County of Hawai'i v. Ala Loop Homeowners

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIT

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~»- F'*~O
ma ea__
5
COUNTY oF HAWAI‘I, a municipal corporation of the of§;'-_*
HawaFi, Respondent-/P1aintiff-/Counterclaim_ ` ri
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellee, uD
s § ~ §
"’S~ ‘ ;;§§3 m
ALA LOOP HOMEOWNERS, an unincorporated associati§L, §§

Respondent-/Defendant~/Counter-C1aimant-/Cross-Claimant-
_Appe1lee/Cross-Appel1ant,

and

WAfOLA WATERS OF LIFE CHARTER SCHOOL, a public SChOOl
organized under the law of the State of Hawafi,
Respondent-/Defendant-/Cross-Claim Defendant-

Appel1ant/Cross-Appe11ee; =

and

ALA LOOP COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated non-profit
association, Petitioner-/Defendant~/Counter-C1aimant-/
Cross-Claimant-/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee/CroSs-Appellant;

VS.

LAND USE COMMISSION, STATE OF HAWAI‘I, ReSpOndent~/
Third-Party Defendant-Appe1lee/Cross-Appe1lee.

NO. 27707

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIV. NO. 03-1-O308)

JULY 9, 2010

NAKAYAMA, DUFFY, AND RECKTENWALD, JJ.;

MOON, C.J.,
CONCURRING SEPARATELY AND DISSENTING

WITH ACOBA, J.,

GE"TH

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OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, J.

Respondent Wafola Waters of Life Charter School
(WaFola)1 acquired land in an agricultural use district on Ala
Loop Road on the Island of HawaFi in 2003, with the intention of
using it as a working farm and as a campus for its school. A
dispute arose between WaFola and neighboring residents regarding
whether WaFola should be required to obtain a special use permit
under Hawafi Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 205. The County of
Hawafi filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of the Third
Circuit (circuit court) seeking declaratory relief with regard to
that issue, naming WaFola and Petitioner Ala Loop Community
Association (Ala L0op)2 as defendants. Ala Loop filed a cross-
claim against Wafola, seeking to enforce the provisions of
chapter 205.

The circuit court subsequently entered default against
WaFola on Ala Loop’s cross-claim, but denied Ala Loop’s request
for an award of attorney’s fees.3 Both parties then appealed
from the circuit court's First Amended Final Judgment.

The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) filed a summary

disposition order (SDO) on March l2, 2009. The ICA, citing Pono

1 Wafola is a new century charter school chartered pursuant to HRS
§ 302A-l18l, et seq.

2 Ala Loop is a n0n~profit unincorporated association whose members
are residents and owners of lots abutting Ala Loop Road, and was formed
pursuant to HawaFi Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 429.

3 The Honorable Greg K. Nakamura presided.

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v. Molokai Ranc_h, Ltd., 119 Hawai‘i 164, 194 P.3d 1126 (App.
2008), cert. rejected, 2008 WL 539232O (Haw. Dec. 29, 2008),
concluded that Ala Loop did not have a private right of action to
enforce its HRS chapter 205 claims against WaFola, and,
therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to determine the
claims. The ICA entered judgment pursuant to the SDO on

April 22, 2009.

Ala Loop filed an application for writ of certiorari
(application), requesting this court to review the ICA’s
judgment. In its application, Ala Loop argues, inter alia, that
Qggg was wrongly decided because it failed to consider article
XI, section 9 of the HawaFi State ConstitutionF and HRS § 607-25

(Supp. 20O2).5

4 Article XI, section 9 provides:

Each person has the right to a clean and
healthful environment, as defined by laws relating to
environmental quality, including control of pollution
and conservation, protection and enhancement of
natural resources. Any person may enforce this right
against any party, public or private, through
appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable
limitations and regulation as provided by law.

5 HRS § 607~25 (Supp. 2002) provides in relevant part:

§607-25 Actions based on failure to obtain government
permit or approva1s; attorney's fees and costs.

ic) For purposes of this section, the permits
or approvals required by law shall include compliance
with the requirements for permits or approvals

established by chapters . . . 205, . . . and
ordinances or rules adopted pursuant thereto under

chapter 9l.
(e) In any civil action in this State where a

private party sues for injunctive relief against
another private party who has been or is undertaking

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On August 5, 2009, Wafola filed a response in
opposition (response) to the application, in which it contended
that this court should reject the application on mootness
grounds.

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that this
dispute is not moot, and that in any event review is appropriate
under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. We
further conclude that article XI, section 9 of the Hawafi
Constitution creates a private right of action to enforce chapter
205 in the circumstances of this case, and that the ICA
accordingly erred in its analysis in the SDO. Finally, we
conclude that the circuit court erred in declining to set aside
the entry of default against Wafola.

Accordingly, we vacate the April 22, 2009 judgment of
the ICA and the 0ecember l2, 2005 First Amended Final Judgment of
the circuit court, and remand to the circuit court for further

proceedings. In view of this disposition, we do not address the

any development without obtaining all permits or
approvals required by law from government agencies:

(l) The court may award reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs of the suit to the
prevailing party.

(2) The court shall award reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs of the suit to
the prevailing party if the party bringing
the civil action:

(B) Posts a bond in the amount of $2,50O
to pay the attorneys' fees and costs
provided for under this section if
the party undertaking the
development prevails.

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other issues raised by Ala Loop in its application, or by Ala
Loop and Wafola in their appeals to the ICA.

I. IBA£HUIROIH§D

A. Dispute over whether WaFola must obtain a special use
permit

WaFola is a new century charter school, chartered
pursuant to HRS chapter 302A (Supp. l999). In July of 2003,
WaFola acquired ownership of a 28 acre parcel of land formerly
known as the Sunshine Farm property, located in a district
designated for agricultural use by the Land Use Commission (LUC)
of the State of HawaFi. WaFola intended to maintain the
property as a working farm and to use it as a campus for its
school.

when residents in the area learned of the acquisition,
they began contacting various county officials to express
concern. On July 21, 2003, Ala Loop received a letter from the

County of Hawafi Planning Department stating that:

We have received your letter dated July ll, 2003
regarding the Waters of Life Charter School in escrow
to purchase the old Sunshine Farm property on Ala
Loop.

The Planning Department has received numerous
inquiries regarding the operation of charter schools
within the State Land Use Agricultural District in
regards to H.R.S. § 302A-1184,‘ which exempts charter

6 HRS § 302A~1l84 (Supp. 2002), provides in pertinent part, as
follows:

New century charter schoo1s; exemptions.

Schools designated as new century charter schools

shall be exempt from all applicable state laws, except

those regarding:
(l) Co1lective bargaining under chapter B9;

provided' that:

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schools from state laws, except those relating to
health and safety, and a few other exceptions. Based
on this law and a legal opinion received from the

County Corporation Counsel, we are exempting charter
schools from state land use laws not expressly related
to health and safety,

The major effect of this exemption is that charter

schools located in the State Land Use Agricultural
District do not have to obtain special permits.

Normally, a school in the agricultural district would
need a special permit with a process that requires
notice to nearby landowners and a public hearing.

Charter school facilities may need other approvals and
permits, including those related to building, fire,
and sanitation.

The law exempting the charter schools is open to
interpretation and the courts have the final say.

You, as homeowners concerned about the traffic impacts
this operation may have on your community, have the

right to take this matter to court to have a judge
decide if this charter school needs a special permit.

On August l4, 2003, Ala Loop through counsel wrote to
the County of HawaFi Office of the Corporation Counsel (Corp.
Counsel), inquiring “whether the proposed operation of Waters of

Life Charter School upon land zoned for agriculture and accessed

(A) The exclusive representatives
defined in chapter 89 may enter into
agreements that contain cost and
noncost items to facilitate
decentralized decisionmaking;

(B) The exclusive representatives and
the local school board of the new
century charter school may enter
into agreements that contain cost
and noncost items;

(C) The agreements shall be funded from
the current allocation or other
sources of revenue received by the
new century charter school; and

(D) These agreements may differ from the
master contracts;
(2) Discriminatory practices under section
378-2; and
(3) Health and safety requirements.

This section was repealed in 2006 and reenacted as HRS § 302B-9
(Supp. 2006). 2006 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 298, §§2-3 at 1210-ll, 1216.

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through Ala Loop Road in the absence of a state or county land
use regulatory process was proper.” The letter also stated that
WaFola purchased the property for the purpose of operating a
charter school, and included background on the property as wellj
as the reasons for Ala Loop’s opposition to the operation of the
charter school. Ala Loop requested that Corp. Counsel review HRS
§ 302A-1184 (Supp. 2002) which exempts new century charter
schools from all applicable state laws except, inter alia,
“health and safety requirements.”

The letter explained Ala Loop’s disagreement with the

County's interpretation of HRS § 302A-ll84 as follows:

As we understand, the County of Hawaii has
previously interpreted certain statutes, particularly
HRS Section 302A-1lB4, as exempting charter schools
from applicable State land use district law to the
effect that charter schools have been deemed exempt
from obtaining special permits for the operation of
charter schools on lands within the State agricultural
district. Based upon our review of Section 302A-1184
and other applicable law, we find that:

1. There is no exemption from land use
regulatory law that has been established
for the purpose of protecting the public
health and safety, and

2. There is no express exemption from
or preemption of county land use laws and
regulations.

» We therefore believe that the County's
interpretation is contrary to the plain language and
intent of Section 302A-1184 and that the failure to
require the Waters of Life school to undergo the
scrutiny of a special permit or other land use
approval process will severely compromise the health,
safety and welfare of the residents of the Ala Loop
community, students and others who work at or visit

5 the proposed school, and the public at large. For
this reason, we ask that you review the current
interpretation that the County has apparently adopted
in light of the [above] information and to provide us
with your position on the issue.

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In summary, Ala Loop argued that

a special permit was required for the charter school,
pursuant to HRS § 205-6 (2001), county zoning laws,
and Land Use Commission (LUC) rules, because the
special permit requirements specifically involve a
review of health and safety issues before an otherwise
impermissible use can be established on land within
the state agricultural district. [Ala Loop's]
attorneys concluded that WaFola was not exempt from
compliance with State land use laws and county zoning
laws, and that a use permit was required under county
zoning laws in the absence of a special use permit.

iIn a letter to the Hawafi County Council dated
October 9, 2003, Corp. Counsel opined that HRS § 302A-1184
exempts new century charter schools from obtaining a special
permit under HRS § 205-6J but that such schools are required to
obtain a county use permit under Chapter 25 of the HawaFi County
Code 1983 (l995 ed-).

In»a letter dated October 22, 2003, the Attorney

General (AG) of the State of HawaFi advised Corp. Counsel that

7 HRS § 205-6 (2001) provides in pertinent part:

Specia1 permit. (a) The county planning
commission may permit certain unusual and reasonable
uses within agricultural . . . districts other than
those for which the district is classified. Any
person who desires to use the person's land within an
agricultural . . . district other than for an
agricultural . . . use, as the case may be, may
petition the planning commission of the county within
which the person's land is located for permission to
use the person's land in the manner desired; Each
county may establish the appropriate fee for
processing the special permit petition.

(d) Special permits for land the area of which
is greater than fifteen acres shall be subject to
approval by the land use commission. The land use
commission may impose additional restrictions as may
be necessary or appropriate in granting such approval,
including the adherence to representations made by the
applicant.

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Although the Office of the Attorney General has
not issued a formal opinion concerning [whether
charter schools are exempt from the special permit
requirement set forth in HRS chapter 205], our
position is that new century charter schools are
required to adhere to special permit requirements
prescribed in H.R.S. chapter 205.

f Based upon legislative intent and statutory
language, our interpretation of H.R.S. §302A-1184 is
that new century charter schools are exempted from
state laws that relate to the regulation of education.
However new century charter schools are subject to
laws that apply to the general public and other state
agencies and entities (i.e. criminal statutes, zoning
regulations, etc.). lt would be inconceivable to
conclude that H.R.S. §302A-1184 exempts new century
charter schools from laws that the general public and
other state agencies are required to adhere to.

. . As to the issue of whether new century
charter schools are required to adhere to county use
permit requirements, we would initially defer to the
Office of the Corporation Counsel, but note that in
considering the phrase “health and safety
requirements” and its applicability to county use
permit requirements, you may, of course, consider the
rationale of this letter.

On November 14, 2003, the County filed a Complaint for
Declaratory Relief against Ala Loop and WaFola. The complaint
sought, inter alia, judicial confirmation that new century
charter schools “are exempt from obtaining a State special
permit, but are required to obtain a County use permit, pursuant
to Chapter 25 of the HawaFi County Code[.]”

On November 20, 2003, Ala Loop filed an answer to the
County's complaint, a counterclaim against the County, and a
cross-claim against WaFola. Ala Loop’s counterclaim and cross-
claim included five counts.

In Count I, Ala Loop requested declaratory relief

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“determining that [WaFola] must obtain a special permit from the
Planning Commission and the LUC pursuant to HRS Section 205-6 and
the applicable rules and regulations of the Planning Commission

and the Land Use Commission, prior to operating a charter school

on [the property].”

In Count II, Ala Loop requested temporary and permanent

injunctive relief enjoining and restraining:

A. The County of Hawaii, its agencies, officers,
directors, and employees from issuing any building
permits, occupancy permits, or similar permits that
would encourage, allow, or permit [WaFola] to operated
a charter school, or any components or activities
connected with the charter school, on [the property]
until and unless a special permit has been issued for
[the property] and [WaFola] has complied with all
applicable conditions and laws for the operation as
may be established by the Planning Commission and LUC
and as may be required by applicable State and County
law.

B. [Wafola], its agents, officers, directors,
employees, teachers or representatives from conducting
any classes or school related activities on [the
propertyl until and unless a special permit has been
issued for [the property] and [Wafola] has complied
with applicable conditions for the operation as may be
established by the Planning Commission and LUC.

