MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 15 2020, 8:45 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas C. Allen Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Matthew B. Mackenzie
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
D.L., October 15, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-JV-704
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Andrea R. Trevino,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
The Honorable Carolyn S. Foley
Trial Court Cause No.
02D07-1912-JD-1203
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-704 | October 15, 2020 Page 1 of 7
[1] D.L. appeals his placement in the Department of Correction (“DOC”)
following his adjudication as a delinquent for committing acts that, if
committed by an adult, would be Level 6 felony auto theft 1 and Level 6 felony
resisting law enforcement. 2 Because the evidence supports the trial court’s
decision that the DOC was the best available placement for D.L., we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On December 12, 2019, D.L., who had never obtained a driver’s license, stole a
Honda Odyssey van. When a police officer located the stolen van and activated
his lights and siren, D.L. did not stop until the van broke down. When the van
stopped, D.L. ran from police on foot. Police apprehended D.L. and placed
him in the Allen County Juvenile Center. After a detention hearing on
December 13, 2019, the State filed a petition alleging D.L. was a delinquent for
committing auto theft, driving without a license, and two counts of resisting law
enforcement. On January 2, 2020, D.L. admitted committing auto theft and
resisting law enforcement, the State dismissed the other two allegations, and the
court adjudicated D.L. a delinquent. Following a dispositional hearing on
February 26, 2020, the court placed D.L. in the DOC after finding “detention is
essential to protect the child or community and is in the child’s best interests.”
1
Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a).
2
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3).
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(Appealed Order at 2.) The court also found “by way of example and not
limitation”:
1. The act committed by the juvenile would constitute a felony if
committed by an adult.
2. The juvenile has an extensive history of incorrigible behavior.
3. The juvenile’s delinquent conduct is chronic and escalating
and the juvenile has been offered ample opportunities to alter
such behavior.
4. The juvenile must learn the logical and natural consequences
of delinquent behavior.
5. The juvenile is in need of rehabilitation and will benefit from a
highly structured environment.
6. The Pre-Dispositional Report indicates that placement in a
residential treatment facility is not an option at this time.
7. The Dual Status Assessment Team recommends treatment in
the structured environment of the Indiana Department of
Correction.
8. The Indiana Youth Assessment System indicates that juvenile
is at a high risk to re-offend.
(Id. at 1.)
Discussion and Decision
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[3] D.L. asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it placed him in the DOC.
“The disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent is a matter committed to
the trial court’s discretion, subject to the statutory considerations of the child’s
welfare, community safety, and the policy favoring the least harsh disposition.”
J.S. v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1173, (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. We review the
trial court’s decision without reweighing the evidence or assessing witness
credibility, and we reverse only if the “decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before [the court] or the reasonable
inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Id.
[4] As quoted above, the trial court included some findings in its written
dispositional order. D.L. “does not contest the trial court’s findings of fact,”
(Br. of Appellant at 16), and we accordingly accept those findings as correct.
See Coles v. McDaniel, 117 N.E.3d 573, 576 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (unchallenged
findings must be accepted as correct). In addition, when announcing its
decision at the end of the dispositional hearing, the court made the following
findings on the record:
I do find that [D.L.] has a, an extensive history of delinquent
behavior before the Court. Some of these matters have been
closed with referrals to the Department of Child Services, and I
am seeing that some of these matters have been dismissed, but
even just looking at the most recent cases, the bottom line is that
services appear to have been in place in one form or another
since at least 2014, noting that this is designated as case twenty
within the Court’s computer system. So I do find that [D.L.] has
an extensive history of delinquent behavior before the Court. I
will note that as, as noted within the report of, the
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Predispositional Report, that services have been attempted and
provided through both the Department of Child Services as well
as the Juvenile Probation Department. [D.L.] has been given
opportunities at community services [and] has been given ample
opportunity to alter his behaviors. I do find that [D.L.] needs to
learn logical and natural consequences of his delinquent
behavior. He remains in need of rehabilitation. The
psychological test report that was submitted by, or to the Court,
dated February 24, 2020, does recommend the intensive therapy
services available through the [DOC] as being in [D.L.’s] best
interests. We’ll note that there have been services attempted
through residential treatment which have been unsuccessful.
That was through orders from, through the Department of Child
Services. I will note that the Indiana Youth Assessment Tool
does show that [D.L.] is a high risk for re-offense. The Dual
Status Assessment Team Recommendation is also
recommending the intensive therapeutic services available
through the [DOC]. And finally note that the Predispositional
Report is indicating that residential treatment is not an option, as
no placement facilities would be willing to accept [D.L.] at this
point in time. Sorry, I’ve got one more finding. We’ll further
note that [D.L.] does not appear to be responding to the structure
of the Allen County Juvenile Center. According to the Juvenile
Center Detention Court Report, [D.L.] has received five
disciplinary reports since the last court report dated January 22
for a variety of issues, including damaging facility property.
[D.L.], the staff states that [D.L.] needs constant redirection and
has also received school disciplinary reports as well for failing to
comply and physical aggression while in the classroom.
(Tr. Vol. 4 at 11-12.)
[5] D.L. contends the court could have met its goal of giving him the “natural and
logical consequences of his behavior” by placing him on probation with home
detention and electronic monitoring, (Br. of Appellant at 16), because he had
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already spent sixty-six days detained in the Juvenile Center. He also asserts
that home detention with electronic monitoring would provide the “highly
structured environment” that the court believed he needed, (id. at 17), and
would permit him to engage in family and individual counseling to obtain
“rehabilitative therapy.” (Id. at 18.) Under the facts and circumstances
presented herein, we must disagree.
[6] At the disposition hearing, D.L. requested home detention with electronic
monitoring. However, after D.L. made that recommendation at the hearing,
both the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) and Probation expressed
concerns about D.L.’s safety if he was placed with his mother rather than in the
DOC. (See Tr. Vol. 4 at 8, 9.) Probation also had “concerns that placing him
on a probation supervision with his mom would only make things worse.” (Id.
at 9.) Because D.L. had already had services through DCS and Probation, had
been aggressive and destructive of property while in the Juvenile Center
awaiting the dispositional hearing, and had been in the possible residential
placements – none of which are willing to admit him again – we cannot say the
trial court abused its discretion in placing D.L. in the DOC. See, e.g., D.E. v.
State, 962 N.E.2d 94, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (trial court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting less restrictive placement when juvenile had already
failed in that placement).
Conclusion
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[7] Contrary to D.L.’s assertion, the court did not abuse its discretion when it
placed him in the DOC. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.
[8] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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