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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL TEIL CHAPMAN :
:
Appellant : No. 1421 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 15, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-45-CR-0002046-2017
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 04, 2020
Michael Teil Chapman (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed after the trial court found him guilty of possession with
intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance (PWID).1 On appeal,
Appellant challenges the denial of his suppression motion. After careful
review, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence, reverse the order
denying the suppression motion, and remand this matter to the trial court.
The trial court summarized the facts as follows:
On August 18, 2017, Trooper Joseph Urban of the Pennsylvania
State Police observed a vehicle traveling on Interstate 380 North
in the left passing lane for approximately a mile, with the right
lane readily available. The vehicle’s speed also fluctuated
between 65 and 73 miles per hour in a 70 mile per hour zone.
Trooper Urban made these observations while following
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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[Appellant] for about one mile. Trooper Urban pulled the vehicle
over and initiated a traffic stop. Trooper Urban noticed that the
registration of the vehicle began with “HPC,” which indicated to
him that it was a newer registration, even though the vehicle was
an older model.
During the stop, Trooper Urban noticed [Appellant] exhibiting
visible signs of extreme nervousness. Trooper Urban saw
[Appellant]’s hand shaking, and several facial tremors.
Following a discussion with [Appellant], Trooper Urban decided
to issue a warning in lieu of a citation. Trooper Urban stated to
[Appellant] that he appeared “overly nervous,” noting that his
eyelid had quivered and his voice cracked. He immediately asked
[Appellant] if there was anything illicit in the vehicle. Trooper
Urban then asked for consent to search the vehicle, and when
[Appellant] declined[,] Trooper Urban said “You have every right
to refuse consent,” and “I don’t want to talk you into it,” instead
indicating he would call for a canine team to come to sniff the
vehicle. Trooper Urban provided [Appellant] the consent form and
made efforts to go over it with him, but when [Appellant]
continued to waiver about consenting to the search, Trooper
Urban decided to call the canine unit. While waiting, Trooper
Urban twice had to tell [Appellant] he could not return to his
vehicle.
About 45 minutes after calling the canine unit, the dog, Micho,
and his handler, Corporal Doblovasky, arrived and conducted an
exterior search of the vehicle. Micho alerted, signaling the
presence of narcotics. Based upon the alert, Trooper Urban and
Troopers Sohns and Doblovasky conducted a search of the interior
of the vehicle. There were groceries in the rear of the vehicle and
the Troopers noted that even the perishable food items were room
temperature, indicating to the Troopers to examine them further.
Upon close inspection of the groceries, the Troopers found
approximately 220 grams of cocaine in sealed bags inside a plastic
Folgers coffee container, located in the back of the vehicle.
On August 18, 2017, a criminal complaint was filed against
[Appellant]. A preliminary hearing was held on August 30, 2017
and the charges were bound over. Formal arraignment was held
on October 11, 2017. On November 6, 2017, [Appellant] filed his
[suppression motion]. We held a hearing on [Appellant]’s
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[m]otion on January 18, 2018, briefs were ordered and
submitted[.]
Trial Court Opinion, 7/6/18, at 1-3 (record citations omitted). On July 6, 2018,
the trial court denied Appellant’s suppression motion.
On March 1, 2019, following a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant
guilty of PWID. On April 15, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 4 to
24 months minus one day of incarceration. On May 7, 2019, Appellant timely
appealed to this Court.
Appellant presents the following issues for review:
A. Did the trial court err in finding that the traffic stop was valid
based on “reasonable suspicion” that [Appellant] had committed
a non-investigable traffic offense?
B. Did the trial court err in finding that the police had “reasonable
suspicion” to detain [Appellant] after the traffic stop?
C. Did the trial court err in finding that it was reasonable to detain
[Appellant] for over 1 hour when he didn’t even receive a citation?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Each of Appellant’s three issues challenge the trial court’s denial of his
suppression motion. Therefore, we address these issues together, mindful of
the following:
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a challenge
to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
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supported by the record, [the appellate court] is bound by [those]
findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the determination of the
suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
of law of the courts below are subject to [ ] plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation
omitted). Importantly, our scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited
to the evidentiary record that was created at the suppression hearing. In re
L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013).
First, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in determining his traffic
stop was constitutional. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the trial court
wrongly concluded that Trooper Urban had reasonable suspicion to stop
Appellant’s vehicle for violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3313(d)(1) of the Pennsylvania
Vehicle Code. Appellant contends that a police officer must have probable
cause to stop an individual suspected of violating Section 3313(d)(1).
