IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 35666
DOUG CRUMP and AMY CRUMP, husband )
and wife, )
) St. Anthony, September 2009
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
) 2009 Opinion No. 136
vs. )
) Filed: October 26, 2009
TED BROMLEY dba RHINO LINING, )
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
Defendant-Respondent, )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bonneville County. Hon. Joel E. Tingey, District Judge; Hon. Mark Riddoch,
Magistrate.
Award of costs and attorney fees to the prevailing party, affirmed.
Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for appellants. B.J. Driscoll
argued.
Blaser, Sorensen & Oleson, Chtd., Blackfoot, for respondent. Justin B. Oleson
argued.
_____________________________________
BURDICK, Justice
Appellants Doug and Amy Crump (the Crumps) appeal from the district court’s decision
affirming the magistrate court’s award of attorney fees and costs to Ted Bromley (Bromley),
d/b/a Rhino Lining, as the prevailing party. The Crumps argue that both courts erred in
determining prevailing party status. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Crumps retained the services of Bromley on August 5, 2005, for the purpose of
installing a protective lining on their drift boat. The Crumps allege that the boat was damaged
while in Bromley’s possession, requiring repairs and preventing the Crumps from using their
boat for a period of time. In their complaint filed on November 2, 2005, the Crumps alleged
property damage to the boat in the amount of $945 and loss of use damages in the amount of
$1,875, for a total of $2,820.
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Bromley denied liability and asserted a counterclaim seeking to recover the $400 that had
not been paid for the installation of the lining. On March 16, 2006, Bromley submitted an offer
of judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 68, in the amount of $1,000. The parties
thereafter filed motions for summary judgment, which were heard on November 21, 2006. At
that time, the magistrate court denied the motions but ruled that repair costs were $600. On
April 27, 2007, the parties stipulated to a judgment in favor of the Crumps in the amount of
$200. The stipulation expressly left open the issue of whether either party was entitled to an
award of costs or attorney fees.
Both parties then moved for costs and attorney fees under I.C. §§ 12-120(1) and 120(3).
The court ruled that Bromley was the prevailing party in the matter and awarded Bromley
attorney fees in the amount of $2,400 and costs in the amount of $483.38, for a total award of
$2883.38. In its memorandum decision on the Crumps’ motion to reconsider, the court lowered
the attorney fees award to $1,200 and awarded the same costs. The court then stated in its order
that it had reviewed the amounts of the parties’ claims and requested attorney fees, and
apportioned the award of fees to Bromley “as the partial and greater prevailing party.”
The Crumps appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court. This
appeal was then timely filed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
“On appeal of a decision rendered by a district court while acting in its intermediate
appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court's decision.” In re Doe, 147 Idaho
243, __, 207 P.3d 974, 979 (2009). However, to determine whether there was an abuse of
discretion, the Court independently “examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there
is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings.” State v.DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711,
184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008). “If those findings are so supported and the conclusions
follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we [will] affirm the
district court's decision as a matter of procedure.” Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183
P.3d 758, 760 (2008) (quoting Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561, 633 P.2d 1137, 1139
(1981)).
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A court’s determination of prevailing party status will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d 1114, 1126 (2009). When
examining whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers whether the court: (1)
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of this discretion
and consistently within the applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise
of reason. Id. “A determination on prevailing parties is committed to the discretion of the trial
court.” Id. at 914, 204 P.3d at 1125. “Only in rare cases has this Court or the Court of Appeals
reversed a trial court’s determination of which party prevailed.” Id.
B. Prevailing Party Determination
The Crumps argue that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court’s decision
because the magistrate court abused its discretion by finding that Bromley was the prevailing
party. The Crumps contend that the magistrate court misapplied Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v.
Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005), as well as Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 68, in reaching its decision. Finally, the Crumps allege that the district court
erred in affirming the magistrate court’s misapplication of the law and in focusing on Rule 68 in
its analysis. We affirm the district court’s decision upholding the magistrate court’s prevailing
party determination.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) provides: “Attorney fees. In any civil action the
court may award reasonable attorney fees . . . to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule
54(d)(1)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract.” Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(1)(B) guides courts in determining prevailing party status through the following analysis:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part
and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments
obtained.
This Court has stated that, in considering all of the claims involved in the action, a court
examines the prevailing party question “from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis.”
Shore, 146 Idaho at 914, 204 P.3d at 1125. In addition, when both parties are partially
successful, “it is within the court’s discretion to decline an award of attorney fees to either side.”
Id. Furthermore, the fact that a party receives no affirmative relief does not prohibit it from
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being deemed the prevailing party. Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 24, 27, 72 P.3d 864, 867
(2003).
In finding that the Crumps were not entitled to an award of attorney fees, the magistrate
court analogized the facts in this case with those presented in Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005). The Crumps argue that the
court’s interpretation of Eighteen Mile Ranch was in error. In Eighteen Mile Ranch, this Court
reversed the district court’s finding that neither of the parties prevailed and, viewing the success
of each party from an overall standpoint, this Court determined that the defendant had prevailed.
141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. This Court found that the district court had improperly
focused on the defendant’s “less than tremendous success on its counterclaim” and ignored the
fact that it had avoided all liability as a defendant. Id. Thus, the Court found that the defendant
was a prevailing party because it had a small victory on its counterclaim (even though it was less
than a tenth of the damages it had sought) and a verdict in its favor.
This Court also determined that a district court had abused its discretion in determining
prevailing party status in Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 204 P.3d 1114 (2009). The district
court there, in its decision on the merits of the case, determined that the defendant had prevailed
on his affirmative defense and the court made no findings on the substance of his other claim.
