IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
DOCKET NO. 36934
STATEWIDE CONSTRUCTION, INC., )
)
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) Boise, January 2011 Term
)
v. ) 2011 Opinion No. 18
)
SEQUOIA PIETRI, LUKE CRAWFORD, ) Filed: February 7, 2011
JIM CRAWFORD and MAGGIE )
CRAWFORD, LONNIE R. KING and ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
CHARLENE KING, husband and wife, )
LARRY MONKARSH, )
)
Defendants-Appellants.
)
)
and
)
)
M&T MORTGAGE, FIRST HORIZON HOME
)
LOANS, ESTATE OF RAYMOND PIATT,
)
ANTHONY F. FRONTINO, GERRY LEE
)
IKOLA and ELLEN I. IKOLA,
)
)
Defendants.
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Valley County. Hon. Michael R. McLaughlin, District Judge.
District court decision granting summary judgment, affirmed.
Evans, Keane, LLP, Boise for appellants. Victor Villegas argued.
Cosho Humphrey, LLP, Boise, for respondents. Mackenzie E. Whatcott argued.
__________________________________
BURDICK, Justice
This case involves the interpretation and application of I.C. § 55-313 to the relocation of
a private roadway/easement used for vehicular travel. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Statewide Construction, Inc. (“Statewide”) in a declaratory judgment
1
proceeding, finding that Statewide, as the owner of the servient estate on which an express
easement for vehicular travel was situated, could unilaterally relocate that easement, as that
relocation did not injure the dominant estate holders. The dominant estate holders—Sequoia
Pietri, Luke Crawford, Jim Crawford, Maggie Crawford, Charlene King and Larry Monkarsh
(collectively “Appellants”)—appeal, arguing that: (1) Idaho Code § 55-313 does not grant a
servient estate holder the right to unilaterally relocate an express easement, and such relocation
constitutes a per se injury; (2) the Statement of Legislative Intent for I.C. § 55-313 makes it clear
that the legislature meant to exclude access roads that enter onto a public highway from
unilateral relocation under I.C. § 55-313; (3) if I.C. § 55-313 does allow unilateral relocation of
an express easement it is in violation of the “takings clause” of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and its equivalent under Article I, section 14 of the Idaho
Constitution, as it amounts to a taking of Appellants’ property right for a private rather than
public purpose; (4) even if the relocation were considered a permissible taking under the United
States and Idaho Constitutions, I.C. § 55-313 is in violation of due process requirements, as it
provides no mechanism for providing Appellants with just compensation for their loss; and (5)
even if the foregoing arguments fail, the district court erred in granting summary judgment as
there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Appellants were injured by the
relocation of their easement. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Statewide owns a parcel (“Parcel 1”) consisting of approximately 15.18 acres, located in
Valley County, Idaho. There are seven parcels of land located adjacent to Parcel 1, which hold
express easements by deed over Parcel 1, allowing ingress and egress.
On May 31, 2005, Statewide applied for a Conditional Use Permit to develop a
subdivision on Parcel 1, and that permit was subsequently issued. The permit required Statewide
to construct a new roadway to provide access to the lots in the proposed subdivision. Statewide
dedicated a seventy foot easement (“New Easement”) and constructed a road, which is over three
hundred feet away from the original easement (“Original Easement”) being used by Appellants.
Statewide intended for Appellants to use the New Easement, eliminating the Original Easement
location, but Appellants did not consent to such relocation.
Statewide filed a declaratory judgment action on October 31, 2008, and a summary
judgment motion on April 16, 2009, requesting that the district court declare that Statewide could
2
relocate the easement under I.C. § 55-313 without Appellants’ consent. Appellants filed a cross-
motion for summary judgment on May 26, 2009.
The district court issued a memorandum decision on July 15, 2009, granting Statewide’s
motion for summary judgment and denying Appellants’ cross-motion. A final judgment was
entered on September 2, 2009, and Appellants timely appealed on September 23, 2009.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As this Court wrote in Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance, Co. v. Pedersen:
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment from a
declaratory judgment proceeding, this Court employs the same standard as used
by the district court originally ruling on the motion. On review, summary
judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
I.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the
non-moving party, and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported
by the record in favor of the party opposing the motion. If reasonable people
could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the
evidence, the motion must be denied. However, if the evidence reveals no
disputed issues of material fact, the trial court should grant the motion for
summary judgment.
