IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 37175
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) 2010 Opinion No. 71
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) Filed: November 3, 2010
v. )
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
PHILLIP DAVID HELMUTH, )
)
Defendant-Respondent. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Darla S. Williamson, District Judge.
Order dismissing charge of failure to register as a sex offender, reversed, and case
remanded.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Elizabeth A. Koeckeritz, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for appellant.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
LANSING, Chief Judge
Phillip David Helmuth was charged with failing to register as a sex offender on an
allegation that he did not timely notify the Ada County Sheriff of his change of address in
violation of Idaho statutes requiring the registration of sex offenders. On Helmuth’s motion, the
district court dismissed the charge based on a conclusion that Helmuth was not required to
register by terms of the Idaho statutes. The State appeals from the order of dismissal.
I.
BACKGROUND
In May 1992, Helmuth was convicted of two counts of the felony crime of sexual battery
in the state of Ohio. He was sentenced to eighteen months of imprisonment on those charges,
and he apparently completed service of that sentence in mid-August 1993. So far as revealed by
the record here, he did not have any duty to register as a sex offender in the state of Ohio.
1
Helmuth moved to Idaho in 1999, and initially registered as a sex offender in August 2000
because, he asserts, a law enforcement official told him that he was required to register. In July
2009, Helmuth was charged in Ada County with failure to register as a sex offender under
Idaho’s Sexual Offender Registration Act, I.C. § 18-8301, et seq., because he did not provide
written notice to the sheriff of a new address within two days after changing his residence.
Helmuth moved to dismiss the charge, asserting that none of the provisions of the Act applied to
him, and the district court granted his motion. The State appeals, contending that the district
court misinterpreted the provisions of I.C. § 18-8304(d).
II.
ANALYSIS
Idaho Code § 18-8304 requires that persons who have been convicted of certain sex
offenses register their addresses with the sheriff of their county of residence. Portions of the
statute that are pertinent to this appeal state:
(1) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to any person who:
(a) On or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of the crime, or an attempt, a
solicitation, or a conspiracy to commit a crime provided for in [listing various
Idaho statutes defining sex crimes].
(b) On or after July 1, 1993, has been convicted of any crime, an attempt,
a solicitation or a conspiracy to commit a crime in another state, territory,
commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States, including tribal courts
and military courts, that is substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in
subsection (1)(a) of this section and enters the state to establish permanent or
temporary residence.
(c) Has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation or a
conspiracy to commit a crime in another state, territory, commonwealth, or other
jurisdiction of the United States, including tribal courts and military courts, that is
substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (1)(a) of this section
and was required to register as a sex offender in any other state or jurisdiction
when he established permanent or temporary residency in Idaho.
(d) Pleads guilty to or has been found guilty of a crime covered in this
chapter prior to July 1, 1993, and the person, as a result of the offense, is
incarcerated in a county jail facility or a penal facility or is under probation or
parole supervision, on or after July 1, 1993.
At issue here is whether Helmuth was subject to the registration requirements as the result of his
1992 conviction and imprisonment in Ohio.
The State does not contend that I.C. § 18-8304(1)(c) requires that Helmuth register in
Idaho, but asserts that subsection (1)(d) applied to him because on or after July 1, 1993, he was
2
incarcerated in an Ohio penal facility for a covered sex offense. For purposes of his motion to
dismiss, Helmuth stipulated that his Ohio offenses were substantially equivalent to the offenses
listed in I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a), but argued that subsection (1)(d) applies only to persons who were
incarcerated or under probation or parole supervision in Idaho. He reasoned that because
subsections (b) and (c) expressly reference out-of-state convictions while subsection (d) does
not, the legislature intended subsection (d) to apply only to those incarcerated for the Idaho
crimes listed in subsection (a).
The district court found Helmuth’s argument persuasive. In addition to relying on this
distinction between the legislative language used in subsection (d) and that in subsections (b) and
(c), the district court also relied on the definition of “incarceration” in I.C. § 18-8303(7), which
states that “incarceration” means “committed to the custody of the Idaho department of
correction or department of juvenile corrections, but excluding cases where the court has
retained jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added.) That definition, when applied to I.C. § 18-8304(1)(d),
the district court reasoned, limited the application of I.C. § 18-8304(1)(d) to Idaho offenders.
