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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
23-FEB-2022
08:13 AM
Dkt. 81 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
KAUIONÂLANI P.A. MAUKELE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ELIZA K. MAUKELE, SCOTT K. MAUKELE,
MICHELLE AND THERON KAKAE AND FAMILY,
CHELSEA KAKAE, BOYFRIEND AND CHILDREN;
TRAVIS KAKAE, MELISSA CORREA AND FAMILY,
Defendants-Appellants
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
KO#OLAUPOKO DIVISION
(CASE NO. 1RC16-1-07395)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard and McCullen, JJ., with
Ginoza, Chief Judge, concurring separately)
Defendants-Appellants Eliza K. Maukele, et al.,1
(Eliza) appeal from the District Court of the First Circuit's
(District Court) January 11, 2018 Order Denying Defendants'
Motion for Relief from Judgment and Writ.2 Eliza's appeal arises
from Plaintiff-Appellee Kauionâlani P.A. Maukele's (Kauionâlani)
Complaint (Assumpsit, Summary Possession/Landlord-Tenant,
Damages); Declaration; Exhibit(s); Summons (Complaint), which
1
The Complaint also names Scott K. Maukele; Michelle and Theron Kakae
and Family; Chelsea Kakae, Boyfriend and Children; Travis Kakae; Melissa
Correa and Family as defendants.
2
The Honorable Ronald Albu presided. The Honorable Hilary B. Gangnes,
signed the order for Judge Albu.
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sought a writ of possession for Hawaiian home lands Lease
No. 2817, Lot No. 79-A in Waimânalo, O#ahu (Lease).
Kauionâlani's brother, Joseph M. Maukele (Joseph), was
the lessee until his death on November 17, 2014. Following his
death, the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL) transferred
the Lease to Kauionâlani, as Joseph's designated successor, on
September 28, 2016.
About a month later, Kauionâlani filed the Complaint
indicating that she provided written notice to all families that
she was the successor to the DHHL Lease for Lot 79-A and
requested Eliza, Joseph's widow, be removed from the premises.
Attached to the Complaint was a copy of that notice, which also
stated that Kauionâlani knows Eliza "went before the Board of
Commissioners in July, to tell them of [Eliza's] interest in the
land as the wife of Joseph."
With both parties appearing pro se, and no written
answer to the Complaint, trial commenced on November 25, 2016.
According to the court minutes, Kauionâlani, Eliza, and one other
witness testified, and Kauionâlani's exhibits were received into
evidence. Kauionâlani's exhibits included the document
designating Kauionâlani as Joseph's successor, dated May 13,
1974, and the DHHL transfer of the Lease from Joseph to
Kauionâlani through designated successorship.
The court minutes then show that after Eliza's
testimony, "Recess [was] had and court settlement discussions
with both parties. Agreement reached. By stipulation, and
granted by order of the court, judgment for and writ of
possession to issue effective 02/28/17[.]" (Formatting altered.)
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The District Court entered a Judgement for Possession in favor of
Kauionâlani because she was "entitled to possession of the
premises . . . ." The District Court also issued a Writ of
Possession ordering removal of Eliza.
Eliza, represented by counsel, moved for relief from
the judgment and writ pursuant to District Court Rules of Civil
Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 60(b)(4). In her motion, Eliza denied
that she agreed to any settlement and claimed title to the home
on the property that she argued should be probated. Eliza
proffered that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because
this case involved an issue of title to real property, and
attached a declaration. The District Court denied her motion.
On appeal, Eliza contends the Complaint failed to state a claim
and the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
issue the Judgment of Possession and Writ of Possession.
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve Eliza's
point of error as follows.
DCRCP Rule 60(b)(4) allows the court to provide relief
from a judgment or order if the judgment is void, and a judgment
is void if the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Bank of Hawaii v. Shinn, 120 Hawai#i 1, 11-12, 200 P.3d 370, 380-
81 (2008). A denial of a DCRCP Rule 60(b)(4) motion and a
question of jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. See Wagner v.
World Botanical Gardens, Inc., 126 Hawai#i 190, 194, 268 P.3d
443, 447 (App. 2011) (applying de novo review to the denial of a
Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(4) motion and a
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question of jurisdiction); see also Cvitanovich-Dubie v. Dubie,
125 Hawai#i 128, 139, 254 P.3d 439, 450 (2011) (applying de novo
review to the denial of a Hawai#i Family Court Rules
Rule 60(b)(4) motion).
Eliza first contends that the Complaint failed to state
a claim for relief because it did not precisely plead an action
for ejectment. However, a "fundamental tenet of Hawai#i law is
that pleadings prepared by pro se litigants should be interpreted
liberally." Waltrip v. TS Enters., Inc., 140 Hawai#i 226, 239,
398 P.3d 815, 828 (2016) (cleaned up); Villaver v. Sylva, 145
Hawai#i 29, 36, 445 P.3d 701, 708 (2019). Although there was a
defect as to form, the Complaint filed by Kauionâlani, pro se,
may be liberally interpreted as an action for ejectment.
Eliza then contends that even if the Complaint is
interpreted as an ejectment action, the home's value exceeded the
amount over which the District Court may exercise jurisdiction.
Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 604-5 (2016) provides in relevant
part that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided, the district courts
shall have jurisdiction in all civil actions where the debt,
amount, damages, or value of the property claimed does not exceed
$40,000[.]" But, "[n]othing in section 604-5 shall preclude a
district court from taking jurisdiction in ejectment proceedings
where the title to real estate does not come in question at the
trial of the action." HRS § 604-6 (2016). In other words, the
$40,000 limitation does not preclude the District Court from
adjudicating an ejectment action if the property's title is not
at issue.
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Eliza, thus, argues that the home's title was at issue
because "there should be a probate to determine ownership of the
improvements," and so the District Court did not have
jurisdiction over this action. To comply with HRS § 604-6, Eliza
was required to raise a question as to the title of the real
estate at trial. Although Eliza, pro se, testified at trial, it
appears that the trial ended abruptly with a settlement
agreement. To the extent a trial occurred, we cannot discern
from the record whether Eliza raised a question as to title at
trial because the record on appeal does not contain any
transcripts. State v. Hoang, 93 Hawai#i 333, 336, 3 P.3d 499,
502 (2000) (explaining that "[w]ithout the relevant transcript,
there is insufficient evidence to review the alleged error, and
[the appellant] carries the burden of demonstrating the alleged
error in the record") (emphasis omitted).
Also, when raising a defense based on a question to
title under HRS § 604-6, the defendant must file a written answer
or motion with an affidavit setting forth the source, nature, and
extent of title claimed:
Whenever, in the district court, in defense of an
action in the nature of an action of trespass or for the
summary possession of land, or any other action, the
defendant shall seek to interpose a defense to the
jurisdiction to the effect that the action is a real action,
or one in which the title to real estate is involved, such
defense shall be asserted by a written answer or written
motion, which shall not be received by the court unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the defendant, setting forth
the source, nature and extent of the title claimed by
defendant to the land in question, and such further
particulars as shall fully apprise the court of the nature
of defendant's claim.
DCRCP Rule 12.1 (emphases added); Hawai#i Rules of District Court
Rule 7(g) (providing a declaration may be made in lieu of an
affidavit).
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Thus, to comply with DCRCP Rule 12.1, Eliza was
required to assert her defense that there was a question of title
in a written answer or motion with an affidavit setting forth the
source, nature, and extent of her claim to title. Eliza, pro se,
failed to file any written answer or motion prior to or at trial.
Eliza, represented by counsel, filed a motion for
relief from the judgment of possession, pursuant to DCRCP
Rule 60(b)(4), arguing that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction and claiming that she set forth the nature of her
claim to title in her attached declaration. In reviewing whether
the District Court properly denied Eliza's motion for relief, we
examine Eliza's declaration to determine if she set forth the
source, nature, and extent of her claim so as to fully apprise
the District Court of the nature of her claim. See Curtis v. Bd.
of Appeals, Cnty. of Hawai#i, 90 Hawai#i 384, 393, 978 P.2d 822,
831 (1999) (Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may
be challenged at any time.).
Claims to title cannot be asserted in a conclusory
fashion; the source, nature, and extent of title must be
described with "detail and specificity." Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr.
Co. v. Peelua, 126 Hawai#i 32, 37, 265 P.3d 1128, 1133 (2011).
Case law in this jurisdiction provides guidance regarding detail
and specificity.
In Monette v. Benjamin, 52 Haw. 246, 248, 473 P.2d 864,
865 (1970), the defendant's affidavit stated that her grandfather
built the home on "his land," which her father "inherited." The
defendant claimed ownership of the property for herself and her
five brothers by "inheritance from her father, who had inherited
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the same from his father." Id. The Hawai#i Supreme Court
observed that the defendant "claimed title to the land in
question by inheritance from her father, who in turn had
inherited from his father, and that the title claimed by her was
an undivided one-sixth interest in fee simple, which descended to
her by intestate succession from the immediately preceding sole
owner." Id. The Court held that the defendant's affidavit
contained sufficient information to show that the title to the
property was in dispute. Id. at 248–50, 473 P.2d at 865.
Conversely, in Peelua, the Hawai#i Supreme Court held
that the defendant's affidavit failed to show that title was in
dispute because it did not include information as to the source,
nature, and extent of the title claimed. Peelua, 126 Hawai#i at
38–39, 265 P.3d at 1134–35. The defendant's affidavit stated
that he was the "owner of the Property," which was previously
owned by his "family for generations," which was eventually
deeded to him. Id. at 35, 265 P.3d at 1131. The Court explained
that the defendant's affidavit lacked any specificity concerning
the source of title because it stated in a "vague and conclusory
fashion that he owns the Property and that title was deeded to
him by his family." Id. at 38, 265 P.3d at 1134.
Particularly, the defendant failed to state the nature
of his claim because the affidavit did not describe the contents
of the deed or the type of deed he acquired. Id. The Court
explained that, unlike the affidavit in Monette, the defendant
"failed to provide any detail or specificity regarding the
source, nature, or extent of title claimed, or any other
particulars regarding his claim." Id. at 38–39, 265 P.3d at
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1134–35. The defendant's "bare assertion that he owned the
Property was insufficient to establish that he continued to
maintain a claim to title at the time the action against him had
been filed." Id. at 38, 265 at 1134.
Here, as in Peelua, Eliza's declaration fails to
establish that she had a claim to title at the time the Complaint
was filed. Eliza declared:
4. I am the widow of Joseph Maukele, deceased, from whom
plaintiff claims to be the owner of the Hawaiian Homestead.
5. In 1977, my late husband Joseph Maukele and I built a
residence on the leasehold.
6. The cost of the residence at the time was about $70,000.
7. We took a mortgage and paid on it over the years.
8. At the time my husband died, we owed about $8,000 on the
mortgage.
. . . .
10. There has been no probate of the estate of my deceased
husband, Joseph.
Like the affidavit in Peelua, Eliza's declaration
contained no information about the contents or terms of Joseph's
Lease or the mortgage, or how the mortgage was the source of her
claim to title. Moreover, Eliza's declaration did not assert
that the house or Lease was part of Joseph's estate subject to
intestate succession. Nor did it state she inherited the
property or was successor to the Lease. Finally, Eliza's
declaration merely alleged that she and Joseph owed $8,000.00 on
the mortgage at the time of his death, from which no deduction of
the extent of her interest can be made.
In summary, Eliza's declaration "failed to provide any
detail or specificity regarding the source, nature, [and] extent
of title claimed . . . ." Peelua, 126 Hawai#i at 38–39, 265 P.3d
at 1134–35. Without apprising the District Court of the source,
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nature, and extent of her claim to title at the time the
Complaint was filed, Eliza failed to show there was a question as
to title. The District Court, thus, had jurisdiction over this
action, and properly denied Eliza's DCRCP Rule 60(b)(4) motion
for relief.
Therefore, we affirm the Order Denying Defendants'
Motion for Relief from Judgment and Writ entered January 11,
2018, in the District Court of the First Circuit.
The appellate clerk shall serve this summary
disposition order on Eliza, through attorney Eric Lee Niemeyer at
his address listed at the Hawaii State Bar Association.3
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, February 23, 2022.
On the briefs: /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Associate Judge
Walter R. Schoettle
Emmett E. Lee Loy, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
for Defendants-Appellants. Associate Judge
Kauionâlani P.A. Maukele,
Plaintiff-Appellee, pro se.
3
On January 20, 2022, Eric Lee Niemeyer was appointed trustee over the
legal practice of deceased attorney Walter R. Schoettle.
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CONCURRING OPINION BY GINOZA, CHIEF JUDGE
I agree with the majority that the District Court of
the First Circuit (District Court) properly exercised
jurisdiction in this case, but I reach this conclusion on
different grounds. In my view, we need not address whether
Defendant-Appellant Eliza K. Maukele (Eliza) submitted a
declaration that sufficiently set forth the source, nature and
extent of the title that she claims, see District Court Rules of
Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 12.1,4 because the record indicates
she submitted her declaration and raised the issue of her
purported title after trial had been completed. In these
circumstances, HRS § 604-6 (2016) establishes that the District
Court was not precluded from taking jurisdiction in this
ejectment action.
Plaintiff-Appellee Kauionalani P.A. Maukele (Plaintiff
Kauionalani) brought this action to eject Eliza from the subject
property. On November 25, 2016, trial was held. On March 1,
2017, the District Court entered a Judgment For Possession and a
Writ of Possession in favor of Plaintiff Kauionalani.
Thereafter, on March 14, 2017, Eliza filed a Motion for Relief
from Judgment and Writ (Motion for Relief) which sought relief
under DCRCP Rule 60(b)(4) and challenged for the first time the
District Court's subject matter jurisdiction, citing HRS § 604-6.
4
DCRCP Rule 12.1 provides:
Rule 12.1. Defense of Title in District Courts
Pleadings. Whenever, in the district court, in defense of an
action in the nature of an action of trespass or for the
summary possession of land, or any other action, the
defendant shall seek to interpose a defense to the
jurisdiction to the effect that the action is a real action,
or one in which the title to real estate is involved, such
defense shall be asserted by a written answer or written
motion, which shall not be received by the court unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the defendant, setting forth
the source, nature and extent of the title claimed by
defendant to the land in question, and such further
particulars as shall fully apprise the court of the nature
of defendant's claim.
(Emphasis added.)
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The District Court's civil jurisdiction is generally
set forth in § 604-5 (2016),5 which provides in subsection (d) as
follows:
§604-5 Civil jurisdiction.
. . . .
(d) The district courts shall not have cognizance of real
actions, nor actions in which the title to real estate comes
in question, nor actions for libel, slander, defamation of
character, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, breach
of promise of marriage, or seduction; nor shall they have
power to appoint referees in any cause.
(Emphasis added.) However, HRS § 604-6 must also be considered,
which specifically addresses ejectment proceedings and states:
"Nothing in section 604-5 shall preclude a district court from
taking jurisdiction in ejectment proceedings where the title to
real estate does not come in question at the trial of the
action." (Emphases added.)
Eliza does not assert, in her Motion for Relief or on
appeal, that the issue of title to real estate came into question
at the trial. Further, the record does not indicate an issue
about title being raised at trial, nor are there any transcripts
from the trial.
Instead, based on our record, Eliza first raised the
issue of her title in her Motion for Relief under DCRCP Rule
60(b)(4), after trial was completed and after judgment was
entered. Under HRS § 604-6, because Eliza failed to raise the
issue of title at the trial in this case,6 her subsequent Motion
for Relief was properly denied on these grounds. In my view,
5
The jurisdiction of state district courts originates from the Hawai #i
Constitution and is defined by statute. See Schwartz v. State, 136 Hawai #i
258, 263, 361 P.3d 1161, 1166 (2015). Article VI, section 1 of the Hawai #i
Constitution provides:
The judicial power of the State shall be vested in one
supreme court, one intermediate appellate court, circuit
courts, district courts and in such other courts as the
legislature may from time to time establish. The several
courts shall have original and appellate jurisdiction as
provided by law . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
6
Eliza could have also raised the issue of title in a motion to
dismiss prior to trial. See Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Peelua, 126
Hawai#i 32, 34-35, 265 P.3d 1128, 1130-31 (2011); DCRCP Rule 12.1.
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therefore, we need not reach the issue of whether Eliza's
declaration, filed in support of her Motion for Relief,
sufficiently described the source, nature and extent of the title
that she claims, under DCRCP Rule 12.1. Even if it did, Eliza
submitted her declaration and raised the issue of title after
trial.
HRS §§ 604-5 and 604-6 delineate the pertinent
boundaries of the District Court's subject matter jurisdiction
for purposes of this case. Under HRS § 604-5, the District Court
generally does not have jurisdiction where a party sufficiently
raises an issue of title to real estate. See also DCRCP Rule
12.1. However, under HRS § 604-6, a District Court is not
precluded "from taking jurisdiction in ejectment proceedings
where the title to real estate does not come in question at the
trial of the action." (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, I concur in affirming the District Court's
order denying Eliza's Motion For Relief from the Judgment for
Possession and the Writ of Possession, but for the reasons set
forth above.
/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
Chief Judge
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