In Count III, Ala Loop alleged that it was entitled to
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs from the County. In Count
IV, Ala Loop sought damages, attorneys' fees, and costs from
WaFola based on nuisance per se and HRS § 607-25. Count V
sought a production of documents from the County as well as

attorneys' fees and costs related to obtaining those records.3

8 On December 2, 2003, Ala Loop filed a joinder and third party

complaint against the LUC, alleging that the LUC has an interest in the

subject and disposition of this action because the LUC has jurisdiction over
the approval of special permits for land within the land use agricultural

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Ala Loop’s cross-claim was served on November 21, 2003.
On November 24, 2003 WaFola sought legal representation from the
AG. In a letter dated January 21, 2004 to James Killebrew, Chair
of the Wafola School Board, AG Mark Bennett stated that the
Rules of Professional Conduct would preclude the Department of
the Attorney General from representing Wafola because, although
“we have concluded that [HRS] § 302A-1184 does not exempt charter
schools categorically from the State's land use laws,” “[i]t is
my understanding that [WaFola] rejects this advice.” The letter
advised Wafola “to apply (through this Department) to the
Governor for a waiver under [HRS] § 28-8.3[U so that [Wafola]

may contract directly with a private attorney to represent it in

district consisting of more than 15 acres in area.
9 HRS § 28-8.3 (Supp. 2003) provides in relevant part:

Emp1oyment of attorneys. (a) No department of
the State other than the attorney general may employ
or retain any attorney, by contract or otherwise, for
the purpose of representing the State or the
department in any litigation, rendering legal counsel
to the department, or drafting legal documents for the
department; provided that the foregoing provision
shall not apply to the employment or retention of
attorneys:

(l9) By a department, in the event the attorney
general, for reasons deemed by the
attorney general good and sufficient,,
declines, to employ or retain an attorney
for a department; provided that the
governor thereupon waives the provision of
this section.

(b) For purposes of this section the term

“department” includes any department, board,
Commission, agency, bureau, or officer of the State.

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that litigation (at [Waiola's] own expense).”

On January 30, 2004, the parties stipulated to an
extension for WaFola to file an answer or responsive pleading
from January 15, 2004 to February l6, 2004. The parties
subsequently agreed to another extension giving WaFola until
February 25, 2004 to file an answer or responsive pleading.

On February 25, 2004, Deputy Attorney General (DAG)
Charleen Aina, appearing specially on behalf of WaFola, filed a
motion requesting an extension of time for WaFola to answer or
otherwise respond to the complaint and cross-claim. The motion
explained that the AG “would ordinarily appear on behalf of
Wafola in this action,_inasmuch as Wafola is a state agency,”
however, the AG's position regarding whether HRS § 302A-1184
exempts WaFola from obtaining a special permit under HRS chapter
205 was contrary to Waiola's position. The motion further
explained that although WaFola had been informed that the office
would not be able toVrepresent it and that it should avail itself
of the provisions of HRS § 28-8.3, Wafola disagreed that it must
bear the cost of retaining legal services. As to the extension
of time requested, DAG Aina reasoned that “[b]ecause this motion
will not be heard until March l8, 2004, and that interval may be
long enough to work out the differences that remain, we
respectfully request an extension of no more than 30 days after
the motion is decided for counsel to answer or otherwise file a
responsive pleading to the complaint and cross-claim.”

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On March 10, 2004, Ala Loop filed a memorandum in
opposition arguing that the “[AG] and [WaFola] have had more
than ample time to sort out any differences between them as to
who should represent [WaFola] and the terms of such
representation” and that “[a]ny further delays in the case being
at issue may result in irreparable harm to the public, the
interests of the residents of Ala Loop, and possibly the students
of [Wafola].”

After a March l8, 2004 hearing,” the circuit court
entered an order on April 6, 2004 granting Waiola's request for
an extension of time to file an answer or responsive pleading.

The order provided that:

2. Defendant WaFola [has] until April 19, 2004 to
file an answer or other responsive pleading to the
complaint of the County of Hawaii, and the cross-
complaint of Defendant-Cross Complainant Ala Loop
Homeowners Association filed herein; and

3. If an answer or other responsive pleading is not
timely filed, the County of Hawaii and the Ala Loop

Homeowners Association may take appropriate action for
the entry of default against Wafola.

On April 19, 2004, Sandra Pechter Song, an attorney
appearing specially for Wafola, filed a motion for stay of
proceedings, or in the alternative to extend time to file
responsive pleadings (motion for a stay). WaFola alleged in its
motion that it has a “clear and definite right to representation

by Bennett.” However, Bennett has “refused to defend WaFola in

m A transcript of the March l8, 2004 hearing is not included as part
of the record on appeal.

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the subject action, either through his office or through special
counsel appointed by his office” and that “[WaFola] has no funds
to hire private counsel; nor does it have the ability to
represent itself in this case.” Accordingly, WaFola requested
that this “proceeding be stayed to permit it to obtain an order
requiring Bennett to provide it with legal representation.” In
an attached declaration, Song stated that she had agreed to “file
a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court on behalf
of Wafola,” directing Bennett and his office to represent Wafola
in the subject case.

On April 29, 2004, Song filed a petition for writ of
mandamus with,this court, In the petition, Song argued that AG
Bennett was obliged to provide legal representation to Wafola,
and requested that this court either compel him to defend WaFola
or pay for special counsel to represent WaFola. In an attached

declaration, the director of WaFola stated the following:

4. Although WaFola receives State and Federal
funds, those funds are barely sufficient to provide
for the daily classroom needs. 'The State has never
given any funds to WaFola that were specifically
earmarked for a school building or other capital
improvement. To my knowledge, all non-conversion
charter schools are left to find facilities for their
schools without any State assistance.

l6, Mr. Bennett has repeatedly offered to obtain the
consent of the governor to permit WaFola to hire
private counsel to represent WaFola in Civil No. 03-

1-O308. However, Wafola has no funds to retain a
private attorney,

On May 4, 2004, Ala Loop opposed Waiola's motion

for a stay on several grounds including that “[f]urther delay

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would be unreasonable” because “[i]nstead of retaining
special counsel to seek mandamus, [WaFola] could as well
have retained counsel to defend it in this proceeding” or
alternatively “have its current special counsel provide
representation in its defense, and also concurrently seek the
mandamus action it has threatened.”

On May 4, 2004, Ala Loop filed a request for entry
of default against WaFola because Wafola did not file an
answer to Ala Loop’s cross-claim.

At a May l3, 2004 hearing,“ the circuit court
orally denied Waiola's motion for a stay. The court entered
a written order denying the motion on June 29, 2004, stating

that:

in the event that a request for a hearing on any issue
[related to the entry of default judgment] is
requested by any party herein, [WaFola] should have
the opportunity to retain counsel for the purpose of
representation of the school in any such hearing, and
the Court considers a 45-day period of time after

May l3, 2004 to be a reasonable period of time for
[WaFola] to retain counsel for that purpose, should
it choose to do so.

Default was entered against WaFola on May 24, 2004.

On June 2, 2004, the AG sent a letter to WaFola
outlining the terms of its offer of representation, which
included the stipulation that “in defending WaFola against the

default and in other aspects of the representation, the

“ A transcript of the May l3, 2004 hearing is not included as part
of the record on appeal. However, portions of what appears to be a transcript
were attached as an exhibit to a July 6, 2004 motion to set aside entry of
default filed by Wafola in the circuit court,

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Department of the Attorney General will proceed without asserting
the defense that ‘State Land Use laws do not apply to charter
schools.’”

On June 2, 2004, Wafola accepted the AG’s offer of
representation.

On June l0, 2004, this court issued an order denying
Waiola's petition for writ of mandamus.

On June 22, 2004, Wafola, now represented by the AG,
filed an answer to Ala Loop’s cross-claimi On July 6/ 2004,
WaFola filed a motion to set aside entry of default. WaFola

argued that the entry of default should be set aside because the

:court may not have jurisdiction over the claims that Ala Loop

asserts against WaFola, Ala Loop has not proven all of its
claims, WaFola has made continuous efforts to secure counsel,
Waiola's defenses are meritorious, and defaults are generally
disfavored. On July l4, 2004, Ala Loop filed a memorandum in`
opposition.
0n August ll, 2004, the circuit court entered an order

denying the motion,“ finding and concluding that:

1. [Wafola] made a conscious choice not [to] be
represented by private legal counsel and therefore,
failed to answer Ala Loop’s cross-claim in a timely
manner. Therefore, it cannot be said that [WaFola]
was guilty only of excusable neglect.

2. If it is assumed that [WaFola] is a State
agency, Rule 55(e), Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure
(HRCP), does not prohibit a default judgment against a
State agency. HRCP Rule 55(e) allows for a default

“ The motion was decided without a hearing.

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judgment against a State agency if the claimant State
agency establishes a claim or right to relief by
evidence satisfactory to the court, Therefore, where
there is an entry of default, a claimant may obtain a
default judgment against a State agency, if there is a
hearing in which the claimant presents sufficient
evidence establishing a claim or right to relief. 10
Moore’s Federal Practice § 55.3[2][a](Matthew Bender
3rd ed.)

3. [WaFola] has failed to satisfy the necessary
criteria for setting aside an entry of default, and
therefore, its Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default
Dated May 24, 2004, Filed Herein July 64 2004, should

be denied.

On October 20, 2004, Ala Loop filed a Motion for Entry
of Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction Against Defendant
WaFola (motion for entry of default judgment). The motion was
supported, inter alia, by the record, pleadings, attached
declarations of neighbors, excerpts of depositions of WaFola
officials, and correspondence with county officials.

The circuit court held a hearing on December 2, 2004.
with respect to the declaratory relief sought by Ala Loop, the

circuit court stated the following:

The subject land abutting Ala Loop Road is
classified as agricultural. Consistent with the State
Deputy Attorney General’s position set forth in that
letter dated October 22nd, 2003, charter schools are
required to comply with chapter 205 of the Hawaii
Revised Statutes. As such, the subject real property
may be used only for the purposes permitted under HRS
Section 205-4 . . . unless a special permit is granted
pursuant to HRS Section 205-6.

Waiola has indicated that it will not undertake
construction on the land until a special permit is
secured. However this does not mean that the matter
is not ripe for adjudication at this juncture. Waiola
initially indicated that it did not intend to obtain a
special permit and now states that it will. The
Court’s concern is that unless there’s a Court order
in place, Waiola is free to change its mind and
generate another--create another generation of
litigation. _ .

Also there is the issue of whether Waiola's
ongoing activities are permitted under HRS Section

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205-4 . . ., and we are here on a motion for entry of
default judgment.
‘ So, the Court will order as follows.

One, declare that Waiola is subject to the
restrictions of Chapter 205 of the Hawaii Revised
Statutes.

Two, order that Waiola not construct facilities,
educational facilities, on the real property unless it
first receives a special permit.

And, third, will order that Waiola not violate
Chapter 205, HRS, with its ongoing activities.

With respect to the injunctive relief sought by Ala
Loop, the circuit court stated that “no instruction or
educational meetings are to occur on the premises[,]” but that
“farming activities” and a “once-a-week field trip per student
would be acceptable.”

0n February 4, 2005, the circuit court entered Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment which stated in

pertinent part:

I. Findings of Fact.

12. Since the acquisition of the Subject
Property, Wafola has used the Subject Property for
the following purposes: (a) operating its
administrative offices; (b) storing its office
equipment, files, computers and books; (c) holding
instructional and laboratory classes; and (d) the
growing of crops and associated activities, such as
testing, conducting experiments and making

observations.
l3, wafola students have been bussed to the
Subject Property, ~
’ 14. lt is WaFola's intention to use the

Subject Property for school activities and associated
facilities, to include a school building, an athletic
field, athletic building, amphitheater and smaller,
structures for classes.

15. If Waiola is to use the Subject Property
as a school, certain improvements relating to health
and safety are necessary or appropriate: to include:
(a) an expansion of the Ala Loop, (b) an increase in
water availability to fight fires, and (c) an

- individual waste water system.

16. Members of [Ala Loop], as neighbors of the
Subject Property, may suffer injury if the Subject
Property is used as a school.

17. Initially, Wafola declined to obtain a

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special permit even though it understood from the
Attorney General, State of Hawaii, pursuant to a
letter dated October 22, 2003, that it was the
Attorney General’s Office's opinion that Wafola, even
though it was a new century charter school, was
subject to the requirements of Chapter 205, HRS.

18. While Wafola now asserts that it intends
to obtain a special permit, it seeks to use the
Subject Property for uses other than permitted under
Chapter 205, HRS, while its application for a special
permit is pending.

II. Conclusions of Law.

1. [Ala Loop] has standing to assert its
claims regarding WaFola's use of the Subject
Property. In particular, it has suffered an actual or
threatened injury as a result of WaFola's conduct,
the injury is fairly traceable to the conduct of
Wafola and a favorable decision would likely provide
relief for [Ala Loop's] injury.

2. Since the Subject Property is located in
an agricultural use district, its use is limited by
HRS § 205-4.5. Schools and school activities are not
permitted under HRS § 205-4.5.

3. HRS § 302A-1184 does not apply to so as
Isic] to exempt a new century charter school from
complying with the requirements and limitations of
Chapter 205, HRS.

4. Under HRS § 205-6, an entity may obtain
[a] special permit to make “unusual and reasonable
uses” of agricultural land which are not otherwise
permitted under HRS § 205-4.5.

5. Since the acquisition of the Subject
Property) Waiola has used the Subject Property in
violation of Chapter 205, HRS, at least in the
following ways: (a) operating its administrative
offices; (b) storing its office equipment, files,
computers and books; and (c) holding instructional and
laboratory classes.

6. There is a reasonable apprehension that
Waiola may use the Subject Property in violation of
the requirements and limitations of Chapter 205, HRS,
unless it is enjoined from doing so.

7. [Ala Loop] is entitled to a permanent
injunction against WaFola enjoining WaFola from
violating the requirements of Chapter 205, HRS.

` 8. There is an actual controversy regarding
the applicability of Chapter 205, HRS, to WaFola.
[Ala Loop] is entitled to a declaratory judgment
against WaFola.

9. [Ala Loop] has provided evidence
satisfactory to the Court that is entitled to relief
as required by Rule 55(e), HRCP.

III, Judgment;

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ordered,
adjudged and decreed as follows:

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1. Notwithstanding HRS § 302A-1184, Waiola
is subject to the limitations and requirements of
Chapter 205, HRS. Accordingly, WaFola may not
conduct school activities on the Subject Property
which would otherwise violate Chapter 205, HRS, unless
Wafola first receives a special permit under HRS
205-6. 9
2. Accordingly, WaFola, and its agents,

representatives, faculty and students, are permanently
enjoined from undertaking school activities on the
Subject Property which would otherwise violate Chapter
205, HRS, unless WaFola first receives a special
permit under HRS § 205-6 which permits the otherwise
‘ unpermitted activities. The prohibited school

activities on the Subject Property, include, but are
not limited to:

a. Operating administrative offices;

b. Storing office equipment, files, computers
and books;

c. Holding instructional and laboratory
classes;

d. Holding parent-teacher conferences and
staff meetings; and

e. The construction of educational
facilities.

However, WaFola, and its agents,
representatives, faculty and students are specifically
allowed use of the Subject Property as follows:

a. A student may be bussed no more than once

a week to the Subject Property during
school hours for agricultural activities;
and '

b. Permitted agricultural activities by
students using the Subject Property
include the cultivation of crops, the
making of observations of crops, the
undertaking of individual tests or
experiments designed to improve the
cultivation of crops and the receipt of
individual advice from faculty members
regarding the cultivation of crops or the
[] individual tests or experiments.

