IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 35689-2008
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Boise, June 2010 Term
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) 2010 Opinion No. 88
v. )
) Filed: July 26, 2010
RICHARD T. YEOMAN, )
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for Kootenai County. The Hon. Lansing L. Haynes, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Eric
Fredericksen argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth Jorgensen
argued.
EISMANN, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for failing to register as a sex offender.
Appellant contends that he was not required to register upon moving into this State or, if he was,
the registration requirement violated his constitutional right to travel. We affirm the judgment of
the district court.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1984, Richard T. Yeoman (Defendant) was convicted of rape in Washington and was
required to register in that State as a sex offender. In 2007, he moved to Idaho, but did not
register as required by Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c). On February 22, 2008, the State charged
him with the crime of failing to register as a sex offender, a felony. After the district court
denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss, he pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal the
applicability and constitutionality of the statute.
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Does Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c) apply to persons whose conviction for a sex crime occurred
before July 1, 1993?
2. Does Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c) violate Defendant’s constitutional right to travel?
III. ANALYSIS
A. Does Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c) Apply to Persons Whose Conviction for a Sex Crime
Occurred before July 1, 1993?
In 1998, Idaho enacted the “Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community
Right-to-Know Act,” Idaho Code §§ 18-8301 to 18-8326. Ch. 411, § 2, 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws
1275, 1276-90. When adopted, the Act applied to three categories of sex offenders, including
any person convicted in Idaho on or after July 1, 1993, of any of the crimes listed in Idaho Code
§ 18-8304(1)(a). Those crimes consisted of a list of crimes designated by code section and an
attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit any of those crimes.
In 2005, the legislature added another category of sex offender who was required to
register under the Act. Ch. 233, § 1, 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws 710, 711. Section 18-8304 was
amended to apply to any person who was convicted of a crime that was substantially equivalent
to the crimes set forth in subsection (1)(a) and who was required to register as a sex offender in
another jurisdiction when the person entered Idaho to establish permanent or temporary
residence. Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c). Defendant pled guilty to violating this subsection of the
statute. He contends that it should be read as applying only to convictions that occurred on or
after July 1, 1993.
Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c) applies to any person who:
Has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation or a conspiracy
to commit a crime in another state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction
of the United States, including tribal courts and military courts, that is
substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (1)(a) of this section
and was required to register as a sex offender in any other state or jurisdiction
when he established permanent or temporary residency in Idaho.
2
This provision only applies if the conviction was “substantially equivalent to the offenses
listed in subsection (1)(a) of this section.” That subsection applies to any person who:
On or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of the crime, or an attempt, a
solicitation, or a conspiracy to commit a crime provided for in section 18-909
(assault with attempt to commit rape, infamous crime against nature, or lewd and
lascivious conduct with a minor, but excluding mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-
911 (battery with attempt to commit rape, infamous crime against nature, or lewd
and lascivious conduct with a minor, but excluding mayhem, murder or robbery),
18-919 (sexual exploitation by a medical care provider), 18-1505B (sexual abuse
and exploitation of a vulnerable adult), 18-1506 (sexual abuse of a child under
sixteen years of age), 18-1506A (ritualized abuse of a child), 18-1507 (sexual
exploitation of a child), 18-1507A (possession of sexually exploitative material
for other than a commercial purpose), 18-1508 (lewd conduct with a minor child),
18-1508A (sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age), 18-
1509A (enticing a child over the internet), 18-4003(d) (murder committed in
perpetration of rape), 18-4116 (indecent exposure, but excluding a misdemeanor
conviction), 18-4502 (first degree kidnapping committed for the purpose of rape,
committing the infamous crime against nature or for committing any lewd and
lascivious act upon any child under the age of sixteen, or for purposes of sexual
gratification or arousal), 18-4503 (second degree kidnapping where the victim is
an unrelated minor child), 18-5609 (inducing person under eighteen years of age
into prostitution), 18-6101 (rape, but excluding 18-6101(1) where the defendant is
eighteen years of age or where the defendant is exempted under subsection (4) of
this section), 18-6108 (male rape, but excluding 18-6108(1) where the defendant
is eighteen years of age or where the defendant is exempted under subsection (4)
of this section), 18-6110 (sexual contact with a prisoner), 18-6602 (incest), 18-
6605 (crime against nature), 18-6608 (forcible sexual penetration by use of a
foreign object), upon a second or subsequent conviction under 18-6609 (video
voyeurism) or 18-8602(1), Idaho Code, (sex trafficking).
One of the crimes listed in subsection (1)(a) is rape in violation of Idaho Code § 18-6101.
Defendant does not contend that the definition of the crime of rape for which he was convicted in
Washington in 1984 was not substantially equivalent to rape as defined in Idaho Code § 18-6101.
Rather, he argues that the words “[o]n or after July 1, 1993,” should be read as part of the
definition of “the offenses listed in subsection (1)(a) of this section” so that subsection (1)(c)
would only apply if the conviction of a substantially equivalent offense occurred on or after July
1, 1993. Because his conviction occurred before that date, he contends that the statute does not
apply to him.
