Slip Op. 02-11
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
BEFORE: SENIOR JUDGE NICHOLAS TSOUCALAS
________________________________________
KOYO SEIKO CO., LTD. and :
KOYO CORPORATION OF USA; :
NSK LTD. and NSK CORPORATION; :
NTN BEARING CORPORATION OF AMERICA, :
AMERICAN NTN BEARING MANUFACTURING :
CORPORATION and NTN CORPORATION; and :
THE TIMKEN COMPANY, : Consolidated
: Court No.
Plaintiffs and : 98-06-02274
Defendant-Intervenors, :
:
v. :
:
UNITED STATES, :
:
Defendant. :
________________________________________
This consolidated action concerns the claims raised by: Koyo
Seiko Co., Ltd. and Koyo Corporation of USA (collectively “Koyo”);
NSK Ltd. and NSK Corporation (collectively “NSK”); NTN Bearing
Corporation of America, American NTN Bearing Manufacturing
Corporation and NTN Corporation (collectively “NTN”); and The
Timken Company (“Timken”), plaintiffs and defendant-intervenors,
that move pursuant to USCIT R. 56.2 for judgment upon the agency
record challenging various aspects of the United States Department
of Commerce, International Trade Administration’s (“Commerce”)
final results of administrative review of: (1) tapered roller
bearings and parts thereof, finished and unfinished, from Japan;
and (2) tapered roller bearings, four inches or less in outside
diameter, and components thereof, from Japan, entitled Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Termination
in Part of Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and
Unfinished, From Japan, and Tapered Roller Bearings, Four Inches or
Less in Outside Diameter, and Components Thereof, From Japan
(“Final Results”), 63 Fed. Reg. 20,585 (April 27, 1998).
Specifically, Koyo argues that Commerce: (1) failed to
calculate constructed value profit so that home market movement
expenses are excluded from the gross unit price; (2) erred in
Commerce’s decision to use the entered value of the subject
merchandise to determine assessment rates; (3) erred in Commerce’s
calculation of marine insurance charges; (4) erred in Commerce’s
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 2
calculation of certain constructed value commissions and direct
selling expenses; and (5) wrongly used Koyo’s product nomenclature
in Commerce’s computer program. NSK asserts that: (1) Commerce’s
model matching program is not supported by substantial evidence;
and (2) Commerce erred in determining NSK’s general and
administrative expenses factor in the cost of production
calculation. NTN alleges that Commerce erred in: (1) determining
that NTN’s sample and small-quantity home market sales are within
the ordinary course of trade; (2) denying an adjustment to NTN’s
United States indirect selling expenses for expenses purportedly
related to the financing of antidumping duty cash deposits; (3)
disallowing an adjustment to foreign market value for NTN’s home
market discounts; and (4) reallocating NTN’s selling expenses
without regard to level of trade and denying a level of trade
adjustment. Timken contends that Commerce: (1) erred by failing to
adjust Koyo’s further-manufactured import prices to reflect
inventory carrying costs associated with further-manufacturing in
the United States; and (2) committed a clerical error in
calculating NTN’s indirect selling expenses for United States
constructed export price sales.
Held: Koyo’s motion for judgment on the agency record is
granted in part and denied in part. NSK’s motion for judgment on
the agency record is granted in part and denied in part. NTN’s
motion for judgment on the agency record is denied. Timken’s
motion for judgment on the agency record is granted. Case is
remanded to Commerce to: (1) recalculate Koyo’s constructed value
profit so that Koyo’s home market movement expenses are deducted
from Koyo’s net home market price; (2) recalculate Koyo’s marine
insurance charges using the correct factor indicated by Koyo; (3)
recalculate Koyo’s constructed value using commission factor
provided by Koyo; (4) recalculate constructed value direct selling
expenses relying on the factor indicated in Koyo’s questionnaire
response; (5) enter necessary corrections and recalculate pertinent
parts of Commerce’s determination with respect to Koyo’s imports;
(6) recalculate Koyo’s United States inventory carrying costs for
final product by applying the appropriate inventory carrying costs
factor reported by Koyo to the landed cost for the 1992/93 period
of review and to the cost of manufacturing for the 1993/94 period
of review; (7) apply the correct general and administrative
expenses factor in Commerce’s calculation of NSK’s cost of
production; and (8) correct the computer program error with respect
to NTN’s sales. Commerce's final determination is affirmed in all
other respects.
[Koyo’s motion for judgment on the agency record is granted in part
and denied in part. NSK’s motion for judgment on the agency record
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 3
is granted in part and denied in part. NTN’s motion for judgment
on the agency record is denied. Timken’s motion for judgment on
the agency record is granted. Case remanded.]
Dated: February 1, 2002
Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy LLP (Peter O. Suchman, Neil
R. Ellis and Elizabeth C. Hafner) for Koyo, plaintiff and
defendant-intervenor.
Lipstein, Jaffe & Lawson, L.L.P. (Robert A. Lipstein, Matthew
P. Jaffe and Grace W. Lawson) for NSK, plaintiff and defendant-
intervenor.
Barnes, Richardson & Colburn (Donald J. Unger, Kazumune V.
Kano, David G. Forgue and Clarice K. M. McCauley) for NTN,
plaintiff and defendant-intervenor.
Stewart and Stewart (Terence P. Stewart, William A. Fennell
and Patrick J. McDonough) for Timken, plaintiff and defendant-
intervenor.
Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General; David M.
Cohen, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice (Lucius B. Lau); of counsel:
Joan L. Mackenzie and Barbara Campbell Potter, Office of the Chief
Counsel for Import Administration, United States Department of
Commerce, for defendant.
OPINION
TSOUCALAS, Senior Judge: This consolidated action
concerns the claims raised by: Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd. and Koyo
Corporation of USA (collectively “Koyo”); NSK Ltd. and NSK
Corporation (collectively “NSK”); NTN Bearing Corporation of
America, American NTN Bearing Manufacturing Corporation and NTN
Corporation (collectively “NTN”); and The Timken Company
(“Timken”), plaintiffs and defendant-intervenors, that move
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 4
pursuant to USCIT R. 56.2 for judgment upon the agency record
challenging various aspects of the United States Department of
Commerce, International Trade Administration’s (“Commerce”) final
results of administrative review of: (1) tapered roller bearings
and parts thereof, finished and unfinished, from Japan; and (2)
tapered roller bearings, four inches or less in outside diameter,
and components thereof, from Japan, entitled Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Termination in Part of
Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished,
From Japan, and Tapered Roller Bearings, Four Inches or Less in
Outside Diameter, and Components Thereof, From Japan (“Final
Results”), 63 Fed. Reg. 20,585 (April 27, 1998).
Specifically, Koyo argues that Commerce: (1) failed to
calculate constructed value profit so that home market movement
expenses are excluded from the gross unit price; (2) erred in
Commerce’s decision to use the entered value of the subject
merchandise to determine assessment rates; (3) erred in Commerce’s
calculation of marine insurance charges; (4) erred in Commerce’s
calculation of certain constructed value commissions and direct
selling expenses; and (5) wrongly used Koyo’s product nomenclature
in Commerce’s computer program. NSK asserts that: (1) Commerce’s
model matching program is not supported by substantial evidence;
and (2) Commerce erred in determining NSK’s general and
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 5
administrative expenses factor in the cost of production
calculation. NTN alleges that Commerce erred in: (1) determining
that NTN’s sample and small-quantity home market sales are within
the ordinary course of trade; (2) denying an adjustment to NTN’s
United States indirect selling expenses for expenses purportedly
related to the financing of antidumping duty cash deposits; (3)
disallowing an adjustment to foreign market value for NTN’s home
market discounts; and (4) reallocating NTN’s selling expenses
without regard to level of trade and denying a level of trade
adjustment. Timken contends that Commerce: (1) erred by failing to
adjust Koyo’s further-manufactured import prices to reflect
inventory carrying costs associated with further-manufacturing in
the United States; and (2) committed a clerical error in
calculating NTN’s indirect selling expenses for United States
constructed export price sales.
BACKGROUND
The administrative review at issue arose from two antidumping
orders: Antidumping Duty Order on Tapered Roller Bearings, Four
Inches or Less in Outside Diameter, and Components Thereof, From
Japan, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,974 (Aug. 18, 1976),1 and Antidumping Duty
1
The name of the document is given in accordance with the name
provided by the parties in their briefs. The document is: (1)
omitted from the print in Vol. 41 of the Federal Register; and (2)
unavailable in electronic legal databases.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 6
Order on Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and
Unfinished, From Japan, 52 Fed. Reg. 37,352 (Oct. 6, 1987). The
reviews for the period 1992-93 were initiated on November 17, 1993.
See Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Administrative Reviews, 58 Fed. Reg. 60,600 (Nov. 17, 1993). The
reviews for the period 1993-94 were initiated on November 14, 1994.
See Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Administrative Reviews, 59 Fed. Reg. 56,459 (Nov. 14, 1994).2 The
preliminary results of the reviews were published on May 20, 1996.
See Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews
and Termination in Part of Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts
Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From Japan, and Tapered Roller
Bearings, Four Inches or Less in Outside Diameter, and Components
Thereof, From Japan (“Preliminary Results”), 61 Fed. Reg. 25,200.
The final results of the reviews were published on April 27, 1998.
See Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,585.
JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 19
2
Since the administrative reviews at issue were initiated
before January 1, 1995, the applicable law is the antidumping
statute as it existed prior to the amendments made by the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
See Torrington Co. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 7
U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1994) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1994).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a challenge to Commerce’s final determination in
an antidumping administrative review, the Court will uphold
Commerce’s determination unless it is “unsupported by substantial
evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law .