Final judgment was entered on March 4, 2005, WaFola
filed a notice of appeal on March 4, 2005, On July 29, 2005,
this court issued an order dismissing the appeal because the
judgment did not comply with Jenkins v. Cades Schutte Fleming &
Wright, 76 HaWafi 1l5, 119-l20, 869 P.2d 1334, 1338-39 (1994).

On August 23, 2005, Ala Loop filed a motion for an

award of attorney's fees and costs against Wafola. A hearing

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was held on the motion on September 13, 2005. On October 28,
2005, the circuit court entered an order granting Ala Loop all of
its costs, but denying Ala Loop its attorney's fees.
A First Amended Final Judgment was entered on

December 12, 2005. The First Amended Final Judgment entered
judgment in favor of Ala Loop and against WaFola on Counts I and
II. As to Count IV, the circuit court dismissed with prejudice

Ala Loop’s cross-claim against Waiola alleging damages on the

i`basis of nuisance per se, and entered judgment in favor of

Wajfola on Ala-Loop’s claim for attorney's fees, and against
WaFola for costs in the sum of $3,878.64.“.

waFola timely filed a Notice of Appeal on January 10,
2006. Ala Loop filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on January 24,

2006.
B. ICA Appeal
On May 22, 2006, WaFola filed its opening brief in

which it raised the following points of error:

1. “Because [Ala Loop] lacked standing and its
claim to require Wafola to obtain a special use
permit was either moot or not ripe, the circuit court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and erred by
proceeding to adjudicate [Ala Loop's] cross-claim to
judgment”; »

2. “The circuit court erred in failing to recognize
that [Ala Loop's] claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief and for nuisance per se against
Waiola as a state agency are barred by sovereign

immunity”;
3. “The circuit court misapplied HRCP Rule 55(c)
3 The court noted in a footnote that Counts III and V sought relief

solely from the County of HawaFi.

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and abused its discretion in denying WaFola's Motion
to Set Aside Entry of Default”;

4. “The circuit court lacked sufficient admissible,
competent evidence for, and therefore erred in
entering default judgment under [HRCP Rule] 55(e) in
[Ala Loop's] favor”; and 6

5. “The circuit court erred in concluding that
Wafola was using its farm in violation of the State's
and the County's land use and zoning laws.”

On June 2, 2006, Ala Loop filed its opening brief which

raised the following points of error on cross-appeal:

1. “The Court erred in determining that [Ala Loop]
was required by HRS Section 607-25(e)(2) to post a
bond at the time it filed its Answer and Cross-Claim
against [Wafola], thus denying [Ala Loop] a mandatory
award of attorneys' fees and costs”;

2. “The Court erred when it failed to award [Ala
Loop] attorneys[’] fees under HRS Section 607-
25(e)(l)”;

3. “The Court erred when it determined that HRS

Section 607-25 did not include [Waiola's] activities
of operating the school on the Property and that such
activities did not constitute ‘development’ under the
statute”; and

4. “The Court erred when it determined that
[WaFola] was not considered a private party under HRS
Section 607-25.”

The ICA’s March 12, 2009 SDO reversed the circuit
court's December 12, 2005 First Amended Final Judgment. The ICA
cited its decision in Pono v. Molokai Ranch, Ltd., 119 HawaiH
164} 180-90, 194 P.3d l126, 1142-52 (App. 2008), Cert. rejeCted,
2008 WL 5392320 (Haw. Dec. 29, 2008),“ for the proposition that
“private citizens do not have a private right of action to

enforce the provisions of HRS chapter 205 and, therefore, lack

“ The parties in this action filed their opening briefs with the ICA
prior to the ICA’s decision in Pono. Pono was decided on October 21,
2008, and the ICA's disposition in this case was filed on March 12, 2009.

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standing to invoke a circuit court’s jurisdiction to determine
their claims to enforce Chapter 205.” Accordingly, the ICA
concluded that “[Ala Loop] did not have a private right of action
to enforce their Chapter 205 claims and, therefore, the Circuit
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over [Ala Loop's]
claims.” Based on that conclusion, the ICA did not “reach the
merits of WaFola's other grounds for challenging the Circuit
Court’s rulings in favor of [Ala Loop] and against Wafola on
[Ala Loop's] cross-claim.”

As for Ala Loop’s cross-appeal, the ICA noted that
“[i]n light of our conclusion that [Ala Loop] has no authority to
prosecute a private action against WaFola to enforce HRS § 205-
6,” “we need not address the other issues raised by [Ala Loop] in
conjunction with their request for an award of attorneys' fees.”

The ICA entered judgment on April 22, 2009.
C. Application

Ala Loop timely filed its application on July 21, 2009.

In its application, Ala Loop stated that:

lt is Petitioner's position that the ICA:

(l) ignored Petitioner's standing under HRS
Section 632-1 based on the personal stake its members
had in the controversy relating to the exemption
issue,

(2) ignored the direct procedural injury
suffered by its members when they were deprived of the
opportunity to participate in public hearings and
contested case hearings which are available under the
applicable special permit procedures mandated under
HRS Section 205-6,

(3) ignored the provisions of Article XI,
Section 9 of the Hawaii State Constitution or the
legislative intent of HRS Section 607-25, which
expressly provides private parties with the right to

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decision”

sue for injunctive relief when a development is
undertaken without obtaining all permits or approvals
required by law, including permits required by Chapter
205, and
(4) did not account for the fact that

Petitioner was named as a defendant to the action,
which both the County of Hawaii and the Land Use
Commission of the State of Hawaii (“LUC”) were
parties, and the County of Hawaii sought declaratory
relief as to the same issues.

in

Accordingly, Ala Loop characterized the “question for

aS

[W]hen property is being used by an entity in
violation of Chapter 205, HRS and the entity claims an
exemption from the coverage of the land use statute,
does an association comprised of neighbors of the
entity named as a party have standing to obtain
declaratory relief as to the exemption issue
particularly when the public agencies provided with
express statutory authority to enforce the chapter
have failed to do so, or should the neighbors be
without a remedy?[“] 4

Wafola timely filed its response on August 5, 2009.

In its response, WaFola contends that this court should reject

15

. 3. Where as here,

Ala Loop also raised the following subsidiary questions:

1. Whether [Ala Loop has] established standing
based on injury in fact or procedural injury.

2. Did the Circuit Court have jurisdiction to enter
a judgment in favor of [Ala Loop] when the County of
Hawaii and Land Use Commission have specific notice of
a violation of Chapter 205, . . .?

the neighbors also sought
injunctive relief based on the law of nuisance, did
the Circuit Court have jurisdiction to determine that
the activities upon which the nuisance claim is based
are in violation of Chapter 205 when the public
agencies provided express authority to enforce the
statute are named as parties and have the opportunity
to provide input on the issues? -o

4. As a matter of procedural due process, did the
circuit court have jurisdiction to consider the
position of [Ala Loop] on the issues raised by the
County in its Complaint, and by [Ala Loop] in its
Counterclaim and Cross-claim?

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the application on mootness grounds.

On August 6, 2009, this court ordered Ala Loop to show
cause why this case is not moot. On August 11, 2009, Ala Loop
filed its response to the order to show cause.

On July 28, 2009, the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation
filed an amicus curiae brief (NHLC amicus brief) in support of
Ala Loop’s application for writ of certiorari. On July 29, 2009,
Hawaii's Thousand Friends filed an amicus curiae brief (HTF

amicus brief) also in support of the application,

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Mootness

This court has stated that

It is axiomatic that mootness is an issue of subject matter
jurisdiction. Whether a court possesses subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law reviewable de novo.

Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 119 HawaiH 1, 4-5, 193 P.3d

839, 842-43 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

B. Interpreting the Hawaii Constitution

In interpreting constitutional provisions:

“[W]e have long recognized that the Hawaii
Constitution must be construed with due regard to the
intent of the framers and the people adopting it, and
the fundamental principle in interpreting a
constitutional provision is to give effect to that
intent.” Hirono v. Peabody, 81 HawaiH 230, 232, 915
P.2d 704, 706 (1996)(citation omitted). “This intent
is to be found in the instrument itself.” State v.
Kahlbaun, 64 Haw. 197, 201, 638 P.2d 309, 314 (1981).

As we recently reiterated in State of HawaiH,
ex rel. Bronster v. Yoshina, 84 Hawafi 179, 932 P.2d
316 (1997), “[t]he general rule is that, if the words

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used in a constitutional provision . . . are clear and
unambiguous, they are to be construed as they are
written.” lQp [at 186], 932 P.2d 323 (quoting Blair
[v. Cayetano], 73 Haw. [536,] 543, 836 P.2d [1066,]
1070, [(1992)] (citation omitted)). “In this regard,
the settled rule is that in the construction of a
constitutional provision the words are presumed to be
used in their natural sense unless the context
furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge

them.” Pray v. Judicial Selection Comm'n, 75 Haw.
333, 342, 861 P.2d 723, 727 (1993) (CitatiOn, internal

quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted).

Moreover, “a constitutional provision must be
construed in connection with other provisions of the
instrument, and also in the light of the circumstances
under which it was adopted and the history which
preceded it[.]” Carter v. Gear, 16 Haw. 242, 244
(l904), affirmed, 197 U.S. 348, 25 S.Ct. 49l, 49 L.Ed.
787 (l905).

In re water Use Permit Applications, 94 HawaFi 97, 131, 9 P.3d
409, 443 (2000) (brackets in the original) (quoting Hawaii State
AFL~clo_wv. Yoshina, 34 Hawai‘i 374, 376, 935 P.2d 39, 91 (1_997)).
C. Motion to Set Aside An Entry of Default

The application of HRCP Rule 55, which governs the
entry of default judgment, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp., 100 HawaFi 149, 158, 58

P.3d 1196, 1205 (2002).

III. DISCUSSION.

A. Ala Loop’s chapter 205 claim is not moot and would, in any
event, fall within the “pub1ic interest” exception to the
mootness doctrine '

In its response to Ala Loop’s application, wafola
contends that this court should not accept the application
because the case is moot. wafola asserts that “wafola School no

longer owns the property . . . on Ala Loop Road where the events

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and controversies that spawned this case occurred,”“ and that it
“no longer conducts classes or other school activities on the Ala
Loop property, see declaration of Daniel Caluya, and would need

the current owner’s permission before it could do so.”"

.Accordingly, waFola argued, “[b]ecause wafola School no longer

owns the subject property, and no longer conducts classes or
activities at that location, the issues and claims for relief
raised by [Ala Loop] are moot.”
However, we conclude that waFola failed to

establish that Ala Loop’s cross-claim is moot, and even if this
case is moot, the “public interest” exception applies.

This court has stated that:

A case is moot if it has lost its character as a
present, live controversy of the kind that must exist
if courts are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract
propositions of law. The rule is one of the
prudential rules of judicial self-governance founded
in concern about the proper-and properly limited-role
of the courts in a democratic society. we have said
the suit must remain alive throughout the course of
litigation to the moment of final appellate

“ Attached to waiola's response is a certified copy of a warranty
deed conveying the property back to its former owner.

n The declaration of Daniel Caluya, which was attached to the
response, provides: .

I, DANIEL CALUYA, declare as follows:

1. I have personal knowledge of the following facts
and am competent to testify to them.

2. I am the current director of Wafola waters of
Life Public Charter School (“waFola School”).

3. wafola School no longer owns the property that

is located at Ala Loop, and that is the subject
of this case.

4. wafola [S]chool no longer conducts classes or
activities at that location.

I declare the foregoing to be true and correct
under penalty of perjury.

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disposition to escape the mootness bar.

Kona Old Hawaiian Trails GrouD v. LVman, 69 Haw. 81, 87, 734 P.2d
161, 165 (l987) (internal quotation marks, citations, and
brackets omitted).

In sum, “[a] case is moot if the reviewing court can no
longer grant effective relief.” Kahdohanohano v. State, 114
Hawai‘i 302, 332, 162 P.;zd 696, 726 (2007) (brackets in original)
(emphasis and citations omitted).

Waiola failed to establish that Ala Loop’s cross-claim
is moot. In its February 4, 2005 order, the circuit court found,
inter alia, that waFola was storing computers and equipment at
the property as well as using the property as the site for its
administrative offices,“ and concluded that these activities
violated chapter 205 in the absence of a special use permit.
However, Mr. Caluyals declaration is silent as to whether wafola
continues to store equipment or supplies at the site, or remains
in possession of any portion of the property.

Moreover, although waFola states that it “no longer
owns the property” and “no longer conducts classes or other
activities on the Ala Loop Property,” it does not assert that it
has abandoned its attempts to operate a school there. Rather,
wafola states that “it would need the current owner’s

permission” before operating a school on the property. Thus,

“ These findings are supported by deposition testimony.

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waFola could lease or otherwise secure the property for future
school operations. _fp Lathrop v. Sakatani, 111 Hawafi 307,
313, 141 P.3d 480, 486 (2006) (holding that sale of property
rendered appeal moot because the property plaintiffs sought to
record a lis pendens upon was no longer owned by defendants).

Even if Ala Loop’s claim is moot, it falls within the
“public interest” exception to the mootness doctrine. Doe v.Doe,
116 HawaiH 323, 327, 172 P.3d l067, 1071 (2007). when analyzing
the public interest exception, this court reviews the following
three factors: “(1) the public or private nature of the question
presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination
for future guidance of public officers, and (3) the likelihood of
future recurrence of the question.” lQp (citations omitted).

wafola argues that the “[public interest exception] is
not implicated here because the neighbors['] counterclaim against
the county is still pending in the Third Circuit Court.”
However, this argument is inconsistent with waiola's contention
that the cross-claim is moot, since presumably the same mootness
arguments would apply to the counterclaim as to the cross-claim.
Moreover, wafola cites no authority for the proposition that the
public interest exception should not apply to claims against one
party based on the possibility that the issues could be litigated
in connection with claims against another party.