The State argues on appeal that the district court erred in this interpretation of the statute and that
subsection (1)(d) applies to those who were incarcerated in other jurisdictions on or after July 1,
1993, for sex offenses described in subsection 1(b).
The interpretation of a statute “must begin with the literal words of the statute; those
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed
as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows
the law as written.” State v. Yeoman, 149 Idaho 505, 507, 236 P.3d 1265, 1267 (2010). When
this Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent
and give effect to that intent. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). To
ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined,
but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative
history. Id. It is also incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not
render it a nullity. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003).
We cannot agree with the district court’s conclusion that subsection (1)(d) applies only to
persons who were incarcerated in Idaho, for it encompasses all persons incarcerated on or after
July 1, 1993, for “a crime covered in this chapter,” that is, in Chapter 83, Title 18 of the Idaho
Code. The crimes described in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) plainly are covered in that chapter.
3
Section 18-8304(1)(a) identifies Idaho crimes that may make an individual subject to
registration, but limits the registration requirement to persons who committed those offenses on
or after July 1, 1993. Subsection (b) then brings into the category of offenses giving rise to a
registration requirement those post-June 1993 convictions in other jurisdictions for crimes that
are substantially equivalent to the Idaho offenses listed in subsection (1)(a). While subsections
(a) and (b) limit the registration requirement to people convicted on or after July 1, 1993,
subsections (c) and (d) eliminate that temporal element in certain circumstances. That is,
subsection (c) requires registration for conviction of a substantially equivalent offense in another
jurisdiction at anytime if the individual was subject to a registration requirement in another
jurisdiction when the individual moved to Idaho, and subsection (d) extends the registration
requirement to persons who were adjudicated guilty of a covered crime before July 1, 1993, but
remained incarcerated or subject to supervision on or after that date. The reference in
subsection (d) to a “crime covered in this chapter” thus encompasses crimes in other jurisdictions
because those crimes are within the covered crimes identified in subsections (b) and (c).
The district court concluded, however, that the definition of “incarceration” in I.C. § 18-
8303(7) demonstrated a legislative intent that I.C. § 18-8304 would apply only to Idaho offenses.
The court reasoned:
Idaho Code section 18-8303(7) defines incarceration as being “committed to the
custody of the Idaho department of correction or department of juvenile
corrections, but excluding cases where the court has retained jurisdiction.”
(emphasis added) This definition is further evidence that subsection (1)(d) can be
read as clearly and unambiguously applying only to in-state convictions. The
legislature chose to use the word “incarcerated,” a form of incarceration, in
subsection (1)(d) and then defined incarceration in the same chapter to mean
being in the custody of the Idaho department of corrections. This is additional
evidence that the legislature intended for subsection (1)(d) to apply to only Idaho
convictions.
Although we acknowledge that the statutory definition of “incarceration” adds complexity to the
interpretation of I.C. § 18-8304(1)(d), we disagree with the district court’s analysis. Applying
the definition of “incarceration” from I.C. § 18-8303(7) to the word “incarcerated” in I.C. § 18-
8304(1)(d), is contrary to the clear legislative intent expressed in subsection (1)(d) and would
have the effect of nullifying a part of that subsection. By the language in subsection (1)(d) the
legislature plainly included all offenses covered by the chapter, not just the offenses covered by
subsection (1)(a). If the I.C. § 18-8303(7) definition of “incarceration” is applied, it would cut
4
from the operation of subsection (1)(d) an entire class of out-of-state offenses that the legislature
otherwise included. Moreover, it would also cut out many Idaho offenders who would otherwise
be subject to subsection (1)(d). This is because the I.C. § 18-8303(7) definition limits
“incarceration” to those in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction or Department of
Juvenile Corrections. Applying the definition to subsection (1)(d) would nullify the language in
that subsection which refers to persons “incarcerated in a county jail facility.” We thus conclude
that the legislature could not have intended the definition of “incarceration” found in I.C. § 18-
8303(7) to apply to the word “incarcerated” found in I.C. § 18-8304(1)(d).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court erred in determining that I.C.
§ 18-8304(d) did not apply to Helmuth’s circumstance and that he had no duty to register as a
sex offender under Idaho law. The district court’s order dismissing the charge against Helmuth
is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Judge GRATTON and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.
5