“The Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 53 A.3d
889, 892 (Pa. Super. 2012). “To secure the right of citizens to be free from
such [unreasonable] intrusions, courts in Pennsylvania require law
enforcement officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify
their interactions with citizens as those interactions become more intrusive.”
Commonwealth v. Pratt, 930 A.2d 561, 563 (Pa. Super. 2007). Courts in
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this Commonwealth have recognized three types of interactions between the
police and a citizen: a mere encounter, an investigative detention, and a
custodial detention.
A mere encounter between police and a citizen need not be
supported by any level of suspicion, and carr[ies] no official
compulsion on the part of the citizen to stop or to respond. An
investigatory stop, which subjects a suspect to a stop and a period
of detention . . . requires a reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot. A custodial search is an arrest and must be
supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Newsome, 170 A.3d 1151, 1154 (Pa. Super. 2017).
With respect to the quantum of cause necessary to conduct a traffic
stop, the relevant statutory authority is Section 6308(b) of the Pennsylvania
Vehicle Code, which provides:
Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of
checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a
violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a
vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the
vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle
identification number or engine number or the driver’s license, or
to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably
believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b).
Section 6308(b) requires only reasonable suspicion in support of a
vehicle stop for gathering information necessary to enforce the Vehicle Code
violation. However, a police officer must have probable cause to support a
vehicle stop where the officer’s investigation following the stop serves no
“investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected [Motor Vehicle Code]
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violation.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super.
2010) (en banc), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 397 (Pa. 2011).
Our Supreme Court explained:
Indeed, the language of § 6308 reflects this very intent. Stops
based on reasonable suspicion are allowed for a stated
investigatory purpose: “to secure such other information as the
officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the
provisions of this title.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). This is conceptually
equivalent to the purpose of a Terry[2] stop. It does not allow all
stops to be based on the lower quantum – it merely allows this for
investigatory stops, consistent with the requirements of both
federal and state constitutions. We interpret the legislature’s
modification of § 6308 as merely eliminating the statutory
requirement of a greater level of information for a stop under the
Vehicle Code than is constitutionally required for all other stops.
Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. 2008). “[I]f the officer
has a legitimate expectation of investigatory results, the existence of
reasonable suspicion will allow the stop – if the officer has no such
expectations of learning additional relevant information concerning the
suspected criminal activity, the stop cannot be constitutionally permitted on
the basis of mere suspicion.” Id. at 115. Therefore, “when the existence of
reasonable suspicion combines with the expectation that the stop will allow
light to be shed on the relevant matters, the stop is not unconstitutional.” Id.
Trooper Urban stopped Appellant based on his determination that
Appellant had violated Section 3313(d)(1) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code.
Section 3313(d)(1) provides:
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2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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(d) Driving in right lane.--
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) and unless otherwise
posted, upon all limited access highways having two or more
lanes for traffic moving in the same direction, all vehicles shall
be driven in the right-hand lanes when available for traffic
except when any of the following conditions exist:
(i) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding
in the same direction.
(ii) When traveling at a speed greater than the traffic flow.
(iii) When moving left to allow traffic to merge.
(iv) When preparing for a left turn at an intersection, exit or
into a private road or driveway when such left turn is legally
permitted.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3313(d)(1).
With this authority in mind, we conclude that the trial court improperly
determined that reasonable suspicion was the necessary quantum of cause
for stopping Appellant under Section 3313(d)(1). Instead, Trooper Urban
needed probable cause to stop Appellant for violating Section 3313(d)(1), as
Trooper Urban could not have possessed a legitimate expectation of learning
additional relevant information concerning whether Appellant was driving in
the appropriate lane during the stop. See Chase, 960 A.2d at 115-16.
Although the trial court incorrectly determined reasonable suspicion was the
appropriate standard in this case, Appellant’s traffic stop was nevertheless
constitutional because it was supported by probable cause.
Probable cause exists “where the facts and circumstances within the
officers’ knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in
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the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Commonwealth
v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 883 (Pa. Super. 2015). Trooper Urban testified at
Appellant’s suppression hearing to observing the following:
[Trooper Urban]: Upon catching up to [Appellant’s] vehicle, I
observed the vehicle traveling in the left lane when the right lane
was readily available for travel. The vehicle was not passing
anybody, did not exit on the left, never allowed any cars to merge
on from the right.
Q. Did it pass any entrance ramps? You said there were no
entrance ramps?
A. There were no entrance ramps -- there are no exit ramps when
you exit on the left. This occurred for approximately one mile I
observed this violation. So as a result of the violation,
Pennsylvania Vehicle Code 3313(d)(1), I initiated a traffic stop.