All three prongs of the public interest test are
satisfied here, First, even if this dispute is viewed as one

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between two private parties, the ICAfs ruling that there is no
private right of action under chapter 205 “inject[ed] the
requisite degree of public concern” in support of having the
public interest exception apply. §pg idp (finding that, although
the underlying proceedings were private in_nature, the family
court's invalidation of the grandparent visitation statute made
the question public in nature). Second, because the availability
of private enforcement is a potentially important consideration
for public officers to take into account in performing their own
duties under HRS chapter 205, public officials need guidance with
regard to whether private citizens have a private right of action
to enforce HRS chapter 205. As for the third prong, given the
volume of land development activity in the State and the
frequency with which issues relating to chapter 205 have been
litigated, the question regarding whether a private party may
seek to enforce HRS chapter 205 is likely to recur in the
future.”
This case is similar to Kona Old, where an

environmental group challenged the county planning director’s
issuance of “special management area minor permit” to the owner

of property situated within a special management area. The owner

” waFola contends that “the plain language of HRS § 205-12 obviates
any need for a court to determine who is responsible for enforcing land use
classification laws.” However, this argument goes more to the merits rather
than the question of mootness, and makes no attempt to address the arguments
regarding the significance of article XI, section 9, HRS § 607-25, or this
court's previous decisions. §pp sections III(B)(4) and (5), infra.

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moved to dismiss the appeal as moot, arguing that no work
remained to be done under the minor permit. 69 Haw. at 86-87,
734 Pi2d at 165. Although it was unclear whether all
construction was in fact complete, this court nevertheless
proceeded to the merits of the group's appeal reasoning that the

questions raised were “of public concern.” Id. at 87-88, 734

P.2d at 165-l66.

Likewise, the question of whether there is a private
right of action to enforce claims brought under chapter 205 is of
equal “public concern.” Accordingly, we will address the merits

of Ala Loop’s application even if waFola has sold the property

,where the events underlying this case took place.

B. Ala Loop had a private right of action to enforce HRS
chapter 205

l. Pono erred in failing to consider the effect of article
XI, section 9 of the Hawafi Constitution

Since the ICA relied on Pono in determining that Ala

.Loop did not have a private right of action, and that the circuit

court accordingly lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we begin
our analysis there. The ICA held in Qppp that private citizens
do not have the authority to enforce the provisions of HRS
chapter 205 and, therefore, lack standing to invoke a circuit

court's jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims under chapter

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205.” 119 HawaFi at 167, 194 P.3d at 1129. The plaintiffs, an
unincorporated association and several of its members
(collectively Pono), filed a complaint in circuit court against
Molokai Ranch (MR) for allegedly violating HRS chapter 205 by
developing fifteen overnight campgrounds on agricultural lands
without obtaining a special use permit pursuant to HRS § 205-6.“
The complaint alleged jurisdiction “pursuant to HRS §§ 6E-13,
603-21.5, 603-2l.7(b), 632-l, and ArtiC1e XI, SeC. 9, Hawaii

Constitution.” Id. at 173-74, 194 P.3d at 1135-36 (footnotes

omitted). The circuit court, relying on a Special Master’s
” while the term “standing” is sometimes used to describe the
private right of action inquiry, see, e.g., Pono 119 Hawai‘i at 167, 194 P.3d

at 1129, nevertheless, our cases make clear that the two inquiries involve
distinct policy considerations and distinct tests, see, e.qp, Pele Defense
Fund V. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 591, 837 P.2d 1247, 1256-57 (1992) (finding that,
in action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged breach of trust by the state,
this court separately analyzes whether plaintiff had a “right to sue” “to
enforce federal rights created by § 5(f) of the Admission Act” and whether
plaintiff had “standing” under the injury-in-fact test). The private right of
action inquiry focuses on the question of whether apy private party can sue to
enforce a statute, while the standing inquiry focuses on whether a particular
private party is an appropriate plaintiff. §pg Sierra Club v. Hawafi Tourism
Auth., 100 HawaFi 242, 271, 59 P.3d B77, 906 (2002) (Moon, C.J., dissenting)
(“This court has long acknowledged that ‘[s]tanding is that aspect of
justiciability focusing on the party seeking a forum rather than on the issues

he for she] wants adjudicated.’”) (brackets in the original) (quoting Citizens

for Prot. of N. Kohala Coastline v. County of Hawaii, 91 HawaFi 94, 100, 979
P.2d~1120, 1126 (1999)). 1

" Prior to Pono filing its lawsuit, the Director of the Department
of Public works and waste Management stated in a letter dated December 11,
1995 to MR's vice president that “camping is a permitted use in agricultural
districts having a soil classification rating of C, D, E, or U[.]” ;gp at
170, 194 P.3d at 1132. Based on the director’s opinion, MR did not apply for
a special use permit for its proposed campgrounds. ldp at 170-71, 194 P.3d at
1132-33. Thereafter, MR applied to the Department of Public works and waste
Management (DPw) for, and was issued, approximately one hundred building
permits for construction of different camping facilities along the Great
Molokai Ranch Trail. lQp at 171, 194 P.3d at 1133.

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report,” dismissed the complaint and Pono appealed. lQp at 179,
194 P.3d at 1141.
The ICA began its analysis by noting that this court in

Reliable Collection Agency v. Cole, 59 Haw. 503, 584 P.2d 107
(1978), had utilized the United States Supreme Court’s approach
set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (l975), to determine
whether “‘a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing one'--an analysis that also involves the determination
of whether a statute creates a right upon which a plaintiff may
seek relief.” Epnp, 119 Hawafi at 184-85y 194 P.3d at 1146-47.
The ICA further noted that the Reliable court discussed the
following three relevant factors used in Qp;p to make this

determination:

First, is the plaintiff ‘one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted[']...-that is,
does the statute create a...right in favor of the
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a
remedy or to deny one?...Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintiff?

Id. at 185, 194 P.3d at 1147 (emphasis and citations omitted).
The ICA also cited to Rees v. Carlisle, 113 HawaFi

446, 153 P.3d 1131 (2007), wherein this court stated that

Subsequent to Cort, decisions of the United States
Supreme Court have emphasized that “the key inquiry is

” The Special Master, relying on Kona Old, in which this court held
that judicial relief is not available unless the party affected has taken
advantage of the procedures provided for in the administrative process,
concluded that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over Pono's HRS chapter
205 claims because Pono failed to appeal its chapter 205 claim to the Maui
County Board of variances and Appeals (BVA). ;Qp at 178-79, 194 P.3d at 1140-
4l.

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whether Congress intended to provide the plaintiff
with a private right of action.” whitey's Boat

Cruises,`Inc. v. Napali-Kauai Boat Charters, Inc., 110
HawaiH.302, 313 n 20, 132 P.3d 1213, 1224 n.20 (2006)

(quoting First Pac. Bancorp, Inc. v. Helfer, 224 F.3d
1117, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2000)). Therefore, as we
recognized in whitey's Boat Cruises, “we apply Cort’s
first three factors in determining whether a statute
provides a private right of action though
understanding that legislative intent appears to be
the determinative factor.” Id. See also Gonzaqa Univ.
V. DOe, 536 U.S. 273, 284, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d
309 (2002) (For a statute to create private rights,
its text must be phrased in terms of the persons
benefitted.); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,
286, 121 S.Ct. 1151, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) ("The
judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has
passed to determine whether it displays an intent to
create not just a private right but also a private
remedy.”). ’

Pono, 119 Hawafi at 185, 194 P.3d at 1147 (quoting Rees, 113

HawaFi at 458, 153 P.3d at 1143).

Applying the Bp§§/Reliable test, the ICA first
concluded that no statute expressly creates a private right to
enforce HRS chapter 205. lQp at l87, 194 P.3d at 1149. Unlike
other statutes enacted by the legislature which expressly
authorize private causes of actions for violations of those
statutes, the ICA noted that “there is no provision in HRS

chapter 205 that expressly authorizes a private individual to

enforce the chapter.” Id. at 187, 194 P.3d at 1149.

As to the second factor, the ICA concluded that there
was no indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to
create a private right of action to enforce chapter 205, and that
implying a private right of action on the basis of legislative

silence would be a “hazardous enterprise, at best.” Id. at 189,

194 P.3d at 1151 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442

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U.S. 560, 571 (1979)). §

Finally, as to the third factor, the ICA concluded that
recognizing a private right of action to enforce HRS chapter 205
is not consistent with the underlying purposes of HRS chapter

205. Id. The ICA noted that pursuant to HRS § 205-12 (1993),”

“the legislature has delegated enforcement of the restrictions

and conditions relating to land-use-classification districts in a

county to the county official charged with administering the
zoning laws for that county[.]” lQp Relying on Lanai Co. v.
Land Use Commission, 105 HawaiU.296, 97 P.3d 372 (2004), in
which this court held that HRS § 205-12 authorizes counties, but
not the LUC, to enforce chapter 205, the ICA concluded that “it
would be incongruous to hold that the legislature intended to
grant private citizens a right to enforce the provisions of HRS

chapter 205 against violators of the chapter.” Pono, 119

Hawai‘i at 190-91, 194 P.3d at 1152-53.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Foley, relying on Kona
Old, stated that, “I would hold that Pono did not exhaust its

administrative remedies prior to bringing suit in the circuit

court because Pono did not appeal [the DPw director's] decision

” HRS § 205-12 (1993) provides:

Enforcement. The appropriate officer or agency
charged with the administration of county zoning laws'
shall enforce within each county the use
classification districts adopted by the land use
commission and the restriction on use and the
condition relating to agricultural districts under
section 206-4.5 and shall report to the commission all
violations. 4

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to the BVA.” ldp at 200, 194 P.3d at 1162. Judge Foley noted
that at the time of the events that led to Pono's lawsuit,
Section 8-5.4(2) of the Maui County Charter provided that the BVA
“[h]ear and determine appeals alleging error from any person
aggrieved by a decision or order of any department charged with
the enforcement of zoning, subdivision and building ordinances.”
lQp at 199, 194 P.3d at 1161. 'Under the Maui County Code, the
DPw was charged with the “enforcement of zoning, subdivision and
building ordinances.” ldp at 200, 192 P.3d at 1162. Pursuant to
§ 8-5.4(2), the BVA had the authority “to hear and determine
appeals alleging error from any person aggrieved by a decision or
order” of the DPw director. ldp Accordingly, in Judge Foley's
view, Pono was required to exhaust its administrative remedies,
by appealing the DPw's determination that camping was a permitted
use and that a special use permit accordingly was not required,
before it could seek judicial review. lQp
Ala Loop and the amicus fault the ICA’s analysis in

Qppp on several grounds. First, they note that the ICA did not
consider the effect of article XI, section 9 of the Hawai‘i
Constitution in its §gp§/Reliable analysis. Second, they argue
that the ICA failed to consider the effect of HRS § 607-25, which
authorizes the award of attorneys' fees in actions brought by
private parties to enjoin development undertaken without permits,
including permits required under Chapter 205. Finally, they

argue that the ICA’s analysis is inconsistent with cases of this

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court that granted standing to plaintiffs in environmental cases,
and with cases of this court which have implicitly recognized
private rights of action to enforce environmental laws, including
chapter 205.

we conclude that Ala Loop had a private right of action
to enforce chapter 205 against wafola. while the gpp§/Reliable
test is appropriately used to determine whether the legislature
intended to create a private right of action when it enacts a
statute, it is not applicable when the state constitution creates
the private right of action. In Reliable, the question was
whether the legislature intended to create a private right of
action when it enacted prohibitions on the unauthorized practice
of law. 59 Haw. at 506, 584 P.2d at 109. In B§g§, the question
was whether the ordinances of the City and County of Honolulu
created a private right of action by which a citizen could seek
to enforce the provisions of the city's ethics code against a
public official. 113 Hawafi at 456-459, 153 P.3d at 1141-1144.
Neither case addressed the question of whether a provision of the

state constitution had created a private right of action. Thus,

the ICA erred in Qppp and here by applying the Rees/Reliable
analysis to chapter 205, without also addressing the question of
whether article XI, section 9 created a private right of action
for the enforcement of that chapter.

For the reasons set forth below, article XI, section 9

creates a private right of action to enforce chapter 205 in the

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circumstances of this case, and the legislature confirmed the
existence of that right of action by enacting HRS § 607-25, which
allows recovery of attorneys' fees in such actions.
2. Article XI, section 9
Article XI, section 9 of the HawaFi Constitution'

provides:

Each person has the right to a clean and
healthful environment, as defined by laws relating to
environmental quality, including control of pollution
and conservation, protection and enhancement of
natural resources. Any person may enforce this right
against any party, public or private, through
appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable
limitations and regulation as provided by law.

This provision was proposed by the 1978 Constitutional
Convention, and approved by the voters in the November 7, 1978'
general election. _gg Stand. Comma Rep. No. 77, in 1 Proceedings
of the Constitutional Convention of 1978, at 689 (1980). It has
both a substantive and a procedural component. First, it
recognizes a substantive right “to a clean and healthful
environment,” with the content of that right to be established
not by judicial decisions but rather “as defined by laws relating

to environmental quality.”“ Second, it provides for the

“ As the committee report from the 1978 Constitutional Convention
observed regarding this section:

Your Committee believes that a clean and
healthful environment is an important right of every
citizen and that this right deserves constitutional
protection. The definition of this right would be
accomplished by relying on the large body of statutes,
administrative rules and ordinances relating to
environmental quality, Defining the right in terms of
present laws imposes no new legal duties on parties, a
point of fairness important to parties which have

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enforcement of that right by “any person” against “any party,
public or private, through appropriate legal proceedings, subject
to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law.”

In order to determine the relevance of article XI,
section 9 here, we must answer several questions. First, is
chapter 205 a “law[] relating to environmental quality” within
the meaning of article XI, section 9? Second, is article XI,
section 9 self-executing, i,e., does the legislature need to act
before the ability to “enforce this right” can be realized?
Finally, if the provision is self-executing, has the legislature
acted to impose “reasonable limitations and regulation” that are
applicable in the circumstances of this case, and which would
preclude Ala Loop from maintaining an action for alleged
violations of Chapter 205?

3. Chapter 205 is a “law[] relating to environmental
quality” within the meaning of article XI, section 9

invested or are investing large sums of money to
comply with present laws.

Developing a body of case law defining the
content of the right could involve confusion and
inconsistencies. 0n the other hand, legislatures,
county councils and administrative agencies can adopt,
modify or repeal environmental laws or regulation laws
[sic] in light of the latest scientific evidence and
federal requirements and opportunities. Thus, the
right can be reshaped and redefined through statute,1
ordinance and administrative rule-making procedures
and not inflexibly fixed.

Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 77, in 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of
,HawaFi of 1978, at 689.

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Article XI, section 9 establishes the right to a clean
and healthful environment, “as defined by laws relating to
environmental quality.” The provision goes on to set forth '
examples of such laws, including laws relating to “control of
pollution” and the “conservation, protection and enhancement of
natural resources.”

