IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0137
Filed March 4, 2020
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
TREVION DUPRI SMITH-TOLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Jeffrey L.
Larson, Judge.
Trevion Smith-Toles appeals the sentence imposed upon his conviction of
first-degree robbery. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Mullins and Ahlers, JJ.
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MULLINS, Judge.
Trevion Smith-Toles was sixteen years of age when he and three other
individuals engaged in conduct resulting in Smith-Toles being charged with first-
degree robbery. Following Smith-Toles’s guilty plea, the matter proceeded to
sentencing and consideration of juvenile sentencing factors. See, e.g., Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012); State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 404 n.10
(Iowa 2014).
At the hearing, the court received conflicting recommendations from both
witnesses and counsel as to whether Smith-Toles should be incarcerated or
released to engage in community-based rehabilitation services. It also received
an abundance of evidence specific to Smith-Toles concerning the mitigating
features of his youth, his home and family environment, the circumstances of the
crime and how youth may have played a role in its commission, the challenges he
would face in going through the criminal process, and his prospects for
rehabilitation. Smith-Toles’s statement of allocution and his counsel’s arguments
also included mitigating information.
In imposing sentence, the court was torn, noting “prison is not a great option
for you because of your young age and all of the mitigating circumstances that the
attorneys talked about.” The court proceeded to Smith-Toles’s poor track record
and the need for protection of the community, both of which the court indicated
weighed against placing Smith-Toles on probation. The court noted residential
correctional facilities would not be a workable option for rehabilitation given the
level of supervision Smith-Toles required, which the facilities could not provide.
Ultimately, the court sentenced Smith-Toles to a term of imprisonment not to
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exceed twenty-five years. As to its option of imposing a mandatory minimum of
seventy percent of the sentence prior to parole or work release eligibility, 1 the court
declined to impose the minimum given Smith-Toles’s young age.
Smith-Toles appeals, arguing the court improperly considered
characteristics of youth as aggravating, rather than mitigating, factors in imposing
sentence.2 Specifically, he maintains the factors cited by the court in its decision
to send him to prison “were immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks
and consequences,” which “cannot be used to justify a harsher sentence.”
We agree that considering the features of youth as aggravating
circumstances in sentencing would amount to an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 402 n.8; State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Iowa 2013).
Here, however, to put it simply, we agree with the State that the court considered
the features of Smith-Toles’s youth as mitigating circumstances. The reasons for
the court’s decision to send Smith-Toles to prison were protection of the
community, his need for rehabilitation, and his poor prospects for rehabilitation
without going to prison. While Smith-Toles attempts to put words in the district
1 Iowa Code section 902.12(1)(e) (2018) requires denial of parole or work release
for individuals convicted of first-degree robbery until they have served seventy
percent of their maximum prison sentence. While the court can impose a minimum
term, the mandatory nature is unconstitutional as to juvenile offenders. See Lyle,
854 N.W.2d at 404.
2 As the State points out, recent legislation, effective July 1, 2019, limits our ability
to consider appeals of convictions when a defendant has pled guilty. See 2019
Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 28(a)(3) (codified at Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2019)).
However, the State filed its brief before our supreme court decided whether the
legislation is retroactive. The court recently ruled the new legislation does “not
apply to a direct appeal from a judgment and sentence entered before July 1,
2019.” State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Iowa 2019).
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court’s mouth, we conclude the court considered the features of his youth as
mitigating, not aggravating, and we find no abuse of discretion.
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the sentence imposed upon Smith-
Toles’s conviction of first-degree robbery.
AFFIRMED.