L.V. v. A.D.

J-A19038-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

L.M.V., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
A.T.D. :
:
v. :
:
M.R.D. : No. 646 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered January 22, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s):
No. 2019-FC-0692

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED MAY 12, 2021

This appeal returns to this panel following our remand on November 3,

2020, for the trial court to prepare a supplemental opinion pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). L.M.V. (Mother) appeals from the custody order entered

in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, pertaining to Mother and

A.T.D.’s (Father’s) child, J.R.D. (Child).1 The order awarded: (1) shared legal

custody to Mother and M.R.D. (Paternal Grandmother), who is Father’s

mother; (2) primary physical custody to Mother; and (3) partial physical

custody to Paternal Grandmother. Mother avers the court: (1) erred in

____________________________________________

1 Mother did not file an amended brief in response to the trial court’s
supplemental opinion. Paternal Grandmother has not filed any brief in this
matter.
J-A19038-20

granting Paternal Grandmother’s petition to intervene pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 5324; (2) failed to consider whether the custody order will interfere with the

parent-child relationship, with respect to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(c); (3) failed to

apply the presumption in favor of parent, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5327(b);

and (4) abused its discretion in awarding shared legal custody to Paternal

Grandmother, under the 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)(1)-(16) factors. After careful

review, we affirm.

I. Facts & Procedural History

Child was born in 2013; Mother and Father never married. At this

juncture we note Mother has two additional children, a three year-old daughter

and a one year-old son, with her paramour, J.W. Trial Ct. Op., 11/20/20, at

9. In its supplemental opinion on remand, the trial court summarized the

underlying factual history:

According to the testimony of [the August 7, 2019, standing]
hearing, Child had attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(“ADHD”), was very aggressive and had a history of self-inflicted
bruises. Paternal Grandmother was not employed. She was on
oxygen and took medications for anxiety and depression, but
there was no evidence her condition inhibited her ability to care
for Child. Her daughter, P.D., lived with her. Neither . . . had a
criminal record or been the subject of an OOCYS investigation.
Both . . . held a valid driver’s license. P.D. was employed as a
patient transporter at a local hospital and was expecting to
become a full-time assistant daycare teacher within two weeks of
that hearing.

Child lived with Paternal Grandmother for the first month
after Child’s birth because Mother was arrested for hitting Father
at the hospital. Child then resided with Mother until January 2019,
when Mother and Paternal Grandmother began to share physical

-2-
J-A19038-20

custody of Child in a rather loose, informal arrangement between
them.

In early February, 2019, Mother decided she wanted to
move to Las Vegas to establish a music career. Mother did not
intend to take Child with her to Las Vegas; she wanted Child to
live with Paternal Grandmother while she was gone.

Between January and mid-May, 2019, Paternal
Grandmother would have custody of Child for five days and Mother
would have custody of Child on weekends in some weeks; in other
weeks, that arrangement would be reversed; and in other weeks,
Paternal Grandmother would have custody of Child for three days
and Mother would have custody of Child for four days. During this
period of time, Mother and Child had been living with her mother,
K.R. [(Maternal Grandmother).] Sometime in mid-May Mother
abruptly left [Maternal Grandmother’s] residence with Child and
moved into a hotel for two weeks. Paternal Grandmother believed
Mother left [Maternal Grandmother’s] residence because
[Maternal Grandmother] physically abused Child, including
choking him.

On or about June 1 or 2, 2019, after living in the hotel for
two weeks, Mother placed Child with Paternal Grandmother for the
next six weeks and returned to [Maternal Grandmother’s]
residence. During that time, Mother did not contact Child for
weeks[,] causing Paternal Grandmother to believe Mother had
actually moved to Las Vegas.[FN]
___________________
[FN] The record reflects inconsistencies and discrepancies regarding

precise dates as to when Paternal Grandmother had physical
custody of Child. That [P]aternal Grandmother had physical
custody of Child for long periods, even weeks at a time, was not
in dispute.

Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4 & n.1 (paragraph break added).

Meanwhile, on May 22, 2019, Mother filed a custody action against

Father. At this time, Child was approximately five years old. This Court

summarized in our prior memorandum:

-3-
J-A19038-20

On May 28[, 2019], Mother and [Father] entered into a custody
agreement, filed in the court, which granted sole physical custody
to Mother, while setting forth a holiday schedule. Custody
Agreement, 5/22/19, at 1-2.

On July 29, 2019, Paternal Grandmother filed a petition to
intervene in the custody action, a petition for modification of the
custody order, and a petition for special relief. In these petitions,
Paternal Grandmother averred that throughout June of 2019,
Child had been in her care five days a week, and “for all of July[,]
7 days a week,” as Child was abandoned by Mother. Paternal
Grandmother’s Petition to Intervene, 7/29/19, at 2. The petitions
also averred that Child suffered physical abuse and neglect by
Mother. Id.; Paternal Grandmother’s Petition for Modification of
a Custody Order, 7/29/19, at 2. Paternal Grandmother requested
emergency custody of Child. Paternal Grandmother’s Petition for
Special Relief, 7/29/19, at 1. [In her modification petition,
Paternal Grandmother also requested legal and physical custody.]

The court convened a hearing on Paternal Grandmother’s
petition for special relief on August 7, 2019. [Mother, Father, and
Paternal Grandmother each appeared pro se.] Paternal
Grandmother, her daughter P.D., Father, Mother, and Jessica
Haldemann, an employee of [the Office of] Lehigh County Children
and Youth Services [(OCYS)], testified. That same day, the court
[granted] Paternal Grandmother’s petition to intervene, finding
that [she] both stood in loco parentis to the child, pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. § 5324(2), and is the grandparent of a child not in loco
parentis, whose relationship with Child began with the consent of
the parents and Child was substantially at risk of abuse, pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(3) (statute discussed infra). Id. at 1-2.