Shore, 146 Idaho at 915, 204 P.3d at 1126. But in its decision denying costs and attorney fees,
the district court found that the defendant had lost on his other claim, and therefore did not award
fees and costs. Id. This Court held that the district court’s decisions were inconsistent and it had
erred in failing to identify the defendant as the prevailing party. Id. In contrast, in Trilogy
Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119 (2007), this Court upheld a
district court’s determination that each party had prevailed in part, and not prevailed in part,
because the district court utilized the prevailing party analysis, as set forth in I.R.C.P.
54(d)(1)(B), by looking at the multiple claims of the parties and determining who prevailed on
each issue. 144 Idaho at 847-48, 172 P.3d at 1122-23.
The Crumps also argue that both the district court and magistrate court erred in
considering Rule 68 in their prevailing party analyses. However, in this Court’s recent decision
in Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 210 P.3d 552 (2009), we determined that it was proper to
consider Rule 68 offers of judgment as a factor in a prevailing party analysis, overruling our
previous holding to the contrary in Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955, 855 P.2d 40 (1993). We
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did caution that offers of judgment “should not be the only, or even most significant, factor in the
trial court’s prevailing party analysis,” but they may be considered. Zenner, 147 Idaho at __, 210
P.3d at 557.
The magistrate court here stated:
After considering the amount claimed by the Crumps and the amount
settled for in the stipulated judgment, and the foregoing authorities, the Court
concludes that the Crumps were not a prevailing party in this action. Therefore,
the Crumps are not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs. See similar
analysis in Eighteen Mile Ranch v. Nord Excavating, 141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d
130 (S. Ct. 2005).
On the other hand, Bromley, pursuant to his timely offer of judgment
under Rule 68, prevailed in the dispute. The Court considered the factors in Rule
54(e)(3), particularly the time and labor required, less difficult issues, the amount
involved and the results obtained. Accordingly, Bromley, as the prevailing party
pursuant to Rule 68 where he offered $1,000 and settled for $200 which was less
than that which was offered, is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees in
the amount of $2,400; costs as a matter of right . . . for a total cost of $483.38 and
for a total award of fees and costs in the amount of $2,883.38.
The court reduced Bromley’s award of attorney fees following the Crumps’ motion to
reconsider, stating that each party had prevailed in part, but Bromley was the overall prevailing
party and thus entitled to attorney fees in the amount of $1,200.
In considering the relief sought by the respective parties, and the relief received by each
party, we find that the district court did not err in upholding the magistrate’s determination that
Bromley was the prevailing party and entitled to attorney fees. Similar to Trilogy Network
Systems, the magistrate court here utilized the prevailing party analysis of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B)
by looking at the claims of the parties and determining who prevailed on each issue. The
Crumps sought $2,820 in damages and Bromley sought damages in the sum of $400. The
magistrate court determined that the damages to the boat amounted to $600. In the Crumps’
brief in support of their motion for attorney fees and costs, the Crumps stated that their counsel
had arrived at the $200 amount for the stipulation to judgment as follows:
$600 was the undisputed amount the court ruled it would cost to repair the crack
in the boat. Counsel for defendants sought a $400 credit to pay for the services of
his client in applying the Rhino Lining. Therefore, judgment of at least $200 was
probable against defendants. In reaching an agreement to stipulate to a judgment
in this amount, counsel for plaintiff agreed to waive plaintiffs’ right to claim (1)
defendants were not entitled to a $400 credit because Rhino Lining would need to
be reapplied to the boat after the repair was completed; (2) there was additional
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damage that defendants caused in addition to the $600 with respect to the boat;
and (3) plaintiffs would not seek loss of use damages.
Thus, while the Crumps recovered $600 on their claim for $2820, Bromley recovered the entirety
of the $400 he sought in damages pursuant to the stipulation. Therefore, the magistrate court
acted within the boundaries of its discretion in concluding that, from an overall view, Bromley
prevailed despite the $200 the Crumps received.
In addition, the magistrate court did not err in considering Bromley’s offer of judgment in
its prevailing party analysis. As we stated in Zenner, while offers of judgment should not be the
only or most significant factor in the trial court’s analysis, they may be considered. The
magistrate court analyzed whether Bromley would be considered a prevailing party, and properly
compared the Crumps’ final “adjusted award” of $200 to the $1,000 offer of judgment.
Therefore, the offer of judgment was just one of the factors in the court’s prevailing party
analysis. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision affirming the
magistrate court’s determination that Bromley was the prevailing party.
C. Attorney Fees on Appeal
Both parties argue they are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. The Crumps
contend that Bromley waived his right to seek attorney fees and costs on appeal because he did
not assert his claim for attorney fees and costs in the statement of issues on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rules 41(a) and 35(b)(5). Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a) provides:
Any party seeking attorney fees on appeal must assert such a claim as an issue presented
on appeal in the first appellate brief filed by such party as provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and
35(b)(5); provided, however, the Supreme Court may permit a later claim for attorney
fees under such conditions as it deems appropriate.
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(5) states: “If the respondent is claiming attorney fees on appeal the
respondent must so indicate in the division of additional issues on appeal that respondent is
claiming attorney fees and state the basis for the claim.”
This Court determines that Bromley properly raised the issue of attorney fees on appeal
by listing it as a separate issue in his first appellate brief and addressing it in detail with
supporting argument and authority. We find that Bromley, as the prevailing party, is entitled to
attorney fees and costs on appeal.
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III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s determination that the magistrate court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs to Bromley as the prevailing party. We award
costs and attorney fees on appeal to Bromley.
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.
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