133 Idaho 135, 138, 983 P.2d 208, 211 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
The crux of this action is the interpretation of I.C. § 55-313, which is titled “Relocation
of access” and provides as follows:
Where, for motor vehicle travel, any access which is less than a public dedication,
has heretofore been or may hereafter be, constructed across private lands, the
person or persons owning or controlling the private lands shall have the right at
their own expense to change such access to any other part of the private lands, but
such change must be made in such a manner as not to obstruct motor vehicle
travel, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such
access.
There are three questions before this Court. First, whether I.C. § 55-313 prohibits a
landowner from relocating a private access road where that private access road enters onto a
public roadway. Second, whether I.C. § 55-313 permits a servient estate holder to unilaterally
move an expressly granted easement (where the easement is for motor vehicle travel) without the
consent of the dominant estate holder(s), and if so whether the statute is in violation of the
United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. Third, whether there are genuine issues of
3
material fact regarding whether Appellants have suffered an injury under I.C. § 55-313. These
issues shall be addressed in turn.
A. Idaho Code § 55-313 allows for the relocation of access less than a public dedication,
whether or not the access road enters onto a public roadway.
Appellants argue that the Statement of Legislative Intent for I.C. § 55-313 demonstrates
that the legislature did not intend to allow for relocation of access roads where they immediately
enter onto a public highway system. Statewide argues that I.C. § 55-313 is clear on its face, and
as such, it is inappropriate to resort to any statutory construction or examination of legislative
history.
In City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., this Court noted that “where the language of a
statute is unambiguous, there is no need to consult extrinsic evidence. We have consistently held
that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence
should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.”
123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993). Furthermore, “[t]he most fundamental premise
underlying judicial review of the legislature’s enactments is that, unless the result is palpably
absurd, the courts must assume the legislature meant what it said. Where a statute is clear and
unambiguous the expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.” Id. (quoting State,
Dep’t of Law Enforcement v. One 1955 Willys Jeep, V.I.N. 573481691, 100 Idaho 150, 153, 595
P.2d 299, 302 (1979)).
Appellants cite to several cases which they claim demonstrate that this Court may
examine legislative intent even absent ambiguity. See Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v.
Highlands, Inc., 141 Idaho 202, 207, 108 P.3d 349, 354 (2005) (“A statute need not be
ambiguous in order for this Court to examine the legislature’s intent in enacting it.”); State v.
Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931–32, 104 P.3d 969, 973–74 (2005) (acknowledging that a statute is
unambiguous, but still considering public policy behind the statute and legislative history). In
examining these cases, it is evident that although there have been cases in which this Court went
on to consider public policy and legislative intent where a statute was unambiguous on its face,
these considerations were never used to alter the plain textual meaning of a statute. See also
George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990).
Idaho Code § 55-313 allows for relocation of access, where that access is “less than a
public dedication.” The phrase “less than a public dedication” is unambiguous. A public
dedication may be made through either a statutory dedication or a common law dedication.
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Worley Highway Dist. v. Yacht Club of Coeur D’Alene, Ltd., 116 Idaho 219, 222, 775 P.2d 111,
114 (1989). Appellants offer no argument that the Original Easement has been dedicated to the
public by Statewide as either a statutory or common law dedication, therefore the easement in
question is not excluded from the scope of I.C. § 55-313. As I.C. § 55-313 is unambiguous and
makes no reference to whether or not an access for motor vehicle travel is entering onto a public
road, in limiting the applicability of said statute, Appellants’ argument fails. 1
B. Idaho Code § 55-313 permits a servient estate holder to move an expressly granted
easement without consent from the dominant estate holder(s).
Appellants argue that—even where a property owner is permitted to relocate an access
road—where an access road takes the form of an express easement it may not be moved without
the consent of the dominant estate holder(s). Appellants contend that allowing such a relocation
without consent is a per se injury to the dominant estate holder, and thus not permitted under I.C.