The trial court then convened a hearing on Paternal
Grandmother’s petition to modify custody on January 13, 2020.
[Mother and Father each appeared pro se, and Paternal
Grandmother was represented by counsel.] Paternal
Grandmother, P.D., Mother, Father, Mother’s paramour (J.W.),
and [Maternal Grandmother] testified. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court examined the sixteen statutory custody factors,
see 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)(1)– (16), on the record, before
awarding shared legal custody to Mother and Paternal
Grandmother, primary physical custody to Mother, and partial
physical custody to Paternal Grandmother. N.T., 1/13/20, at 132-
43. On January 22, 2020, the court issued the underlying final

-4-
J-A19038-20

custody order memorializing the same, and additionally providing
vacation and holiday scheduling. Order, 1/22/20, at 1-3.

On February 20, 2020, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal
and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

L.M.V. v. A.T.D. v. M.R.D., 646 EDA 2020 (unpub. memo. at 1-3) (Pa. Super.

Nov. 3, 2020).

II. Statement of Questions Involved & Standard of Review

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(d) requires a trial court to provide
a transcript of its reasons stated on the record.

2. Whether the trial court erred in granting Paternal
Grandmother’s Petition to Intervene under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(2)
and (3)(iii)(B).[ ]

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
consider whether the award of partial physical custody interfered
with the parent-child relationship.

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply
the statutory presumption in favor of parents.

5. Whether the court abused its discretion by awarding shared
legal custody . . . to Paternal Grandmother.

Mother’s Brief at 5.2

____________________________________________

2 We have reordered the issues for ease of review. Mother notes that in her
second issue, she has consolidated claims that were set forth separately in
her Rule 1925 concise statement. See Mother’s Brief at 5 n.1. We find her
issues were sufficiently preserved for our review. See Krebs v. United
Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(appellant waives issues that are not raised in both her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement and the statement of questions involved in her appellate brief).
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

-5-
J-A19038-20

For ease of review, we now set forth the relevant standard of review

and guiding principles. “Our paramount concern in child custody cases is the

best interest of the child.” M.A.T. v. G.S.T., 989 A.2d 11, 19 n.9 (Pa. Super.

2010) (en banc) (citation omitted).

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type
and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept findings
of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of
record, as our role does not include making independent factual
determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility
and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial
judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand.
However, we are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or
inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether
the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the
evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial
court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in
light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.

C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 443 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

[T]he discretion that a trial court employs in custody matters
should be accorded the utmost respect, given the special nature
of the proceeding and the lasting impact the result will have on
____________________________________________

Furthermore, we note Mother’s fifth issue, as articulated in her
statement of questions involved, challenged both the “shared legal and partial
physical custody” award. Mother’s Brief at 5. However, the corresponding
heading in her argument section states, “The trial court abused its discretion
in awarding shared legal custody to Paternal Grandmother.” Id. at 61
(emphasis added). Neither this heading nor her discussion include any
reference to the award of physical custody. See id. at 61-69. Accordingly,
we deem any challenge to physical custody award waived. See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a) (“The argument shall [include] such discussion and citation of
authorities as are deemed pertinent.”); C.H.L. v. W.D.L., 214 A.3d 1272,
1276 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“It is well-established that the failure to develop an
argument with citation to, and analysis of, pertinent authority results in waiver
of that issue on appeal.”).

-6-
J-A19038-20

the lives of the parties concerned. Indeed, the knowledge gained
by a trial court in observing witnesses in a custody proceeding
cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court by a printed
record.

Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 540 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

[A]lthough we are given a broad power of review, we are
constrained by an abuse of discretion standard when evaluating
the court’s order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
judgment, but if the court’s judgment is manifestly unreasonable
as shown by the evidence of record, discretion is abused. An
abuse of discretion is also made out where it appears from a
review of the record that there is no evidence to support the
court’s findings or that there is a capricious disbelief of evidence.

M.A.T., 989 A.2d at 18-19 (citations omitted).

III. Trial Court’s Statement of Reasons

Previously, we considered Mother’s first issue: whether 23 Pa.C.S. §

5323(d) required a trial court to provide a transcript of its reasons stated on

the record. On November 3, 2020, we remanded the appeal for the trial court

to file a Rule 1925(a) opinion, thus disposing of this issue.

IV. Paternal Grandmother’s Standing, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324

In Mother’s second issue, she challenges the trial court’s granting

standing to Paternal Grandmother to intervene in this custody matter. Mother

avers the court erred in granting standing under both 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(2)

(“[a] person who stands in loco parentis”) and § 5324(3)(iii)(B) (“[a]

grandparent of the child who is not in loco parentis”), which she avers is

contrary to the court’s own findings of fact, as well as the plain language of

the statute. Mother alleges:

-7-
J-A19038-20

The record does not establish that Paternal Grandmother assumed
a role equal to that of a parent in the eyes of a child, but does
indicate that Paternal Grandmother’s intervention was against
Mother’s wishes and interfered with the parent-child relationship.
The record contains no evidence of parental abuse, [and contains]
a specific finding that neither parent is a risk to the child.

Mother’s Brief at 14 (citation to reproduced record omitted). We conclude no

relief is due.

We note the relevant standard of review:

An issue regarding standing is a threshold issue that is a
question of law. Moreover, the interpretation and application of a
statute is also a question of law. As with all questions of law, we
must employ a de novo standard of review and a plenary scope of
review to determine whether the court committed an error of law.

When interpreting a statute, this court is constrained by the
rules of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (the “Act”). 1
Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991. The Act makes clear that the goal in
interpreting any statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intention
of the General Assembly while construing the statute in a manner
that gives effect to all its provisions. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).
The Act provides: “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and
free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded
under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).
Moreover, it is well settled that “the best indication of the General
Assembly’s intent may be found in a statute’s plain language.”
Additionally, we must presume that the General Assembly does
not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or
unreasonable and does intend to favor the public interest over
any private interest. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) and (5). . . .

G.A.P. v. J.M.W., 194 A.3d 614, 616-17 (Pa. Super. 2019) (some citations

omitted).

Section 5324 of the Child Custody Act provides, in relevant part,

standing to the following individuals to file an action for child custody:

(2) A person who stands in loco parentis to the child.

