in three juvenile matters. Specifically,
P.S. argues that the court abused its discretion or otherwise erred in ordering
that he be committed to Long Creek Youth Development Center (Long Creek)
for an indeterminate period up to age eighteen. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 3313(1)-(2),
3314(1), 3316(2), 3402(1)(B) (2018).2 Because our language in State v. J.R.,
2018 ME 117, ¶¶ 24, 27, 191 A.3d 1157, could be read to suggest that a court
imposing an indeterminate commitment of a juvenile to a Department of
1 Although Justice Hjelm participated in the appeal, he retired before this opinion was certified.
2 Title 15 §§ 3313(1)-(2), 3314(1) (2018) have since been amended, though not in any ways that
affect this case. See, e.g., P.L. 2019, ch. 474, §§ 1-2 (effective Sept. 19, 2019) (to be codified at 15 M.R.S.
§§ 3313(2)(F), 3314(1)(E)).
2
Corrections facility must specify a commitment no shorter in duration than up
to the juvenile’s eighteenth birthday, and the trial court may have proceeded
under such a belief, we take this opportunity to clarify the law, vacate the
dispositional orders, and remand for the court to revisit the disposition
pursuant to 15 M.R.S. §§ 3314(1), 3316(2).
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the “record of the proceedings
in juvenile court.” 15 M.R.S. § 3405(2) (2018). On June 4, 2018, when P.S. was
fourteen, he was adjudged to have committed criminal trespass (Class E),
17-A M.R.S. § 402(1)(B) (2018). The court imposed a disposition of a thirty-day
confinement, all suspended; a one-year term of probation; and forty hours of
community service to be completed within two months. Soon after, the State
filed its first motion for probation revocation, alleging that P.S. had violated
probation conditions by possessing alcohol, failing to complete the forty hours
of community service, and refusing to comply with a curfew. P.S. admitted to
violating the conditions of his probation, at which time the court (Nelson, J.)
partially revoked his probation and ordered that he complete forty hours of
community service within thirty days.
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[¶3] The State filed second and third motions for probation revocation
on November 15 and December 11, 2018. In addition to the allegations that P.S.
violated the conditions of his probation, the State charged four new
misdemeanors: criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A) (2018), for
destroying his mother’s artwork; domestic violence assault (Class D),
17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2018), for assaulting his sister; assault (Class D),
17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(A) (2018), for assaulting a student at school; and criminal
mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A), for damaging a school laptop.
[¶4] On March 4, 2019, the court (Soucy, J.) held a hearing to consider the
State’s motions for probation revocation and the four new charges. At the
hearing, P.S.—who was not yet fifteen years old—admitted to all four new
offenses and the probation violations. The State advocated for the court to
impose a disposition of indeterminate commitment until age eighteen.
P.S. argued for a thirty-day confinement. The court revoked P.S.’s probation
and imposed a disposition of commitment to Long Creek for an indeterminate
period up to age eighteen. The court stated,
[T]ypically I think we could set you up with really intensive
services in the community . . . and I think, in fact, we’ve tried to do
some of that. . . . But ideally we’d have other services available as
well that are perhaps a bit more assertive and are a bit more local.
We don’t have those services, and I’m satisfied there is no
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alternative but to commit you to Long Creek, and I don’t think a
shock sentence is going to do it. It’s going to be [until] age 18.
[¶5] P.S. timely appealed the disposition. See 15 M.R.S. § 3402(1)(B).3
II. DISCUSSION
[¶6] In a comprehensive list, 15 M.R.S. § 3314(1) outlines the
dispositional alternatives available to the juvenile court, including home
supervision under court-imposed conditions, participation in a supervised
work or service program, a period of confinement not to exceed thirty days, and
commitment to a juvenile correctional facility. 15 M.R.S. § 3314(1)(A), (B), (F),
(H). Section 3316(2)(A) expounds on juvenile commitments to the Department
of Corrections that are ordered under section 3314(1)(F) and provides in
relevant part,
A commitment of a juvenile to a Department of Corrections juvenile
corrections facility pursuant to section 3314 must be for an
indeterminate period not to extend beyond the juvenile’s
18th birthday unless the court expressly further limits or extends the
indeterminate commitment, as long as the court does not limit the
commitment to less than one year nor extend the commitment
beyond a juvenile’s 21st birthday and as long as an order does not
result in a commitment of less than one year, unless the
commitment is for an indeterminate period not to extend beyond
the juvenile’s 21st birthday.
3 In addition to briefs from the parties, we were provided a joint brief from a group of
organizations serving as amici curiae pursuant to M.R. App. P. 7A(e). The organizations that signed
onto the amicus brief in support of P.S. include the ACLU of Maine Foundation, Maine Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, Disability Rights Maine, and GLBTQ Legal Advocates and Defenders.
5
15 M.R.S. § 3316(2)(A) (emphases added).
[¶7] In other words, if the juvenile court decides to order the
commitment of a juvenile to a Department of Corrections facility pursuant to
section 3314(1)(F), that indeterminate commitment will be for a period up to
the juvenile’s eighteenth birthday, unless the court decides to limit or extend
the commitment within the bounds of section 3316(2)(A). Relevant to the
present matter, the court could not have limited P.S.’s commitment to a period
of “less than one year.” 15 M.R.S. § 3316(2)(A). In sum, the statute provides
the court a range of discretion for calculating a juvenile’s period of
commitment.