§ 55-313. Statewide argues that the district court correctly found that “if consent was required to
relocate, [I.C. § 55-313] would simply say so. Instead, the statute provides for relocation so long
as the easement does not obstruct motor vehicle travel or otherwise injure any person using the
easement.” The district court further reasoned that “if any unilateral relocation was per se
injurious, section 55-313 and the language regarding injury to any person using the easement
would be wholly ineffective.”
Appellants argue that it is the majority common law rule that an express easement may
not be relocated by either the dominant or servient estate holders without the consent of the
other. The Arizona Supreme Court in Stamatis v. Johnson noted that it is an “almost universal
rule” that an easement, once definitely established, cannot be changed by either the dominant or
servient estate holder without the other’s consent. 224 P.2d 201, 202–03 (Ariz. 1950).
However, the Court in Stamatis also quoted 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 84, stating: “As a general
rule, in the absence of statutes to the contrary, the location of an easement cannot be changed by
either party without the other’s consent, after it has been established . . . except under the
authority of an express or implied grant or reservation to this effect.” Id. at 203 (emphasis
1
The Statement of Legislative intent reads: “It is the intent of the Legislature that the phrases, ‘any access which is
less than a public dedication’ . . . shall not include any access that is a part of a public highway system.” Even if this
Court were to consider this statement, Appellants’ argument is unpersuasive. Although the access road at issue here
directly enters onto a public highway system, it cannot—as a privately-owned access road that is not open to use by
the general public—be considered “part of” a public highway system.
5
added). Thus, whatever the “almost universal rule” might be, the Stamatis Court recognized that
such a rule may be altered by statute. 2
Here, it is instructive to consider I.C. § 55-313 alongside I.C. §§ 42-1207 and 18-4308, 3
which allow for the relocation of irrigation ditches, canals, laterals, drains or buried irrigation
conduits (“appurtenances”) by the owner of the property upon which such appurtenances are
located, where such relocation does not impede water flow or injure those using the
appurtenance at issue. Appellants acknowledge that much of the language in these two statutes
is “strikingly similar” to the language of I.C. § 55-313. However, both I.C. § 42-1207 and I.C. §
18-4308 require that “[t]he written permission of the owner of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain or
buried irrigation conduit must first be obtained before it is changed or placed in buried pipe by
the landowner” whereas I.C. § 55-313 contains no equivalent provision. The inclusion of
language requiring written permission of the easement owner in I.C. §§ 42-1207 and 18-4308,
and the absence of such language from I.C. § 55-313, strongly suggests that the legislature did
not intend to require the servient estate holder to gain the consent of the dominant estate
holder(s) in order to move an access road. 4
Appellants argue that the absence of the language requiring consent in I.C. § 55-313
should not be considered determinative on this issue as there are “a myriad of ways a private
roadway is created” other than by easement, and I.C. § 55-313 was intended to address them all
generally. The only example of an alternative way to create an interest in a private access road
that Appellants provide is that of a license to enter land, but as Appellants note, licenses are
freely revocable and create no estate in lands. See State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 945, 866
P.2d 193, 202 (Ct. App. 1993). Where permission to use an access road is freely revocable there
is no logical reason why the owner of the property upon which the road is located would need
2
An example of such a statutory alteration may be seen in article 695 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides
that:
The owner of the enclosed estate has no right to the relocation of this servitude after it is fixed.
The owner of the servient estate has the right to demand relocation of the servitude to a more
convenient place at his own expense, provided that it affords the same facility to the owner of the
enclosed estate.
3
Idaho Code § 18-4308 is essentially identical to I.C. § 42-1207, except that I.C. § 18-4308 makes it a misdemeanor
to relocate such an appurtenance in noncompliance with the statute.