-8-
J-A19038-20

(3) A grandparent of the child who is not in loco parentis to
the child:

(i) whose relationship with the child began either with the
consent of a parent of the child or under a court order;

(ii) who assumes or is willing to assume responsibility for
the child; and

(iii) when one of the following conditions is met:

(A) the child has been determined to be a dependent
child under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 63 (relating to juvenile
matters);

(B) the child is substantially at risk due to parental
abuse, neglect, drug or alcohol abuse or incapacity; or

(C) the child has, for a period of at least 12
consecutive months, resided with the grandparent,
excluding brief temporary absences of the child from the
home, and is removed from the home by the parents, in
which case the action must be filed within six months
after the removal of the child from the home.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(2), (3)(i)-(iii)(A)-(C).

In addressing standing, the trial court first summarized the history of

Mother and Paternal Grandmother sharing physical custody of Child, along

with Paternal Grandmother’s belief that “Mother had actually moved to Las

Vegas,” in light of Mother’s non-contact “for weeks.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 3-

4. The court further considered Paternal Grandmother’s testimony at the

August 7, 2019, standing hearing:

We [Paternal Grandmother and P.D.] are asking to
receive emergency custody because we know how to give
[Child] the proper care, love, and support he has been
needing for a very long time. [Child] has been thriving

-9-
J-A19038-20

in our care this far within the past few months, and we
have been preparing him to enter the school system
which no one has been helping him with. We have been
teaching him to be respectful and cared for as a
household member, and I’ve been teaching him right
from wrong as any other child should be, but without the
abuse given by his mother [ ] and grandmother [K.R.].

Thanks to us, [Paternal Grandmother and P.D.][,] he’s
finally receiving the stability he was never given before
with the schedules, appropriate meals throughout the day,
educational readiness, proper hygiene, learning manners,
and overall is learning how to be a kind, caring person
more than he already is despite the abandoned, neglected
abuse he has been given.

N.T. 8/7/19 at 5-6. No one disputed her statement. In fact,
Mother said:

I made the decision to move [in approximately early
February, 2019.] So I’ve been in the process of saving
money and all this extra [sic]. Since then I’ve been
saying back and forth to [Paternal Grandmother] that it
was a possibility that I may be taking [Child] with me,
that I didn’t know what I wanted to do yet. But the closer
the time came, you know, if he was going to be with
anybody, I did want him indeed to be with his grandma
because the way that they interact with him.

Like, I love the way they take care of [Child]. I don’t
have no objections to that. They’re very caring. They’re
very loving. Like, he’s learned a lot, not only from me,
but from them as well. Like, I never had the plan on
taking him out of their life at all.

N.T. 8/7/19 at 25.

Trial Ct. Op., 11/30/20, at 4-5.

The court further summarized:

On or about July 24, 2019, Paternal Grandmother reported
[Maternal Grandmother] and Mother to [OCYS] when neither she
nor Child had heard from Mother for weeks. She believed

- 10 -
J-A19038-20

[Maternal Grandmother] physically abused Child and Mother was
unstable and had neglected to protect Child. Mother had no
residence of her own; she resided with [Maternal Grandmother],
moved into a hotel for two weeks when [Maternal Grandmother]
allegedly abused Child and then returned to K.R.’s residence
leaving Child with Paternal Grandmother. She believed Mother
had failed to protect Child from [Maternal Grandmother’s] abusive
behavior. Also, Paternal Grandmother took Child to the doctor
earlier in the year because Mother neglected to do so when Child
was coughing, had difficulty breathing, had allergies and was
experiencing some discharge from his penis. On another day,
Paternal Grandmother believed Mother neglected Child when she
took Child outside to a pool where he got a bad sunburn. Finally,
Paternal Grandmother was concerned Mother may be going to jail
because she understood Mother had two pending charges of
driving while under the influence (“DUI”) and an August 20 date
to dispose of them.

When Mother learned Paternal Grandmother reported her and
[Maternal Grandmother] to OCYS, she retrieved Child and
threatened Paternal Grandmother that she would not see Child
again unless she withdrew the allegations against her and
[Maternal Grandmother.] Mother, who had returned to [Maternal
Grandmother’s] residence, had two other children and was
concerned that OCYS would conclude they, too, would be at risk
in [Maternal Grandmother’s] residence.

At the August hearing, the OCYS caseworker confirmed its
investigation was on-going and [Maternal Grandmother] was the
alleged perpetrator. There were photographs of numerous bruises
and recent scratches on the child’s body. Mother testified at least
two of the scratches were from [Maternal Grandmother.] Mother
also testified she had decided not to move to Las Vegas. Finally,
Father, who had never been involved in Child’s life and had never
requested any form of custody of Child, announced he wanted
some custody because he had a good job and was going to have
a place to live.

Trial Ct. Op. at 3-6.

The trial court clarified that its August 17, 2019, order should have

reflected that Grandmother had standing under Section 5324 (person who

- 11 -
J-A19038-20

stands in loco parentis) or, in the alternative, under Section

5324(3)(i)(3)(1)(iii)(B). Trial Ct. Op. at 8. The court first set forth its analysis

under Section 5324(2), which confers standing to “[a] person who stands in

loco parentis to the child.” Id., citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(2). It reasoned this

provision was “broad enough to include a grandparent who stood in loco

parentis to the child.” Trial Ct. Op. at 8. It found:

Child has resided with Paternal Grandmother for long periods
of time from early 2019 until June 1 or 2, 2019, after which Child
resided exclusively with Paternal Grandmother [for]
approximately six weeks[, until] Mother retrieved Child. Mother
had only one interaction with Paternal Grandmother or Child
during that time. Paternal Grandmother believed Mother had
moved to Las Vegas and, consistent with her earlier discussions
with Mother, believed Mother left custody of Child with her.
During that time, Paternal Grandmother performed all of the
parental functions for Child. She took Child to the doctor when
Mother neglected to do so and reported to OCYS [that] Child had
been abused. Paternal Grandmother stood in loco parentis to
Child.

Trial Ct. Op. at 6.