HRS chapter 205 is a law relating to the conservation,
protection and enhancement of natural resources, and thus falls
within the scope the enforcement right established by article XI,
section 9. when the legislature enacted what became HRS chapter
205 in 1961, it stated that the purpose of the statute was “to
preserve, protect and encourage the development of the lands in
the State for those uses to which they are best suited for the
public welfare[.]” 1961 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 187, § 1. A
committee report on the bill stated that its purpose was to
“protect and conserve through zoning the urban, and agricultural
and conservation lands within all counties” in order to, inter
alia, “conserve forests, water resources and land.” _§§ H.
Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 395, in 1961 House Journal, at 855.
Moreover, in Curtis v. Board of ADDeals, CountV of Hawafi, 90

Hawafi 384, 978 P.2d 822 (1999), this court examined the “reason

and spirit” of the statute and concluded that its “overarching

purpose . . . is to ‘protect and conserve' natural resources and
foster ‘intelligent,' ‘effective,’ and ‘orderly' land allocation
and development.” Id. at 396, 978 P.2d at 834 (emphasis added,

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citation omitted).

Consistent with that understanding, the provisions of
chapter 205 expressly require consideration of issues relating to
the preservation or conservation of natural resources. §p§ HRS §
205-17(3) (requiring that the land use commission in reviewing
any petition for reclassification of district boundaries consider
among other things “[t]he impact of the proposed
reclassification” on the “[p]reservation or maintenance of
important natural systems or habitats,” the “[m]aintenance of

valued cultural, historical, or natural resources” and the

4“[m]aintenance of other natural resources relevant to Hawaii's

economy, including, but not limited to, agricultural resources”);
HRS § 205-2(e) (mandating that land classified as conservation
districts include “areas necessary for protecting watersheds and
water sources; preserving scenic and historic areas; providing
park`lands, wilderness and beach reserves; conserving indigenous
or endemic plants, fish and wildlife....”).

Finally, HRS § 607-25 reflects the legislature's
determination that chapter 205 is an environmental quality law.
That determination is particularly pertinent since article XI,
section 9 does not itself define the substantive content of the
right to a clean and healthful environment, but rather leaves it
to the legislature to determine. HRS § 607-25 is a fee recovery
statute that authorizes the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs

by private parties against other private parties who undertake

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development without “obtaining all permits or approvals required
by law from government agencies[.]” HRS § 607-25(e). HRS § 607-
25(c) provides that “[f]or purposes of this section, the permits
or approvals required by law shall include compliance with the
requirements for permits or approvals established by chapter[]
205 . . . and ordinances or rules adopted pursuant thereto

under chapter 91.” Thus, permits or approvals required by

.chapter 205 are expressly covered by the statute.A

The legislature explained the purpose of HRS § 607-25
as follows:

The legislature finds that article XI, section
9, of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii has
given the public standing to use the courts to enforce

laws intended to protect the environment, However, the
legislature finds that the public has rarely used this

right and that there have been increasing numbers of
after-the-fact permits for illegal private
development. Although the legislature notes that some
government agencies are having difficulty with the
full and timely enforcement of permit requirements
against private parties, after-the-fact permits are
not a desirable form of permit streamlining. For these

reasons, the legislature concludes that to improve the
implementation of laws to protect health,

environmental gpality, and natural resources, the
impediment of high legal costs must be reduced for

public interest groups by allowing the award of
attorneys' fees, in cases involving illegal
development by private parties, '

1986 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 80, § 1 at 104-105 (emphasis added).
Thus, in enacting HRS § 607-25, the legislature 5
recognized that chapter 205 implements the guarantee of a clean
and healthful environment established by article XI, section 9.
Accordingly, we conclude that chapter 205 is a “law[] relating to

environmental quality” within the meaning of article XI,

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section 9.

4. Artic1e XI, section 9 is self-executing in the
circumstances presented here

In State v. Rodrigues, 63 Haw. 412, 629 P.2d 1111
(1981), this court held that a constitutional provision is self-
executing “if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the
right may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be
enforced[.]” lQp at 414, 629 P.2d at 1113 (citing Davis v.
Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403 (1900)). However, a provision “is not
self-executing when it merely indicates principles, without
laying down rules by means of which those principles may be given
the force of law.” lQp

The Hawaiii Constitution itself addresses the subject
of whether its provisions are self-executing, providing in
article XVI, section 16 that “[t]he provisions of this
constitution shall be self-executing to the fullest extent that
their respective natures permit.”

In Rodrigues, the question was whether article I,
section 11 relating to the appointment of independent grand jury

counsel was self-executing.” Id. at 413-14, 629 P.2d at 1113.

” That provision, which was adopted in 1978, provides:

whenever a grand jury is impaneled, there shall
be an independent counsel appointed as provided by law
to advise the members of the grand jury regarding
matters brought before it- Independent counsel shall
be selected from among those persons licensed to
practice law by the supreme court of the State and
shall not be a public employee. The term and -
compensation for independent counsel shall be provided
by law.

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we evaluated the plain language of the provision, as well as the
intent of the framers as reflected in the standing committee
reports from the 1978 Constitutional Convention, ldp at 416-17,
629 P.2d at 1114-15. we concluded that the provision's reference
to the appointment, term and compensation of the independent
counsel “as provided by law4 reflected the framers' intent that
“subsequent legislation was required to implement the
amendment[,]” since at the time the amendment was adopted, “there
[were] no other constitutional provisions or statutes to which
the phrase could refer.” ldp at 415, 619 P.2d at 1114.

we have revisited the analysis of Rodrigues in several

subsequent cases. In In re water Use Permit Applications, 94

HaWaFi 97, 131-32, 9 P.3d 409, 443-44 (2000), this court

'considered a challenge to actions taken by the Commission on
water Resource Management, including the apportionment of water
for various uses. The Commission had cited the public trust
doctrine, in addition to the State water Code, as support for its
decisions. ldp at 113, 9 P.3d at 425. we held that article XI,

section 1” and article XI, section 7” adopted the public trust

“ Article XI, section 1 provides:

For the benefit of present and future v
generations, the State and its political subdivisions
shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and
all natural resources, including land, water, air,
minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the
development and utilization of these resources in a
manner consistent with their conservation and in
furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State.

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doctrine as a fundamental principle of constitutional law in
Hawafi, and rejected a claim that the doctrine was not self-
executing. lQp at 132 n.30, 9 P.3d at 444 n.30. we examined the
history of the provisions, and concluded that “[w]hereas review
of the history of article I, section 11 in Rodrigues evidenced
the intent to require further legislative action, the same
inquiry here reveals that the framers intended to invoke the
public trust in article XI, section 7.” ;gp we cited to article
XVI, section 16 as further support for that conclusion. lQp
In United Public workers, AFSCME, Local 646 v. Yoqi,

101 Hawaii 46, 62 P.3d 189 i2002), this court considered whether
a statute which prohibited public employers and public employee
unions from collectively bargaining over cost items for the 1999-

2001 biennium violated article XIII, section 2” of the HawaFi

All public natural resources are held in trust
by the State for the benefit of the people.

” Article XI, section 7 provides:

The State has an obligation to protect, control
and regulate the use of Hawaii's water resources for
the benefit of its people.

The legislature shall provide for a water
resources agency which, as provided by law, shall set
overall water conservation, quality and use policies;
define beneficial and reasonable uses; protect ground
and surface water resources, watersheds and natural
stream environments; establish criteria for water use
priorities while assuring appurtenant rights and
existing correlative and riparian uses and establish
procedures for regulating all uses of Hawaii's water
resources. '

” Article XIII, section 2 [formerly Article XII, section 2] provides
that :

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Constitution. ldp at 47, 62 P.3d at 190. This court noted that
at the time article XII, section 2 was amended in 1968,”
“collective bargaining as provided by law” had a well recognized
meaning, usage and application under both federal and state laws.
lQp at 51, 62 P.3d at 194. Thus, we concluded that “Rodrigues is

inapposite[,]” and explained:

The context in which the phrase “as provided by law”
in Rodrigues was used is factually distinguishable
from the situation presented in the instant case.
Unlike the amendment at issue in Rodrigues, when
article XII, section 2 was amended in 1968, there were
pre-existing federal and state statutes,
constitutional provisions, and court cases which give
meaning to the term “collective bargaining.”

After evaluating the intent of the framers as reflected
in committee reports from the 1968 Constitutional Convention as
well as the voters' understanding of the term “collective

bargaining” as reflected by its common definition at the time,

Persons in public employment shall have the
right to organize for the purpose of collective
bargaining as provided by law.

” In a footnote this court explained that:

Prior to the 1968 amendment, article XII, section 2`
provided that “[p]ersons in public employment shall
have the right to organize and to present their
grievances and proposals to the State, or any
political subdivision or any department or agency
thereof.” Article XII, section 2 was amended in 1968
to read, “[p]ersons in public employment shall have
the right to organize for the purpose of collective
bargaining as prescribed by law.” Ten years later, at
the 1978 Constitutional Convention, article XII,
section 2 was renumbered to article XIII, section 2,
and the phrase, “as prescribed by law” was replaced
with as “provided by law.” -

101 HawaFi at 47 n.5, 62 P.3d at 190 n.5 (internal citations omitted).

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this court concluded that the provision's reference to
“collective bargaining” had a clear meaning which entailed the
“ability to engage in negotiations concerning core subjects such
as wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.” ;dp at 53,
62 P.3d at 196. Accordingly, this court held that lawmakers did
not have the absolute discretion to define the scope of
collective bargaining. lQp

In Save Sunset Beach Coalition v. City and County of

Honolulu, 102 Hawaii 465, 78 P.3d 1 (2003), this court

considered whether article XI, section 3” relating to the
conservation and protection of agricultural land was self-
executing. ilQp at 474-76, 78 P.3d at 10-12. This court
concluded that article XI, section 3 read as a whole required
future action be taken by the legislature in order for the “two-
thirds vote of the body responsible for the reclassification or
rezoning action” provision to be effective. ldp This court

explained that since the text imposes a duty on the legislature

” Article XI, section 3 provides:

The State shall conserve and protect
agricultural lands, promote diversified agriculture,
increase agricultural self-sufficiency and assure the
availability of agriculturally suitable lands. The
legislature shall provide standards and criteria to
accomplish the foregoing,

Lands identified by the State as important
agricultural lands needed to fulfill the purposes
above shall not be reclassified by the State or
rezoned by its political subdivisions without meeting
the standards and criteria established by the
legislature and approved by a two-thirds vote of the
body responsible for the reclassification or rezoning
action.

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to “provide standards and criteria to accomplish the foregoing
[mandate with respect to the preservation of agricultural
lands],” it did not appear that the framers considered article
XI, section 3 to be “complete in itself,” and instead required
implementing legislation. lQp at 475-76, 78 P.3d at 11-12.
Several principles emerge from these cases. First, we

closely review the language of the provision at issue to
determine whether it indicates that the adoption of implementing
legislation is necessary. while a reference to a right being
exercised “as provided by law” may reflect an intent that
implementing legislation is anticipated, ppg Rodrigues, 63 Haw.
at 415, 629 P.2d at 1114, it can be interpreted in other ways,
such as simply referring to an existing body of statutory and

6

other law on a particular subject, see Yogi, 101 Hawaii at 51-

53, 62 P.3d at 194-96.“ Second, we review the history of the

” Thus, we respectfully disagree with the dissent's reliance on

Board of Education of State of Hawaii v; waihee, 70 Haw. 253, 264 n.4, 768
P.2d 1279, 1286 n.4 (1989) for the proposition that “[t]he phrase ‘as provided
by law’ in the context of . . . state constitutional provisions [is a
directive] to the legislature to enact implementing legislation” in the
circumstances here. Dissenting opinion at 70-71 & 71 n.23 (ellipses and
brackets in the original). waihee is distinguishable from the instant case
because waihee concerned whether what had been “provided by law” was
consistent with the constitutional provisions, not whether the provisions were
self-executing.

Moreover, the case from which waihee draws this proposition, State
v. Rodrigpes, 63 Haw. 412, 415, 629 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1981) considered the
phrase “as provided by law” in the context of a constitutional amendment
where, “[a]t the time the amendment was adopted, there was no other
constitutional provision or statute to which the phrase could refer. Absent
such provision, subsequent legislation was required to implement the
amendment.” lQp However, in the instant case, the framers specifically noted
that “[d]efining the right in terms of present laws imposes no new legal
duties on parties,” indicating that, at the time the amendment was adopted,
there were other laws in existence to which the phrase “as provided by law”
could refer. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 77, in 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of HawaFi of 1978, at 689 (1980) (emphasis added); ppg discussion

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provision, to determine if the framers' intent as reflected in
that history confirms our analysis of the plain language.

The plain language of article XI, section 9 suggests

that the right of enforcement described in the provision is self-

executing. while the right is “subject to reasonable limitations
and regulation as provided by law,” that provision does not
suggest that legislative action is needed before the right can be
implemented. Put another way, although the provision preserves
the ability of the legislature to impose reasonable limitations
on the exercise of the right, the right exists and can be
exercised even in the absence of such limitations.

It is noteworthy that some limitations already existed
in the State's environmental laws at the time the amendment was
approved in 1978. For example, HRS § 343-7(a) (Supp. 1975)
provided that judicial proceedings challenging the failure to
prepare an environmental impact statement must be brought within
180 days. Absent the final clause in article XI, section 9, it
could be argued that such provisions would be unconstitutional
because they restrict the right to enforce environmental quality
laws. Thus, the situation here is similar to that in Xpgi, where
the phrase “as provided by law” in article XI1I, section 2 was
interpreted as a reference to the existing law of collective

bargaining, rather than that in Rodrigues, where article I,i

infra.

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section 11 established a new right to grand jury counsel, and the
phrase “as provided by law” reflected the framers' understanding
that administrative details such as the compensation of the
counsel needed to be addressed by the legislature first.

It is also worth noting that the right at issue here--
i.e., the right to seek enforcement “through appropriate legal
proceedings”--is within the ability of the judiciary to implement
without legislative action. Unlike the establishment of a new
right to grand jury counsel, which raised issues of,
implementation such as who gets to serve as such counsel and how
much they will be paid, establishing a right to enforce
environmental rights does not raise practical issues of
implementation.

This interpretation of the plain language of article
XI, section 9 is confirmed by an examination of the intent of its
framers, as reflected in the proceedings of the 1978
Constitutional Convention, The report of the Committee on

Environment, Agriculture, Conservation and Land observed:

Your Committee believes that a clean and
healthful environment is an important right of every
citizen and that this right deserves constitutional
protection.

Your Committee believes that this important
right deserves enforcement and has removed the
standing to sue barriers, which often delay or
frustrate resolutions on the merits of actions or
proposals, and provides that individuals may directly
sue public and private violators of statutes,

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ordinances and administrative rules relating to
environmental quality. The proposal adds no new
duties but does add potential enforcers. This private
enforcement right complements and does not replace or
limit existing government enforcement authority.