4
Prior to their amendment in 1994, I.C. §§ 42-1207 and 18-4208 did not require the consent of the appurtenance
holder prior to relocation of the appurtenance by the servient estate holder. S.L. 1994, ch. 151, §§ 1 and 2, pp. 345–
47. In several cases addressing the pre-1994 version of I.C. § 42-1207, the servient estate holder had relocated the
appurtenance without consent of the appurtenance holder(s), and this Court implicitly acknowledged that such an
action was permissible under the statute. See Simonson v. Moon, 72 Idaho 39, 237 P.2d 93 (1951); Savage Lateral
Ditch Water Users Ass’n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 869 P.2d 554 (1993). For further discussion see section C below.
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statutory authority to relocate that road. The property owner could simply revoke the license,
relocate the road, and then renew the license.
Appellants argue that this Court’s opinion in Villager Condominium Ass’n v. Idaho
Power Co., 121 Idaho 986, 829 P.2d 1335 (1992), demonstrates judicial recognition that
unilateral relocation of an express easement is impermissible. The issue in Villager was whether
Idaho Power, as the dominant estate holder, could relocate its express easement to install power
lines underground by instead installing the lines above ground on cement pads. Id. at 987–88,
829 P.3d at 1336–37. Villager provides no guidance to the facts at hand for several reasons: (1)
in Villager it was the dominant estate holder seeking to relocate the easement, not the servient
estate holder, and it involved a change in the character of the easement, not mere location; and
(2) the easement at issue in Villager was not an access road and I.C. § 55-313 was therefore
inapplicable.
Appellants next cite Turner v. Cold Springs Canyon Ltd. Partnership, 143 Idaho 227, 141
P.3d 1096 (2006), arguing that this opinion demonstrates that this Court agrees with the majority
position on unilateral easement relocation expressed in Stamatis. However, the discussion about
relocation of an access road in Turner was dicta, as this Court held that the issue had not
properly been raised on appeal. Id. at 229, 141 P.3d at 1098. In addition, neither party in Turner
argued that I.C. § 55-313 applied.
Statewide in turn cites to Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 129 P.3d 1235 (2006), as
“the only published decision in Idaho that does address Section 55-313.” Although the trial court
in Benninger had found that the servient estate holder was entitled to modify or relocate an
access road (driveway) without consent from the dominant estate holder, that issue was not
raised on appeal. See id. at 488, 129 P.3d at 1237. Therefore, the Benninger case is of no
precedential value here.
If the legislature had intended for the unilateral relocation of an easement to constitute a
per se injury under I.C. § 55-313, it would have required consent from the dominant estate
holder(s), as it did in I.C. §§ 42-1207 and 18-4308. 5 It is true that, as a general principal, “the
5
At the time that I.C. § 55-313 was enacted in 1985 neither I.C. §§ 42-1207 nor 18-4308 required the written
consent of the appurtenance owner in order for the landowner to relocate or bury that appurtenance. S.L. 1985, ch.
252, § 1. However, in 1994 these statutes were amended to require that:
In the event that the ditch, lateral, buried irrigation conduit or canal is owned by an organized
irrigation district, canal company, ditch association, or other irrigation entity, the written
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rules of common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication.” Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho
594, 607, 151 P.2d 765, 771 (1944) (quoting Congdon v. Congdon, 200 N.W. 76, 82 (Minn.
1924)), superseded on other grounds by statute, I.C. § 5-327, as recognized in Doggett v. Boiler
Eng’g & Supply Co., 93 Idaho 888, 890, 477 P.2d 511, 513 (1970). However, “where the
implication is obvious it cannot be ignored.” Id. See also Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95
Idaho 575, 583, 513 P.2d 627, 635 (1973) (“Where the clear implication of a legislative act is to
change the common law rule we recognize the modification because the legislature has the
power to abrogate the common law.”). If I.C. § 55-313 requires consent from all interested
parties prior to the relocation of an access road easement, there would be no reason for that
statute to have been enacted; access road easements could already be relocated if all interested
parties agreed. This Court has noted that “it is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an
interpretation that will not render it a nullity.” Hecla Mining Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n,
108 Idaho 147, 151, 697 P.2d 1161, 1165 (1985). See also State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92
P.3d 521, 525 (2004) (noting that the Court disfavors statutory construction that leads to absurd
results). Therefore, we hold that the clear implication of I.C. § 55-313 is to allow for the
relocation of an access road where such relocation does not injure interested parties—even where
that road takes the form of an express easement—without the consent of the dominant estate
holder(s).