The trial court then reasoned, pursuant to Section 5324(3)(iii)(B), which

grants standing to a grandparent who is not in loco parentis to the child,

where, inter alia, “the child is substantially at risk due to parental abuse,

neglect, drug or alcohol abuse or incapacity.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(3)(i)-(iii)(A)-

(B). The court found:

Mother placed Child with Paternal Grandmother for lengthy
periods of time between early 2019 and June 1 or 2, 2019, and
thereafter for the next six weeks when Child resided exclusively
with Paternal Grandmother. During those times, Paternal
Grandmother assumed responsibility for Child and, as evidenced
by her filing for legal and physical custody of Child, was willing to

- 12 -
J-A19038-20

continue to do so. Father, who attended the hearing, was not a
resource for Child and did not oppose Paternal Grandmother’s
request for custody. OCYS’ investigation of [Maternal
Grandmother] as the alleged perpetrator was on-going.
Photographs of Child [showed] bruises and scratches [that he
sustained] while residing with Mother and [Maternal
Grandmother] at [Maternal Grandmother’s] residence. Mother
had no residence of her own. She went to a hotel for two weeks
when Child was allegedly abused by [Maternal Grandmother.] She
then returned to [Maternal Grandmother’s] residence without
Child, who she left with Paternal Grandmother. Furthermore,
Mother had two outstanding DUIs, which exposed her to possible
incarceration, and she indicated she intended to relocate to Las
Vegas and leave Child . . . in Paternal Grandmother’s custody. At
that point, there was evidence Child had physical injuries incurred
while in Mother’s custody and residing at [Maternal
Grandmother’s] residence; [Maternal Grandmother] was the
perpetrator; OCYS’s investigation was on-going; Mother’s living
situation was unstable; and Father had not been involved in
Child’s life. Paternal Grandmother, who had physical custody of
Child for significant portions of the previous seven months during
which time Mother had neglected to contact Child or Paternal
Grandmother for weeks at a time, was the only available resource
other than OCYS to take custody of Child. Paternal Grandmother
met the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(3)(i)(ii) and (iii)(B).

Trial Ct. Op. at 7.

In response to Mother’s statutory argument, that the trial court could

not grant standing under the mutually inconsistent subsections of Section we

conclude the court did not err in finding Paternal Grandmother had standing

to intervene in this custody matter. See G.A.P., 194 A.3d at 616-17. 5324(2)

and 5324(3)(iii)(C), the court clarified that it found standing under the first

subsection, or, in the alternative, the latter. We are satisfied the court did

not intend to grant Paternal Grandmother’s petition under both subsections,

simultaneously. As to the merits under each subsection, the court thoroughly

- 13 -
J-A19038-20

reviewed the cumulative underlying history of: Child living with Paternal

Grandmother, both on a shared-time basis with Mother and on an exclusive

basis; Paternal Grandmother’s performance of “all of the parental functions

for Child[;]” the allegations that Mother allowed Child to live with Maternal

Grandmother, despite Maternal Grandmother’s abuse of Child; Mother’s lack

of residence and potential imprisonment; and along with Father’s prior

inactivity in caring for Child. See Trial Ct. Op. at 6-7. Accordingly, we

conclude the court did not err in finding Paternal Grandmother had standing

to intervene in this custody matter. See G.A.P., 194 A.3d at 616-17.

V. Paternal Grandmother’s Standing, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5325, 5328

In her third issue, Mother asserts that in awarding partial physical

custody Paternal Grandmother, the trial court failed to consider whether the

award interfered with the parent-child relationship, as required by 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 5328(c).

In order to review Section 5328(c), we first note Section 5325 addresses

standing for, inter alia, grandparents who seek partial physical custody:

In addition to situations set forth in section 5324 (relating
to standing for any form of physical custody or legal custody),
grandparents . . . may file an action under this chapter for partial
physical custody or supervised physical custody in the following
situations:

* * *

(2) where the relationship with the child began either
with the consent of a parent of the child or under a court order
and where the parents of the child:

- 14 -
J-A19038-20

(i) have commenced a proceeding for custody; and

(ii) do not agree as to whether the grandparents or
great grandparents should have custody under this
section; or

(3) when the child has, for a period of at least 12
consecutive months, resided with the grandparent or great-
grandparent, excluding brief temporary absences of the child
from the home, and is removed from the home by the
parents, an action must be filed within six months after the
removal of the child from the home.

See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5325(2)(i)-(ii), (3) (emphasis added).

Section 5328(c) then pertains to partial physical custody awards to a

grandparent who has standing under Subsection 5325(1) or (2):

(1) In ordering partial physical custody or supervised physical
custody to a party who has standing under section 5325(1)
or (2) . . . the court shall consider the following:

(i) the amount of personal contact between the child and
the party prior to the filing of the action;

(ii) whether the award interferes with any parent-child
relationship; and

(iii) whether the award is in the best interest of the child.

(2) In ordering partial physical custody or supervised physical
custody to a . . . grandparent who has standing under section
5325(3), the court shall consider whether the award:

(i) interferes with any parent-child relationship; and

(ii) is in the best interest of the child..

23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(c)(1)(i)-(iii), (2)(i)-(ii) (emphases added).

Here, Mother acknowledges that because the trial court found

Grandmother had standing to intervene in this custody matter under Section

- 15 -
J-A19038-20

5324, the “court was not required to consider whether its [custody] award

affected Mother’s relationship to the child” pursuant to Section 5328(c).

Mother’s Brief at 55. Nevertheless, Mother contends that “because it is

evident that Paternal Grandmother did not have standing [under Section

5324], the lack of [consideration of Section 5328(c)] requires remand,” where

“Paternal Grandmother will bear the burden of proving that her claim of

physical custody does not interfere with Mother’s relationship to the child.”

Id.

Section 5325 provides standing to a grandparent, by its terms, “[in]

addition to situations set forth in section 5324.” 23 Pa.C.S. 5325. The

requirements of Sections 5328(c)(1) and (2), for a trial court to consider

whether a custody award interferes with any parent-child relationship, apply

only to a grandparent who has standing under Sections 5325(1), (2), or (3).