Your Committee intends that the legislature may
reasonably limit and regulate this private enforcement
right by, for example, prescribing reasonable
procedural and jurisdictional matters, and a
reasonable statute of limitations.

Your Committee believes that this new section
adequately recognizes the right to a clean and
healthful environment and at the same time would
prevent abuses of this right. Concern was expressed
that the exercise of this right to a clean and
healthful environment would result in a flood of
frivolous lawsuits. However, your Committee believes
that if environmental law enforcement by government
agencies is adequate in practice, then there should be
few additional lawsuits, given the barriers that
litigation costs present.

Moreover, your Committee is convinced that the
safeguards of reasonable limitations and regulations
as provided by law should serve to prevent abuses of
the right to a clean and healthful environment.

Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 77, in 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of 1978, at 689-690 (1980).

The committee report does not indicate that the framers
understood that implementing legislation was needed before
enforcement actions could be brought pursuant to article XI,
section 9. To the contrary, the report explicitly recognizes
that the provision “provides that individuals may directly sue

public and private violators.”” Id. at 690. while the report

” A 1978 study prepared for the constitutional convention by the
Legislative Reference Bureau contained a section entitled “The Right to Sue
For Environmental Grievances.” Hawaii Constitutional Convention Studies
Article X: Conservation and Development of Resources, Legislative Reference
Bureau, at 35-38 (May 1978). The study examined provisions from other states,
including one from Illinois which it characterized as “[p]erhaps the strongest
constitutional expression of the right to sue[.]” lQp at 35-36 (citing
Illinois Constitution, Art. XI, § 2, which provided in relevant part that
“Each person has the right to a healthful environment” and “[e]ach person may
enforce this right against any party, governmental or private, through

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recognizes that the legislature retains the power to impose
reasonable limits on the right to bring suit, such as statutes of
limitations,” it does not suggest that such limits must be in
place before actions can be brought.“ Ldp at 689-90.

This interpretation is further confirmed by the
subsequent actions of the legislature, which reflect its
understanding that the provision was self-executing. In 1979,

the State House appointed the committees on Ecology and

appropriate legal proceedings subject to reasonable limitations and regulation
by law.”). The study did not indicate that implementing legislation would be
required; to the contrary, it clearly assumed the opposite. ;Qp at 36
(“[t]here are a number of advantages to the inclusion of a constitutional
provision, in contrast to a statute, granting the right to sue[.]”).

” The standing committee report of the 1978 constitutional
convention provides that “the legislature pay reasonably limit and regulate
this private enforcement right by, for example, prescribing . . . a reasonable
statute of limitations.” Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 77, in 1 Proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention of Hawafi of 1978, at 690 (l980) (emphasis added).
“[T]he term ‘may' is generally construed to render optional, permissive or
discretionary the provision in which it is embodied,” State v. Kahawai, 103
Hawaii 462, 465, 83 P.3d 725, 728 (2004) (citations omitted), and there is
nothing about the context of its use here to suggest a contrary meaning.

Thus, we respectfully disagree with the dissent's assertion that “the framers
clearly intended that § specific statute of limitations be enacted” before
article XI, section 9 can be enforced. Dissenting opinion at 75 (emphasis in
original). '

Thus, the legislature may, consistent with article XI, section 9, enact
a specific statute of limitations applicable to actions seeking to enforce the
provisions of HRS Chapter 205. Alternatively, statutes of limitations of
general application can be applied to such claims consistent with article XI,
section 9. §fp Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 595, 837 P.2d 1247,
1259 (1992). `

" we respectfully disagree with the dissent's suggestion that the
plain language of article XI, section 9 does not reflect the clearly-stated

7intention in the committee report that the right of enforcement be self-

executing without further action by the legislature. To the contrary, for the
reasons set forth supra, the text of article XI, section 9 unambiguously
establishes a self-executing private right of action, and is therefore
completely consistent with the committee report's understanding that by
recommending adoption of that provision, the committee “ha§ removed the
standing to sue barriers” and thereby “provide|d| that individuals may
directly sue public and private violators.” Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 77, in 1

'Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1978, at 689-690 (l980)

(emphasis added).

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Environmental Protection and the Judiciary to serve as a joint
Interim Committee to review article XI, section 9 “to determine
whether legislation is necessary to implement” the right to a
clean and healthful environment established by the provision, H.
Spec. Comm. Rep. No. 22, in 1980 House Journal, at 1247. The
joint Interim Committee reviewed the provision and its history,
and held a hearing at which various witnesses testified,
including four former delegates who served on the committee that
drafted the provision, ldp at 1247-48.r The committee reported

to the House as follows:

Your joint Interim Committee . . . finds that
both of the constitutional rights contained in the
environmental rights amendment took effect and were
granted to each person in Hawaii immediately upon
ratification, at the general election of November 7,
1978, of the amendment to the Hawaii State
Constitution now designated as Article XI, Section 9.

Your Committee relatedly finds and concludes
that the environmental rights amendment (Article XI,
Section 9) is self-executing or self-implementing, and
that no legislation is necessary at this time to
implement its provisions.

I_d_. at 1248.
The committee further reported that “[a]lthough Article

XI, Section 9 does not mandate the legislature to enact
limitations and regulations, testimonies presented by
representatives from the private sector . . . expressed concern
that the broad, liberalized standing-to-sue provision in the
subject amendment will encourage a flood of lawsuits[.]” lQp at
1250. The report noted that the experience to date in HawaiH

with the provision, as well as that in other states (such as

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Illinois) with similar provisions, did not justify those
concerns. ;Qp Thus, the report concluded that “your joint
Interim Committee on Environmental Rights recommends not
legislation, at this particular time, to implement, limit or
regulate the provisions of, or the rights granted by[]” article
XI, section 9. ldp (emphasis in original).

The report is not dispositive in our analysis since it
cannot change the meaning of article XI, section 9 as approved by
the voters in 1978, and since it sets forth the views only of the
joint committee, rather than the legislature as a whole.
Nevertheless, it is relevant to the extent that it provides an
explanation for the non-action of the legislature, which is the
body that would be charged with enacting legislation to implement
the provision if it was not self-executing.

Even stronger evidence of the legislature's views on
the self-executing nature of article XI, section 9 came in 1986,
when the legislature enacted Act 80, which was codified as HRS §
607-25. when the legislature enacted Act 80, it specifically
included chapter 205 among the list of provisions for which
attorneys' fees could be recovered in a suit by one private party
against another for an injunction against development undertaken
without permits or approvals. _g§ 1986 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 80,

§ 607 at 105 (“[f]or purposes of this section, the permits or
approvals required by law shall include compliance with the

requirements for permits or approvals established by chapter[]

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205 . . . and ordinances or rules adopted pursuant thereto
under chapter 91.”). 7
Although one might read the inclusion of chapter 205
within HRS § 607-25 as creating a cause of action under HRS §
607-25, the legislature's findings and committee reports all
suggest that the legislature understood that such causes of
action already existed and were authorized by article XI, section
9. _§§ 1986 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 80, § 1 at 104-05 (“The
legislature finds that article XI, section 9 of the Constitution
of the State of Hawaii has given the public standing to use the
courts to enforce laws intended to protect the environment.
However, the legislature finds that the public has rarely used
this right . . . .”); H. Standi Comm. Rep. No. 766-86, in 1986
House Journal, at 1373 (“Your Committee further finds that if the
bill is adopted, it will give fuller effect to Article XI,
Section 9 of the State Constitution, which gives Hawaii's people
the right to bring lawsuits enforcing environmental laws.”); S.
Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 450-86, in 1986 Senate Journal at 976 (“The
bill will give fuller effect to Article XI, Section 9 of the
Constitution of the State of Hawaii, which gives Hawaii's people
the right to bring lawsuits enforcing environmental laws.”).
In sum, it appears that the legislature found in 1986

that article XI, section 9 was self-executing. Moreover, to
ensure that the public was not dissuaded from asserting their

rights under that provision, the legislature enacted HRS § 607-25

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to allow citizens to recover their attorneys' fees for bringing a
successful civil action against a private party for a violation
of the enumerated chapters (including chapter 205) contained
within the statute,

This view is consistent with this court's discussion of
HRS § 607-25 in Kahana Sunset Owners Association v. Maui County
Council, 86 Hawafi 132, 948 P.2d 122 (1997). In Kahana, the
plaintiffs failed to prevail on appeal in an action against a
private defendant with regard to the approval of a rezoning
application, lQp at 133, 948 P.2d at 123. After a review of the
legislative history of HRS § 607-25, this court concluded “that

the legislature intended that individuals and organizations would

help the state's enforcement of laws and ordinances controlling

idevelopment by acting as private attorneys general and suing

' developers who did not comply with the proper development laws.”

ldp at 134-35, 948 P.2d at 124-25, we concluded that an award of
attorney's fees to the defendants was not warranted, because the
plaintiffs’ arguments were not frivolous. ;Qp at 135, 948 P.2d
at 125.’

The conclusion that article XI, section 9 is self-
executing is also widely supported in the scholarly writing about
the provision, §§§ Susan Morath Horner, EmbryoF Not Fossil:
Breathing Life into the Public Trust in wildlife, 35 Land & water
L. Rev. 23, 65 (2000) (describing article XI, section 9 as

expressing a “manifest self-executing nature”); Janelle P.

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Eurick, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment:
Enforcing Environmental Protection Through State and Federal

Constitutions, 11 Int’l Legal Persp. 185, 208 (2001) (noting that
this court in Kahana found that “Hawaii's environmental
constitutional provision, Article XI, Section [9], gives citizens
standing to use the court to protect the environment”); Carole L.
Gallagher; The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of
RiQhts: From Earth Dav, 1970 to the Present, 9 Fordham Envtl. L.
Rev. 107, 139 (1997) (noting that this court in Kahana “affirmed
that article XI, section 9 gives the Hawaiian people the right to
bring lawsuits to enforce environmental laws”); David Kimo
Frankely Enforcement of Environmental Laws in Hawaii, 16 U. Haw.
L. Rev. 85, 135 (1994) (noting that article XI, section 9 was
“intended to be self-executing” and that “[t]he plain language
and history of [that] provision declare that citizens have the
right to sue, but that this right can be limited and regulated by
the Legislature”).

This court's other decisions have not directly
addressed whether article XI, section 9 is self-executing. §§§
Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp. (Superferry I), 115 HawaFi 299,
320 11.28, 167 P.3d 292, 313 1'1.28 (2007) (Statirlg that "[a] lthough
this court has cited [article XI, section 9] as support for our
approach to standing in environmental cases, we have not directly
interpreted the text of the amendment,” and declining to discuss

the meaning of article XI, section 9 further because the

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environmental statute at issue contained specific language
regarding who may enforce the law and the parties did not discuss
the constitutional provision in their appellate briefs) (internal
citations omittedl); Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n, 63 Haw.
166, 172 n.5, 623 P.2d 431, 438 n.5 (1981) (noting that standing
requirements are “tempered” by article XI, section 9); see also
Bremner v. CitV & County of Honolulu, 96 HawaFi 134, 145 n.3, 28
P.3d 350, 361 n.3 (App. 2001) (addressing the text of article XI,
section 9 to the extent it recognized that, “[i]n his complaint,
Bremner asserts the omission of an environmental assessment
violated his environmental rights under article XI, section 9 of
the HawaiH Constitution. The manner in which Bremner's rights
under article XI may be enforced, however, is governed by section
9’s qualification that any such legal proceeding be ‘subject to
reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law.' Haw.
Const. art. XI, § 9. Because HawaFi Revised Statutes ch. 343
provides reasonable limitations and regulations for adjudicating
disputes involving environmental assessments, Bremner's failure
to comply with its provisions forecloses further consideration of
his constitutional claim.”). while several of our decisions have
touched upon the existence of private rights of action for

violations of environmental laws, they did not consider article

XI, section 9. ee Citizens for the Prot. of the N. Kohala

Coastline v. County of Hawari, 91 Hawaid 94, 979 P.2d 1120

(1999); whitev's Boat Cruises, Inc. v. Napali-Kauai Boat

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chartera, Ino., 110 Hawai‘i 302, 132 P.3d 1213 (2006) .35

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that article XI,
section 9 is self-executing. Having determined that article XI,
section 9 is self-executing, we turn to whether the legislature
has acted to impose “reasonable limitations and regulation” that
might preclude Ala Loop from maintaining an action for alleged
violations of chapter 205.

75. HRS § 205-12 does not preclude Ala Loop from bringing
an action to enforce chapter 205 against WaFola

Article XI, section 9 provides that the legislature has
the authority to impose “reasonable limitations and regulation”
on potential litigants, such as Ala Loop, who seek to bring
private actions to enforce laws relating to environmental

quality. In its response to the application, waFola argues that

” In Citizens for the Protection of North Kohala Coastline, a
community group sought declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the
county wrongfully failed to allow for proper state land use review as required
by HRS chapter 205. 91 HawaFi at 96, 979 P.2d at 1l22. This court
emphasized the state's liberal standing doctrine “where the interests at stake
are in the realm of environmental concerns,” igp at 100, 979 P.2d at 1126
(citation omitted), and reasoned that “[b]ecause a declaratory judgment will
serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to this
proceeding and will foster ‘the needs of justice,’” the community group had
standing to participate in the action for declaratory and injunctive relief,
pdp at 101-02, 979 P.2d at 1127-28. This court then reached the merits of the
group's claim and concluded that the county did not violate HRS chapter 205.
gap at 106, 979 P.2d at 1132. '

In whitev’s Boat Cruises, several commercial tour boat operators
brought common law tort claims against other operators and promoters, alleging
that their failure to obtain permits required by state and county regulations
promulgated under HRS chapters 200 and 205A amounted to unfair competition and
tortious interference with prospective business advantage. This court found
that the regulations in question did not provide the parties a private right
of action “in the circumstances of this case” because the regulations “were
not promulgated with the objective of protecting business interests or
competition but rather with the objective of protecting and preserving the
environment for the general public[.]” 110 HawaFi at 313, 132 P.3d at 1224.
whitev's Boat Cruises is thus distinguishable from the circumstances here,
where there are no allegations of commercial injury.