N.T., 1/18/18, at 9.
The record reflects that Trooper Urban observed Appellant violating
Section 3313(d)(1) for approximately one mile. Thus, although the trial court
improperly identified reasonable suspicion as the appropriate quantum of
cause necessary to stop Appellant in this case, Trooper Urban nevertheless
had probable cause to stop Appellant for violating Section 3313(d)(1).
Accordingly, Appellant’s argument that his traffic stop was unconstitutional is
meritless.
For his second and third issues, Appellant argues that Trooper Urban
impermissibly extended the traffic stop and improperly conducted a canine
sniff of the vehicle. Appellant contends that Trooper Urban lacked reasonable
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suspicion of criminal activity beyond the initial reason for the stop and
therefore, could not detain Appellant and his vehicle for a canine sniff.
During a traffic stop, an officer “may ask the detainee a moderate
number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information
confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 439 (1984). “[I]f there is a legitimate stop for a traffic violation . .
. additional suspicion may arise before the initial stop’s purpose has been
fulfilled; then, detention may be permissible to investigate the new
suspicions.” Chase, 960 A.2d at 115 n.5. This Court has held that such
investigations, including a canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle, must be
supported by reasonable suspicion. Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d
1009, 1021 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“[C]onsidering the relatively minor privacy
interest in the exterior of the vehicle and the minimal intrusion occasioned by
a canine sniff, . . . mere reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, [is]
required prior to [a dog] sniffing the exterior of [a] vehicle.”).
Our Supreme Court has explained:
A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an
investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the individual
is engaging in criminal conduct. Commonwealth v. Cook, [] 735
A.2d 673, 676 ([Pa.] 1999). “This standard, less stringent than
probable cause, is commonly known as reasonable suspicion.” Id.
In order to determine whether the police officer had reasonable
suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered.
In re D.M., [] 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 ([Pa.] 2001). In making this
determination, we must give “due weight . . . to the specific
reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw from
the facts in light of his experience.” Cook, 735 A.2d at 676
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 [] (1968)). Also, the
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totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an
examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal
conduct. Rather, “[e]ven a combination of innocent facts, when
taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police
officer.” [Id.]
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004).
We conclude that Trooper Urban lacked the reasonable suspicion
necessary to detain Appellant for a canine sniff. Trooper Urban’s testimony
points to three reasons for his determination that he had reasonable suspicion
to detain Appellant for a canine sniff of his vehicle. First, Appellant was
traveling from Brooklyn, New York, a known source area, west on Interstates
80 and 380, a known drug corridor. N.T., 1/18/18, at 8, 26, 29. Second,
although Appellant’s license plate indicated that his automobile was a newly
registered vehicle, he was actually driving “an older model SUV.” Id. at 7.
Third, Appellant exhibited abnormal and excessive nervousness while
speaking with Trooper Urban. Id. at 26-27.
On their face, these factors are each innocuous. Although this Court
has frequently stated that even a combination of innocent facts, when
considered together, can warrant further investigation by the police, this case
does not present such a situation. In short, the trial court based its finding of
reasonable suspicion on Appellant becoming nervous after Trooper Urban
pulled him over for driving in the left lane while traveling west from Brooklyn,
New York along Interstates 80 and 380 in a used car. Even considering the
totality of the circumstances, there is no indicia of criminal activity in this fact
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scenario, as these set of facts could apply to any number of the many
individuals who the police stop along Interstates 80 and 380 in Pennsylvania.
The only fact that arguably could point to criminal activity was
Appellant’s extreme and excessive nervousness. This Court, however, has
repeatedly stated that “while nervous behavior is a relevant factor,
nervousness alone is not dispositive and must be viewed in the totality of the
circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Gray, 896 A.2d 601, 606 n.7 (Pa. Super.
2006). Moreover,
It is the rare person who is not agitated to some extent when
stopped by police, even if the driver is a law-abiding citizen who
simply failed to notice or repair a broken taillight or was unaware
that he or she was driving above the speed limit. Whether
described as nervousness, apprehension, concern or otherwise,
forced interaction with a police officer is not an everyday
occurrence for the average citizen.
Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 63 A.3d 294, 305-06 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
banc).
Based on our review of the certified record on appeal, we conclude that
Trooper Urban lacked reasonable suspicion to extend his traffic stop of
Appellant for a canine sniff. Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of
sentence, reverse the order denying Appellant’s suppression motion, and
remand this matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this
decision.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Suppression order reversed. Case
remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judge Colins joins the memorandum.
Judge Nichols concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/4/20
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