Dorbest Ltd. v. United States

Slip Op. 11-14

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

DORBEST LTD., et al.,

Plaintiffs,
Before: Pogue, Chief Judge
v.
Consol. Ct. No. 05-00003
UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

[Commerce’s remand determination remanded in part.]

Decided: February 9, 2011

Mowry & Grimson PLLC (Kristin H. Mowry, Jeffrey S. Grimson,
Jill A. Cramer, Susan E. Lehman, and Sarah M. Wyss) for Dorbest
Limited et al.;

King & Spalding LLP (Joseph W. Dorn, Stephen A. Jones, Jeffrey
M. Telep, J. Michael Taylor, Daniel L. Schneiderman, and Ashley C.
Parrish) for the American Furniture Manufacturers Committee for
Legal Trade, et al.;

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Jeanne E. Davidson,
Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director, Commercial
Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice
(Stephen C. Tosini, Carrie A. Dunsmore, and Brian A. Mizoguchi);
Rachael E. Wenthold, Senior Attorney, Of Counsel, Office of Chief
Counsel for Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, for
the United States Department of Commerce; and

Trade Pacific PLLC (Robert G. Gosselink) on behalf of Dongguan
Lung Dong/Dong He, et al.

Pogue, Chief Judge: In prior proceedings in this matter, the

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) held that when

calculating surrogate labor rates for the valuation of goods from

a nonmarket economy (“NME”), the Department of Commerce
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 2

(“Commerce”) must use data from countries that are both

economically comparable to the NME and significant producers of

comparable merchandise. Dorbest Ltd. v. United States, 604 F.3d

1363, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(“Dorbest IV”). Dorbest IV thus

required Commerce to redetermine, on remand, the labor rate

applicable here. See Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant

to Remand, Dorbest Ltd. v. United States, (Nov. 10, 2010)(“Remand

Results”).

In its remand determination, choosing data from the record,

Commerce calculated a labor wage rate by averaging industry-

specific earnings and/or wages from three countries – India,

Indonesia and Pakistan – that it found to be both economically

comparable to China and significant producers of wooden bedroom

furniture. Based on these calculations, Commerce identified an

average wage rate of 0.23 USD/hour and found that using that

average wage rate as a surrogate for the cost of labor in the

production of Plaintiff/Respondent Dorbest’s merchandise, Dorbest

has a de minimis dumping margin. Remand Results at 17, 42.

Plaintiff/Petitioner American Furniture Manufacturers

Committee for Legal Trade (“AFMC”) now seeks review of Commerce’s

data choices in that redetermination on remand.1 AFMC challenges

1
Dorbest does not challenge Commerce’s remand
determination. Dorbest’s Comments on Fourth Remand
Determination, Dorbest Ltd. v. United States, (Dec. 2, 2010).
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 3

four of Commerce’s specific choices: 1) Commerce’s initial

selection of two “bookend” countries – the Philippines and

Pakistan – to limit its consideration of countries with economies

comparable to China, the NME at issue; 2) Commerce’s exclusion of

data not available during the original investigation; 3)

Commerce’s use of wage rate data from India alleged to be

“capped” or limited to wages of workers making 1600 Rupees

(“Rs.”) per month or less; and 4) Commerce’s calculation of an

average surrogate wage rate using only countries for which

industry-specific data was available.

After a brief review of the relevant procedural history, the

agency’s methodology, and the applicable standard of review, the

court will explain why it concludes that, given the record as a

whole, the first of Commerce’s choices must be remanded but the

other three data choices were reasonable and therefore must be

sustained.

BACKGROUND

Procedural history

This matter arises from Commerce’s investigation of whether

wooden bedroom furniture from China was being dumped in the

United States domestic market during the time period between

April 1, 2003 and September 30, 2003. Wooden Bedroom Furniture
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 4

from the People’s Republic of China, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,228 (Dep’t

Commerce Dec. 17, 2003)(Notice of Initiation of Antidumping

Investigation). Commerce’s final determination in the original

investigation was subsequently challenged and remanded three

times before it was appealed to the CAFC.