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the legislature has expressly delegated enforcement of chapter
205 to the counties in HRS § 205-12,” and thereby precluded a
private right of action by Ala Loop. In support of its argument,
waiWola cites to Lanai Co. v. Land Use Commission, 105 HawaiH
296, 318, 97 P.3d 372, 394 (2004),

Although the response does not discuss article XI,
section 9, waiola's argument amounts to a contention that HRS §
205-12 is a “reasonable limitation[] and regulation” within the
meaning of the provision. However, HRS § 205-12 does not

preclude Ala Loop’s private right of action to enforce chapter

_205. In Lanai Co., this court considered the power of the Land

0se Commission (LUC) to enforce the provisions of chapter 205.
After examining the authority granted to the LUC under chapter
205, we concluded that “the LUC must necessarily be able to order
that a condition it imposed be complied with, and that violation
of a condition cease.” ldp However, we further concluded that
HRS § 205-12 gave the counties, rather than the LUCy the
authority to enforce the provisions of chapter 205. 1Qp we
noted that although HRS § 205-12 expressly gave enforcement

authority to the counties, “[t]here is no provision in HRS § 205-

“ HRS § 205-12 (1993) provides:

Enforcement. The appropriate officer or agency
charged with the administration of county zoning laws
shall enforce within each county the use
classification districts adopted by the land use
commission and the restriction on use and the
condition relating to agricultural districts under
section 205-4.5 and shall report to the commission all
violations.

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12 that expressly delegates enforcement power to the LUC.” ;Qp
we added that “[i]f the legislature intended to grant the LUC
enforcement powers, it could have expressly provided the LUC with
such power.” ;dp

Thusj the issue in Lanai Co. was which of`two
governmental entities (the LUC, or the county) was authorized by
the legislature to enforce chapter 205. There was no suggestion
that article XI, section 9 was relevant to that analysis, or that
HRS § 205-12 reflected any intent by the legislature to preclude
private enforcement. Thus, Lanai Co. is not dispositive of the
issues here.

In any event, if we were to interpret HRS § 205-12 as
waFola suggests, it would exceed the power granted to the
legislature in article X1, section 9 to impose “reasonable
limitations and regulation” on the right of private enforcement.
The inclusion of the word “reasonable” in that phrase clearly
indicates that the power to limit or regulate is not unfettered.
The abolishment of the private right altogether by HRS § 205-12,
on the theory that the county would enforce the same underlying
substantive interests, would not be a “reasonable” limitation
within the meaning of the provision.

This interpretation is supported by the history of
article XI, section 9. After discussing the right to a clean and
healthful environment, the report of the 1978 Constitutional

Convention's Committee on Environment, Agriculture, Conservation

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and Land observed:

Your Committee believes that this important
right deserves enforcement and has removed the
standing to sue barriers, which often delay or
frustrate resolutions on the merits of actions or
proposals, and provides that individuals may directly
sue public and private violators of statutes,
ordinances and administrative rules relating to
environmental quality. The proposal adds no new
duties but does add potential enforcers. This private
enforcement right complements and does not replace or

limit existing government enforcement authority.

Your Committee intends that the legislature may
reasonably limit and regulate this private enforcement
right by, for example, prescribing reasonable
procedural and jurisdictional matters, and a
reasonable statute of limitations.

Your Committee believes that this new section
adequately recognizes the right to a clean and
healthful environment and at the same time would
prevent abuses of this right. Concern was expressed
that the exercise of this right to a clean and
healthful environment would result in a flood of
frivolous lawsuits. However, your Committee believes
that if environmental law enforcement by government
agencies is adegpate in practice, then there should be
few additional lawsuits, given the barriers that
litigation costs present.

Moreover, your Committee is convinced that the
safeguards of reasonable limitations and regulations
as provided by law should serve to prevent abuses of
the right to a clean and healthful environment.

Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 77, in 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of 1978, at 690 (emphasis added).

As the highlighted sections of the report indicate, the
framers understood that private enforcement would “complement”
government enforcement, rather than be supplanted by it, The
clear import of the passage is that “reasonable limitations and
regulation” would encompass matters such as statutes of
limitations or procedural or jurisdictional limitations. while

such restrictions might preclude a particular plaintiff from

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bringing suit in a particular circumstance, the framers did not
envision that they would be used to eliminate private enforcement
altogether.

Accordingly, we conclude that HRS § 205-12 does not
limit or restrict the ability of Ala Loop to enforce the
provisions of chapter 205 against wafola.

Finally, we note that waFola has not identified
any other “reasonable limitations or regulation.” ySpecifically,
it has not suggested that exhaustion or primary jurisdiction
applies. Accordingly, we do not address whether the application
of those doctrines would constitute a reasonable limitation or
restriction under the facts of this case. Qfy Qppp, 119 HawaFi
at 192-201, 194 P.3d at 1154-1163 (Foley, J., concurring)
(concluding that Pono's action was properly dismissed since Pono
did not exhaust its administrative remedies prior to bringing
suit in the circuit court, because Pono did not appeal the
decision of the director of Public works and waste Management to
the Board of Variances and Appeals).

6.` The cases cited by the dissent address requirements for
standing and do not establish the existence of a
statutory private right of action

we respectfully disagree with the dissent's suggestion
that this court has recognized a private right of action for
“adjoining landowners” who are affected by “land use decisions

that interfere with the enjoyment of their property,” dissenting

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opinion at 10, based on our holdings in Dalton v. City and County
of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 400, 462 P.2d 199 (1969), East Diamond Head

Association v. ZoninG Board of Appeals of the CitV §nd County of

Honolulu, 52 Haw. 518, 479 P.2d 796 (1971); Town v. Land Use

Commission, 55 Haw. 538, 524 P.2d 84 (1974), Perry v. Planning

. Commission of the County of Hawaii, 62 Haw. 666, 619 P.2d 95

(1980), and Mahuiki v. Planning Commission and Planning

Department of the County of Kauai, 65 Haw. 506, 654 P.2d 874
(1982). To the extent the cases cited by the dissent focus on
the status of the plaintiffs as adjoining landowners, they did so
in the context of assessing standing." Moreover, the appeals in

East Diamond Head Association, Town, Perry, and Mahuiki were

brought pursuant to chapter 91, and do not establish the
existence of a private right of action outside of that context.
In Dalton, the plaintiffs, who “apparently ‘live[d]
across the street from [the] real property'” at issue, sought a
declaratory judgment that four Honolulu zoning ordinances were
null and void. 51 Haw. at 400-017 403, 462 P.2d at 201, 202.
The defendants, lessees and developers of land rezoned under the
ordinances, “argued that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.” Lgp

at 402, 462 P.2d at 202 (emphasis added). This court identified

” As noted in n.20, supra, while the term “standing” is sometimes
used to describe the private right of action inquiry, see, e.g., Pono 119

HawaFi at 167, 194 P.3d at 1129, nevertheless, our cases make clear that~the
two inquiries involve distinct policy considerations and distinct tests, see
e.g., Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 591, 837 P.2d 1247, 1256-57
(l992).

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“the issues to be resolved” as “standing, laches, and the
validity of the ordinances.” ldy (emphasis added). In
addressing the defendants' standing argument, this court
concluded that “[p]laintiffs' interest in this case is that they
‘reside in very close proximity’ to the proposed

development. . . . Clearly this is a ‘concrete interest’ in a
‘legal relation'.” lQy Accordingly, this court concluded that
“plaintiffs have standing to challenge the validity of the
ordinances in question.” lgy (emphasis added). without
addressing whether the plaintiffs had a private right of action
to challenge the ordinances," this court went on to address the
plaintiffs' contention that the ordinances were null and void,
and concluded that the trial.court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendants was erroneous. lgp at 408, 417, 462 P.2d at
205, 209.

In East Diamond Head Association, an association of
neighboring landowners challenged the trial court's order
concluding that the association was not a “person aggrieved”
within the meaning of the HawaFi Administrative Procedures Act

(HAPA), and was therefore not entitled to judicial review of the

” we note that Dalton was decided prior to the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). This court first

utilized the Cort analysis for determining whether a statute authorized an
implied private right of action in Reliable Collection Agency v. Cole, 59 Haw.
503, 584 P.2d 107 (1978). Thus, our analysis of private rights of action has
been modified since our decision Dalton, and we therefore respectfully
disagree with the dissent's assertion that Dalton should control our analysis
here.

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zoning board's issuance of a variance allowing a parcel of land
to be used for movie production.” 52 Haw. at 518-19, 479 P.2d
at 796-97. The zoning board had held a public hearing on the
movie studio’s petition for the variance, at which members of the
association had testified that “the movie operation interfered
with the enjoyment of their property[.]” ;gy at 520-21, 479 P.2d
at 797-98. After the zoning board's decision to issue the
variance, the association “instituted proceedings for a judicial
review under [§] 91-14(a) (1968) of the [HAPA].” lgy at 521, 479
P.2d at 798. The trial court dismissed the association’s agency
appeal, finding that the association was not “entitled to review
as a person aggrieved by a final decision and order in a
contested case as provided for in HRS Chapter 91 and HRS [§] 91-
14(a)” because it had not “intervened in the board's
proceedings[.]” lgy
This court disagreed and concluded both that the

association was a Fperson aggrieved” and that the public hearing
was a “contested case.” lgy at 522, 524, 479 P.2d at 798, 799.
In concluding that the association was a “person aggrieved,” this

court noted that the “[s]tudio's industrial use within [the

” we have since characterized the determination of whether a party
is a “person aggrieved” for the purposes of chapter 91 as comprising part of
the standing inquiry. §gg Bush v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 76`Hawafi 128, 133-
34, 870 P.2d 1272, 1277-78 (1994) (“Appellants' standing to invoke judicial
review under the HAPA is contingent upon a showing that they are ‘person[s]
aggrieved by a final decision and order in a contested case’ conducted before
an administrative agency”) (brackets in the original; citation omitted).

_55_

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association members'] residential neighborhood as sanctioned by
the board's zoning variance immediately and directly affects each
homeowner[,]” and that the association members were therefore not
“merely tangentially touched by the zoning change[.]” lgy at
522, 479 P.2d at 798. In holding that the public hearing was a
“contested case,” this court concluded that the association had
“done everything possible to perfect an appeal” by “comport[ing]
with all board procedural dictates[.]” lgp at 524, 479 P.2d at

799. Accordingly, this court remanded the case for a new trial.

Id.

In Town, adjoining landowners challenged the trial

court's grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the

Land Use Commission (LUC), where the LUC had approved a petition
to amend the district designation for a parcel of land from
agricultural to rural. 55 Haw. at 539, 524 P.2d at 85. The LUC
had held a public hearing on the petition, at which the adjoining
landowners “spoke in opposition to the [] petition.” ;gy at 539,
524 P.2d at 86. Two subsequent meetings were held, at which a
decision on the petition was deferred. ;gy At a third meeting,
where the adjoining landowners were not present, the owner of the
parcel spoke to “rebut all statements made by the opposition to
his petition and submitted documents for the consideration of the
[LUC.]” lgy at 540, 524 P.2d at 86. A motion to approve the

petition was carried, but the Vice-Chairman of the LUC noted that

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the motion was “‘not based on anything that was said here today
because these facts were made known to us before.’” ;gy The
adjoining landowners appealed, seeking reversal of the LUC’s
decision. lgy

In the adjoining landowners' agency appeal, this court
concluded that the meeting at which the petition was approved was
a “contested case,” igp at 548, 524 P.2d at 91, the provisions of
the HAPA were applicable, iQp at 545, 524 P.2d at 89, and the LUC
had violated the provisions of the HAPA in accepting the owner’s
testimony and evidence, igy at 549, 524 P.2d at 91. In
concluding that the meeting was a “contested case”“ within the

meaning of HRS § 91-1(5), we noted that:

The appellant has a property interest in the amending
of a district boundary when his property adjoins the
property that is being redistricted. Therefore, any
action taken on the petition for boundary change is a
proceeding in which appellant has legal rights as a
specific and interested party and is entitled by law

to have a determination on those rights.
;gp at 548, 524 P.2d at 91 (citations and footnoted omitted).
This court further concluded that the approval of the
petition “was rendered in violation of HRS [§§] 205-3 and 205-4
as well as Land Use Regulation 2.35” because the LUC had failed

to act on the petition within the prescribed statutory period.

“ we have also characterized a party's participation in a “contested
case” as a standing requisite in an administrative appeal. §gg Bush, 76
Hawaii at 134, 870 P.2d at 1278 (noting that a party “‘must have participated
in [a] contested case before [an] administrative agency[,]' to acquire
standing to challenge the decision in court”) (brackets in the original;
citation omitted).

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lQp at 542-545, 524 P.2d at 87-89,

In Eg;;y, adjoining landowners challenged the grant of
a special permit to Shield-Pacific, Ltd. and Kapoho Land and
Development Company (hereinafter Applicants), who had filed an
application with the County of Hawafi Planning Commission
(planning commission) seeking permission to use a parcel of land
for quarrying purposes. 62 Haw. at 669, 619 P.2d at 99. “Since
the land was within an ‘agricultural' district for purposes of
Land Use Law, HRS Chapter 205, favorable actions upon the request
by both the [planning commission] and the [LUC] were necessary
before such use was permissible.” LQy The planning commission
held a public hearing, at which opponents “object[ed] to the
proposed quarrying operations[.]” ;gy at 670-71, 619 P.2d at
100. “The planning commission later voted to permit the requested
use, and the planning commission’s decision was transmitted to
the LUC pursuant to HRS § 205-6. lQp at 671, 619 P.2d at l0O.
Following a lengthy public meeting in which “opponents of the
application again voiced their . . . concerns,” the LUC approved
the special permit. lgy at 672, 619 P.2d at 101. The owners of
property adjoining the proposed quarry site appealed from the
decision and order of the LUC, and the circuit court set aside
the grant and approval of the special permit on several grounds,
including that the planning commission had not acted on the

application in a timely manner and that the LUC therefore lacked

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jurisdiction to act on the permit. ;gp at 672-73, 619 P.2d at
101. The government agencies and the Applicants appealed the
circuit court's judgment. lgy at 673, 619 P.2d at 101.

On appeal of the circuit court's judgment, this court
did not address jurisdiction, but instead proceeded directly to
address the appellants’ arguments on the merits and reversed the
circuit court, lgy at 673-686, 619 P.2d at 101-108. Thus,
although Perry provides an example of adjoining landowners
bringing a chapter 91 appeal of a LUC decision,“ it contains no
discussion directly relevant to the issues here.

In Mappiki, a limited partnership sought to develop a
condominium and single family residence project at Haena on
Kauai. 765 Haw. at 508, 654 P.2d at 876. The partnership sought
various approvals from the Kauai Planning Commission, including
a special management area use permit under the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA), HRS chapter 205A. lQy at 508, 654 P.2d at
876. The commission held a hearing on the request, and approved
the permit with conditions. ;gy at 511, 654 P.2d at 877-78. The
appellants, who were “adjacent landowners or residents of Haena,”

id. at 515, 654 P.2d at 880, appealed to the circuit court,

“ Although Perry does not explicitly mention chapter 91, the court's
discussion of the LUC proceedings clearly reflects that it was an
administrative appeal. 62 Haw. at 668, 672, 619 P.2d 98, 101 (noting that
“[t]his case is before us on an appeal from an order and judgment of the
Circuit Court of the Third Circuit reversing and vacating an order of the Land
Use Commission of the State of Hawaii” and that the appellees “filed a timely
Notice of Appeal from the fore oin decision and order of the LUC to the
circuit court”) (emphasis added).

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challenging the commission’s approval of the permit on numerous
grounds, igy at 512, 654 P.2d at 878. The circuit court
dismissed the appeal “on the ground that appellants had not
participated in the administrative proceedings.” lQy

On appeal, this court first considered “the appellants’
standing to seek review of the administrative action[,]” and
concluded that two of the appellants had satisfied the
requirements of HRS § 91-14 since there was a final decision and
order in a contested case, appellants’ interests were injured,
and they had submitted written testimony in opposition to the
permit request and thus were involved in the contested case
proceedings. lQy at 508, 512, 514-15, 654 P.2d at 876, 878-80.
with regard to the injury to the appellants’ interests, we noted

that:

The interests asserted by appellants were “special”
and “personal” unto themselves, as they are adjacent
landowners or residents of Haena. And a decision to
permit the construction of multi-family housing units
on undeveloped land in the special management area
could only have an adverse effect on their
environment.

lQp at 515, 652 P.2d at 880.

1 we then concluded that the planning commission erred by
omitting a required finding, and accordingly vacated the
dismissal of the case. lgy at 519, 654 P.2d at 883.

4 In sum, each of these five cases addressed standing
requisites. Dalton expressly discussed its determination that

adjoining landowners had “a ‘concrete interest’ in a ‘legal

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relation'” in standing terms. 51 Haw. at 403, 462 P.2d at 202.

Mahuiki, Town and East Diamond Head Association directly

addressed questions relating to whether the adjoining landowners
had standing to appeal an agency action in a contested case under
HRS § 91-14.“ £g;;y, similarly, was an agency appeal, and did
not directly discuss standing or private rights of action.
Moreover, to the extent that Mahuiki, Ipyn and East Diamond Head
Association discussed the nature of the parties' status as
adjoining landowners, they did so in the context of determining
whether they were “person[s] aggrieved” for purposes of HRS § 91-

14. Because the landowners lived adjacent to the properties that

were the subject of the proposed land use action at issue in each

case, we determined that they had a sufficient stake to be
aggrieved persons. Thus while the nature of the impacts that the
neighboring landowners alleged provided the basis for determining
that they had standing under HRS § 91-14 as “persons aggrieved,”
at no point in our discussion in those cases did we suggest that
they had a cause of action independent of chapter 91 based on
their status as neighboring landowners, §ee Ponohu v. Sunn, 66

Haw. 485, 487, 666 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1983) (holding that “it would

“ we have elsewhere characterized the discussion in Mahuiki and East
Diamond Head Association as addressing the question of “standing.” Sierra
Club v. HawaFi Tourism Auth., 100 Hawafi 242, 252, 59 P.3d 877, 887 (2002)
(plurality opinion) (finding that Mahuiki held that “adjacent landowners H
had standing to invoke judicial review” and East Diamond Head Association held
that neighboring landowners “had standing to challenge movie operation” based
on impacts that showed “each appellant was a person aggrieved”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

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be anomalous to permit a declaratory judgment action to be
substituted for an appeal from an agency determination in a
contested case”).

Accordingly, we respectfully disagree with the
dissentfs interpretation of these cases, and conclude that they

did not recognize the existence of a private right of action in

`the circumstances here.

7. Conclusion
Ala Loop had a private right of action under article
XI, section 9 of the Hawafi Constitution to enforce its chapter

205 claims against waFola.“ Accordingly, the ICA erred in its

“ Ala Loop also had standing to bring its claims. Hawaii courts
determine “whether a plaintiff has the requisite stake” in an action so as to
have standing by asking “(1)'has the plaintiff,suffered an actual or
threatened injury . . . ; (2) is the injury fairly traceable to the
defendant's actions; and (3) would a favorable decision likely provide relief

for plaintiff's injury.” See Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 115 Haw. 299,

319, 167 P.3d 292, 312 (2007) (“Superferry ”). (footnote and citation
omitted; ellipses in original). Here, the record amply supports the circuit

court's conclusion that:

[Ala Loop] has standing to assert its claims regarding
waFola’s use of the Subject Property. In particular,
it has suffered an actual or threatened injury as a
result of waFola's conduct, the injury is fairly
traceable to the conduct of wafola and a favorable
decision would likely provide relief for [Ala Loop's]
injury.

For example, the record includes declarations from residents of
Ala Loop detailing, inter alia, the impact of Waiola's school operations on
traffic in the neighborhood, and the potential impacts that expanded
operations could have on sewage and water systems. Accordingly, Ala Loop has
shown that it suffered an “actual or threatened injury” that is “fairly
traceable” to waiola's use of the property without a permit, and that relief
could be provided by the court, §§g Superferry I, 115 Haw. at 319, 167 P.3d
at 312. ’

Because we conclude that Ala Loop has standing under the
traditional injury-in-fact test, we need not reach whether the doctrine of
procedural standing is applicable in this case.

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March 12, 2009 SDO, and the ICA’s April 22, 2009 judgment must be

vacated.

C. The circuit court abused its discretion in denying the
motion to set aside default

waFola argues that the circuit court abused its
discretion in denying its motion to set aside the entry of
default. In denying the motion, the circuit court ruled in its

August 11, 2004 order as follows:

1. [wafola] made a conscious choice not [to] be
represented by private legal counsel and therefore,
failed to answer Ala Loop’s cross-claim in a timely
manner. Therefore, it cannot be said that [wafola]
was guilty only of excusable neglect.

3. [waFola] has failed to satisfy the necessary
criteria for setting aside an entry of default, and
therefore, its Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default
Dated May 24, 2004, Filed Herein July 6, 2004, should
be denied.

HRCP Rule 55 governs the entry of default and default
judgments. with regard to the entry of default, it provides in

pertinent part as follows:

(a) Entry. when a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed
to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or
otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's default.

(c) Setting Aside Default. For good cause
shown the court may set aside an entry of default and,
if a judgment by default has been entered, may 4
likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).

we review the denial of a motion to set aside default

for abuse of discretion. Hupp v. Accessory Distrib., Inc., 1

Haw. App. 174, 177, 616 P.2d 233, 235 (l980) (holding that “an

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application under Rule 55(c), Hawafi Rules of Civil Procedure to
set aside entry of default is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court”); see also Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp., 100
Hawai‘i 149, 158, 53 P.3d 1196, 1205 (2002). l
Defaults are generally disfavored. §ee Rearden Family

Trust V. WiSenbaker, 101 HawaiH.237, 254, 65 P.3d 1029, 1046
(2003) (holding that “defaults and default judgments are not
favored and [] any doubt should be resolved in favor of the party
seeking relief, so that, in the interests of justice, there can
be a full trial on the merits”) (citations omitted). In §QMy
Inc., v. Saqeco, Inc., 57 Haw. 73, 549 P.2d 1147 (1976), this
court held that a party seeking to set aside a default must

demonstrate the following three factors:

In general, a motion to set aside a default
entry or a default judgment may and should be granted
whenever the court finds (1) that the nondefaulting
party will not be prejudiced by the reopening, (2)
that the defaulting party has a meritorious defense,
and (3) that the default was not the result of
inexcusable neglect or a wilful act.

lQy at 76, 549 P.2d at 1150 (citations omitted).

In §QM, we observed that the showing necessary to set
aside the entry of default was lower than that needed to set
aside a default judgment. ldy (“It should be noted that a motion
to set aside a default entry, which may be granted under Rule
55(c) ‘for good cause shown’, gives the court greater freedom in
granting relief than is available on a motion to set aside a

default judgment where the requirements of Rule 60(b) must be

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satisfied.”) (citation omitted). This is a reasonable
distinction, since the entry of default occurs at a more
preliminary stage of the case than does the entry of judgment.

Applying these principles here, we conclude that the
circuit court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set
aside the entry of default.a ln denying the motion, the circuit
court appeared to find that waiola's conduct constituted
inexcusable neglect. However, the circumstances here are
dissimilar from those in which relief from default is typically
denied. For example, this is not a case in which a defendant
that was properly served with a complaint fails to answer without
any reason, or for an improper reason. See, e.g., Poqia v. 7
RamoS, 10 Haw. App. 4l1, 416-17, 876 P.2d l342, 1345 (l994)
(noting that the circuit court properly refused to set aside
default when defendant claims that she did not answer because
“she was having ‘problems with her marriage,’” claimed that she
“did not understand what the legal papers meant,” and believed
that when she signed the summons, “that was all she ‘had to
do.’”). To the contrary, waFola wanted to defend against the
cross-claimy tendered the defense to the AG within a few days of
being served, and continued to aggressively pursue representation
by the AG thereafter, culminating in the filing of the petition
for writ of mandamus.

Nor is this a case in which the defaulting party failed

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to file an answer without seeking the approval of the court for
the delay. See, e.g., Hupp v. Accessory Distrib., Inc., 1 Haw.
App. at 178-79, 616 P.2d at 236 (holding that the circuit court
properly refused to set aside default when defendant's insurer
failed to file an answer for nine months without seeking approval
of the court, based on insurer's understanding that it had an
“‘open' extension of time from [plaintiff's] attorneys”). After
stipulating with Ala Loop for two extensions to answer, waFola,
with the AG specially appearing on its behalf, filed a motion on
February 25, 2004, asking for an extension of time to answer or
otherwise respond. The motion noted the existence of the
conflict between waFola and the AG, and suggested that the court
extend the deadline until approximately 30 days after the motion
was heard on March 18, 2004, since “that interval may be long
enough to work out the differences that remain[.]” The court
granted the extension to April 19, 2004. On April 19, wafola
filed the motion for a stay, noting that it had been unable to
resolve the dispute with the AG and accordingly was about to file
a petition for writ of mandamus.

Nor is this a case in which there was a lengthy delay
between the entry of default and the filing of the motion to set
the default aside. See, e.g., Bpgia, 10 Haw. App. at 413-14, 876
P.2d at 1344 (noting that the motion to set aside entry of

default and default judgment was not filed until more than 3

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years after entry of default and nine months after entry of
judgment). Default was entered on May 24, 2004, waFola agreed
to representation by the AG on June 2, 2004, and the motion to
set aside default was filed on July 6, 2004.

In the circuit court's August 11, 2004 Order denying
waiola's motion to set aside default, the court found that
“[waFola] made a conscious choice not [to] be represented by
private legal counsel and therefore, failed to answer [the]
cross-claim in a timely manner. Therefore, it cannot be said
that [waFola] was guilty only of excusable neglect.” However,
the record does not support the conclusion that waFola could
have retained private counsel to file an answer. To the
contrary, the record contains a declaration from waiola's
director that details the organization's extremely limited
financial resources, and states that waFola could not afford to
retain private counsel.

Ala Loop argues that waiola's ability to obtain
attorney Sandra Song to appear specially on its behalf to file
the motion to stay and the petition for a writ of mandamus
indicates that it could have retained private counsel to file an
answer. However, it is unclear from the record whether Song was
retained or acting pro bono, and whether she would have been
willing to appear for the purpose of filing an answer, with the

potentially more significant involvement in ongoing litigation

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that such an appearance could entail. Ala Loop also contends
that in January of 2004, Waiola's board authorized the
expenditure of $10,000 to construct a temporary building on the
site at issue here. However, the record does not establish that
those funds were in fact expended. 7

Finally, it is noteworthy that once default was
entered, wafola agreed to the AG's demand that it relinquish its
potential HRS § 302A-1184 defense, and the AG entered the case on
waiola's behalf. The fact that wafola eventually accepted
representation from the AG under these circumstances belies the
suggestion that it had the resources available to hire its own
counsel. =

This is not to say that waFola was without fault in
its approach to its dispute with the AG. Most notably, waFola
should not have waited until April 19, 2004, the last day of the
extension that had been granted by the circuit court, to file the
motion for a stay so that it could pursue the mandamus petition.
The circuit court, in its order granting the extension, had
clearly warned waFola that it could be defaulted for failing to
answer or otherwise respond by April 19. In those circumstances,
the entry of default was appropriate, as would be other sanctions
such as requiring waFola to pay Ala Loop’s attorneys' fees and
costs in connection with the ensuing motion to set aside default.

However, the circuit court went further and denied the motion to

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set aside, thereby imposing the ultimate sanction of denying

1waFola the opportunity to defend on the merits. In the

circumstances of this case, where waFola could not afford
private counsel and could obtain representation by the attorney
general only by relinquishing its primary defense on the merits,
imposition of that sanction was an abuse of discretion.“
Rearden FamilV Trust, 101 HawaFi at 255, 65 P.3d at 1047
(concluding that circuit court abused its discretion by
defaulting defendant for failing to attend a settlement
conference, since “lesser sanction[s]” would “better serve the
interest of justice”) (citation and internal brackets omitted).
This is particularly so given the fact that the court was being
asked to set aside the entry of default, rather than a default
judgment, ppg §QM, 57 Haw. at 76, 549 P.2d at 1150, and the
relative promptness with which the motion was brought.
IV. CONCLUSION

Ala Loop had a private right of action under article
XI, section 9 of the HawaFi Constitution to enforce its chapter
205 claims against wafola. Accordingly, we vacate the April 22,

2009 Judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals.

“ The circuit court did not address the first two prongs of the
three-part BDM test, i.e., lack of prejudice to the non-defaulting party and

the existence of a meritorious defense. BDM, 57 Haw. at 76, 549 P.2d at 1150.

However, both of those requirements were satisfied here. There was no
apparent prejudice to Ala Loop, other than the burden of having to litigate
its claims, and wafola raised significant issues concerning whether its
activities on the site at the time of the motion violated chapter 205 and
whether there was a ripe dispute.

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we further conclude that the Circuit Court of the Third
Circuit erred in failing to set aside the entry of default
against wai‘ola, and accordingly we vacate the circuit court's
First Amended Final Judgment entered on December 12, 2005, and
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. f

In view of this disposition, we need not address the
other issues raised by Ala Loop in its application, or by Ala

Loop and wai‘ola in their appeals in the ICA.

Thomas Yeh (Tsukazaki
Yeh & Moore) for

Petitioner Ala Loop v _'SLMM&D‘H,WQMLW[@JW

Community Association

Charlene M. Aina, Deputy 2 foia 1 ` :

Attorney General, for &/ '%\

Respondent wai‘ola waters .

of Life Charter School M”"‘/(/ /Z”c’zz""'*""(%

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