. . .” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1994).
I. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TEST
Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence “is something less
than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial
evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620
(1966) (citations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the [agency] when the choice is
‘between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would
justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 8
it de novo.’” American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 8 CIT
20, 22, 590 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (1984) (quoting Penntech Papers,
Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1983) (quoting, in turn,
Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488)).
II. CHEVRON TWO-STEP ANALYSIS
To determine whether Commerce’s interpretation and application
of the antidumping statute is “in accordance with law,” the Court
must undertake the two-step analysis prescribed by Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (“Chevron”), 467
U.S. 837 (1984). Under the first step, the Court reviews
Commerce’s construction of a statutory provision to determine
whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.” Id. at 842. “To ascertain whether Congress had an
intention on the precise question at issue, [the Court] employ[s]
the ‘traditional tools of statutory construction.’” Timex V.I.,
Inc. v. United States, 157 F.3d 879, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9). “The first and foremost ‘tool’ to
be used is the statute’s text, giving it its plain meaning.
Because a statute’s text is Congress’s final expression of its
intent, if the text answers the question, that is the end of the
matter.” Id. (citations omitted). Beyond the statute’s text, the
tools of statutory construction “include the statute’s structure,
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 9
canons of statutory construction, and legislative history.” Id.
(citations omitted); but see Floral Trade Council v. United States,
23 CIT ___,___ n.6, 41 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323 n.6 (1999) (noting that
“[n]ot all rules of statutory construction rise to the level of a
canon, however”) (citation omitted).
If, after employing the first prong of Chevron, the Court
determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the Court becomes whether
Commerce’s construction of the statute is permissible. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Essentially, this is an inquiry into the
reasonableness of Commerce’s interpretation. See Fujitsu Gen. Ltd.
v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Provided
Commerce has acted rationally, the Court may not substitute its
judgment for the agency’s. See Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States,
36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that “a court must
defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute even if
the court might have preferred another”); see also IPSCO, Inc. v.
United States, 965 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The “[C]ourt
will sustain the determination if it is reasonable and supported by
the record as a whole, including whatever fairly detracts from the
substantiality of the evidence.” Negev Phosphates, Ltd. v. United
States, 12 CIT 1074, 1077, 699 F. Supp. 938, 942 (1988) (citations
omitted). In determining whether Commerce’s interpretation is
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 10
reasonable, the Court considers the following non-exclusive list of
factors: the express terms of the provisions at issue, the
objectives of those provisions and the objectives of the
antidumping scheme as a whole. See Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. v.
United States, 22 CIT 541, 545, 15 F. Supp. 2d 807, 813 (1998).
DISCUSSION
I. COMMERCE ’S DECISION TO USE ENTERED VALUE OF THE
SUBJECT MERCHANDISE TO DETERMINE ASSESSMENT RATES
As a preliminary matter, Commerce raises two affirmative
defenses to the particular claim. Specifically, Commerce asserts
that the plaintiff on the claim, Koyo: (1) has failed to exhaust
plaintiff’s administrative remedies, see Def.’s Resp. Partial Opp’n
Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Pls. Koyo J. Agency R. (“Def.’s Resp.
Koyo”) at 11; and (2) is precluded from litigating the issue by the
Court’s ruling in Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 16 CIT 539, 796
F. Supp. 1526 (1992) under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
See Def.’s Resp. Koyo at 11-12.
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
1. Background
The exhaustion doctrine requires a party to present its claims
to the relevant administrative agency for the agency’s
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 11
consideration before raising these claims to the Court. See
Unemployment Compensation Comm’n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143,
155 (1946) (“A reviewing court usurps the agency’s function when it
sets aside the administrative determination upon a ground not
theretofore presented and deprives the [agency] of an opportunity
to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for
its action”). There is, however, no absolute requirement of
exhaustion in the Court of International Trade in non-
classification cases. See Alhambra Foundry Co. v. United States,
12 CIT 343, 346-47, 685 F. Supp. 1252, 1255-56 (1988). Section
2637(d) of Title 28 directs that “the Court of International Trade
shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative
remedies.” By its use of the phrase “where appropriate,” Congress
vested discretion in the Court to determine the circumstances under
which it shall require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
See Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 133 F.3d 897, 905 (Fed. Cir.
1998). Therefore, because of “judicial discretion in not requiring
litigants to exhaust administrative remedies,” the Court is
authorized to determine proper exceptions to the doctrine of
exhaustion. Alhambra Foundry, 12 CIT at 347, 685 F. Supp. at 1256
(citing Timken Co. v. United States, 10 CIT 86, 93, 630 F. Supp.
1327, 1334 (1986), rev’d in part on other grounds, Koyo Seiko Co.
v. United States, 20 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 12
In the past, the Court has exercised its discretion to obviate
exhaustion where: (1) requiring it would be futile, see Rhone
Poulenc, S.A. v. United States, 7 CIT 133, 135, 583 F. Supp. 607,
610 (1984) (in those cases when “it appears that it would have been
futile for plaintiffs to argue that the agency should not apply its
own regulation”), or would be “inequitable and an insistence of a
useless formality” as in the case where “there is no relief which
plaintiff may be granted at the administrative level,” United
States Cane Sugar Refiners’ Ass’n v. Block, 3 CIT 196, 201, 544 F.
Supp. 883, 887 (1982); (2) a subsequent court decision has
interpreted existing law after the administrative determination at
issue was published, and the new decision might have materially
affected the agency’s actions, see Timken, 10 CIT at 93, 630 F.
Supp. at 1334; (3) the question is one of law and does not require
further factual development and, therefore, the court does not
invade the province of the agency by considering the question, see
id.; R.R. Yardmasters of Am. v. Harris, 721 F.2d 1332, 1337-39
(D.C. Cir. 1983); and (4) the plaintiff had no reason to suspect
that the agency would refuse to adhere to clearly applicable
precedent. See Philipp Bros., Inc. v. United States, 10 CIT 76,
79-80, 630 F. Supp. 1317, 1321 (1986).
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 13
2. Contentions of the Parties
Commerce asserts that Koyo failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies. Pointing to the Preliminary Results, 61
Fed. Reg. at 25,205, that “set forth [Commerce’s] assessment rate
methodology” as well as Commerce’s “briefing and hearing schedule,”
Commerce contends that parties to the review had to “raise[]
[their] concerns about [Commerce’s] assessment rate methodology”
prior to Commerce’s issuance of the Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg.
20,585. Def.’s Resp. Koyo at 11 (citing Final Results, 63 Fed.
Reg. at 20,590-91 and relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) (“the Court .
. . shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustion of
administrative remedies”) and McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140,
145 (1992) (“Exhaustion concerns apply with particular force when
the action under review involves exercise of the agency’s
discretionary power or when the agency proceedings in question
allow the agency to apply its special expertise” (citations
omitted)).
Timken supports Commerce and points out that Commerce’s method
of calculating assessment rates was in accordance with law. See
Timken’s Resp. Mot. J. Agency R. Filed by Koyo, NTN and NSK
(“Timken’s Resp.”) at 6-7.
Koyo maintains that, under the “futility” exception, “[t]he
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exhaustion doctrine does not[] . . . preclude Koyo from raising
this issue.” Koyo’s Reply Br. Supp. Mot. J. Agency R. (“Koyo’s
Reply”) at 3-4 (citing Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de
Flores v. United States, 916 F.2d 1571, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“A
party need not exhaust his administrative remedies where invoking
such remedies would be futile”) and Koyo Seiko Co., 16 CIT at 544,
796 F. Supp. at 1531). Specifically, Koyo alleges that it would be
futile for Koyo to raise the issue before Commerce because of: (1)
Commerce’s practice of using the methodology challenged by Koyo;
and (2) the Court’s ruling on the issue in Koyo Seiko Co., 16 CIT
539, 796 F. Supp. 1526.
3. Analysis
While Koyo errs in a part of its reasoning,3 Koyo is correct
in its conclusion. Indeed the very fact that Commerce had employed
the methodology at issue during the past reviews notwithstanding
analogous challenges to the methodology submitted during those
3
The Court’s ruling on the issue in Koyo Seiko Co., 16 CIT
539, 796 F. Supp. 1526, is irrelevant to the futility exception to
administrative exhaustion. “As a general rule, courts may ‘refuse
to require administrative exhaustion when resort to the
administrative remedy would be futile . . . .’” Koyo Seiko, Co.,
16 CIT at 544, 796 F. Supp. at 1531 (quoting Asociacion Colombiana
de Exportadores de Flores, 916 F.2d at 1575, quoting, in turn,
Bendure v. United States, 554 F.2d 427, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1977),
emphasis supplied); see also United States Cane Sugar Refiners’
Ass’n, 3 CIT at 201, 544 F. Supp. at 887.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 15
reviews, see, e.g., Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews of Tapered Roller Hearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and
Unfinished, From Japan and Tapered Roller Bearings, Four Inches or
Less in Outside Diameter, and Components Thereof, From Japan, 58
Fed. Reg. 64,720, 64,731 (Dec. 9, 1993), rendered a challenge by
Koyo during the review at issue futile. See Von Hoffburg v.
Alexander, 615 F.2d 633, 638 (1980) (stating that the exhaustion is
futile if an agency: (1) consistently applies the challenged policy
or methodology; (2) issues rules, regulations or bulletins
promulgating such policy or methodology; and (3) rejects similar
challenges); see also Rhone Poulenc, S.A., 7 CIT at 135, 583 F.
Supp. at 610; United States Cane Sugar Refiners’ Ass’n, 3 CIT at
201, 544 F. Supp. at 887. Therefore, Koyo is not barred from
raising this issue before the Court.
B. Collateral Estoppel
1. Background
Collateral estoppel doctrine provides that “an issue of
ultimate fact . . . determined by a valid judgment, . . . cannot be
again litigated between the same parties [or their privies] in
future litigation.” BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (6th ed. 1990) (citing
City of St. Joseph v. Johnson, 539 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976)). In other words,
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 16
Collateral estoppel scans the first action and takes note
of each issue decided. Then if the second action,
although based on a different cause of action, attempts
to reintroduce the same issue, collateral estoppel
intervenes to preclude its relitigation and to bind the
party, against whom the doctrine is being invoked, to the
way the issue was decided in the first action.
DAVID D. SIEGEL , NEW YORK PRACTICE 715-16 (3d ed. 1999).
For example, if a plaintiff enters a contract with several
defendants who, upon the plaintiff’s suit for one installment under
the contract, are deemed jointly liable to the plaintiff, such
defendants are collaterally estopped from claiming several
liability when the plaintiff sues them for the next installment
under the contract. See id. at 716 (referring to Schuylkill Fuel
Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304 (1929)).
In contrast, the doctrine of stare decisis, “which makes the
common law what it is,” id. at 724, provides that “[once the] court
has . . . laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to
all future cases, where facts are substantially the same;
regardless of whether the parties and property are the same.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Horne v. Moody, 146
S.W.2d 505, 509-10 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)).
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 17
2. Contentions of the Parties
Commerce asserts that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
applies to the issue because
“(i) the issue previously adjudicated [in Koyo Seiko Co.,
16 CIT 539, 796 F. Supp. 1526] is identical with that now
presented, (ii) that issue was ‘actually litigated’ in
the prior case, (iii) the previous determination of that
issue was necessary to the end-decision then made, and
(iv) the party precluded was fully represented in the
prior action.”
Def.’s Reply Koyo at 12 (quoting PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States,
978 F.2d 1232, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1992), citation omitted, and relying
on RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982)).
Koyo contends that Commerce’s reliance on the doctrine of
collateral estoppel is: (1) misplaced because “[p]arties . . .
frequently continue to contest issues previously ruled on by [a]
[c]ourt [of original jurisdiction] until the matter has been
ultimately resolved by [a] [c]ourt of [a]ppel[late jurisdiction],”
Koyo’s Reply at 4-5; and (2) “ironic [because Commerce] . . .
itself has made a regular practice of disregarding decisions of
[the] [c]ourt until the matter at issue is resolved by [t]he
[c]ourt of [a]ppeals.” Id. at 5.
3. Analysis
The Court is equally amused with the arguments offered by both
parties. Koyo’s innovative test effectively makes the doctrine of
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 18
collateral estoppel: (1) dependent on an affirmation by an
appellate court (thus, automatically placing all original
jurisdiction cases out of the realm of the doctrine); and (2)
inapplicable under some concept of “validation of illegal acts
through vigilante violations” that is unknown to the Court.
A more conventional test offered by Commerce lists four
elements of collateral estoppel: “(i) the issue previously
adjudicated is identical with that presented[;] (ii) that issue was
‘actually litigated’ in the prior case[;] (iii) the previous
determination of that issue was necessary to the end-decision then
made[;] and (iv) the party precluded was fully represented in the
prior action.” Def.’s Reply Koyo at 12. The Court agrees with
Commerce that these elements are indeed indispensable to any
analysis of collateral estoppel doctrine. The list offered by
Commerce is, however, not exhaustive: There are two other elements
that must be satisfied to trigger the application of the doctrine.
One of these elements provides that the party to be estopped in the
second action must either be the same party that lost in the first
action or someone “in strict privity” with the losing party. In
the given case, this element is satisfied because Koyo’s motion
against Commerce was denied in Koyo Seiko Co., 16 CIT 539, 796 F.
Supp. 1526.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 19
The final element is best summarized by Judge Cardozo, who
stated that
[a] judgment in one action is conclusive in a later one
. . . when the two causes of action have such a measure
of identity that a different judgment in the second would
destroy or impair rights or interests established by the
first . . . .
Schuylkill Fuel Corp., 250 N.Y. at 306 (emphasis supplied).
This final element is not present in the case at bar. Indeed,
if, in this case, the Court holds differently from its decision in
Koyo Seiko Co., 16 CIT 539, 796 F. Supp. 1526, such holding would
not and could not destroy or impair any rights or interests
established in Koyo Seiko Co., 16 CIT 539, 796 F. Supp. 1526 (that
dealt with Commerce’s determination in Final Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Reviews of Antifriction Bearings (Other Than
Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From Japan, 56 Fed. Reg.
31,754 (July 11, 1991), a determination entirely different from
that made in the Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,585). While indeed
Koyo Seiko Co., 16 CIT 539, 796 F. Supp. 1526, created a precedent
on the issue under the doctrine of stare decisis, it clearly cannot
collaterally prevent Koyo’s challenge in this case under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. Commerce simply fails to
appreciate the distinction between the doctrines.4
4
If Commerce’s circumcised test for collateral estoppel was
operable, the judicial docket would indeed be greatly relieved,
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 20
C. Use of Entered Value in Order to
Determine Assessment Rates
Commerce’s use of entered value for the purpose of determining
assessment rate was approved by the Court in Koyo Seiko Co., 16 CIT
539, 796 F. Supp. 1526, and Koyo Seiko, Co. v. United States, 24
CIT ___, 110 F. Supp. 2d 934 (2000), aff’d, Koyo Seiko, Co. v.
United States, 258 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Because the
arguments at issue in this case (same as the parties) are
practically identical to those presented in Koyo Seiko Co., 16 CIT
539, 796 F. Supp. 1526, and Koyo Seiko, Co., 24 CIT ___, 110 F.
Supp. 2d 934, the Court adheres to its reasoning as it is stated in
these cases.
II. COMMERCE ’S INCLUSION OF HOME MARKET MOVEMENT EXPENSES
IN THE CALCULATION OF CONSTRUCTED VALUE PROFIT
A. Background
In the Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. at 20,608, Commerce, while
recalculating Koyo’s reported constructed value (“CV”) profit,
included movement expenses in the per-unit profit amount. In order
to calculate the per-unit CV profit amount, Commerce defined the
term “profit” as a difference between adjusted gross unit price and
Koyo’s reported cost of production (“COP”). See id. Then, for
although to a detriment of parties stripped from their
constitutional right to a day in court.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 21
each model of the merchandise, Commerce multiplied the per-unit
profit amount and COP by the total quantity sold in order to
calculate model-specific profit and COP amounts. See id. The
ratio of total profit for all models to the total COP for all
models was used by Commerce as the profit ratio for the purpose of
calculating CV. See id.
As Koyo observes, see Koyo’s Mem. at 9-10, and Commerce
acknowledges, see Def.’s Resp. Koyo at 8, Commerce did not take
into account the fact that movement expenses were included in the
gross-unit price but were not included in the COP. Koyo’s reported
gross-unit price included various selling expenses (including
movement expenses, that is, both home market pre-sale inland
freight and home market post-sale inland freight), whereas Koyo’s
reported COP did not include movement expenses, even though it did
include the cost of manufacture (“COM”), selling, general and
administrative (“SG&A”) expenses, interest and packing. See id.
Therefore, Commerce omitted to consider the fact that all the
expenses (except for the movement expenses) included in Koyo’s
gross-unit price were mirrored in Koyo’s COP calculation.
Consequently, the amount reached by Commerce that represented the
difference between the gross-unit price and COP and intended by
Commerce to be Koyo’s CV profit was, in fact, the CV profit plus
Koyo’s movement expenses.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 22
Koyo contends that movement expenses should be deducted from
“the net home market price to ensure an accurate CV profit
calculation.” Koyo’s Mem. at 11. Commerce concurs with Koyo. See
Def.’s Resp. Koyo at 8. As both parties correctly observed, a
nearly identical issue was dealt by the Court in FAG Kugelfischer
Georg Schafer AG v. United States (“FAG Kugelfischer”), 19 CIT 634
(1995). Indeed, following FAG Kugelfischer, 19 CIT 634, Commerce’s
practice is to “deduct certain home market expenses (which are not
included in the total . . . COP) from net unit price” for the
purpose of calculating CV profit. Therefore, the issue is remanded
to Commerce to recalculate Koyo’s CV profit so that Koyo’s home
market movement expenses are deducted from Koyo’s net home market
price.
III. COMMERCE ERROR IN CALCULATION OF MARINE INSURANCE CHARGES
Koyo contends that Commerce relied upon an erroneous marine
insurance factor in the Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. at 20,610-11.
See Koyo Mem. at 14. Specifically, Koyo argues that Commerce
calculated an amount for marine insurance charges for sales of
further-processed merchandise by doing the following: (1)
subtracting the custom duties from landed cost; and (2) multiplying
the result by a certain factor, the use of which was inappropriate
for the calculation. See id. Commerce agrees with Koyo’s
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 23
observation. See Def.’s Resp. Koyo at 16. Therefore, the issue is
remanded to Commerce to recalculate Koyo’s marine insurance charges
using the correct factor indicated by Koyo. Accord Koyo’s Mem. at
14 (proprietary version).
IV. COMMERCE ’S CALCULATION OF CONSTRUCTED VALUE
RELYING UPON BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE
During the administrative review, Commerce calculated CV for
a particular part of the merchandise imported by Koyo relying upon
best information available, operating under the impression that
Koyo did not provide Commerce with CV commission factor. Final
Results, 63 Fed. Reg. at 20,596-98. Koyo, however, reported CV
commission factor. See Koyo’s Mem. at 15-16; Def.’s Resp. Koyo at
16. It follows that Commerce erred in using an incorrect
commission expense factor in order to calculate CV for the
merchandise at issue. Therefore, the issue is remanded to Commerce
to recalculate Koyo’s CV using commission factor provided by Koyo.
V. COMMERCE ’S CALCULATION OF CONSTRUCTED VALUE DIRECT SELLING EXPENSES
During the administrative review, Commerce applied a certain
direct selling expense ratio in order to calculate the CV of
particular merchandise imported by Koyo. While the factor used by
Commerce should have been the sum of warranty and imputed credit
expenses that were indicated in Koyo’s questionnaire response,
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 24
Commerce used a factor inappropriate for the calculation. See id.
Therefore, the issue is remanded to Commerce to recalculate CV
direct selling expenses relying on the factor indicated in Koyo’s
questionnaire response.
VI. COMMERCE ’S USE OF COMPUTER PROGRAM CONCERNING PRODUCT NOMENCLATURE
In the Final Results, Commerce corrected an input error that
Koyo made in Koyo’s reported data for the nomenclature of a
particular product. See Def.’s Resp. Koyo at 17. While making
this correction, however, Commerce did the following: (1)
improperly transcribed the product nomenclature for two types of
entries by erroneously entering a certain letter in place of a
certain number; and (2) entering a double slash symbol instead of
a single slash symbol between certain denominations that
transcribed the nomenclature of a particular product. See id.
Moreover, Commerce entered a certain correction language too early
in the computer program, consequently instructing the computer to
enter the correction for a certain model before a necessary
variable came to exist in the program. See id. at 17-18. As a
result of placing the correction language prior to the importation
of the necessary data, the program produced erroneous results. See
id. Therefore, this issue is remanded to Commerce to enter
necessary corrections and recalculate pertinent parts of Commerce’s
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 25
determination with respect to Koyo’s imports.
VII. COMMERCE 'S CALCULATION OF INVENTORY CARRYING COSTS
FOR FURTHER -MANUFACTURED UNITED STATES SALES
A. Background
During the review at issue, Commerce calculated two separate
inventory carrying costs for Koyo’s further-manufactured United
States sales: (1) an inventory carrying cost that reflected the
amount of time unfinished product spent in inventory in Koyo’s home
market; and (2) an inventory carrying cost that reflected the
amount of time the finished product at issue spent in inventory in
the United States. See Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. at 20,600.
Commerce did not calculate an inventory carrying cost from the time
that Koyo’s subsidiary purchased the unfinished product until the
time that the unfinished product was processed into the finished
product at issue See Def.’s Resp. Partial Opp’n Timken’s Mem.
Supp. Rule 56.2 Mot. J. Agency R. (“Def.’s Resp. Timken”) at 12-13.
B. Contentions of the Parties
Relying on 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(2) (1988) and Koyo Seiko Co.
v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and pointing out
that “[i]nventory carrying cost measures the imputed cost incurred
by a company for storing merchandise in inventory,” Commerce
asserts that it acted properly when Commerce calculated the
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 26
inventory carrying costs in the above-stated manner. Id. at 12
(quoting Thai Pineapple Pub. Co. v. United States, 20 CIT 1312,
1329, 946 F. Supp. 11, 26 (1996), rev’d, Thai Pineapple Pub. Co. v.
United States, 187 F.3d 1362 (1999). Specifically, Commerce
maintains that because the product in question was
further-manufactured, separate inventory periods existed. See id.
at 14. Commerce further explains that its policy is "to make an
[inventory carrying costs] adjustment to [United States price] for
only finished goods in inventory because unfinished goods represent
production expenses rather than [United States] selling expenses.”
Id. (quoting Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. at 20,600, and relying on
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Dynamic
Random Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit or Above From
the Republic of Korea, 61 Fed. Reg. 20,216, 20,221 (May 6, 1996)).
Commerce notes that Timken’s assertion that Commerce “deducted only
the inventory carrying cost attributable to the imported portion of
the merchandise, not the [United States] portion" is only partially
correct and does not render Commerce’s calculations wrongful. Id.
at 14-15. In sum, Commerce: (1) reads Timken's challenge as a
statement that the whole of further-manufactured merchandise is
kept in inventory pending sale, not just the imported parts; and
(2) points out that the “inquiry, however, is not whether
[merchandise] physically remains in inventory. Rather, the
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 27
pertinent question is whether time spent in inventory represents a
selling expense or a production expense.” Id. at 15.
Koyo supports Commerce’s assertions and points out that, while
“Timken’s argument . . . is brief and rather cryptic,” Koyo’s Mem.
Resp. Timken’s Mot. J. Agency R. (“Koyo Resp. Timken”) at 7, the
two readings of Timken’s argument that Koyo envisions, namely: (1)
the argument asserting that Koyo’s inventory carrying costs should
be calculated for the time period in which the unfinished product
was held by Koyo’s subsidiary as raw material inventory; or (2) the
argument that Koyo’s inventory carrying costs for the time period
during which the finished product was held in Koyo’s inventory
prior to sale should be included among the expenses deducted from
Koyo’s United States price, see id. at 8-9, are erroneous because:
(1) “[i]n the first case, the proposed calculation would double
count the expense[;] while [(2)] in the second case[,] [Commerce]
has already” included among the expenses deducted from Koyo’s
United States price the amount of Koyo’s inventory carrying costs
for the time period during which the finished product was held in
Koyo’s inventory. Id. at 10.
Timken, however, states that Timken “is not arguing that
Commerce erred in [the above discussed] respect.” Timken’s Reply
Resps. Timken’s Mot. J. Agency R. (“Timken’s Reply Commerce”) at 3
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 28
n.1. “The crux of Timken’s argument . . . is . . . that the method
of calculation of the [United States inventory carrying costs]
identified by Koyo” itself was not consistently implemented in the
way corresponding to Koyo’s questionnaire response. Id. at 2
(proprietary version).
C. Analysis
The Court agrees with Timken’s argument. While Koyo’s
formulae satisfy the requirements of the statute, factual data
reveals that Koyo’s application of the formulae suffers of
inconsistency. See id. at 3-4 (proprietary version, 1992/93 and
1993/94 tables). Therefore, the issue is remanded to Commerce to
recalculate Koyo’s United States inventory carrying costs for final
product by applying the appropriate inventory carrying costs factor
reported by Koyo to the landed cost for the 1992/93 period of
review (“POR”) and to the COM for the 1993/94 POR.
VIII. COMMERCE 'S MODEL MATCHING PROGRAM
A. Background
During the review at issue, Commerce relied upon the
“sum-of-the-deviations” (“SUMDEV”) methodology to rank NSK’s
similar home market models of the merchandise as potential matches
to United States models of the merchandise. See Def.’s Resp.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 29
Partial Opp’n Mem. P. & A. Supp. NSK’s Mot. J. Agency R. (“Def.’s
Resp. NSK”) at 5; NSK’s Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Agency R. (“NSK’s
Reply”) at 2-3. Using the SUMDEV methodology, the model with the
smallest SUMDEV is deemed the most similar. See Koyo Seiko Co. v.
United States, 66 F.3d 1204, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In cases where
the SUMDEV of two models is the same, the program determines the
most-similar model based upon a series of “tie breakers”: (1) level
of trade; then (2) the deviation in cost of production (“COSTDEV”);
and then (3) NSK’s alpha-numeric product nomenclature. See Def.’s
Resp. NSK at 5-6; NSK’s Reply at 3-4.
The review at issue presented Commerce with a model, the
matching process of which reached the last tier of the “tie
breaking” process, namely, the comparison of NSK’s alpha-numeric
product nomenclature. NSK’s designation of the model to be matched
is comprised of fourteen various symbols (the one like
ABCDEFGHIJKLMN), inclusive of but not limited to numeric and letter
symbols. See id.
In the process of matching, Commerce’s computer executed two
operations. See id. First, the computer created a list of models
to be matched with the model at issue. The list created included
two models, one having nine various symbols (the one like
ABCDEFGHI) and another having eleven symbols, with identical first
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 30
nine symbols (the one like ABCDEFGHIJ*). See id. Commerce’s
computer, however, listed the eleven-symbols model prior to the
nine-symbols model, effectively creating a “backwards” list that:
(1) deviated from all other lists Commerce’s computer created for
all other NSK’s models; and (2) presented a list opposite to those
commonly used in listing compilations, e.g., dictionaries that list
such a word as “work” prior to the word “worker.” See id.
Second, Commerce’s computer matched the model at issue (the
one like ABCDEFGHIJKLMN) to the eleven-symbols model (the one like
ABCDEFGHIJ*) that was, as stated above, listed prior to the nine-
symbols model (the one like ABCDEFGHI). See id. The model at
issue had the same first ten symbols as the eleven-symbols model
(and, obviously, the very same first nine symbols as the nine-
symbols one).
B. Contentions of the Parties
NSK argues that Commerce’s computer program made an error by
matching the model at issue to the eleven-symbols one rather than
to the nine-symbols one. See NSK’s Reply at 3-4. Specifically,
NSK contends that, because the nine-symbols model (the one like
ABCDEFGHI) should have been listed prior to the eleven-symbols one
(the one like ABCDEFGHIJ*), the computer program should have
matched the model at issue (the one like ABCDEFGHIJKLMN) to the
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 31
model that should have been the first on the list (the one like
ABCDEFGHI). See id. In support of its contention, NSK points to
all other lists created by Commerce’s computer program that
correctly listed the models with less symbols (the one like 12345)
prior to those models that were designated first with the symbols
identical to the less-symbols models and then, in addition, with a
number of following symbols (the ones like 12345ABC). See id. at
4.
Commerce asserts that Commerce’s matching program was not in
error. Commerce points out that the “program matched identical
nomenclature out to the tenth place . . ., rather than the ninth
place . . . [because the eleven-symbols] home market model [chosen
by the computer] is more similar to [the model at issue] based upon
model names.” Def.’s Resp. NSK at 6-7.
C. Analysis
The Court agrees with Commerce. While NSK is correct in its
contention that the nine-symbols model (the one like ABCDEFGHI)
should have been listed by the program prior to the eleven-symbols
model (the one like ABCDEFGHIJ*), this error is not dispositive
with regard to the outcome of the inquiry. The gist of the inquiry
is to find models that match to the highest degree. The model at
issue (the one like ABCDEFGHIJKLMN) is certainly more like the
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 32
eleven-symbols model (the one like ABCDEFGHIJ*) than the nine-
symbols model (the one like ABCDEFGHI). The mere fact that the
initial comparative list was created in a “backwards” order does
not detract from the fact that the model at issue and the eleven-
symbols model have the first ten symbols identical, while the model
at issue and the nine-symbols model have only nine identical
symbols. Because NSK failed to demonstrate the error in the
conclusion reached by Commerce’s computer program, the Court holds
that Commerce’s conclusion was correct.
IX. COMMERCE ’S CALCULATION OF A REVISED COST OF PRODUCTION
In order to calculate NSK’s COP, Commerce revised NSK’s
general and administrative (“G&A”) expenses to account for certain
non-operating gains and losses. Following the revision, Commerce:
(1) decreased NSK’s G&A factor accordingly; and (2) implemented the
change in Commerce’s calculation of NSK’s COP. See NSK’s Mem. P.
& A. Supp. Mot. J. Agency R. (“NSK’s Mem.”) at 4. Commerce,
however, erred while implementing the latter changes. See id.; see
also Def.’s Resp. NSK at 7. The issue is, therefore, remanded to
Commerce to apply the correct G&A expenses factor in Commerce’s
calculation of NSK’s COP.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 33
X. COMMERCE ’S DETERMINATION THAT SAMPLE AND SMALL -QUANTITY HOME
MARKET SALES ARE WITHIN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF TRADE
A. Background
Under the pre-URAA law, fair market value (“FMV”) was defined
as “the price . . . at which such or similar merchandise is sold
or, in the absence of sales, offered for sale in the principal
markets of the country from which exported, in the usual commercial
quantities and in the ordinary course of trade for home consumption
. . . . 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis supplied). The
term “ordinary course of trade” was, in turn, defined as
the conditions and practices which, for a reasonable time
prior to the exportation of the merchandise . . . , have
been normal in the trade under consideration with respect
to merchandise of the same class or kind.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(15) (1988).
While the language of § 1677(15) indicates that various types
of sales could be considered outside the ordinary course of trade,5
5
A later clarification came in the Statement of
Administrative Action (“SAA”), accompanying the URAA. SAA provides
that, aside from §§ 1677b(b)(1) and (f)(2) (1994) transactions,
Commerce may consider other types of sales or
transactions to be outside the ordinary course of trade
when such sales or transactions have characteristics
that are not ordinary as compared to sales or
transactions generally made in the same market. Examples
of such sales or transactions include merchandise
produced according to unusual product specifications,
merchandise sold at aberrational prices, or merchandise
sold pursuant to unusual terms of sale. As under
existing law, [the pertinent] section . . . does not
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 34
Commerce’s regulations (of the pertinent period of time) did not
provide any further clarification of the phrase “ordinary course of
trade.” See 19 C.F.R. § 353.46(b) (1994) (providing a definition
that mirrored the statutory one).
In the Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. at 20,588, Commerce
determined that NTN’s sample and small-quantity home market sales
were within the ordinary course of trade. Consequently, Commerce
used these sales for purposes of determining FMV. Commerce’s
decision was based on Commerce’s determination that NTN failed to
provide Commerce with any information other than a general
description of those sales that, according to NTN, fell outside the
ordinary course of trade. See Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. at
20,588. Specifically, Commerce concluded that there was “no
evidence supporting the notion that NTN’s sample sales were sold
only for the purpose of allowing the customer to make a decision to
buy” as well as “no evidence supporting NTN’s categorization of its
‘small-quantity’ sales as abnormal, other than the fact that they
establish an exhaustive list, but the Administration
intends that Commerce will interpret [this] section . .
. in a manner which will avoid basing normal value on
sales which are extraordinary for the market in question,
particularly when the use of such sales would lead to
irrational or unrepresentative results.
H.R. DOC. 103-316, at 834 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4171 (emphasis supplied).
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 35
were small-quantity . . . .” Id. at 20,588 (emphasis supplied).
B. Contentions of the Parties
NTN contends that Commerce erred in Commerce’s determination
that NTN’s sample and small-quantity home market sales were within
the ordinary course of trade. See NTN’s Mot. Mem. Supp. J. Agency
R. (“NTN’s Mem.”) at 5-7; NTN’s Reply Mem. Def.’s and Def.-
Intervenor’s May 28, 1999 Resp. Mem. Mot. J. Agency R. (“NTN’s
Reply”) at 2-4. Specifically, NTN asserts that: (1) “[t]here is
more than adequate information on the record to establish [that]
these . . . sales were outside the ordinary course of trade”; and
(2) Commerce erred in Commerce’s decision to assess “whether
[NTN’s] sale is ‘abnormal or aberrational.’” NTN’s Resp. at 2-4.
Commerce maintains that its determination that NTN’s sales at
issue were within the ordinary course of trade was supported by
substantial evidence since NTN provided Commerce with nothing but
a general description of the sales. See Def.’s Resp. Opp’n Pl.
NTN’s Mot. Mem. Supp. J. Agency R. (“Def.’s Resp. NTN”) at 21-26.
Timken supports Commerce’s assertion and states that NTN failed to
satisfy NTN’s burden to demonstrate that NTN’s sample sales and
small-quantity sales were outside the ordinary course of trade.
See Timken’s Resp. at 9-11.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 36
C. Analysis
The purpose of the ordinary course of trade provision “is to
prevent dumping margins from being based on sales which are not
representative . . . .” Monsanto Co. v. United States, 12 CIT 937,
940, 698 F. Supp. 275, 278 (1988). Accordingly, “Commerce must
evaluate not just one factor taken in isolation but rather . . .
all the circumstances particular to the sales in question,’”
CEMEX, S.A., 133 F.3d at 900 (citation omitted), and the burden
rests with the plaintiff to provide Commerce with sufficient
evidence showing that the sales used in Commerce’s calculations are
outside the ordinary course of trade. See Nachi-Fujikoshi Corp. v.
United States, 16 CIT 606, 608, 798 F. Supp. 716, 718 (1992). In
the absence of adequate evidence to the contrary, Commerce
considers sales within the ordinary course of trade. See
Torrington Co. v. United States, 127 F.3d 1077, 1081 (Fed. Cir.
1997). Thus, a determination of whether a sale or transaction is
outside the ordinary course of trade is a question of fact,6 and
6
Because neither the statutory language nor the legislative
history explicitly establishes what is considered to be outside the
“ordinary course of trade,” the Court assesses whether Commerce’s
interpretation or application is reasonable and in accordance with
the legislative purpose on a case-by-case basis. See Chevron, 467
U.S. at 843. “In determining whether Commerce’s interpretation is
reasonable, the Court considers, among other factors, the express
terms of the provisions at issue, the objectives of those
provisions and the objectives of the antidumping scheme as a
whole.” Mitsubishi, 22 CIT at 545, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 813. The
purpose of the ordinary course of trade provision is “to prevent
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 37
Commerce has the discretion to interpret § 1677(15) and to
determine which sales are outside the ordinary course of trade.
See Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. v. United States (“Mitsubishi”), 22 CIT
541, 568, 15 F. Supp. 2d 807, 830 (1998) (“Congress granted
Commerce discretion to decide under what circumstances . . . sales
would be considered to be outside of the ordinary course of
trade.”); cf. Koenig & Bauer-Albert AG v. United States, 22 CIT
574, 589 n.8, 15 F. Supp. 2d 834, 850 n.8 (1998) (noting that
although Commerce has the discretion to decide under what
circumstances highly profitable sales are outside of the ordinary
course of trade, “Commerce may not impose this requirement
arbitrarily, . . . nor may Commerce impose impossible burdens of
proof on claimants” and citing NEC Home Elecs. v. United States, 54
F.3d 736, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1995) “(holding that burden imposed to
prove a level of trade adjustment was unreasonable because claimant
could, under no practical circumstances, meet the burden)”). In
making this determination, Commerce considers not just “one factor
taken in isolation but rather . . . all the circumstances
particular to the sales in question.” Murata Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 17 CIT 259, 264, 820 F. Supp. 603, 607 (1993) (citation
omitted). Commerce’s methodology for deciding when sales are
dumping margins from being based on sales which are not
representative” of the home market. Monsanto Co., 12 CIT at 940,
698 F. Supp. at 278.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 38
outside the “ordinary course of trade” has been to examine, on a
case-by-case basis, the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the sale or transaction in question to determine whether the sale
or transaction is extraordinary.
NTN alleges that “there is ample evidence establishing that
NTN’s sales were outside the ordinary course of trade.” NTN’s
Reply at 2-3. Citing to its questionnaire response, NTN states
that sample sales at issue were made to enable a customer to decide
whether or not to make a decision to buy. See id. at 3. NTN also
provided Commerce with information on NTN’s procedure to track
small sales. See id. NTN, however, provided Commerce with no
evidence of statements and representations made by NTN to the
entities obtaining samples or small-quantity purchases to enable
Commerce to establish that sample sales were “not a normal
condition or practice in the trade under consideration.” Def.’s
Resp. NTN at 23-24.
While NTN is correct in noting that “[t]he [statutory]
standard . . . is not [specifically testing] whether a sale is
‘abnormal or aberrational,’” see NTN’s Reply at 3, Commerce’s
choice of terms “abnormal” or “aberrational” with regard to
Commerce’s inquiry does not violate the gist of the statutory
mandate. Accord H.R. DOC . 103-316, at 834, reprinted in 1994
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 39
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4171. The term “abnormal” means “[d]eviating from
normal condition,” while the term “aberrational” stands for an act
characterized by “deviation . . . from the natural state, or from
a normal type.” WEBSTER ’S DICTIONARY 4, 6 (New Int’l, 2d ed. 1948).
Thus, these terms are in accord with the definition provided by 19
U.S.C. § 1677(15), and Commerce was: (1) entitled to request
evidence supporting NTN’s assertion about the irregularity of the
sales at issue; and (2) refusing to accept NTN’s claim that sample
sales are “by their very nature” outside the ordinary course of
trade. Accord Koyo Seiko Co., 16 CIT at 543, 796 F. Supp. at 1530.
Commerce is correct in pointing out that “[s]ample sales may well
be a type of ‘condition or practice’ that is ‘normal in the trade
under consideration,’” especially if such sales are done on a
regular and continuous basis.7 Def.’s Resp. NTN. at 24-25 (relying
on Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews of
Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished,
From Japan and Tapered Roller Bearings, Four Inches or Less in
Outside Diameter, and Components Thereof, From Japan, 58 Fed. Reg.
7
Indeed, while the mere fact that NTN has made sample sales
to customers for a number of years does not, alone, prove that the
sales were in the ordinary course of trade, the Court finds the
fact relevant because a customer rarely needs to be familiarized
and re-familiarized and yet re-familiarized with the product,
especially if the customer has already made a purchase at least
once and found the product to be suitable for the customer’s needs.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 40
at 64,732, and Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Reviews and Revocation in Part of an Antidumping Finding on Tapered
Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From
Japan and Tapered Roller Bearings, Four Inches or Less in Outside
Diameter, and Components Thereof, From Japan, 61 Fed. Reg. 57,629,
57,639 (Nov. 7, 1996)); see Torrington Co. v. United States, 25 CIT
___, 146 F. Supp. 2d 845 (2001); NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. United
States, 20 CIT 508, 924 F. Supp. 200 (1996); NSK Ltd. v. United
States, 17 CIT 590, 825 F. Supp. 315 (1993). Therefore, Commerce’s
decision to consider the sales at issue within the ordinary course
of trade is not unreasonable, provided Commerce did not receive any
specific evidence to the contrary. While NTN claims that “there is
ample evidence,” the actual evidence NTN refers to is nothing but
the very same NTN’s questionnaire response discussing NTN’s system
of order placement and NTN’s tracking procedures. See NTN’s Reply
at 2-3. The mere reference to procedures is, however, insufficient
to persuade the Court that Commerce’s conclusion was unreasonable.
Therefore, the Court finds Commerce’s determination that NTN’s
sample and small-quantity home market sales were within the
ordinary course of trade in accordance with law and supported by
substantial evidence.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 41
XI. DENIAL OF AN ADJUSTMENT TO UNITED STATES INDIRECT SELLING
EXPENSES FOR INTEREST ALLEGEDLY INCURRED IN FINANCING
CASH DEPOSITS FOR ANTIDUMPING DUTIES
A. Background
Following the review at issue, Commerce denied an adjustment
to NTN’s United States indirect selling expenses to exclude
expenses that NTN claimed were related to the financing of
antidumping duty cash deposits. See Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. at
20,595-96.
Under the pre-URAA law, Commerce struggled with the issue
whether financing expenses for antidumping cash deposits were: (1)
selling expenses within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(2) and,
thus, deductible from exporter’s sales price (“ESP”); or (2)
analogous, e.g., to legal fees that fall outside 19 U.S.C. §
1677a(e)(2) and should be subject to an offset against the selling
expenses deducted from ESP.
In one of the previous reviews, specifically, Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and Revocation in Part of
an Antidumping Duty Order, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,729, 39,749 (July 26,
1993), Commerce: (1) granted an offset to NTN’s United States
selling expenses to account for imputed interest expenses on
antidumping cash deposits; and (2) upon remand, explained
Commerce’s belief that the interest expenses were analogous to
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 42
antidumping legal fees (because they were incurred solely as a
result of the antidumping duty order) that could not be categorized
as selling expenses. The Court sustained Commerce’s grant of the
offset. See Federal Mogul Corp. v. United States, 20 CIT 1438,
1440, 950 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (1996); see also Timken Co. v. United
States, 22 CIT 621, 622-24, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1104-05 (1998)
(approving analogous offset for Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews and Termination in Part of Tapered Roller
Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and Unfinished, From Japan and
Tapered Roller Bearings, Four Inches or Less in Outside Diameter,
and Components Thereof, From Japan, 62 Fed. Reg. 11,825 (March 13,
1997)).
B. Contentions of the Parties
NTN asserts that Commerce erroneously rejected NTN’s
adjustment to NTN’s indirect selling expenses incurred in regard to
antidumping duty cash deposits. See NTN’s Mem. at 8-11.
Specifically, NTN points out that imputed interest expenses cannot
be (and previously were not) categorized as selling expenses. See
id. at 9-10 (relying on Federal Mogul Corp., 20 CIT at 1440, 950 F.
Supp. at 1182).
Commerce maintains that Commerce’s denial of an adjustment to
NTN’s United States indirect selling expenses for the expenses
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 43
related to the financing of antidumping duty cash deposits
reflected Commerce’s reasonable reading and application of the
statutory mandate. See Def.’s Resp. NTN at 26-33. Timken supports
Commerce’s contention and points out that: (1) the purpose of the
statutory provision for interest on over and under deposits of
duties would be defeated by allowing an expense reduction for
interest on cash deposits, see Timken’s Resp. at 14-15; and (2) NTN
failed to demonstrate that it actually incurred interest expenses
attributable to financing payment of antidumping duty cash
deposits. Id. at 15.8
8
The Court disagrees with Timken’s contentions that these two
points could be dispositive of the issue. Timken asserts that
[a]llowing selling expenses to be reduced (with
consequent increase in [United States] prices and
reduction of margins of dumping) by amounts of alleged
interest on antidumping duty deposits would provide an
incentive to respondents to prolong litigation over
entries so as to avoid actual payment of duties.
Timken’s Resp. at 15.
The Court is not convinced by Timken’s argument. A defeat in
litigation implies the necessity of eventual payment of the duties
due, and the mere possibility of “opportunity use,” possibly
resulting in collection of interest on the funds available calls
for an argument seeking collection of duties together with a
prevailing interest rate rather than for the “anti-incentive”
argument fostered by Timken.
Next, not only the record contains NTN’s claim for the amount
of imputed interest attributable to NTN’s antidumping duty deposits
(the claim that, under the administrative scheme, is subject to
verification by Commerce rather than Timken), but also the factual
inquiry of whether NTN actually incurred interest expenses
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 44
C. Analysis
Because financing expenses on antidumping duty cash deposits
do not fall squarely within the “selling expenses” category and do
not imitate perfectly the expenses that typically fall outside the
reach of Section 1677a(e)(2), Commerce is, effectively, obligated
to find the best default category to house these expenses. In the
Final Results at issue, Commerce: (1) reconsidered Commerce’s
previous position and concluded that expenses pertaining to the
financing of antidumping duty cash deposits would be more properly
treated as indirect selling expenses; and (2) based its decision on
the fact that the statute does not contain a precise definition of
what constitutes a “selling expense.” See 63 Fed. Reg. at 20,595;
accord Torrington Co. v. United States, 44 F.3d 1572, 1579-81 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (holding that Commerce’s treatment of inventory carrying
costs as an indirect selling expense is a reasonable interpretation
of the statute).
In its efforts to identify a selling expense, Commerce
attempts to distinguish “between business expenses that arise from
economic activities in the United States and business expenses that
are direct, inevitable consequences of an antidumping duty order.”
attributable to financing payment is secondary to the threshold
legal inquiry if an adjustment should be allowed for such expenses.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 45
Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. at 20,595-96. Antidumping duties, cash
deposits of antidumping duties, and legal fees associated with
participation in an antidumping case are all expenses that fall
within the category of “business expenses that are direct,
inevitable consequences of an antidumping duty order” because they
are incurred solely as a result of the existence of an antidumping
duty order. Def.’s Resp. NTN at 29 (quoting Final Results at
20,596). Therefore, Commerce does not consider such expenses to be
selling expenses deductible pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(2).
See Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 13 CIT 253, 269, 712 F.
Supp. 931, 947 (1989), rev’d on other grounds, Daewoo Elecs. Co. v.
Int’l Union of Elec., Tech., Salaried and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO,
6 F.3d 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1204 (1994).
Following its change in statutory interpretation, Commerce
deems any financing expenses associated with antidumping duty cash
deposits to be a type of selling expense properly deductible
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(2). In the Final Results, Commerce
explained that: (1) money is fungible because “[i]f an importer
acquires a loan to cover one operating cost, that may simply mean
that it will not be necessary to borrow money to cover a different
operating cost”; and (2) “[c]ompanies may choose to meet
obligations for cash deposits in a variety of ways that rely on
existing capital resources or that require raising new resources
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 46
through debt or equity.” 63 Fed. Reg. at 20,596. Thus, Commerce
concluded that there is nothing inevitable about a company
incurring financing expenses to meet the company’s obligations for
cash deposits. Therefore, these particular expenses could: (1)
fall within the realm of selling expenses, direct and indirect; and
(2) be reasonably qualified as selling expenses for purposes of 19
U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(2).
NTN argues that Commerce’s statutory interpretation is in
error because, regardless of how a company posts cash deposits,
there is an “opportunity cost,” that is, that “money will cease to
be available for other company uses.” NTN Mem. at 8. Commerce,
however, is correct in noting that “it is within Commerce’s
authority to deduct opportunity costs as selling expenses.” Def.’s
Resp. NTN at 30; see also Torrington Co., 44 F.3d at 1580
(sustaining Commerce’s decision to treat inventory carrying costs
as indirect selling expenses). Conversely, NTN is incorrect in its
assertion that since “interest expenses for antidumping duty cash
deposits are not incurred in the course of selling merchandise in
the United States,” there is no basis for deducting these expenses
from United States price. NTN Mem. at 10. In the Final Results,
Commerce implicitly recognized that the selling expenses referred
to in 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(2) is a broad category encompassing
numerous expenses whereas antidumping duties, cash deposits, and
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 47
legal fees represent “a limited exemption.” 63 Fed. Reg. at
20,596. While the plain language of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(2) does
not provide the precise meaning of the term “expenses,” “[t]he
purpose of deducting selling expenses from exporter’s sales price
was to estimate the ‘net amount returned to the foreign exporter’.
. . of the merchandise by removing all of the expenses incurred
after importation by the related-party importer.” Koyo Seiko Co.
v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting
Emergency Tariff and Antidumping: Hearings on H.R. 2435 Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-12 (1921)); accord
19 U.S.C. § 1673g(b)(4) (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 353.26(a) (1994).
Accordingly, Commerce could reasonably deduct financial expenses
associated with cash deposits from United States price in order to
arrive at the ESP, that is, the net amount returned to the
exporter.
The fact that Commerce has changed its interpretation of 19
U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(2) over time does not detract from the
reasonableness of Commerce’s current statutory interpretation.9
9
While “‘an agency does not act rationally when it chooses and
implements one policy and decides to consider the merits of a
potentially inconsistent policy in the very near future,’”
Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 24 CIT ___, ___, 123 F. Supp. 2d
1372, 1381 (2000) (quoting ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC,
725 F.2d 732, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1984)), Commerce should be able to
rely on its “unique expertise and policy-making prerogatives.”
Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1349, 1357
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 48
See Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620 (noting that “the possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by
substantial evidence”); AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 22 CIT
1070, 1082, 34 F. Supp. 2d 756, 766 (1998) (stating that an
initial interpretation by an agency is not “carved in stone” and
citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863).
(Fed. Cir. 2000). “‘The power of an administrative agency to
administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily
requires the formulation of policy . . . .’” Chevron 467 U.S. at
843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
An agency decision involving the meaning or reach of a statute
that reconciles conflicting policies “‘represents a reasonable
accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the
agency’s care by the statute, [and a reviewing court] should not
disturb [the agency decision] unless it appears from the statute or
its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that
Congress would have sanctioned.’” Id. at 845 (quoting United States
v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)). Furthermore, an agency
must be allowed to assess the wisdom of its policy on a continuing
basis. Under the Chevron regime, agency discretion to reconsider
policies is inalienable. See id. at 843. Any assumption that
Congress intended to freeze an administrative interpretation of a
statute would be entirely contrary to the concept of Chevron which
assumes and approves of the ability of administrative agencies to
change their interpretations. See, e.g., Maier, P.E. v. United
States EPA, 114 F.3d 1032, 1043 (10th Cir. 1997), J.L. v. Social
Sec. Admin., 971 F.2d 260, 265 (9th Cir. 1992), Saco Defense Sys.
Div., Maremont Corp. v. Weinberger, 606 F. Supp. 446, 450-51 (D.
Me. 1985). In sum, underlying agency interpretative policies “are
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 49
XII. DENIAL OF ADJUSTMENT TO FOREIGN MARKET
VALUE FOR HOME MARKET DISCOUNTS
A. Background
The pre-URAA statute defined FMV as “the price . . . at which
such or similar merchandise is sold or, in the absence of sales,
offered for sale in the principal markets of the country from which
exported, in the usual commercial quantities and in the ordinary
course of trade for home consumption . . . ." 19 U.S.C. §
1677b(a)(1)(A). Commerce interpreted the term "price" used in the
definition as the price for the foreign like product after any
adjustments for post-sale price adjustments (“PSPAs"), where PSAPs
were direct adjustments to price. See Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg.
at 20,602 (“As a general matter, . . . [Commerce] only accepts
claims for discounts, rebates, or other PSPAs as direct adjustments
to price if actual amounts are reported for each transaction").
Pursuant to Commerce’s statutory interpretation, a respondent may
demonstrate entitlement to a PSPA if the PSPA is: (1) “reported on
a transaction-specific basis"; or (2) “allocated . . . if the
respondent demonstrates that the PSPA was granted as a fixed and
constant percentage of the sales price of all transactions for
which it was reported and to which it was allocated." Id.
In the review at issue, Commerce disallowed an adjustment to
FMV for NTN’s home market discounts, see Final Results, 63 Fed.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 50
Reg. at 20,602-03, because NTN: (1) “did not report these discounts
on a transaction-specific basis, but, rather, reported the
adjustments on a product-[specific] or customer-specific basis”;
and (2) “did not grant and report these discounts as a fixed and
constant percentage of sales.” Id. at 20,603.
B. Contentions of the Parties
NTN asserts that Commerce erred in disallowing any adjustments
to FMV for NTN’s discounts. Specifically, NTN argues that: (1)
“[b]ecause the discounts at issue . . . did vary with the quantity
sold, and were related to particular sales, [Commerce] should have
treated them as direct selling expenses and granted NTN an
adjustment to FMV to account for the expenses”; and (2) because the
discounts at issue “constitute a discount which is a fixed and
constant percentage of sales,” Commerce should have allowed the
adjustments for these discounts. NTN Mem. at 12-13 (relying on
Torrington Co. v. United States (“Torrington”), 82 F.3d 1039 (Fed.
Cir. 1996)).
Commerce contends that its decision to disallow any
adjustments to FMV for NTN’s discounts was in accordance with law
and a reasonable interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(A).
Def.’s Resp. NTN at 33-37. Timken supports Commerce’s assertion
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 51
and points out that Commerce’s conclusion was reasonable in view of
the fact that NTN failed to report NTN’s home market discounts in
a manner required. See Timken’s Resp. at 17-20.
C. Analysis
NTN’s reading of the statutory mandate and case law is
incorrect. NTN errs in its reliance on Torrington, 82 F.3d 1039,
when it argues that the fact that discounts at issue did vary
obligates Commerce to treat these discounts as direct selling
expenses subject to an adjustment. See NTN Mem. at 12-13.
Torrington, 82 F.3d 1039, does not provide a set of two
propositions where from each one the other could be automatically
inferred. While Torrington recognized that “direct selling
expenses ‘are expenses which vary with the quantity sold,’” 82 F.3d
at 1050 (quoting Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 77 F.3d 426,
431 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted)), it does not
necessarily mandate that each expense that could vary with the
quantity sold should be deemed a direct selling expense. See id.
Conversely, Torrington recognized that “[t]he allocation of
expenses in a manner different from the calculation of the
expenses, however, does not alter the relationship between the
expenses and the sales under consideration.” 82 F.3d at 1051
(citing Smith-Corona Group, Consumer Prods. Div., SCM Corp. v.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 52
United States, 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1022 (1984)). The court in Torrington ruled that Commerce
erroneously granted a respondent an ESP offset pursuant to 19
C.F.R. § 353.56(b)(2) (1994) because that regulation limited the
offset to “all selling expenses except direct selling expenses,”
while, in fact, the respondent’s PSPAs were direct selling
expenses. 82 F.3d 1051 (emphasis omitted). Torrington, however,
does not stand for the proposition that Commerce must grant a PSPA
for all discounts or even each selling expense that might be
qualified as a direct selling expense.
While the underlying discounts reported by NTN may indeed vary
with the quantity sold, NTN did not report this information to
Commerce in the required form, namely, on a transaction-specific
basis and as a fixed and constant percentage of sales.
Consequently, Commerce reasonably could deny an adjustment if NTN
has failed to properly allocate or report expenses.
NTN’s second argument is equally unpersuasive. NTN states
that an adjustment should be allowed because the discounts at issue
“constitute a discount which is a fixed and constant percentage of
sales.” See NTN Mem. at 13. As Commerce correctly observes, every
discount granted
may be expressed as a “fixed and constant” percentage of
sales by mere mathematical operation (i.e., dividing the
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 53
discount by the number of sales). In focusing upon the
“fixed and constant” percentage of sales, Commerce is not
inquiring whether a party has the ability to perform this
simple calculation, but, rather, whether the party is
granting the discount itself as a fixed and constant
percentage of the sales to which it pertains. As
explained by [Commerce], “[i]f a respondent grants and
reports a PSPA as a fixed percentage of the sales to
which it pertains, the fact that this pool of sales may
include non-scope merchandise does not distort the amount
of the expense the respondent granted and reported on
sales of subject merchandise because the same adjustment
percentage applied to both scope and non-scope
merchandise.”
Def.’s Resp. NTN at 36 (quoting Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. at
20,603, and relying on Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews and Revocation in Part of an Antidumping
Finding on Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and
Unfinished, From Japan and Tapered Roller Bearings, Four Inches
or Less in Outside Diameter, and Components Thereof, From Japan, 61
Fed. Reg. at 57,642 (emphasis omitted).
Because NTN’s reporting method was not equivalent to
transaction-specific reporting, “allocated price adjustments [may]
have the effect of distorting individual prices by diluting the
discounts or rebates received on some sales, inflating them on
other sales, and attributing them to still other sales that did not
actually receive any at all.” NSK Ltd. v. Koyo Seiko Co., 190 F.3d
1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (internal quotation omitted).
Therefore, the Court holds that Commerce acted reasonably when it
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 54
disallowed any adjustments to FMV for NTN’s discounts under the
mandate of 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(A).
XIII. COMMERCE ’S REALLOCATION OF SELLING EXPENSES WITHOUT REGARD
TO LEVEL OF TRADE AND DENIAL OF A LEVEL OF TRADE ADJUSTMENT
A. Background
The pre-URAA law did not contain a specific provision
concerning adjustments for differences in levels of trade (“LOTs”).
See, e.g., NEC Home Elecs., 54 F.3d at 739. Commerce, however,
provided that it would normally calculate FMV and United States
price at the same commercial LOT. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.58 (1994).
If such sales were insufficient in number to permit an adequate
comparison, Commerce would calculate FMV based upon such or similar
sales at the most comparable LOT to the LOT in the United States
market “and make appropriate adjustments for differences affecting
price comparability.” Id.
In the Preliminary Results, Commerce: (1) accepted NTN’s
proposed allocation of selling expenses by LOT; and (2) granted NTN
an LOT adjustment. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 25,204. However, in the
Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. at 20,608-09, Commerce reexamined the
record, reallocated NTN’s selling expenses without regard to LOT,
and denied NTN an LOT adjustment, operating under the precedent set
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 55
by Timken Co. v. United States (“Timken”), 20 CIT 645, 930 F. Supp.
621 (1996).
B. Contentions of the Parties
NTN contends that Commerce erroneously reallocated NTN’s
selling expenses without regard to LOT and eliminated the LOT
adjustment granted to NTN in the Preliminary Results, 61 Fed. Reg.
at 25,204. See NTN’s Mem. at 14-16. NTN maintains that it
provided “sufficient information to [Commerce] . . . to convince
[Commerce] that NTN’s LOT-specific reporting methodology was
accurate.” NTN’s Reply at 8.
Commerce asserts that it acted reasonably and properly when it
followed the precedent set by Timken, 20 CIT 645, 930 F. Supp. 621.
Timken supports Commerce’s assertion and points out that: (1)
Commerce properly disallowed a home market LOT adjustment because
NTN failed to demonstrate that NTN incurred different selling
expenses at the different LOTs in the home market due to the
differences in selling to the different LOTs, see Timken’s Resp. at
21-23; (2) Commerce properly rejected NTN’s LOT-based expense
allocation method and reasonably reallocated NTN’s home-market
selling expenses without regard to LOT, see id. at 23-25; and (3)
Commerce properly reallocated NTN’s United States selling expenses
without regard to LOT. See id. at 25-26.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 56
C. Analysis
In the Final Results, Commerce examined Timken, 20 CIT 645,
930 F. Supp. 621,10 and stated that the fact that a respondent
merely makes allocations according to LOT does not demonstrate that
the relevant expenses demonstrably varied based upon LOT. See 63
Fed. Reg. at 20,608. Commerce, therefore, concluded that “in order
to determine if a respondent’s expenses demonstrably varied
according to LOT, additional narrative and quantitative evidence
must exist which demonstrates that the respondent either performed
different activities/functions or performed activities/functions to
a different degree when selling to each LOT[,] such that the amount
of expenses incurred for the sale of the identical merchandise to
different LOTs would vary.” Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. at 20,608.
Examining the record, Commerce determined that NTN did not
provide the necessary narrative and quantitative evidence. See id.
Commerce concluded that “NTN’s sole support for [NTN’s] LOT-
10
In Timken, after reviewing the pertinent statutory and
regulatory criteria governing LOT adjustments, the Court noted that
the statute conferred upon Commerce broad discretion in determining
whether an LOT adjustment is warranted, but that such discretion is
not without limits “as the statute requires a direct relationship
between the expenses and the relevant sales.” 20 CIT at 653, 930
F. Supp. at 628 (citing Smith-Corona Group, 713 F.2d at 1575, rev’d
on other grounds, Consumer Prods. Div., SCM Corp. v. United States,
753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). “The issue, therefore, is whether
the reported expenses demonstrably vary according to levels of
trade.” Id. (emphasis supplied).
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 57
specific allocations is the [very fact of the] allocations
themselves.” Id. Because the mere fact of these allocations did
not give Commerce sufficient evidence that NTN’s home market
selling expenses varied by LOT, Commerce reallocated these expenses
without regard to LOT. Id.
Commerce’s decision to re[]allocate NTN’s selling
expenses was not based upon inaccuracies discovered at
verification but, rather, upon Commerce’s determination
that mere allocation of expenses by level of trade does
not demonstrate that [NTN] actually performed different
selling functions at different levels of trade.11
Def.’s Resp. NTN at 40.
NTN’s failure to demonstrate that these different functions
existed provided reasonable grounds for Commerce to proceed with
the reallocation. The mere fact of Commerce’s reallocation of
expenses does not make Commerce’s decision in the Final Results, 63
Fed. Reg. at 20,608-09, invalid. See NSK Ltd. v. United States, 21
11
Commerce stated that it did “not consider NTN’s [relevant]
exhibit [on] home market indirect selling expense differentials as
a reliable basis for a[n] LOT adjustment.” Final Results, 63 Fed.
Reg. at 20,609. NTN points out that Commerce, however, “verified
NTN’s data, and had the opportunity to verify all of the
information on [the particular] exhibit.” NTN’s Reply at 8; see
also NTN’s Mem. at 14. NTN misses the point fostered by Commerce.
In the Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg. at 20,608-09, Commerce did not
assert that the verified information suddenly became wrongful,
rather Commerce deemed it to be insufficient for the lack of
“necessary narrative and quantitative evidence,” Def.’s Resp. NTN
at 39, that is, the exhibit was deemed unreliable because of
insufficiency of its content and not because of the invalidity of
data.
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 58
CIT 617, 635-36, 969 F. Supp. 34, 54 (1997) (“The evidence on the
record does not establish differences in selling expenses at
[different LOTs] because NTN’s allocation methodology . . . does
not reasonably quantify the expenses incurred at each [LOT]”);
Timken, 20 CIT 645, 930 F. Supp. 621; NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v.
United States, 19 CIT 1221, 1234, 905 F. Supp. 1083, 1094-95 (1995)
(“Although NTN purports to show that it incurred different selling
expenses for different trade levels, the record demonstrates that
NTN’s allocation methodology does not reasonably quantify the
expenses incurred at each level of trade” (citation omitted)).
After having determined that reallocation was necessary,
Commerce properly denied NTN an LOT adjustment. Commerce’s
preliminary decision to grant the adjustment was premised upon
Commerce’s preliminary acceptance of NTN’s allocations, see
Preliminary Result, 61 Fed. Reg. at 25,204. Once Commerce has
determined that NTN’s allocations were inapplicable, the basis for
an LOT adjustment was not present. See Final Results, 63 Fed. Reg.
at 20,609; accord 19 C.F.R. § 353.54 (1994) (“Any interested party
that claims an adjustment [under a particular federal regulation]
must establish the claim to the satisfaction of [Commerce]”).
Because NTN claimed an adjustment pursuant to the particular
regulation, namely, the provision authorizing LOT adjustments, NTN
was obligated to provide Commerce with sufficient information in
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 59
support of NTN’s claim. The Court concludes that NTN’s inability
to do so provided Commerce with a reasonable basis to deny NTN an
LOT adjustment.
XIV. COMMERCE ’S APPLICATION OF REVISED INDIRECT SELLING
RATIO TO PURCHASE PRICE SALES
Timken argues that, notwithstanding Commerce's statement in
Commerce's NTN analysis that Commerce intended to apply the revised
indirect selling ratio only to NTN's purchase price sales,
Commerce’s computer program erroneously applied this change to all
of NTN’s sales in the United States sales database (purchase price
and ESP). See Timken’s Reply Commerce at 5. Commerce states that:
(1) while it was Commerce's intent to apply the revised indirect
selling expense ratio only to NTN's purchase sales, Commerce
incorrectly entered certain language outside the proper location;
and (2) the revised ratio was incorrectly applied to all of NTN's
sales. See Def.’s Resp. Timken at 17. Therefore, this issue is
remanded to Commerce to correct the computer program error with
respect to NTN’s sales.
CONCLUSION
The case is remanded to Commerce to: (1) recalculate Koyo’s CV
profit so that Koyo’s home market movement expenses are deducted
Consol. Court No. 98-06-02274 Page 60
from Koyo’s net home market price; (2) recalculate Koyo’s marine
insurance charges using the correct factor indicated by Koyo; (3)
recalculate Koyo’s CV using commission factor provided by Koyo; (4)
recalculate CV direct selling expenses relying on the factor
indicated in Koyo’s questionnaire response; (5) enter necessary
corrections and recalculate pertinent parts of Commerce’s
determination with respect to Koyo’s imports; (6) recalculate
Koyo’s United States inventory carrying costs for final product by
applying the appropriate inventory carrying costs factor reported
by Koyo to the landed cost for the 1992/93 POR and to the COM for
the 1993/94 POR; (7) apply the correct G&A expenses factor in
Commerce’s calculation of NSK’s COP; and (8) correct the computer
program error with respect to NTN’s sales. Commerce's final
determination is affirmed in all other respects.
_________________________
NICHOLAS TSOUCALAS
SENIOR JUDGE
Dated: February 1, 2002
New York, New York