UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4832
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAMONT DEMANUEL EVERETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan,
Chief District Judge. (5:04-cr-00179-FL-1)
Submitted: February 28, 2012 Decided: April 9, 2012
Before AGEE, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lamont Demanuel Everett appeals the twenty-four-month
sentence imposed upon revocation of his term of supervised
release. He contends that the district court imposed the
statutory maximum revocation sentence based on his need for
mental health treatment in violation of Tapia v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011), which provides that a prison term may
not be lengthened for the purpose of providing rehabilitation.
We disagree and therefore affirm.
We will not disturb a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release that is within the prescribed
statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-39 (4th Cir. 2006). In
making this determination, we first consider whether the
sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry
takes a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of
fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review
for [G]uidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d
652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Although a district court “ultimately has broad
discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum,” Crudup, 461 F.3d at
439 (internal quotation marks omitted), the court must consider
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the Chapter Seven policy statements in the federal Sentencing
Guidelines manual, as well as the statutory requirements and
factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006).
Citing Tapia, Everett contends that his sentence is
plainly unreasonable because the district court improperly
considered his need for mental health treatment. Although
counsel argued extensively about Everett’s mental health
concerns, noting that Everett’s “mental health situation seems
to be driving this case to a very large extent,” our review of
the revocation hearing transcript leads us to conclude that the
district court did not rely on Everett’s need for mental health
treatment in determining the appropriate sentence. Rather, the
district court considered Everett’s history of angry outbursts
when frustrated or when told what to do, his difficulties
accepting the authority of the court or the probation officer,
his prior violations for which he was allowed to continue on
supervision, and the “patterns and practices” that Everett
exhibited from an early age. The court did not mention
Everett’s need for treatment in connection with the imposition
of the 24-month sentence, but rather stated that it considered
the mental health issue “in mitigation.” Only after the court
imposed sentence and in response to Everett’s attorney’s
request, the court recommended that Everett be imprisoned at FCI
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Butner and that he be given a mental health evaluation. We
conclude that the 24-month revocation sentence does not run
afoul of Tapia. Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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