23 Pa.C.S. 5325(c)(1)-(2). As Mother acknowledges, Section 5328(c)(1) and

(2) make no reference to a grandparent who has standing under Section

5324. See id.

As we affirm the trial court’s order finding Paternal Grandmother has

standing under Section 5324, we find no relief is due on Mother’s argument

that this matter must be remanded for a determination regarding Section

5325.

- 16 -
J-A19038-20

VI. Presumption in Favor of Parent, 23 Pa.C.S. § 5327(b)

In her fourth claim on appeal, Mother avers the trial court failed to apply

the Section 5327(b) presumption in her favor, against Paternal Grandmother.

We note that subsection provides:

In any action regarding the custody of the child between a parent
of the child and a nonparent, there shall be a presumption that
custody shall be awarded to the parent. The presumption in favor
of the parent may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5327(b).

Mother cites the trial court’s findings that both she and Paternal

Grandmother have provided shelter, food, clothing, and education for Child,

and that Mother has performed the parental duties of ensuring Child’s safety

and welfare. Mother’s Brief at 49. Furthermore, the court found that neither

Mother nor her paramour had been abusive, and credited Mother’s decision to

leave her mother’s house when she believed Child was at risk. Id. at 50.

Mother then maintains that under the Section 5328 presumption, she and

Paternal Grandmother are not “on equal footing.” Id. at 54. We conclude no

relief is due.

The trial court addressed Mother’s argument as follows:

The order on appeal provided for shared legal custody to
Mother and Paternal Grandmother; primary physical custody to
Mother; and partial physical custody to Paternal Grandmother.
Father was not a candidate for legal or physical custody. He had
not been in Child’s life and had never sought any form of custody.
Decisions made by Mother did not entitle her to sole legal custody.
She left Child with Paternal Grandmother and did not contact
Paternal Grandmother or Child at all for weeks at a time, leaving
Paternal Grandmother with the responsibility to perform all

- 17 -
J-A19038-20

parental duties. [Mother] neglected to take Child to the doctor.
She overlooked, or made excuses for, scratches or bruises on
Child’s body while she and Child resided with [Maternal
Grandmother.] Although [Mother] left [Maternal Grandmother’s]
residence when it appeared [Maternal Grandmother] had abused
Child, she returned to [Maternal Grandmother’s] residence while
the OCYS investigation was still on-going. She planned to move
to Las Vegas and leave Child behind in the custody of Paternal
Grandmother. [Mother] had four DUIs in a six-month period and
faced incarceration, eventually going to a 28-day residential
rehabilitation program. By terminating any contact between
Paternal Grandmother and Child because Paternal Grandmother
would not withdraw her referral to OCYS, Mother was not only
vindictive as to Paternal Grandmother, who had cared for Child
and sought to protect him, but cut-off Child from a well-
established, healthy relationship with Paternal Grandmother that
Mother herself had created, encouraged and extolled. In essence,
Mother abandoned Child except when it suited her and deprived
Child of a relationship and environment that was more stable,
safe, nurturing and consistent than the environment offered by
Mother.

Trial Ct. Op. at 13-14.

Here, Paternal Grandmother sought primary legal and physical custody

to protect Child from alleged abuse. In considering the Section 5327(b)

presumption, the trial court did not find, as Mother advances on appeal, that

that she is a capable parent who took reasonable steps to protect Child from

harm. Indeed, Mother ignores the court’s discussion, set forth above.

Furthermore, Mother overlooks that the court granted her primary physical

custody, while awarding Paternal Grandmother partial physical custody.

Based on the trial court’s discussion, we find no merit to Mother’s argument

that the court never addressed whether Paternal Grandmother successfully

rebutted the presumption set forth in Section 5327(b) by clear and convincing

- 18 -
J-A19038-20

evidence. The evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that, through the

evidence, Paternal Grandmother successfully rebutted such presumption.

VII. Award of Shared Legal Custody to Paternal Grandmother

In her fifth issue, Mother asserts the trial court abused its discretion in

awarding Paternal Grandmother shared legal custody. In support, she contends

this award is “not supported by competent evidence of record,” and the “court

never provided any . . . explanation . . . why awarding shared legal custody to

Paternal Grandmother was in the child’s best interest.” Mother’s Brief at 61.

Mother acknowledges that the “court evaluated each of the [Section 5328]

custody factors in varying degrees of detail,” but maintains “the trial court

unevenly and inconsistently applied the custody factors, made factual findings

directly contradicted by the evidence, and applied the parties’ inability to resolve

the matter . . . to Mother’s detriment.” Id. at 61, 63. Mother also presents the

following arguments with respect to specific factors: (1) Factor 6 — where the

court found Child’s siblings “only lived with [him] for the past two weeks,”

Mother’s paramour, J.W., testified “the siblings had lived with the child for most

of their lives;” (2) Factor 8 (“the attempts of a parent to turn the child against

the other parent”) — the term “parent” should also extend “to all parties,” and

here, the court improperly disregarded Paternal Grandmother’s conduct. Id. at

65-67.

As stated above, our standard of review of a custody order is abuse of

discretion, “[w]e must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by

competent evidence of record,” and we defer to the court’s findings of

- 19 -
J-A19038-20

credibility and weight of the evidence.” C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 443. Upon petition,

a trial court may modify a custody order if it serves the best interests of the

child. 23 Pa.C.S. § 5338. Section 5328(a) sets forth the best interest factors

that the trial court must consider. See E.D. v. M.P., 33 A.3d 73, 80-81, n.2

(Pa. Super. 2011). A court is required to consider all of these factors. J.R.M.

v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 652 (Pa. Super. 2011) (emphasis in original).

Section 5328(a) provides:

(a) Factors.—In ordering any form of custody, the court
shall determine the best interest of the child by considering all
relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors
which affect the safety of the child, including the following:

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
frequent and continuing contact between the child and
another party.

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
member of the party’s household, whether there is a
continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
which party can better provide adequate physical safeguards
and supervision of the child.

(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1)
and (2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and
involvement with protective services).