Appellants next argue that if Statewide is permitted to use I.C. § 55-313 to unilaterally
relocate the Original Easement it will have the same impact as vacating that easement.
Appellants state that this vacation would deprive them of a recognized property interest without
compensation in violation of both Article I, § 14 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fifth
Amendment (Takings Clause) of the United State Constitution.
Article I, section 14 of the Idaho Constitution is entitled “Right of Eminent Domain” and
provides, inter alia, “[p]rivate property may be taken for public use, but not until a just
compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefor.” The
permission of the entity must first be obtained before a ditch, lateral, buried irrigation conduit, or
canal is changed or placed in buried pipe by the landowner.
S.L. 1994, ch. 151, §§ 1 and 2, pp. 345–47. In 2002, the wording of the relevant portion of each statute was
amended to read: “[t]he written permission of the owner of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain or buried irrigation conduct
must first be obtained before it is changed or placed in buried pipe by the land-owner.” S.L. 2002, ch. 115, §§ 3 and
4, pp. 327–30. If the legislature wished to require the consent of an easement holder under I.C. § 55-313 it would
have altered that statute as well.
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Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the taking of private property “for
public use; without just compensation.” Appellants cite no authority for the proposition that the
relocation of an easement constitutes a taking of property. In fact, in authorizing the relocation
of the access roads, I.C. § 55-313 expressly provides that “such change must be made in such a
manner as not to obstruct motor vehicle travel, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using
or interested in such access.” As such, any relocation authorized under I.C. § 55-313 will
provide the dominant estate holders with the same benefit they were entitled to under the
easement in its original location. Therefore a takings analysis is unnecessary.
C. There are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Appellants have suffered an
injury due to the relocation of the express easement, under I.C. § 55-313.
Appellants allege that, in addition to their claimed per se injuries, they will suffer specific
injuries if the Original Easement is relocated. Specifically, Appellants allege that: (1) the New
Easement provides less direct access to Appellants’ parcels, and as appellants King, Pietri and
Crawford drive heavy equipment across the easement in the course of business, this will create
safety problems for residents in the area; (2) appellant King has a business contract with the
other appellants to plow snow from the Original Easement, which will effectively be nullified if
the relocation occurs; and (3) appellant Monkarsh believes the New Easement location will make
it more difficult to see oncoming traffic for purposes of accessing the public highway, creating a
safety concern.
Statewide argues, and the district court found, that “[i]njury in the context of relocation of
easements under section 55-313 contemplates a taking or lessening in value to the dominant
estate holders” and there was no evidence of that type of injury here. In assessing what type of
injury was contemplated in I.C. § 55-313, it is again useful to consider I.C. §§ 18-4308 and 42-
1207, which have an injury provision materially identical to that found in I.C. § 55-313. 6 See
Jonathan Burky, Relocating an Easement Under Idaho Code § 55-313, The Advocate, May
2010, at 21–23.
In Simonson v. Moon, 72 Idaho 39, 237 P.2d 93 (1951), this Court first addressed the
issue of what the term “injury” means in the context of I.C. § 42-1207. The version of I.C. § 42-
6
The relevant portion of I.C. §§ 42-1207 and 18-4308 provides that “such change must be made in such a manner as
not to impede the flow of the water therein, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such
ditch, canal, lateral, drain or buried irrigation conduit.” The relevant portion of I.C. § 55-313 states that “such
change must be made in a manner as not to obstruct motor vehicles travel, or to otherwise injure any person or
persons using or interested in such access.”
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1207 at issue in Simonson did not require the written permission of an appurtenance owner prior
to the relocation of that appurtenance by the servient estate holder. Rather, the servient estate
holder was free to relocate the appurtenance where such relocation would not impede water flow
nor injure persons interested in the use of such appurtenance. Id. at 45, 237 P.2d at 97. Noting
that “[p]rior to the enactment of [I.C. § 42-1207] the right of the owner of a servient estate to
change the place or location of an easement did not exist”, the Simonson Court found that the
burden was on the servient estate holder to demonstrate that the relocation would not decrease
water flow or injure the interested parties. Id. at 45–46, 237 P.2d 97. Ultimately, this Court
concluded:
We do not hold that a mere increase in the length of ditch, or other conditions,
which result in a comparatively unimportant increase in maintenance, would be
sufficient to deny the servient owner the right to change the location of a ditch.
