RENDERED: AUGUST 18, 2022
TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2021-SC-0530-DGE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, APPELLANT
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. NOS. 2020-CA-0298, 2020-CA-0299,
2020-CA-0578 & 2020-CA-0579
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NOS. 17-J-504406,
17-J-504406-001 & 17-J-504406-002
L.G.; H.M.; AND J.M. APPELLEES
AND
2021-SC-0533-DGE
J.M. APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. NOS. 2020-CA-0298, 2020-CA-0299,
2020-CA-0578 & 2020-CA-0579
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NOS. 17-J-504406,
17-J-504406-001 & 17-J-504406-002
L.G.; G.M.; H.M.; COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES; AND JEFFERSON
COUNTY ATTORNEY APPELLEES
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER
REVERSING AND REINSTATING
The Jefferson Family Court found that L.G. emotionally abused her son,
H.M. L.G. appealed, naming both the Cabinet for Health and Family Services
(the Cabinet) and J.M., the father, as appellees. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Both the Cabinet and J.M. appealed separately to this Court. This Court
granted discretionary review of both cases and now consider the two appeals
concurrently within this Opinion. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the
Court of Appeals and reinstate the orders of the family court.
I. BACKGROUND
J.M. and L.G. married in 2004. In 2007, they had a son, H.M. The couple
divorced in 2009, originally agreeing to an equal-time parenting arrangement
negotiated through their Marital Settlement Agreement. In April of 2012, when
H.M. was five years old, Child Protective Services (CPS) received a report that
J.M. had sexually abused H.M. L.G. filed a petition for protection with the
Jefferson Family Court. Shortly after, during an investigation into the first
claim, L.G. reported that J.M. threatened H.M. Although an emergency
Domestic Violence Protective Order (DVO/EPO) was granted pending a hearing
on the underlying allegations, the family court ultimately determined that the
facts underlying L.G.’s pursuit of a DVO/EPO had not been proven. That case
was dismissed in July of 2012. Soon after, CPS formally unsubstantiated both
reports against J.M.
L.G. filed a second petition for a DVO/EPO against J.M. in October of
2012 alleging another instance of sexual abuse. The Jefferson Family Court
again found that any claims that J.M. had sexually abused his son, H.M., were
2
unproven. The court denied L.G.’s motion for a DVO/EPO and dismissed the
case, clearing J.M. “of all wrongdoing.” During the pendency of the first three
allegations, J.M. had restricted access to H.M. J.M. and H.M. then went
through reunification therapy. On January 30, 2014, the court re-established
the parents’ equal-time custody agreement.
L.G. filed a fourth report with CPS in October of 2017. The allegation
was, again, that J.M. had sexually abused H.M. CPS initiated an investigation
into J.M. for the alleged abuse. While investigating that allegation, CPS
initiated a separate investigation against L.G. for emotional abuse of H.M. CPS
worried that L.G. was manipulating H.M. into making and supporting false
claims against his father and using the allegations to get back at J.M. after
arguments. For example, each of the allegations of abuse followed an argument
between the two parents: the first allegation followed a dispute over where H.M.
would spend Derby weekend (with L.G. saying she would get H.M. even if she
had to “call C.P.S.”); the second allegation was made during the pendency of
the first DVO/EPO action between the parties; the third allegation followed an
argument over visitation; and the fourth allegation followed a disagreement
between the parents about whether H.M. should continue playing football.
This timing, paired with H.M.’s behavior during CPS’s first three
investigations, caused the Cabinet to become concerned. During investigations
into each of the allegations, H.M. gave largely identical, limited descriptions of
what had happened. Often, his explanations were contradicted by other facts;
H.M. would thereafter attempt to correct himself when confronted with those
3
contradictions or claim not to remember. CPS accordingly never substantiated
the first three allegations of sexual abuse. Following the initiation of CPS’s
fourth investigation into J.M. and first investigation into L.G., the Cabinet for
Health and Family Services (the Cabinet) moved the Jefferson Family Court for
a psychological assessment of H.M. At that time, the Cabinet was considering
whether his removal from L.G. would be appropriate. The family court ordered
an evaluation of H.M. by Dr. Berlá, a licensed psychologist. In addition to
interviewing H.M., Dr. Berlá spoke to H.M.’s former treatment professionals
and reviewed 40 other external reports and records regarding H.M. and L.G.
Following her evaluation, Dr. Berlá ultimately opined that L.G. had emotionally
abused H.M. During this time, CPS deemed H.M.’s fourth allegation credible.
Following these results, the Cabinet filed two petitions with Jefferson Family
Court: one against L.G. for emotional abuse, and one against J.M. for sexual
abuse.1 The family court took up both petitions simultaneously.
At the adjudication hearing on the two petitions, the Jefferson Family
Court heard testimony from J.M., L.G., two social service workers (SSWs), both
stepparents, H.M.’s visitation supervisor, H.M.’s teacher, and psychology
professionals Dr. Berlá, Dr. Tabashneck, Dr. Eisenmenger, and Leanne
Gardner, M.A. H.M. testified in chambers. The trial court received reports and
records from Dr. Berlá, Dr. Tabashneck, Dr. Crumbo, and Ms. Gardner. Of
1 We acknowledge that the two petitions seem contradictory. It appears that the
Cabinet’s investigation ran on two separate tracks conducted by separate social
service workers, resulting in two different petitions.
4
note, Dr. Berlá’s court-ordered evaluation and resulting report received
considerable attention at trial and were explored further through Dr. Berlá’s
testimony. Although L.G. moved to strike Dr. Berlá’s report and testimony
through a Daubert motion, that motion was denied.
Dr. Berlá testified that L.G. had “contaminated” H.M.’s relationships with
mental health professionals and his relationship with his father. Dr. Berlá
further testified that H.M. was constantly worried that a therapist would tell
his mom about things he said or did not say,2 that he believed he would be in
trouble if he did not tell CPS the right thing, and that he had been diagnosed
by other professionals as having dysgraphia, ADHD, and an
anxious/depressive adjustment disorder. Dr. Berlá expressed her worry that
because L.G. both modeled manipulative behavior and rewarded H.M. with
praise and gifts every time he made an allegation against J.M. (gifting him an
iPhone X, a puppy, and a ride in a limousine, for example), H.M. had learned to
lie and manipulate for his mother. Although Dr. Berlá revealed in testimony
that she did not review any school sources,3 it was her expert opinion that the
extensive evidence of H.M.’s learned maladaptive behaviors and L.G.’s
inappropriate, harmful conduct was sufficient to prove emotional injury. This
belief is echoed in her report, in which she states:
2 For example, in one such session in which H.M. did not mention abuse, H.M.
told his therapist “not to tell his mother that he hadn’t because she would get mad.”
3 Dr. Berlá did not review said sources, despite collecting them, because the
evidence had “already met the threshold” for emotional abuse, and she did not see the
value in further investigation.
5
There is ample evidence that [L.G.] engaged in persistent behaviors
that, at best, confounded the ability of investigators and treatment
providers to properly assess and/or intervene in alleged sexual
abuse of [H.M.], or, at worst, induced [H.M.] to manufacture false
allegations against his father. Additionally, [H.M.’s] relationship
with his father and his capacity to obtain reasonable parenting
from his father has been persistently and substantially damaged.
Dr. Berlá’s report detailed this “ample evidence.” Dr. Berlá wrote that L.G., in
addition to “systematically endeavor[ing]” to remove anyone (especially
therapeutic professionals) from H.M.’s life who did not agree with her, “failed to
protect [H.M.] from exposure to inappropriate information about his father and
the case, has subjected [H.M.] to overt negative messages about his father, and
has positioned [H.M.] to have to reject his father in order to preserve his
relationship with her.” Dr. Berlá went on to describe several instances of H.M.’s
dishonesty, troubling emotional outbursts from L.G. and their effect on H.M.,
and H.M.’s vitriolic behavior around his father in supervised visits. As to the
latter, therapists reported that at times H.M. requested more time with his
father, showed no fear, and was playful and affectionate with him. At other
times, however, H.M. threw tantrums, refused to cooperate, and acted out
toward his father. Dr. Berlá expressly underscored the emotional injury caused
by L.G. on the above facts and others, stating:
[H.M.] demonstrates marked impairment in his relationship with his
father. If the abuse allegations are false, [H.M.] has suffered
incalculable damage to his psyche, and will require significant
therapeutic work to regain healthy emotional function. Even if the
allegations are true, [H.M.] still has suffered severe damage to his
potential to adequately and appropriately work through the
psychological and emotional tasks that lay before him.
6
Following the adjudication hearing, the family court entered an order
thoroughly detailing the evidence provided by each party and its assessment of
the credibility of those testifying. The family court was particularly persuaded
by the testimony and report of Dr. Berlá. By contrast, the family court found
L.G. and H.M. to lack credibility. After an exhaustive analysis of each witness’s
statements and credibility, the family court concluded that L.G. had
emotionally injured H.M. The family court’s order read in relevant part:
Further, [L.G.] denied coaching [H.M.] in any way. However, the
Court’s own observations of [H.M.] were that he was influenced by
his mother. The experts observed in his early reporting he was aware
of things a child his age would not have knowledge of unless these
things were relayed to him. The Court notes that regardless of the
evidence put in front of her, such as travel logs and the testimony of
psychological professionals, [L.G.] does not sway from her position.
In assessing [L.G.’s] credibility, the Court not only considered its
own observations, but also the input from the psychological
professionals involved with this family and the past Court
determinations.
The court found the testimony of [H.M.’s stepfather,] [T.G.]
confirmed the timing of the allegation arising just as [J.M.] made it
known he did not want [H.M.] to play football next year. The Court
believes [T.G.] was a pawn used by [H.M.] to try to manipulate the
situation to get his way and be able to play football.
...
With regard to [H.M.’s] testimony, the Court did not find his
allegations of sexual abuse against his father to be credible. There
was substantial inconsistency in [H.M.’s] reports with regard to
when the abuse happened and how often. According to [the CPS
investigator,] Mr. Hogan, [H.M.] reported to [T.G.] the abuse
occurred 182 days prior but then to Mr. Hogan [H.M.] reported the
occurrence one month prior. In testimony, the Court understood
[H.M.] to state that the abuse had never stopped but occurred
regularly over the years. Yet, when pressed for detail [H.M. offered
little]. He said the abuse was the same every time. Curiously, if his
allegation is that all the past allegations were true, he did not
mention any of the fantastical detail documented in [L.G.’s] past
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EPO/DVO petitions such as his father wearing a fish mask during
the abuse and there being a “pictureman” in the room who took
pictures of him naked.
The Court was concerned by [H.M.’s] response to questions
regarding his conversation about children telling lies with Leanne
Gardner. The Court did not find this explanation credible and
believes the question to be telling of the child’s internal struggle with
the false allegations he had made.
The Court also found the timing of the allegations to be telling.
...
The Court placed great weight in the testimony of Leanne Gardner,
MA, and Dr. Berlá. Both expressed concerns that [H.M.’s]
discussions of the alleged sexual abuse were without affect, lacking
in detail, and rote, each of which caused them to question the
veracity of the allegations. In her time with [H.M.], Leanne Gardner
did not suspect [H.M.] to be an abused child. [H.M.] never mentioned
abuse to Ms. Gardner until 2017, nearly three years into his
therapy. The Court found Ms. Gardner’s testimony regarding
[H.M.’s] affect and language usage in comparison to a typical abuse
victim to be important. Further, the Court found the questions
[H.M.] posed to Ms. Gardner about his treatment and cost, to be very
telling on the boundaries between he [sic] and [L.G.]. All of these
inconsistencies and inabilities were testified to by the experts in this
case as uncommon for a child who had actually been sexually
abused.
The Court also placed great weight on Dr. Berlá’s testimony and
Report. Dr. Berlá’s Report encompassed vast amounts of
information upon which this Court has relied but could not possibly
cite in total. As noted above, the Court weighed Dr. Berlá’s
qualifications and testimony against that of Dr. Tabashneck and
determined Dr. Berlá’s testimony to be credible and her expertise
reliable. The Court agrees with her conclusions that [L.G.’s] behavior
was damaging to the child. The evidence that [L.G.] interfered with
the child’s therapeutic relationships, either directly or indirectly
coached [H.M.], and simply refused to accept the multiple conclusions
that [J.M.] has not harmed [H.M.] is undeniable. [L.G.’s] inability to
control her emotions and unwillingness to allow [H.M.] to form his own
opinion of [J.M.] has substantially harmed the child’s relationship
with his father and this is no doubt emotional harm.
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The Court also believes the child’s teacher, Suzanne Noland, was
used as a pawn by [H.M.]. [H.M.] is old enough, and has,
unfortunately, been exposed to the methods and schemes of [L.G.]
long enough, to have learned how to get attention and manipulate
situations to his liking. The Court believes [H.M.] used the “Speak
Up, Be Safe” campaign to start the allegations all over again as this
conflict over football was inevitably brewing.
(Emphasis added). As noted, the family court accordingly found that L.G.
“emotionally injured [H.M.], and that, by doing so, she has seriously
endangered [H.M.’s] emotional stability.” The family court found that the
Cabinet did not, however, meet its burden to prove that J.M. had abused H.M.
H.M. was then removed from L.G.’s custody, and the family court ordered that
L.G.’s visitation be limited to therapeutic visits. H.M. was ordered to be
returned to his father’s custody.
L.G. appealed the final orders of the trial court. On appeal, L.G. argued,
among other things, that the trial court abused its discretion in finding
emotional injury amounting to abuse. Relying on this Court’s decision in M.C.
v. Cabinet for Health & Family Services, 614 S.W.3d 915 (Ky. 2021), the Court
of Appeals reversed the family court and remanded for further proceedings. The
Cabinet moved for discretionary review by this Court. Soon after, J.M. also
moved for discretionary review by this Court. We granted both motions. We
consider each of their independent appeals concurrently.
II. ANALYSIS
In separate appeals to this Court, the Cabinet and J.M. both argue that
the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Jefferson Family Court’s decision
that L.G. emotionally abused H.M. L.G. disagrees and further contends that the
9
trial court erred in refusing to exclude Dr. Berlá’s opinions, that J.M. lacked
standing to prosecute the Cabinet’s DNA (Dependency, Neglect, or Abuse)
petition against L.G., and that the Family Court abused its discretion in
removing custody from L.G. We first address the issue of emotional injury.
A. Emotional Injury
The family court determined that L.G. emotionally abused H.M. in the
context of a DNA action. Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 600.020(1)(a)1 defines
an abused and neglected child as
a child whose health or welfare is harmed or threatened with harm
when . . . [h]is or her parent, guardian . . . [i]nflicts or allows to be
inflicted upon the child physical or emotional injury as defined in
this section by other than accidental means[.]
KRS 600.020(26) defines “emotional injury” as
an injury to the mental or psychological capacity or emotional
stability of a child as evidenced by a substantial and observable
impairment in the child’s ability to function within a normal range
of performance and behavior with due regard to his or her age,
development, culture, and environment as testified to by a qualified
mental health professional[.]
A finding of emotional injury is within the discretion of the family court. M.C.,
614 S.W.3d at 921. We review that finding for an abuse of discretion. Id. As
such, the family court’s findings of fact are only set aside when they are clearly
erroneous. Id. As this Court explained in M.C.,
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by
substantial evidence, which is evidence sufficient to induce
conviction in the mind of a reasonable person. If the family court’s
findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, and it
applied the correct law, its decision will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the family
court’s decision is unreasonable or unfair. Thus, in reviewing the
decision of the family court, the test is not whether the appellate
10
court would have decided it differently, but whether the findings of
the family court are clearly erroneous, whether it applied the correct
law, or whether it abused its discretion.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Substantial evidence has
been defined as some evidence of substance and relevant consequence, having
the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people.” Cabinet for
Health & Fam. Servs. ex rel. C.R. v. C.B., 556 S.W.3d 568, 574 (Ky. 2018) (citing
Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chem. Co., 474 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Ky. 1971)).
Substantial evidence of emotional injury takes different forms. In Cabinet
for Health & Family Services ex rel. C.R. v. C.B., we affirmed the trial court’s
finding of neglect from a risk of physical and emotional injury based on
evidence of “C.B.’s drug issues” which were “still not resolved.” 556 S.W.3d at
576. In Cabinet for Health & Family Services v. P.W., we held that the trial
court’s finding of a risk of emotional injury was supported by substantial
evidence that domestic violence was likely occurring in the home in view of the
children. 582 S.W.3d 887, 896–97 (Ky. 2019). In each of these cases, the Court
deferred to the factual findings of the trial court. As the factfinder, it is the trial
court’s prerogative to make findings of fact according to its own weighing of the
evidence.
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals impermissibly substituted its
own findings for the family court’s and thus found an abuse of discretion. In so
holding, the Court of Appeals conducted its own weighing and interpretation of
the evidence. Given that Dr. Berlá’s report constituted “evidence of substance
and relevant consequence, having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds
11
of reasonable people,” the Court of Appeals was wrong to find, on its own, that
a different doctor’s testimony was more relevant and reliable. C.B., 556 S.W.3d
at 574 (citing Smyzer, 474 S.W.2d at 369).
This Court recently considered the sufficiency of evidence of emotional
injury in M.C. 614 S.W.3d 915. There, the Cabinet filed a DNA petition against
the father of three children. Id. at 917. The father in that case, M.C., was party
to a case plan with the Cabinet under which he agreed to attend A.A. meetings,
not let his children have unsupervised visits with their grandmother, and “not
be under the influence of alcohol while in a caretaking role or in the presence
of the children.” Id. at 918. Soon after taking full custody, M.C. began drinking
again. Id. at 919. However, M.C. never drank in front of the children and
always drank on the porch and only in the evenings. Id. The social service
worker (SSW) assigned to M.C.’s case filed a DNA petition after being told about
M.C.’s drinking. Id. at 918–19.
While investigating, the SSW found that “the children were not missing
any school while in M.C.’s care, that they have always excelled in school,” and
that although two of the children “[were] not bothered” by their father’s
drinking, it upset M.C.’s daughter and sometimes led to arguments between
the daughter and M.C. Id. at 919. Ultimately, the SSW “did not observe
anything in the home that was a threat to the children’s health or well-being.”
Id. at 920.
The evidence indicated that the only negative impact of M.C.’s drinking
was that it sometimes bothered one of the three children. Id. at 919–20. The
12
family court therefore found that M.C. was neglecting his children by violating
the terms of his case plan and drinking. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
This Court reversed and vacated the family court’s finding of neglect. Id. The
Cabinet bore a burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that M.C.
neglected his children; “in other words, that it was more likely than not that
they were neglected.” Id. at 921 (citations omitted). The Cabinet failed to meet
that burden. Id. at 926. “The evidence was uncontroverted that M.C. was
providing appropriate care to his children. . . . [The SSW] saw nothing in the
home that was a threat to the children’s health or well-being.” Id. at 924.
In M.C., we made clear that “we simply cannot affirm a finding of neglect
when there has been no harm or actual, reasonable risk of harm to a child.” Id.
at 929. While we support that holding, the Court of Appeals’ application of it in
the case at bar was improper. The facts underlying this case are a far cry from
the unbased allegation of neglect in M.C. Here, the family court heard and
received numerous claims regarding the ways in which L.G.’s behavior served
to impair H.M. See KRS 600.020(26). The trial court found that H.M. was
deprived of his ability to have a stable and appropriate relationship with his
father and was encouraged to deceive and manipulate those around him. L.G.
intentionally impeded any attempts to remedy these harms in H.M.’s therapy,
only worsening his ability to overcome deficits in his ability to “function within
a normal range of performance and behavior.” Id. Certainly, not being able to
tell the truth to authority figures or have a relationship with his father not
13
marred by reactive allegations of serious crimes constitutes abnormal
performance and behavior for H.M.’s age and development.
Under our standard of review, “an appellate court is obligated to give a
great deal of deference to the trial court’s findings and should not interfere with
those findings unless the record is devoid of substantial evidence to support
them.” D.G.R. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 364 S.W.3d
106, 113 (Ky. 2012) (citations omitted). The evidence from Dr. Berlá’s report
constituted “some evidence of substance and relevant consequence, having the
fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people” to support the
family court’s findings. C.B., 556 S.W.3d at 574 (citing Smyzer, 474 S.W.2d at
369). The report detailing H.M.’s erratic behavior with his father, H.M.’s
manipulative behavior, and L.G.’s inappropriate conduct constituted
substantial evidence of the impairment to H.M.’s ability to have normal
relationships with mental health professionals and his father. The impairment
was so severe according to Dr. Berlá that she found it would take years of
serious treatment to restore H.M. to normal functioning.
Accordingly, the family court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. It was
not unfair or unreasonable for the family court to conclude, based on that
substantial evidence, that H.M. was emotionally injured by L.G. See M.C., 614
S.W.3d at 921. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the family
court’s determination that L.G. abused H.M. by causing emotional injury.
14
B. L.G.’s Remaining Arguments
Because the Court of Appeals made its decision to reverse the family
court solely on L.G.’s argument that the family court lacked substantial
evidence of emotional injury, it did not address L.G.’s remaining arguments.
L.G. raises those issues again to this Court. “[W]e need not remand this case to
the Court of Appeals because we are equally suited to determine the sufficiency
of the evidence based on a closed record as the Court of Appeals would be.”
Dept. for Cmty. Based Servs., Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. v. Baker, 613
S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. 2020). Thus, “a remand would exact the significant cost of
further delay for little benefit,” something to which this Court is sensitive on
this expedited review. Id. at 6–7. Accordingly, we consider each of L.G.’s
remaining arguments in turn.
First, L.G. argues, as she did to the Court of Appeals, that the family
court erred by admitting Dr. Berlá’s testimony and report over a Daubert
motion to exclude her. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993). The family court found Dr. Berlá’s testimony to be reliable and relevant
to the issue of emotional injury. See KRE 702. In fact, Dr. Berlá was selected by
the family court itself and ordered to conduct H.M.’s evaluation. “The decisions
of trial courts as to the admissibility of expert witness testimony under Daubert
are generally entitled to deference on appeal because trial courts are in the best
position to evaluate first hand the proposed evidence.” Miller v. Eldridge, 146
S.W.3d 909, 914 (Ky. 2004). Daubert’s requirements were codified in Kentucky
Rule of Evidence (KRE) 702, which states:
15
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if:
(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data;
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and
(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.
Here, Dr. Berlá based her report on an extensive list of reports and
interviews, as well as interviews she conducted herself of relevant parties. Dr.
Berlá testified regarding her principles and methodology at trial using
guidelines from her practice and her years of experience in child psychology.
Finally, Dr. Berlá’s report clearly shows her application of child psychology
principles and expertise to the facts of the case. Because she satisfied each of
the elements of KRE 702, the family court did not abuse its discretion in
denying L.G.’s motion to exclude Dr. Berlá’s testimony.
Second, L.G. argues that J.M. lacked standing to “prosecute” the DNA
petition against L.G. She argues that the Cabinet “gave over its prosecution” to
J.M.’s counsel. This argument lacks merit. This Court can find no evidence
that the Cabinet turned its case over to J.M.; instead, L.G. seems to argue that
J.M. acted to prosecute the DNA petition by being afforded the ability by the
trial court to question Dr. Berlá first of the four parties at trial. As such, L.G.’s
argument fails to go to the issue of standing and instead pertains to the family
court’s discretion in the administration of justice within the courtroom. “A
court has inherent authority to ensure that it functions efficiently and
16
effectively to provide the fair administration of justice and to control its docket
with economy of time and effort.” Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Blum, 404 S.W.3d 841,
848 (Ky. 2013). Here, the family court agreed to permit J.M.’s counsel to
question Dr. Berlá first in the interest of efficiency. This Court cannot hold that
the decision to alter the order of questioning, absent any other evidence of
harm or unfairness, is an abuse of discretion.
Finally, L.G. claims that the family court abused its discretion in
removing H.M. from L.G.’s custody, arguing that the decision was too severe
and caused distress to H.M. L.G. offers no legal basis for this argument aside
from the severity of the sadness it has caused H.M. However, Dr. Crumbo
stated that any change to H.M.’s ability to see his mother would cause him
distress, and the family court did not go so far as to order no contact between
L.G. and H.M. As such, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering that H.M. be removed from L.G.’s custody.
III. CONCLUSION
The family court was not clearly erroneous and did not abuse its
discretion in finding that L.G. emotionally injured H.M., thus finding abuse and
removing H.M. from L.G.’s custody. Therefore, in both appeals, we reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the orders of the trial court.
All sitting. All concur.
17
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/APPELLEE, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY:
Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael J. O’Connell
Jefferson County Attorney
David Andrew Sexton
Special Assistant Attorney General/Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Elizabeth Ann Duncan
Ingrid Lea Federspiel
Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
David Martin Feldkamp
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/APPELLEE, J.M.:
William David Tingley
Hillary Ann Hunt
Graydon Head & Ritchey, LLP
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, L.G.:
John Harold Helmers, Jr.
Helmers & Associates
Kevin Crosby Burke
Jamie Kristin Neal
Burke Neal PLLC
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, G.M.:
Sarah Eleanor Clay
Clay Law Office, PLLC
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, H.M.:
Pashens L. Fitzpatrick
Fitzpatrick Law Office
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/APPELLEE, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES:
Jennifer Ellen Clay
CHFS Office of Legal Services
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