(3) The parental duties performed by each party on
behalf of the child.

(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
education, family life and community life.

(5) The availability of extended family.

(6) The child’s sibling relationships.

- 20 -
J-A19038-20

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on
the child’s maturity and judgment.

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the
other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the child
from harm.

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving,
stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with the child
adequate for the child’s emotional needs.

(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special
needs of the child.

(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or
ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse
byanother party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability
to cooperate with that party.

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
member of a party’s household.

(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
member of a party’s household.

(16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)(1)-(16). “[T]he only factors that should be given

‘weighted consideration’ are factors that ‘affect the safety of the child[.]’”

M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 338 (Pa. Super. 2013). Nevertheless, “[i]t is

within the trial court’s purview as the finder of fact to determine which factors

are most salient and critical in each particular case.” Id. at 339.

- 21 -
J-A19038-20

We incorporate the trial court’s discussion of the facts, as well as its

findings, as we have summarized above. We also consider the additional,

thorough discussion the court provided in response to Mother’s statutory-

presumption argument:

Mother, [her paramour] J.W., their two children, and Child resided
with [Maternal Grandmother] until [they all] left [Maternal
Grandmother’s] residence for the hotel in [May of 2019,] due to
the bruises and scratches on Child[‘s] body. J.W. and his two
children moved to Reading after staying in the hotel for a few
days.

Child had turned six years old. In addition to [having] ADHD,
he had an oppositional defiant disorder (“ODD”). Paternal
Grandmother did not work; she received Social Security disability
payments. P.D. continued to reside with Paternal Grandmother,
had become a full-time assistant teacher at a daycare program
and helped Paternal Grandmother care for Child. Father is bi-polar
and has ADHD.

According to Pennsylvania’s Common Pleas Case
Management System (“CPCMS”), Mother stabbed J.W. in the chest
with a knife during a domestic dispute over a cell phone in
November 2015. Father said Child was present at that time.
Mother was convicted of recklessly endangering another person,
J.W., and sentenced to two years’ probation. She violated her
probation in 2017, was resentenced to 16 months of probation
and appears to have successfully completed it. . . . J.W. testified
he never knew Mother to be abusive. Mother did not disclose her
conviction on her affidavit of criminal history filed on September
18, 2019.

At the August [7, 2019, standing] hearing Paternal
Grandmother was under the impression Mother had two
unresolved charges of DUI and may be going to jail in August. At
trial, Mother admitted to having incurred four charges of DUI in
the six-month period between January and July 2019 and
completing a 28-day residential rehabilitation program on October
14, 2019. As of trial, Mother had not been sentenced. According
to CPCMS, Mother was convicted of a first offense DUI (alcohol) in
Northampton County on January 23, 2020 and sentenced to three

- 22 -
J-A19038-20

days to six months in the Northampton County Jail . . . and of
three first offense DUI (controlled substance . . .) on January 28,
2020, and sentenced from 72 hours to six months in the Lehigh
County Jail. . . .

At trial, Father testified [Maternal Grandmother] was abusive
and an alcoholic. When Mother decided in early 2019 to move to
Las Vegas to establish a music career for herself, she intended to
do so without taking any of her children with her. The plan was
for Child to remain in Paternal Grandmother’s care, custody and
control; that Paternal Grandmother would give Child a home,
meet his special needs and feed and clothe him during the school
year; and Child would “eventually” join Mother in Las Vegas during
the summers and then permanently when Mother was settled.
J.W. testified the plan was for him to take all three children to live
with him in Reading while Mother was in Las Vegas. J.W.’s
testimony was inconsistent with Mother’s testimony and the fact
that Mother utilized Paternal Grandmother rather than J.W. to care
for Child when she could not. J.W.’s testimony was not credible.
It was also significant that Mother utilized Paternal Grandmother
rather than [Maternal Grandmother] to care for Child.

The explanations for the scratches on Child’s . . . arm and
face varied. According to Mother, [Maternal Grandmother] had
grabbed Child and left a scratch on his arm but did not hurt him,
and the scratches on his face were from Child playing with
[Maternal Grandmother’s] two dogs and cats. According to
[Maternal Grandmother], Child fell off of a couch and her finger
nails accidentally scratched Child’s arm when she picked him up.
According to Paternal Grandmother, Mother told her [Maternal
Grandmother] admitted that she had choked Child, threw him on
a couch, “punched him in his privates” and scratched Child
because he had downloaded a game on her telephone without
asking permission to do so. According to P.D., Child told her
[Maternal Grandmother] scratched his face because [Maternal
Grandmother] did not like the fact he had downloaded a game on
her phone. Paternal Grandmother believed Mother’s abrupt
departure in [May of 2019] from [Maternal Grandmother’s]
residence with J.W. and the three children to the hotel confirmed
Child had been abused while residing in [Maternal Grandmother’s]
residence.

During the two weeks Mother stayed in the hotel, Child spent
about four nights a week at Paternal Grandmother’s house and

- 23 -
J-A19038-20

the other nights with Mother at the hotel. After two weeks in the
hotel, Mother returned to [Maternal Grandmother’s] residence and
left Child with Paternal Grandmother.

Mother acknowledged Paternal Grandmother and Child had,
with Mother’s approval, developed a close relationship with each
other. Mother relied upon Paternal Grandmother to provide care
for Child while she worked. Mother said “I like the way that she
take[s] care of my son, like, teaching him, being playful with him
all that, like, I love the relationship that they had . . .”. N.T.
12/12/19 at 3.

Mother did not move to Las Vegas. Nonetheless, Child
remained with Paternal Grandmother from June 1 or 2 until July
4, during which time Paternal Grandmother exercised full parental
responsibility for Child except for one weekend when Mother
exercised custody of Child. During that time Mother did not
respond to Paternal Grandmother’s repeated attempts to contact
her. Paternal Grandmother expected Mother to exercise custody
of Child on July 4 and was surprised when [Maternal
Grandmother,] instead of Mother, came to her residence and
retrieved him. Paternal Grandmother assumed Mother was in Las
Vegas and had left the child with [Maternal Grandmother] or that
Mother and Child were residing with [Maternal Grandmother.]
Paternal Grandmother was concerned because she believed
[Maternal Grandmother] had abused Child and Mother was
incapable of protecting him from [Maternal Grandmother.]

Mother refused to let Paternal Grandmother see or talk with
Child since she learned Paternal Grandmother had complained to
OCYS. Mother conditioned any future contact by Paternal
Grandmother with Child upon Paternal Grandmother withdrawing
her allegations of abuse against [Maternal Grandmother.]
Paternal Grandmother plausibly believed Mother wanted her to
withdraw the allegations of abuse against [Maternal Grandmother]
because the allegations jeopardized Mother’s ability for her and
her children to reside with [Maternal Grandmother.] At the time
of the pre-trial conference on December 12, 2019, Mother and
Child were living with [Maternal Grandmother] and Mother’s other
two children were living with J.W. in Reading. The two other
children and J.W. moved back to [Maternal Grandmother’s]
residence with Mother and Child about two weeks before the
January 13, 2020, trial.

- 24 -
J-A19038-20

Mother and Father never married. No one disputed Mother’s
representation that Father had been absent from Child’s life for
the past six years. He did not appear at the pre-trial conference
on December 12, 2019. At trial he admitted, and Paternal
Grandmother agreed, he had not been involved in Child’s life for
at least the previous year, although at trial he professed to
wanting to have a relationship with Child going forward. At no
time since Child’s birth had Father sought any form of custody for
himself. In fact, on May 22, 2019, when Mother filed her
complaint for custody against Father, they entered into an
agreement that was formally adopted by the court on May 28,
2019, that provided Mother with sole legal and sole physical
custody of Child. At trial, Father said [Maternal Grandmother] was
abusive, violent and an alcoholic who yelled at Child. He
supported Paternal Grandmother’s claim for custody. Paternal
Grandmother testified she would facilitate Father being involved
in Child’s life if Father wanted to be.

Trial Ct. Op. at 9-13 (citations to Mother’s criminal docket numbers omitted).

The trial court addressed each of the Section 5328(a) custody factors as

follows:

1.) Party more likely to encourage and permit frequent and
continuing contact between child and another party:

* * *

When Paternal Grandmother reported to OCYS Child had been
abused, Mother refused to allow Paternal Grandmother to have
any contact with Child for six months abruptly severing Child from
a primary caretaker who, all evidence establishes, cared for and
nurtured Child. There was no evidence Paternal Grandmother
interfered with Mother’s relationship with Child.

Further, Paternal Grandmother offered to provide a
relationship between Child and Father when Father wanted to be
involved with Child. She testified credibly that she would allow
and encourage both parents to have a relationship with Child even
without a court order.

- 25 -
J-A19038-20

Paternal Grandmother is clearly more likely than Mother to
encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact between
Child and both parents.

2.) Present and past abuse committed by a party or member
of party’s household; whether continued risk of harm to the child
or an abused party; and which party can better provide adequate
physical safeguards and supervision of child:

Child was abused, neglected or at risk of harm while residing
with Mother and [Maternal Grandmother] in [Maternal
Grandmother’s] residence. He had multiple bruises and scratches
his body. There was no evidence of any abuse of Child while in
Paternal Grandmother’s custody. Paternal Grandmother is better
able to provide for the physical safety and supervision of Child.

2.1.) Child abuse and involvement with protective services:

OCYS investigated [Maternal Grandmother] as a possible
abuser. It does not appear such abuse was established.

3.) Parental duties performed by each party on behalf of child:

Mother and Paternal Grandmother performed parental duties
on behalf of Child. However, Paternal Grandmother is better able
to do so. She is not employed. P.D. helps her. There was no
evidence of abuse or self-harm, such as scratches or bruises, while
[Child was] in Paternal Grandmother’s custody.

4.) Need for stability and continuity in child’s education,
family life and community life:

Mother is unstable. She does not have her own residence;
she resides with [Maternal Grandmother] and left [Maternal
Grandmother’s] residence for a hotel when Child presented with
excessive bruises and scratches. She planned to move to Las
Vegas without Child. When she left Child with Paternal
Grandmother, she did not contact Paternal Grandmother or Child
for days at a time. She had four DUIs between January and July
2019. She arbitrarily and vindictively severed Child’s relationship
with Paternal Grandmother, the one stable caretaker in his life, for
six months after Paternal Grandmother reported [to] OCYS [that]
Child had been abused and Paternal Grandmother refused
Mother’s demand she withdraw the charge. Mother was more

- 26 -
J-A19038-20

concerned about not jeopardizing her ability to reside in [Maternal
Grandmother’s] residence with Child and her two other children
than having OCYS investigate whether Child had been abused
within [Maternal Grandmother’s] household.

Paternal Grandmother is stable. She has lived in her current
residence for more than two years. As Mother stated, Paternal
Grandmother and P.D. arc caring and loving and have taught Child
a lot.

5.) Availability of extended family:

Paternal Grandmother’s daughter, P.D., resides with her, is a
teacher at a daycare facility, is involved with Child and helps care
for him. All of the evidence, including Mother’s own statements,
demonstrates P.D. is a positive influence on Child.

Mother resides with her mother[.] It is telling that Mother
planned to leave Child with Paternal Grandmother rather than with
[Maternal Grandmother] when she planned to relocate herself to
Las Vegas. However, Mother left Child with [Maternal
Grandmother] for the 28 days ending October 14, 2019, when
Mother was in a residential rehabilitation program. That was also
the time Mother had severed Paternal Grandmother’s contact with
Child because Paternal Grandmother refused to withdraw her
allegation Child had been abused in [Maternal Grandmother’s]
residence.

J.W. has been in Child’s life since Child was one year and eight
months old. He and Mother resided together with their two
children and Child at [Maternal Grandmother’s] residence until
[May of 2019], when they left . . . and went to the hotel. After a
few days at the hotel, he and his two children went with him to
Reading. He testified, in direct contradiction to Mother’s
testimony, that the plan was for him to have custody of the three
children, including Child, when Mother moved to Las Vegas. His
testimony was not credible.