But, when such an increase in burden is accompanied by the requirement of
rotating the use of the ditch, or other inconvenience, then the impediment to the
flow of the water will be considered substantial and an injury within the statute.
Id. at 46, 237 P.2d at 97–98.
In Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass’n v. Pulley, the servient estate holder relocated
a lateral ditch, which resulted in a decreased water flow to downstream water users. 125 Idaho
237, 240, 869 P.2d 554, 557 (1993). The downstream water users filed for declaratory and
injunctive relief and sought to return the lateral ditch to its original location. Id. at 240–41, 869
P.2d at 557–58. This Court concluded that:
[a]lthough a minor increase in the length of a ditch or other conditions which
negligibly increase its maintenance are insufficient injuries by themselves to
constitute a violation of the statute, when such burdens are accompanied by
forced rotation of ditch use or other inconvenience, the combined injuries are
sufficient. When relocation of a ditch forces its users to rotate their use of the
ditch with other users, this is an injury to them within the meaning of the statute.
Id. at 243–44, 869 P.2d at 560–61 (internal citation omitted). It is worth noting that Savage also
involved the pre-1994 version of I.C. § 42-1207, and thus did not require the written consent of
an appurtenance owner prior to a servient estate holder’s relocation of that appurtenance.
An examination of these two cases reveals that this Court has taken a utilitarian approach
to relocation of appurtenances. A mere increase in length or maintenance for an appurtenance
does not constitute an injury under I.C. § 42-1207, but where the appurtenance holders’ ability to
obtain water—or their historical flow-rate of water—is restricted, this Court will find that an
injury has occurred. As such, in determining whether there is an issue of material fact as to an
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injury under I.C. § 55-313, this Court should consider whether the relocation of the Original
Easement to the New Easement location has impaired the ability of the Appellants to access their
property (the purpose for which they hold their easement).
The district court erred in stating that an injury under I.C. § 55-313 is limited to a taking
or a lessening in value of the dominant estate. However, upon an independent review of the
Appellants’ alleged injuries, assuming Appellants’ allegations are true, we find no genuine issue
of material fact existed as to Appellants suffering an injury under I.C. § 55-313 as a result of the
relocation of the access-road easement.
As for the first alleged injury, the fact that it may take Appellants slightly longer to
access their property from the New Easement than it did from the Original Easement is
irrelevant; this is not an impediment to the use of the easement as an access road, and is not an
injury under I.C. § 55-313. As to the related safety concern, that driving heavy equipment which
is often covered in dirt and mud will create a safety hazard, there is no explanation as to why this
would be a greater hazard where Appellants are using the New Easement to access public roads
rather than the Original Easement. Although the New Easement shall be dedicated to public use
and therefore have increased traffic, Appellants are using the Original Easement to access the
public roads; they are already driving this equipment on highly travelled roads.
Second, the damage to the contract to plow snow is not related to the interest for which
Appellants hold the easement, the access to their property. Loss of an incidental economic
benefit to one easement holder—where such benefit is not related to the purpose for which that
easement is held—is not an injury, for purposes of I.C. § 55-313.
Finally, Appellants contend that the New Easement is less safe in that it is more difficult
to see oncoming traffic. Valley County issued a Conditional Use Permit providing for the
construction of an access at the New Easement location, clearly indicating that the County does
not consider that location to present serious safety concerns. In any event, this type of decrease
in convenience would be akin to a minor increase in maintenance costs, which was found not to
constitute an injury under I.C. § 42-1207.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Statewide. Idaho
Code § 55-313 unambiguously permits the relocation of the access road at issue here, and does
not require the consent of the dominant estate holders. That relocation does not constitute a
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taking, and there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Appellants sustained an injury
under I.C. § 55-313. Costs to Statewide.
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.
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