In Dorbest IV, the CAFC invalidated Commerce’s wage rate

calculation regulation.2 This court then remanded for further

proceedings in accordance with the CAFC decision. Specifically,

as noted above, the CAFC held that, contrary to Commerce’s

regulation, the governing statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4),3

requires that when calculating surrogate labor wage rates,

Commerce shall “to the extent possible,” use factors of

production from market economies that are both economically

comparable to the non-market economy country and significant

2
Prior to Dorbest IV, Commerce used a regression-based
method for calculating wage rates pursuant to 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.408(c)(3). See Dorbest IV, 604 F.3d at 1371.
3
The statute states that:

[Commerce] shall utilize, to the extent possible, the
prices or costs of factors of production in one of more
market economy country that are:

(A) at a level of economic development comparable
to that of the nonmarket economy country, and

(B) significant producers of comparable
merchandise.

19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(2011).
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 5

producers of the subject merchandise. Dorbest IV, 604 F.3d at

1372 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(A)).

After Dorbest IV, Commerce acknowledged that the data on the

record was insufficient to comply with the court’s remand order

and re-opened the administrative record to admit new wage data.

Request for Comment Regarding Wage Rate Data, A-570-890, Remand

Redetermination Investigation (“RRI”) 4/1/03 - 9/30/03 (Aug. 11,

2010), Remand Admin. R. Pub. Doc. 1. Commerce also invited

interested parties to submit comments and new factual information

with regards to the sole issue of labor wage valuation. Id. at

2. AFMC and Dorbest each submitted comments and wage rate data

for Commerce’s consideration.

Methodology

Selecting from the record data, Commerce, in its remand

determination, specified five steps for calculating labor wage

rates (“the 5-step methodology”).4

First, Commerce created a list of economically comparable

4
The 5-step methodology that Commerce applied is described
in greater detail at Analysis Memorandum for the Redetermination
Pursuant to Court Remand in the Antidumping Investigation of
Wooden Bedroom Furniture from the People’s Republic of China: Rui
Feng Woodwork Co., Ltd. (“Rui Feng Shenzhen”), and their parent
company Dorbest Limited (collectively “Dorbest”), A-570-890, RRI
4/1/03 - 9/30/03 (Oct. 8, 2010), Remand Admin. R. Pub. Doc. 8.
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 6

surrogate countries based on gross national income (“GNI”).5 In

doing so, Commerce relied on its original surrogate country

memorandum,6 which provided five economically comparable

countries for consideration as the primary surrogate country for

this investigation.7 Remand Results at 12; Surrogate country

memorandum. The countries on the list in the surrogate country

memorandum are India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the

Philippines. Remand Results at 12. Using, as “bookends,” the

high and low-income countries from that list, i.e., the

5
In determining which countries are economically comparable
to China, Commerce relies primarily on GNI. Remand Results at
12. Commerce’s regulations specify that per capita gross domestic
product is to be given weight when selecting surrogate countries
to value production factors. 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(b) (“[Commerce]
will place primary emphasis on per capita GDP as the measure of
economic comparability”). Nonetheless, Commerce and AFMC both
rely on GNI throughout their discussion of which countries are
economically comparable to China. e.g. Remand Results at 12;
AFMC’s Comments on Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to
Remand, Dorbest Ltd. v. United States, (Dec. 2, 2010) at 22
(“AMFC Br.”).
6
The surrogate country memorandum states that the five
countries selected were all comparable to China in terms of per
capita GNP and national distribution of labor. Memorandum from
Ron Lorentzen to Robert Bolling, “Request for a List of Surrogate
Countries,” A-570-890, POI 4/1/03 – 9/30/03, Admin. R. Pub. Doc.
260 at 1 (Jan 16, 2004)(“Surrogate country memorandum”)(“Per
capita GNP is the primary basis for determining economic
comparability.”).
7
When calculating an antidumping margin, Commerce selects
one country to act as the surrogate country from which it draws
data on all factors of production except labor wage rates. This
country is known as the primary surrogate country.
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 7

Philippines and Pakistan, Commerce then added all countries with

World-Bank reported per capita GNIs that fell within the

“bookend” range. Remand Results at 12–13. This resulted in a

list of 24 countries.

Second, Commerce proceeded to identify which of the 24

listed countries had exports of comparable merchandise between

2001 and 2003. Remand Results at 12. At this step, Commerce

identified 13 countries from the list that were both economically

comparable to China and significant producers of comparable

merchandise.

Third, Commerce identified which of the 13 countries

reported wage data between 1997 and 2002. Remand Results at 13.

In doing so, Commerce relied on the International Labor

Organization (“ILO”) wage data from the base year and five years

prior. See AFMC Br. at 8. After applying this step, six

countries remained.

Commerce then added a fourth step to its methodology: It

identified which countries reported an industry-specific

classification within the ILO wage rate data. Remand Results at

13–14. In doing so, Commerce looked to data that was reported

according to the International Standard Industrial Classification
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 8

of all Economic Activities (“ISIC”) code.8 Remand Results at 14.

Each updated ISIC code is known as a revision, and ISIC Revision

3 was the most recent reporting period available at the time of

the initial investigation. Remand Results at 14 n.46. Commerce,

however, chose to use an older revision, ISIC Revision 2, because

it contained a sub-classification most specific to the production

of wooden bedroom furniture.9 Remand Results at 15. After

applying this step, three countries – India, Indonesia and

Pakistan – remained on the list. Id.

Finally, Commerce calculated an average wage rate for these

three countries by using wage rate data from a three-digit sub-

classification level, when that sub-classification was

available.10 Remand Results at 16. Commerce used wage rate data

from India and Indonesia that was reported at this additional,

three-digit sub-classification level. Pakistan, however, did not

report data at the three-digit sub-classification level;

8
For this and the next step, Commerce relied exclusively on
the most updated data that would have been available during the
original investigation. Remand Results at 13. Commerce used
wage data from 1997-2002 and adjusted it to the 2003 period of
investigation using the relevant Consumer Price Index. Id.
9
Commerce used industry-specific data from the two-digit
sub-classification 33, which is titled, “Manufacture of Wood and
Wood Products, Including Furniture.” Remand Results at 16.
10
Here, Commerce used sub-classification 332, which is
titled, “Manufacture of Furniture and Fixtures, Except Primarily
of Metal.” Remand Results at 16.
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 9

therefore with regards to wage rate data from Pakistan, Commerce

used data which was reported at the two-digit sub-classification

level. Id. Commerce then calculated a simple average using this

data. See id.11

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court will sustain a Commerce redetermination on remand

“if it complies with the court’s remand order, is supported by

substantial evidence on the record, and is otherwise in

accordance with law.” Jinan Yipin Corp. v. United States, __ CIT

__, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1185 (2009)(citing 19 U.S.C.

§ 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i)).

An agency determination is supported by substantial evidence

when the record upon which it is based contains such “relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229

(1938). In making this evaluation of the record, the court

assesses whether the agency’s data choices are reasonable

considering the record as a whole. See Nippon Steel Corp. v.

11
This is the first time that Commerce has included steps
four and five in its methodology. Furthermore, throughout the
remand process Commerce has consistently used only data that was
available during the time of the original investigation. See,
e.g., Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand,
Dorbest, Ltd. v. United States (May 25, 2007).
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 10

United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006). At a

minimum, in making its data choices, the agency must explain the

standards it applied and make a rational connection between the

standards and the conclusion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

United States, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984). A rational

connection is a connection that is supported by justification or

evidence. See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight

Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1975) (explaining that, even under

the narrower arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the

agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a

satisfactory explanation for its action, including a “rational

connection between the facts found and the choice made” (quoting

Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168

(1962))).12

DISCUSSION

I. Commerce’s selection of countries to act as “bookends”

The first issue before the court is Commerce’s initial

selection of a pair of “bookend” countries to establish a range

12
Moreover, a reviewing court should not attempt itself to
make up for such deficiencies; “we may not supply a reasoned
basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not
given.” Bowman, 419 U.S. at 285-86 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807 (1973)(plurality)(“[T]he
agency must set forth clearly the grounds on which it acted.”).
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 11

of GNI with which to identify a list of countries that qualify as

economically comparable to China.13 AFMC contends that this

choice is arbitrarily skewed towards countries with a per-capita

GNI that is less than that of China.14

The high-income “bookend” country selected from the list in

Commerce’s original surrogate country memorandum was the

Philippines, with a GNI of 1,020, and the low-income bookend

country was Pakistan with a GNI of 410.15 Remand Results at 12;

AFMC Br. at 23. China’s GNI at the time of the original

13
Both AFMC and Commerce agree that there is a strong
correlation between wage rates and per capita GNI. See Remand
Results at 30. In addition, Commerce continues to find, and AFMC
agrees, that data from multiple countries constitutes the best
available information for the valuing labor input. Remand
Results at 10. (The use of multiple countries to calculate the
labor wage rate is not an issue that any party contests.)
Commerce cites, and AFMC acknowledges, the high variability and
inconsistency between wage rates and GNI as the reason for using
as many countries as possible when calculating an average wage
rate. See Remand Results at 11.
14
Commerce asserts incorrectly that it is too late for AFMC
to challenge the selection of surrogate countries because it did
not challenge it when the memorandum was initially promulgated.
Remand Results at 31. However, because this is the first time
that the surrogate country memorandum has been used for this
purpose, until now there was no reason for AFMC to challenge the
countries listed therein. See, e.g., Dorbest IV 604 F.3d at 1375
(citing Mittal Steel Point Lisas, Ltd. v. United States, 548 F.3d
1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008)), and United States v. L.A. Tucker
Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952)).
15
All GNI discussed here is in terms of United States
dollars.
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 12

investigation was 1,100.16 AFMC Br. at 23.

AFMC asserts that the CAFC clearly intended Commerce to use

countries with reported GNI’s both above and below that of China

in order to capture an absolute range of economically comparable

countries.17 AFMC Br. at 22, 25. AFMC also points out that the

surrogate country memorandum was not drafted for purposes of

calculating surrogate wage rates and therefore fails to account

for absolute differences in GNI by listing countries both above

and below China’s GNI. AFMC Br. at 23.18

AFMC also contends that Commerce has failed to provide a

reasonable explanation for why it used the five countries listed

16
The other three countries on the original surrogate
country memo list all had GNIs lower than China’s GNI. These
three countries, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Pakistan, reported
GNIs of 860, 740 and 510 respectively. AFMC Br. at 23.
17
In Dorbest IV, the CAFC noted that:

Here, there were five market-economy countries with
gross national incomes less than that of China and an
additional eleven countries with gross national incomes
between one and two times that of China. Although we
need not resolve which of these countries, or which
additional countries, could properly be considered
economically comparable to China, some subset of these
countries must surely fit the bill.

Dorbest IV, 604 F.3d at 1372.
18
Instead, the surrogate country memorandum was intended as
a non-exclusive baseline for determining a principle surrogate
country for “factors other than labor.” AFMC Br. at 23;
Surrogate country memo at 1.
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 13

in the surrogate country memorandum, given that their low GNIs

would necessarily predetermine an underestimated labor wage rate.

AFMC Br. at 23–24. In support of this, AFMC notes that Commerce

has already recognized in an earlier proceeding that using only

wage rates from countries with high GNIs will likely lead to an

overestimated wage rate. AFMC Br. at 24 (citing Dorbest, Ltd. v.

United States, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1327 (CIT 2008) (“Dorbest

II”). For AFMC, it follows that here, when Commerce selected

countries with GNIs lower than China, the data set “pre-ordained

an understated wage rate.” AFMC Br. at 23.

Commerce contends that it was instructed merely to base its

wage value on countries that are economically comparable to China

and that neither the statute nor Dorbest IV define a set range of

GNI to be used when determining economic comparability. Remand

Results at 32. Commerce notes that the countries on the

surrogate country memo were already determined to be economically

comparable to China and that the memo provided a sufficient

number of economically comparable countries to act as a starting

point. Remand Results at 33.

Commerce’s explanation is insufficient. While Commerce has

discretion to determine the countries which will act as bookends

for its selection, it has not provided a reasoned explanation of

its “bookend” choices. In particular, Commerce’s remand decision
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 14

overlooks the explicit statement in the surrogate country memo

that the proposed list is non-exhaustive, allowing for the

possibility of introducing a more balanced range of countries

from which to draw labor wage rate data. Surrogate country memo

at 1.

Here, both of the two bookend countries have GNIs that fall

below China’s, resulting in a range of corresponding wage rates

that will likely fall below China’s wage rates. Given the high

correlation between per capita GNI and wage rates, a correlation

that Commerce acknowledges, Commerce’s selection appears

arbitrarily biased towards the low end of per capita GNI. See

Remand Results at 35–36 (acknowledging established global

relationship between wages and GNI); also Dorbest II, 547 F.

Supp. 2d at 1327. Certainly Commerce does not have to achieve

mathematical perfection in its choice of countries to act as

bookends for its initial selection, but Commerce must explain why

it selected two countries with GNIs that are lower than China’s

to use as bookends, and Commerce’s explanation must rest “upon

principles that are rational, neutral, and in accord with the

agency’s proper understanding of its authority.” FCC v. Fox Tel.

Stations, Inc. , 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823 (Kennedy, concurring)

(2009); see, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 750 F.2d at 933.

Without such an explanation, Commerce’s determination is
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 15

arbitrary because it “fail[s] to consider an important aspect of

the problem,” and is therefore unreasonable. SKF USA v. United

States, 2011 WL 73179, *6 (Fed. Cir. Jan.7, 2011)(quoting Motor

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.

Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43(1983)).

Commerce asserts that the CAFC’s explicit directive to rely

on data from countries that are economically comparable to China

will “necessarily result in a truncated dataset.” Remand Results

at 33. But this argument misses the point. While the CAFC’s

opinion has precluded the larger data sets that Commerce used in

its invalidated regression-based methodology, that opinion did

not hold that Commerce was restricted to using only countries

with GNIs lower than China’s. On the contrary, the CAFC noted

that there were at least 16 countries from which Commerce could

draw. Dorbest IV, 604 F.3d at 1372. While the CAFC explicitly

declined to address exactly which countries could properly be

considered economically comparable to China, it left open the

possibility that countries with GNIs higher than China’s could be

included in the range. Id. Commerce has not provided any

adequate explanation as to why these higher-income countries are

necessarily excluded from the starting selection of countries.

Finally, Commerce claims that the range of economically

comparable countries is not unfair – just because that range is
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 16

not centered around China’s GNI – and points out that there is no

statutory requirement that Commerce select the “most comparable

country.” Remand Results at 33–34. AFMC responds that at a

minimum, Commerce should achieve “substantial balance” in its

data set by selecting bookend countries that are roughly equally

above and below China’s per capita GNI.19 Commerce replies that

focusing on the ranking of each country will create an “illusion

of precision.” Remand Results at 34. In making this argument,

Commerce relies on Fujian Lianfu Forestry Co., Ltd. v. United

States, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1348–49 (CIT 2009), which held that

India was economically comparable to China despite a wide

difference between their respective GNIs (India 620, China 1290).

Fujian Lianfu Forestry is distinguishable, however, because

it involved the choice of a single country to act as a primary

surrogate country. See Fujian Lianfu Forestry, 638 F. Supp. 2d

at 1347. Here, Commerce is selecting a range of countries.

Moreover, there is no indication here that the methodology

applied in Fujian Lianfu Forestry to select a primary surrogate

country is similar to the methodology for determining surrogate

19
AFMC also re-raises the argument that Commerce erred in
continuing to rely on data from the 2004 WDR Publication rather
than a 2010 download of the 2002 per capita GNI data. As
discussed infra, Commerce’s decision to limit the data selected
for these remand results to data that was available during the
time of the original investigation is reasonable.
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 17

wage rates. See id. at 1348–49. On the contrary, in the context

of wage rate calculation, Commerce has stated that there is a

high correlation between wage rates and GNI. Remand Results at

35–36. Given this statement, Commerce has not explained, beyond

conclusory reasoning, how relying on broader GNI rankings of

countries could produce an “illusion of precision.” See Amanda

Foods (Vietnam), Ltd. v. United States, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1368,

1377 (CIT 2009)(holding that Commerce must provide more than

conclusory reasoning for treating all countries on surrogate

country memorandum as identical).

For the above reasons, the court remands this issue to

Commerce so that it may 1) explain why it is justified in

selecting this particular pair of countries to act as bookends

for the selection process, in light of their low GNIs and the

high correlation between GNI and wage rates, or 2) otherwise

reconsider its determination in accordance with this opinion.

II. Commerce’s decision to use data available at the time of the

original investigation

AFMC next contends that Commerce’s reliance on 2002 GNI data

and 2002 ILO wage data does not constitute use of the “best
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 18

available data” under 19 U.S.C.§ 1677b(c)(1). AFMC Br. at 11.20

We disagree.

This court held in Dorbest, Ltd. v. United States, 462 F.

Supp. 2d 1262 (CIT 2006), that “given that administrative law

defines “available” in terms of the underlying investigation,

“available” may reasonably mean “available during the

investigation.” Dorbest, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 1299 (“Dorbest

I”)(citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural

Resources Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 555 (1978)).

AFMC contends that once an agency has reopened the record,

it must consider all evidence properly before it and therefore,

the best available information currently consists of the 2003 ILO

wage data. AFMC Br. at 16. AFMC’s argument, however, disregards

the procedural posture of this case. Remand proceedings do not

grant the parties the right to a new antidumping investigation

20
In calculating the surrogate wage rate, Commerce is
directed by statute to use the “best available information.” 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1). “Best available information” is not
defined in the statute; therefore Commerce has significant
discretion in making this determination. See Nation Ford Chem.
Co. v. United States, 166 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see
also Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Thai Pineapple Pub. Co. v. United
States, 187 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999)(holding that
Commerce’s methodologies are presumptively correct). The CAFC
held in Dorbest IV that the requirement that Commerce use the
“best available information” may not be used to demand of
Commerce more than is required by the antidumping statute. 604
F.3d at 1373.
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 19

from the current date. See, e.g., 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative

Law § 575. Rather, in remand proceedings, an administrative

agency must modify its original determination in accordance with

the remand order. See id.

Here Commerce reopened the record to admit new data because

it needed a new type of data to comply with our remand order;

that order, however, did not require data from a different time

period. See Request for Comment Regarding Wage Rate Data,

A-570-890, RRI 4/1/03 - 9/30/03 (Aug. 11, 2010), Remand Admin. R.

Pub. Doc. 1 at 2. The error in Commerce’s original determination

arose not from the time period for which the ILO wage data were

selected, but rather from the methodology applied to select the

data.21 See Dorbest IV, 604 F.3d at 1372–73. Because we are to

treat Commerce’s calculations on remand as if they were made at

the time of the original investigation, it is reasonable for

Commerce to consider only data that was available to it during

the original investigation, namely, the 2002 ILO wage data. See

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 554–55

(“[a]dministrative consideration of evidence . . . always creates

21
AFMC cites to the authorities in Dorbest I supporting
their argument that “available” information is information before
the decision-maker when a determination is made. AFMC Br. at 16.
Again, their interpretation fails to account for the procedural
posture of this case. These are remand proceedings which
necessarily must be treated as the original investigation. See,
e.g., 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 575.
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 20

a gap between the time the record is closed and the time the

administrative decision is promulgated”)(citation omitted).

Asserting that Commerce’s decision is not in accord with the

statute, AFMC incorrectly cites Port of Seattle v. Fed. Energy

Regulatory Comm’n, 499 F.3d 1016, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). AFMC’s

reliance misses the point. In Port of Seattle, the Ninth Circuit

reviewed a decision made by the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission (“FERC”) which disregarded evidence added to the

record after a preliminary evidentiary proceeding but before FERC

rendered its final decision. Port of Seattle, 499 F. 3d at 1025.

Port of Seattle does not involve or address new data that was not

available at the time of the original determination or

investigation.22

In the alternative, AFMC contends that the decision to use

only data available during the time of the original investigation

is arbitrary and not supported by substantial evidence. AFMC Br.

at 17. AFMC makes three arguments in support of this assertion.

22
AFMC also asserts that Commerce’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence because it has failed to take
into account contradictory evidence present on the record. AFMC
Br. at 17. Nonetheless, AFMC mis-states the case. The evidence
AFMC wishes Commerce to utilize is not contradictory, but rather,
different, newer data of the same type being sought by Commerce.
While this other data could result in a different margin for
Dorbest, such a possibility does not necessarily render the data
contradictory to the data Commerce used.
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 21

First, AFMC contests Commerce’s finding that the interests

of administrative finality and efficiency overcome an interest in

conducting accurate fact finding and that allowing later-

discovered evidence sets an undesirable precedent. AFMC Br. at

17–18. AFMC argues that it is not attempting to circumvent the

finality of Commerce’s determination with new evidence and that

Commerce has strayed from its own precedent in choosing not to

use the updated data.

The case AFMC relies on to make this argument, Shakeproof

Assembly Components Div. Of Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. United

States, 30 CIT 1173, Slip Op. 06-129 (Aug. 25, 2006), does not

support AFMC’s claim. The court in Shakeproof upheld Commerce’s

decision to reject evidence that was not contemporaneous with the

period of investigation and noted in dicta that Commerce has

traditionally used “valuation information contemporaneous with a

period of investigation or review.” Shakeproof, 30 CIT at 1177.

Here the data used by Commerce is contemporaneous with the period

of investigation in that it represents the data available at the

time of the original investigation. Thus Shakeproof is not

contrary authority.

Second, AFMC asserts that 2003 ILO wage data was available

at the time of the original investigation because this court

acknowledged in Dorbest I that the 2004 download, which happened
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 22

to include 2003 data, was materially the same as the data

available during the original investigation. AFMC mis-states our

finding in Dorbest I. In Dorbest I, this court discussed the

availability of 2002 ILO wage data shortly after the original

investigation was completed and found that the 2004 download of

that data was materially the same. Dorbest I, 462 F. Supp. 2d at

1299. The availability of the 2003 ILO wage rate data during the

original investigation was not before us in Dorbest I and

therefore AFMC may not rely on Dorbest I to establish the

existence of the 2003 ILO wage data and its concomitant

availability during the original investigation.

Finally, AFMC asserts that Commerce “cherry picked” from the

data, using both 2002 and 2003 ILO wage data in its calculations.

AFMC Br. at 20. Commerce acknowledged in the remand results that

it needed to extract 2002 ILO wage data that had not been

retained at the time of the original investigation. In the

remand results, Commerce stated that it relied on “a current

download of 2001-2003 export data” to determine which countries

were significant producers of comparable merchandise. Remand

Results at 22. AFMC asserts that there is no reasonable basis

for Commerce to conclude that the 2003 ILO wage data was not

available during the time of the investigation while at the same

time concluding that it was available. AFMC Br. at 21. Commerce
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 23

responds that, by necessity, certain portions of the data it used

were newly extracted, but that it relied upon data that would

have been available during the original investigation.

Defendant’s Response to AFMC’s Remand Comments, Dorbest Ltd. v.

United States, (Dec. 22, 2010) at 14 (“Commerce Reply Br.”).

Commerce acknowledges that this is not a perfect procedure but

the best it can make of the available data sources. Commerce

Reply Br. at 15. This is reasonable. Accordingly, Commerce’s

decision to rely solely on data that would have been available

during the original investigation is affirmed.

III. Indian wage rate

The AFMC next contends that Commerce’s calculations are

unsupported by substantial evidence because they rely in part on

Indian wage data that appear to exclude workers making more than

Rs.1600 per month, and thus appears “capped” or limited to wages

under that amount. AFMC Br. at 37. We disagree.

In support of its claim, AFMC cites the Annual Survey of

Industries (ASI), which can be read to indicate that a “cap”

limits the Indian wage data to the bottom 2% of wage earners.

Petitioners’ Comments Concerning Draft Results of Redetermination

Pursuant to Remand in Dorbest Limited v. United States,

A-570-890, RRI 4/1/03 - 9/30/03 (Oct. 22, 2010), Remand Admin. R.
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 24

Pub. Doc. 13 at 35–37. Commerce, however, declines to use this

information because it was not made available until 2006. Remand

Results at 40. As discussed supra, Commerce’s decision to

exclude data that would not have been available at the time of

the original investigation is reasonable. See Dorbest I, 462 F.

Supp. 2d at 1299.

In addition, Commerce further supports its stance by

explaining that the ASI data do not represent industry-specific

2002 wages.23 See Remand Results at 40 n. 99. Commerce notes

that even though the 2003 ASI report on the record contains a

“trends” column which shows a FY 2002 country-wide rate, no

source data is on the record for this column, nor does the report

include industry-specific data, which is what Commerce used in

its calculations. Id. Thus Commerce decided that the ASI

submission is not an appropriate benchmark because, even if it

were available at the time of the original investigation, it does

not contain industry-specific 2002 ILO wage data and thus would

not be relevant to Commerce’s calculations.24 This determination

23
As discussed infra, Commerce has reasonably chosen to use
industry-specific data in its calculations.
24
AFMC has placed on the record numerous pages extracted
from the ILO website which state that the ILO wage rate data is
capped. AMFC Comments Concering Wage Data Placed on the Record
on August 11, 2010, A-570-890, RRI 4/1/03 - 9/30/03 (Aug. 16,
2010), Remand Admin. R. Pub. Doc. 3, Exhibit 6. However, the
court finds this evidence unpersuasive because the record also
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 25

is reasonable.

IV. Commerce’s calculation of the average wage rate

Finally, AFMC challenges Commerce’s data choices at the

fourth and fifth steps of the wage rate calculation, asserting

that Commerce’s choices arbitrarily reduced the number of

countries from which Commerce could calculate a labor wage rate.

We disagree.

AFMC argues that the use of industry-specific data from ISIC

Revision 2 is arbitrary and capricious because of Commerce’s

stated preference for a large “basket” of countries from which to

choose. AFMC claims that requiring industry-specific wage data

unnecessarily reduces the number of available countries from

which to draw data when country-wide wage data is available from

more countries. AFMC Br. at 32.

Commerce, in response, asserts correctly that the governing

statute is silent on this issue, leaving the determination to

Commerce’s reasonable discretion. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1).

Commerce explains that using industry-specific data is preferable

contains an email from an ILO representative stating that the
cited methodological description dates back to 1995 and has not
been updated since. Id. at 377. Because this e-mail suggests
that the data may not be capped, and in the absence of further
evidence on the record that the data is capped, Commerce’s use of
the India wage rate data is reasonable.
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 26

because it comports with Commerce’s long-standing practice of

valuing the most specific data for production factors, and, at

the very least, such data is more specific to the subject

merchandise than country-wide data. Remand Results at 28–29.

While Commerce acknowledges AFMC’s concerns, it notes, and

we agree, that AFMC has failed to provide evidence to show that

industry-specific data are unsuitable for calculating wage rates.

Remand Results at 28. Furthermore, AFMC’s argument misses the

point. Our inquiry here is not whether Commerce used a certain

number of countries in its calculations. Rather it is whether

Commerce reasonably adhered to the remand order and the statutory

requirements set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4), and whether

Commerce’s determination is supported by a reasonable reading of

the record evidence as a whole.

Nonetheless, with regards to whether Commerce used the best

available information from the record, Commerce states that it

believes industry-specific data will yield the most accurate

results, and explains that it used ISIC Revision 2 because it

contains a two-digit sub-classification of industry-specific

wages which Commerce feels to be most relevant to the production

of wooden furniture. Remand Results at 15 (“[Commerce]

identified the two-digit series most specific to wooden bedroom

furniture as Sub-Classification 33, which is described as
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 27

“Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products, Including Furniture”).

Commerce also stated that it chose to use ISIC Revision 2 rather

than the updated Revision 3 because Revision 2 contained the

specific sub-classification which was more specific to, and thus

a better match for, the subject merchandise.25 Remand Results at

15. Here, Commerce has explained the standards it applied and

made a rational connection between this standard and its decision

to use ISIC Revision 2 data. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,

750 F.2d at 933.

For the reasons given above, Commerce’s decision to use

industry-specific data is reasonable and in compliance with the

statutory requirements set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4).

Conclusion

Accordingly, Commerce’s initial selection of two “bookend”

countries – the Philippines and Pakistan – to limit its

25
“[W]e find that the two-digit description under ISIC-
Revision 2 Sub-Classification 33 (‘Manufacture of Wood and Wood
Products, Including Furniture’) to be more specific and a better
match for the wooden bedroom furniture industry than the
applicable ISIC -Revision 3, Sub-Classification 36 two-digit
description (‘Manufacture of Furniture; Manufacturing NEC’) since
the ISIC-Revision-2 does not contain the broad catch-all category
of ‘manufacturing NEC,’ or merchandise ‘not elsewhere
classified.” Remand Results at 15. In addition, Commerce
explained that it found ISIC Revision 2 to be better because it
contained source data from all the countries determined to be
both economically comparable and a significant producer of the
subject merchandise.
Consolidated Ct. No. 05-00003 Page 28

consideration of countries with economies comparable to China, is

remanded for further consideration in accordance with this

opinion. Commerce shall have until March 28, 2011 to complete

and file its remand determination. Plaintiffs shall have until

April 11, 2011 to file comments. Defendant and Defendant-

Intervenors shall have until April 25, 2011 to file any reply.

Commerce’s other data choices are affirmed.

It is SO ORDERED.

/s/ Donald C. Pogue
Donald C. Pogue, Chief Judge

Dated: February 9, 2011
New York, NY