[¶8] Although we cannot be certain of the court’s understanding, the
record gives us reason to believe that, once the court decided to commit P.S. to
Long Creek, it may have felt compelled to order him committed up to his
eighteenth birthday. At the hearing, the court stated that it believed there was
“no alternative but to commit [P.S.] to Long Creek” until he reached age
eighteen. Further, P.S. advocated for a thirty-day confinement at the hearing,
and it appears that his attorney may have misunderstood the court’s ability to
limit a commitment to somewhere between at least one year and P.S.’s
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eighteenth birthday.4 Given these observations, the court may have operated
under the belief that its indeterminate sentence must extend until P.S.’s
eighteenth birthday and that it was without discretion to impose a lesser period
of commitment.
[¶9] We acknowledge that our language in State v. J.R. may have
contributed to such a belief—one that, if held by the juvenile court, would have
resulted in an incorrect application of the law. In J.R., we stated, “The length of
the institutional disposition ordered by the court was mandated by statute as
an indeterminate period not to exceed J.R.’s eighteenth birthday.”
2018 ME 117, ¶¶ 24, 27, 191 A.3d 1157 (“By imposing the minimum term
permissible for an indeterminate commitment to Long Creek, the court acted
within its discretion and did not err in applying the mandates of section 3313
to J.R.’s specific needs.” (emphasis added)). We recognize that the two
quotations above, when removed from the context of J.R., could lead to the
4 At the hearing, P.S.’s attorney requested a thirty-day confinement, stating, “[P]art of the reason
why we picked 30 days is because that’s the only alternative we have short of indeterminate 18[.]
[I]f there was a two-month, three-month thing, we might be talking that. But this is what we have, so
it—I blame the [L]egislature for that drafting decision.” Similarly, P.S.’s initial brief mentioned only
the option of a thirty-day confinement and did not argue in the alternative that the court should have
limited the indeterminate-up-to-age-eighteen disposition to a commitment of somewhere between
at least one year and P.S.’s eighteenth birthday. Following the State’s failure to submit a brief, we
ordered further briefing and invited amici curiae briefs. After that order, P.S. and the amici curiae
advanced the argument that the court had the prerogative to expressly limit P.S.’s commitment to a
period of one year. See 15 M.R.S. § 3316(2)(A) (2018).
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conclusion that the juvenile court lacks the discretion to impose an
indeterminate commitment of between at least one year and a juvenile’s
eighteenth birthday.
[¶10] Because the issue was not raised by the parties in J.R., we did not
discuss section 3316’s language allowing the court to “expressly further limit[]
or extend[]” a juvenile’s indeterminate commitment. 15 M.R.S. § 3316(2)(A).
Further, J.R.’s age rendered the issue of judicial discretion less meaningful than
in this case. J.R.’s indeterminate disposition up to the age of eighteen meant
that he would spend up to eighteen months at a juvenile facility.
J.R., 2018 ME 117, ¶ 24, 191 A.3d 1157. In contrast, given P.S.’s relative youth
at the time of the hearing, P.S.’s commitment could last almost thirty-nine
months, more than three years. Thus, the potential for a shorter period of
commitment is a more pertinent issue here than it was in J.R.
[¶11] We clarify today that the language of J.R. does not constrain a
juvenile court’s discretion to impose a shorter period of indeterminate
commitment than up to a juvenile’s eighteenth birthday pursuant to 15 M.R.S.
§ 3316(2)(A), so long as that commitment is for at least one year. We cannot
determine on this record whether the District Court believed it was compelled
to impose a commitment extending until P.S.’s eighteenth birthday.
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Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the matter for the court to
readdress the disposition pursuant to 15 M.R.S. §§ 3314(1), 3316(2),
specifically acknowledging the full range of discretion provided to the court in
section 3316(2)(A) and the Legislature’s directive to prioritize the least
restrictive juvenile disposition that is appropriate, see J.R., 2018 ME 117, ¶ 12,
191 A.3d 1157 (citing 15 M.R.S.A. § 3002 (2003) Commentary 1979). In its
review, the court may decide to reimpose P.S.’s up-to-age-eighteen
commitment, or it may exercise its discretion to limit his indeterminate
commitment within the direction of the statute. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 3002,
3313(1)-(2), 3314(1), 3316(2) (2018).
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the District
Court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
John W. Tebbetts, Esq., Tebbetts Law Office, LLC, Presque Isle, for appellant P.S.
Todd R. Collins, District Attorney, and James G. Mitchell, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., 8th
Prosecutorial District, Caibou, for appellee State of Maine
Emma E. Bond, Esq., Zachary L. Heiden, Esq., and Meagan Sway, Esq., ACLU of
Maine Foundation, Portland, for amicus curiae ACLU of Maine Foundation
Peter Rice, Esq., and Jeffrey M. Skakalski, Esq., Disability Rights Maine, Augusta,
for amicus curiae Disability Rights Maine
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Mary Bonauto, Esq., GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, Portland, for amicus
curiae GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders
Tina Heather Nadeau, Esq., Maine Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
Portland, for amicus curiae Maine Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
Fort Kent District Court docket numbers JV-2018-12, JV-2018-20, and JV-2018-21
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY