UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-7180
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
JOHN STEPHENSON,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:12-hc-02022-BR)
Submitted: January 31, 2013 Decided: February 13, 2013
Before MOTZ, KING, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Joseph Bart
Gilbert, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Diana H. Pereira,
Research and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Jennifer D. Dannels, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John Stephenson appeals the district court’s order
committing him to the custody of the Attorney General in
accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d) (2006). Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
A person may be committed under § 4246 if the district
“court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is
presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result
of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily
injury to another person or serious damage to property of
another.” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d). The Government must establish
dangerousness under § 4246 by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. The district court’s finding that the Government has
established dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence will
not be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.
United States v. LeClair, 338 F.3d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992).
In 2010, Stephenson came to the attention of police in
Hillsdale, Michigan after a manager of a local convenience store
reported that Stephenson made a threat in the store to “kill
thousands” and that “Washington and Obama are going down.”
Agents with the United States Secret Service and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation interviewed Stephenson at his residence
prior to a scheduled visit in Michigan by the President and
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observed large quantities of ammunition. Body armor and
thousands of rounds of ammunition were subsequently recovered
from the residence. Following his indictment in the Western
District of Michigan on one count of possession of ammunition by
a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2) (2006), Stephenson was found not competent to stand
trial. A magistrate judge later rejected the Government’s
request to medicate Stephenson against his will and ordered that
he be evaluated to determine whether he was suffering from a
mental disease or defect such that his release from the Federal
Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina (“FMC Butner”) would
create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or
serious damage to the property of another.
In 2011, a panel consisting of three FMC Butner staff
members issued a report concluding that Stephenson suffers from
Delusional Disorder, Mixed Type, and that this mental illness
was such that Stephenson’s release would pose a substantial risk
of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the
property of another. Based on the report, the warden filed a
certificate of mental disease or defect and dangerousness.
At a hearing on the certificate, Hayley Blackwood —
one of the three FMC Butner staffers who signed the report and
the one who diagnosed Stephenson — testified as an expert in the
field of forensic psychology. Blackwood expressed her expert
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opinion that Stephenson would be substantially dangerous if
released. Her opinion was based on: Stephenson’s disorder; his
lack of insight into the nature of his mental illness and
unwillingness to comply with treatment offered to him; his past
training regarding and access to weapons and his lack of
understanding that he was prohibited from possessing weapons or
ammunition; his history of making violent threats related to his
illness; his impulsive behavior; the nature of the social
support he would receive in the community; and the results of a
clinical risk management assessment tool indicating Stephenson
presented a “moderate to high” risk for future violence.
Stephenson presented the testimony of psychiatrist Dr.
Graddy. Dr. Graddy — who testified as an expert in the field of
forensic psychiatry — expressed his expert opinion that,
although Stephenson had several risk factors for future
dangerousness, his social support in the community would
adequately mitigate against these risk factors, such that his
risk of dangerousness to others was low. The district court
accepted the opinion of Ms. Blackwood and issued an order
finding the existence of clear and convincing evidence that
Stephenson suffered from a mental disease or defect and that, as
a result of his mental illness, there was clear and convincing
evidence that Stephenson’s release would pose a substantial risk
of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the
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property of another. Therefore, the district court ordered
Stephenson committed to the custody of the Attorney General in
accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d).
Ms. Blackwood’s expert opinion on dangerousness was
cogent, reasoned, and grounded in factors specific to
Stephenson’s risk of behaving violently in the future and was
based on a review of a plethora of forensic, health, and legal
records and a multi-month course of observation, interviews, and
testing. If the district court credited Blackwood’s opinion
over that given by Dr. Graddy, it alone was sufficient to
establish Stephenson’s dangerousness by clear and convincing
evidence. On appeal, Stephenson implicitly challenges
Blackwood’s credibility by challenging the basis for some of her
conclusions and comparing her credentials with those of Dr.
Graddy. Here, however, the district court had before it the
testimony of two experts who drew opposing conclusions regarding
Stephenson’s risk of future dangerousness. To reach its
conclusion based on clear and convincing evidence, the court had
to accept one opinion and discount the other. Where a finder of
fact observes a witness, its credibility determinations
ordinarily are not disturbed on appeal. Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985); Evergreen Int’l, S.A.
v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 531 F.3d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Locklear, 829 F.2d 1314, 1317 (4th Cir. 1987)
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(per curiam). The district court found Ms. Blackwood credible,
and it based its commitment order on that determination.
Stephenson argues that his substantial dangerousness
was not established by clear and convincing evidence because
there exists in the record no documented history that he engaged
in “physically aggressive behavior” or “acted out violently” on
his delusional beliefs and because Dr. Graddy found that
protective factors present in his life overcame any risk factors
for future violence. We reject these arguments as meritless.
As Stephenson acknowledges, overt acts of violence are not
required to prove substantial dangerousness in a § 4246(d) case.
United States v. Williams, 299 F.3d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 2002).
Further, the arguments ignore Ms. Blackwood’s testimony
concerning Stephenson’s violent threats and physically
aggressive behavior related to his mental illness, his
unwillingness to utilize health resources made available to him,
and her opinion on the nature of his social support system in
the community. Moreover, the arguments effectively ask this
court to overturn the district court’s conclusions regarding
Blackwood’s dangerousness opinion in favor of that given by Dr.
Graddy. In light of the great deference on appeal this court
affords to credibility determinations, these efforts must fail.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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