The interpretation of a statute “must begin with the literal words of the statute; those
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed
3
as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows
the law as written.” McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756,
759 (2006) (citations omitted).
When construing Idaho Code § 18-8304 as a whole, subsection (1)(c) is not limited to
crimes for which the person was convicted on or after July 1, 1993. Subsection (1)(c)
incorporates by reference “the offenses listed in subsection (1)(a) of this section.” (Emphasis
added.) Subsection (1)(a) applies to any person who “[o]n or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of
the crime, or an attempt, a solicitation, or a conspiracy to commit a crime provided for in section
. . . 18-6101 (rape, but excluding 18-6101(1) . . .) . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Subsection (1)(c)
does not incorporate by reference the convictions listed in subsection (1)(a); it incorporates by
reference the offenses listed. The offenses are listed by reference to their respective code
sections. The date of conviction for one of those offenses is not part of the definition of the
crime as set forth in the code section. The date a person was convicted of a crime does not
become part of the definition of the offense for which he or she was convicted. Therefore,
subsection (1)(c) applies to Defendant.
B. Does Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c) Violate Defendant’s Constitutional Right to Travel?
Defendant contends that Idaho Code § 18-8304(1)(c) violates his constitutional right to
travel. In Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999), the United States Supreme Court wrote:
The “right to travel” discussed in our cases embraces at least three
different components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to
leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an
unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those
travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like
other citizens of that State.
Defendant asserts that the statute violates the third aspect of his right to travel, which is
“the right of the newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other
citizens of the same State.” Id. at 502. This aspect of the right to travel is based upon the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 503. Thus, the Supreme
Court has held that the right to travel can be violated when a new resident of a state is denied
rights or benefits available to longer-term residents. See, Attorney General of New York v. Soto-
Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (civil service employment preference given to certain veterans if
4
they were residents of the state when they entered the military, but not if they became residents
later); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (amount of payments from oil revenues based upon
length of residency); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (one-year
residency requirement to receive nonemergency medical care at county expense); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (one-year state residency and three-month county residency
required to vote); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one-year residency
requirement to receive welfare benefits). Defendant has not identified any privilege or immunity
enjoyed by other citizens of Idaho that he has been denied. Likewise, he does not contend that
he is being treated differently because he is a new or temporary resident of Idaho.
Rather, Defendant contends that an Idaho resident would not be required to register as a
sex offender based upon a conviction for rape in Idaho that occurred prior to July 1, 1993, but he
was required to register as a sex offender upon moving to Idaho based upon his rape conviction
in Washington that occurred prior to July 1, 1993. Thus, he argues that “the statute in question
clearly treats an in-state sex offender differently than it would a similarly situated out-of-state
sex offender” and that such difference in treatment violates his right to travel and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendant’s claim that he is treated differently from a similarly situated Idaho sex
offender is faulty. He was not required to register in Idaho as a sex offender simply because he
had a prior conviction for the crime of rape when he moved here.1 He was required to register
because, in addition to the rape conviction, he “was required to register as a sex offender in
[Washington] when he established permanent or temporary residency in Idaho.” Idaho Code §
18-8304(1)(c). Had he not been required to register in Washington, he would not have been
required to register once he moved here.
Because he was required to register while residing in Washington, it is difficult to see
how the requirement that he register in this State in any way infringed upon his right to travel to
1
When Idaho Code § 18-8304 was enacted, it treated persons entering the state with sex offense convictions
predating July 1, 1993, differently from residents with sex offense convictions predating that date. Subsection (1)(b)
of the original statute required a sex offender, who had been convicted of a crime in another jurisdiction that was
substantially equivalent to a crime listed in subsection (1)(a), to register if he or she “[e]nters the state on or after
July 1, 1993.” Ch. 411, § 2, 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws 1275, 1278. An Idaho resident convicted prior to July 1, 1993,
of a crime listed in subsection (1)(a) would not have been required to register if he or she had remained in Idaho. In
2005, subsection (1)(b) of the statute was amended to eliminate that difference in treatment. Ch. 233, § 1, 2005
Idaho Sess. Laws 710, 711.
5
or become a resident of this State. “[M]oving from one jurisdiction to another entails many
registration requirements required by law which may cause some inconvenience, but which do
not unduly infringe upon anyone’s right to travel.” United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151,
162-63 (3d Cir. 2010).
Nevertheless, even assuming that the registration requirement of Idaho Code § 18-
8304(1)(c) has the effect of imposing a penalty on Defendant’s right to change his residence to
Idaho, it will be upheld if it is shown necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999). “The state has a strong interest in preventing future sexual
offenses and alerting local law enforcement and citizens to the whereabouts of those that could
reoffend.” Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 2005). This is “a compelling and
strong interest” that “outweighs any burden imposed.” Shenandoah, 595 F.3d at 163. The
requirement that Defendant register as a sex offender upon relocating to Idaho did not violate his
right to travel.
Defendant also contends on appeal that the registration requirement denied him the equal
protection of the law. As stated above, he has not pointed to any similarly situated category of
sex offenders who are not required to register.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.
6