6.) Child’s sibling relationships:

Child has two half siblings: a three-year-old sister and
a 1-year-old brother. Other than the fact the three children
resided together in [Maternal Grandmother’s] residence,

- 27 -
J-A19038-20

there was no testimony regarding the nature and quality of
their relationship with each other.

7.) Well-reasoned preference of child, based on child’s
maturity and judgment:

Child was not interviewed. Given his age, it did not seem
productive to subject him to such inquiry[.]

8.) Attempts of a parent to turn child against other
parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
child from harm:

There was no evidence either parent attempted to turn
Child against the other parent. However, Mother
terminated Child’s well-established relationship with
Paternal Grandmother.

9.) Party more likely to maintain loving, stable, consistent and
nurturing relationship with [C]hild given child’s emotional needs:

Paternal Grandmother is more likely than Mother to maintain
loving, stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with [C]hild
given [C]hild’s emotional needs. While Paternal Grandmother was
meeting those needs, Mother had left Child with her for great
lengths of time and even contemplated relocating to Las Vegas
without Child.

10.) Party more likely to attend to the daily physical,
emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of child:

Paternal Grandmother is more likely than Mother to attend to
the daily physical, emotional, developmental, educational and
special needs of [C]hild. She took Child to [the] doctor when
Mother would not. She has been preparing Child for school. There
was no evidence to the effect Child’s ADHD or ODD presented
significant challenges to the health or safety of Child while with
Paternal Grandmother. The scratches and bruises about Child’s
body occurred while Child resided in [Maternal Grandmother’s]
residence. Child was out of control while residing in [Maternal
Grandmother’s] residence, even with Mother present. There was
no such evidence while Child was in Paternal Grandmother’s
custody.

- 28 -
J-A19038-20

11.) Proximity of parties’ residences:

Mother and Paternal Grandmother reside in Allentown, about
ten minutes apart by automobile.

12.) Each party’s availability to care for the child or make
appropriate child-care arrangements:

Paternal Grandmother is available full-time and fully capable
to care for Child. Between working, planning to relocate or
otherwise not wanting to be with Child, Mother has utilized
Paternal Grandmother to provide child care.

13.) Level of conflict between parties and their willingness
and ability to cooperate with one another:

At trial, Mother expressed regret over her falling out with
Paternal Grandmother and said it went too far.

14.) History of drug or alcohol abuse of party or member of
household:

Neither Paternal Grandmother nor P.D. have any history of
drug or alcohol abuse. Mother had four DUIs in the first six
months of 2019, one for alcohol and three for controlled
substances, and a 28-day stay at a residential rehabilitation
program that ended on October 14, 2019. Father testified
[Maternal Grandmother] was an alcoholic.

15.) Mental and physical condition of party or member of
party’s household:

There was no evidence that this factor was an issue.

16.) Any other relevant factors:

Mother continues to reside in [Maternal Grandmother’s]
residence where there is evidence of abuse, neglect and, perhaps,
alcoholism. There was no such evidence in or about Paternal
Grandmother’s residence. Mother wisely utilized Paternal
Grandmother rather than [Maternal Grandmother] or J.W. to take
physical custody of Child and care for him for long, uninterrupted
periods of time when Mother could not or would not care for him

- 29 -
J-A19038-20

and during which times Mother did not even contact Child or
Paternal Grandmother to inquire of his welfare. In those
instances, Mother essentially abandoned Child to Paternal
Grandmother. The failure to provide Paternal Grandmother with
any form of legal and physical custody of Child would have
overlooked the relationship between Paternal Grandmother and
Child that Mother herself began, expanded and extolled; the
physical injuries Child suffered while in Mother’s custody; and
Mother’s history of driving while under the influence of alcohol and
drugs, and abandoning Child to Paternal Grandmother for long
periods of time.

Trial Ct. Op. at 14-19 (emphases added).

After a careful review of the record, we find ample support in the trial

court’s analysis for its decision to award shared legal custody to Mother and

Paternal Grandmother. The trial court engaged in the required custody best

interest consideration, analyzed each of the custody/best interest factors

under Section 5328(a), and, we note, found the majority of the factors

weighed in favor of granting Paternal Grandmother shared legal custody. See

23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)(1)-(16). Additionally, we find unpersuasive Mother’s

arguments with respect to the factors at (a)(6) (the child’s sibling

relationships) and (a)(8) (a parent’s attempts turn the child against the other

parent). Whereas Mother cites the trial court’s finding that Child’s siblings

“only lived with [Child] for the past two weeks,” the court’s discussion of (a)(6)

made no such reference. See Mother’s Brief at 65; Trial Ct. Op. at 16. The

trial court acknowledged that the three children lived together, but pointed

out “there was no testimony regarding the nature and quality of their

relationship with each other.” Trial Ct. Op. at 16. Mother offers no argument

- 30 -
J-A19038-20

to the contrary. See Mother’s Brief at 65. Additionally, where Mother argues

the term “parent,” within the (a)(8) factor, should extend to Paternal

Grandmother, the trial court did refer to her, in a manner tending to weigh

against Mother: “Mother terminated Child’s well-established relationship with

Paternal Grandmother.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 17. Indeed, Mother’s discussion

is wholly silent as to the trial court’s repeated referenced to and consideration

of Mother’s “vindictive” action of taking Child from Paternal Grandmother and

threatening to disallow any contact with Child until Paternal Grandmother

withdrew her allegations to OCYS. Mother’s citation to only the facts and

findings favorable to her are not persuasive, when considered against the

thorough discussion by the trial court. We conclude the trial court’s custody

order is supported by competent evidence of record, and accordingly affirm.

VIII. Conclusion

As we conclude none of Mother’s issues merit relief, we affirm the

January 22, 2020, order granting: (1) shared legal custody to Mother and

Paternal Grandmother; (2) primary physical custody to Mother; and (3) partial

physical custody to Paternal Grandmother.

Order affirmed.

- 31 -
J-A19038-20

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/12/2021

- 32 -