No. 14825
I N THE SUPREME COURT O T E STATE O MONTANA
F H F
1979
T E STATE O MONTANA,
H F
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
VS .
CURTIS CARDWELL,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable W. W. L e s s l e y , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
A. M i c h a e l S a l v a g n i a r g u e d , Bozeman, Montana
F o r Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
Donald White, County A t t o r n e y , Bozeman, Montana
Michael J. L i l l y a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y ,
Bozeman, Montana
Submitted: O c t o b e r 31, 1979
3,
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Filed:
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
On December 8, 1978, the Honorable W. W. Lessley granted
the Gallatin County attorney leave to file an information
accusing appellant, Curtis Cardwell, of committing the
offenses of aggravated assault, tampering with witnesses,
and aggravated kidnapping. Cardwell pleaded not guilty to
all three counts, and trial was set for January 26, 1979.
On January 17, 1979, the State filed an amended informa-
tion without leave of court pursuant to section 46-11-
403(1), MCA. The amended information changed the nature of
the aggravated assault charge against Cardwell by adding the
allegation that he committed the crime by threatening Jeff
Sawyer with serious bodily injury by the use of a knife.
The amendments to the original information further altered
the information by charging Cardwell with aiding or abetting
another in committing the offense of tampering with wit-
nesses rather than actually committing the crime as charged
in the original information. The amended information also
eliminated the aggravated kidnapping charge.
Cardwell moved to dismiss the amended information
alleging that the filing of an amended information without
leave of court was cnconstitutional, that Count I was dupli-
citous, and that Count I1 had been filed without the showing
of probable cause. The District Court denied the motion,
and Cardwell was tried on the information on January 29 and
30, 1979. A jury found Cardwell guilty of both offenses
charged in the amended information. This appeal followed.
The thrust of appellant's argument on appeal centers
around a challenge to section 46-11-403(1), MCA. That
statute permits an information to be amended once as to
s u b s t a n c e p r i o r t o t r i a l w i t h o u t l e a v e of c o u r t . Appellant
c o n t e n d s t h a t a l l o w i n g s u b s t a n t i v e changes i n a n i n f o r m a t i o n
without j u d i c i a l examination i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Appellant
r a i s e s h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e t o s e c t i o n 46-11-403(1),
MCA, under A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 20, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .
That c o n s t i t u t i o n provision s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
"All criminal a c t i o n s i n d i s t r i c t court, except
t h o s e on a p p e a l , s h a l l be p r o s e c u t e d e i t h e r by
i n f o r m a t i o n , a f t e r e x a m i n a t i o n and commitment
by a m a g i s t r a t e o r a f t e r l e a v e g r a n t e d by t h e
c o u r t , o r by i n d i c t m e n t w i t h o u t s u c h e x a m i n a t i o n ,
commitment, o r l e a v e . "
Reading t h i s s e c t i o n o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n b r o a d l y , a l l
s t a g e s o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n f i l i n g p r o c e s s i n c l u d i n g amend-
ments r e q u i r e j u d i c i a l e x a m i n a t i o n . Under t h i s i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n of t h e p r o v i s i o n , s e c t i o n 46-11-403(1) conflicts with
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n by a l l o w i n g a n i n f o r m a t i o n t o be amended
without leave of court. A s s u c h , t h e s t a t u t e would be v o i d .
I f , however, A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 20, i s c o n s t r u e d more
narrowly t o apply only t o t h e i n i t i a t i o n of c r i m i n a l a c t i o n s ,
l e g i s l a t i v e c o n t r o l of subsequent s t a g e s of t h e information
p r o c e s s would b e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Construing t h e provision
i n t h i s f a s h i o n would a l l o w t h e amendment w i t h o u t l e a v e of
c o u r t s t a t u t e t o stand.
To d e t e r m i n e t h e meaning of A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 20,
1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , w e must employ t h e same r u l e s o f
c o n s t r u c t i o n employed t o c o n s t r u e s t a t u t e s . K e l l e r v . Smith
( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 399, 404, 553 P.2d 1002, 1006. The
i n t e n t of t h e f r a m e r s o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i s i o n c o n t r o l s
i t s meaning. Keller, 170 Mont. a t 405, 553 P.2d a t 1006.
The i n t e n t of t h e f r a m e r s s h o u l d be d e t e r m i n e d from t h e
p l a i n meaning of t h e words used. I f t h a t i s possible, we
a p p l y no o t h e r means o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Keller, 170 Mont.
a t 405, 553 P . 2d a t 1006.
The q u e s t i o n now becomes whether t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n
p r o v i s i o n i s ambiguous. The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t S e c t i o n 20 of
A r t i c l e I1 i s ambiguous. I t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e key word i n
t h e provision i s "prosecuted." The S t a t e asserts t h a t
p r o s e c u t e d c a n mean e i t h e r i n s t i t u t e o r i n s t i t u t e and c a r r y
forward. The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t i n t e r c h a n g i n g t h e s e two
meanings of t h e t e r m r e s u l t s i n d i f f e r e n t consequences i n
t h i s case. I f p r o s e c u t e d i s t a k e n t o mean i n s t i t u t e , A r t i -
c l e 11, S e c t i o n 20, a p p l i e s o n l y t o t h e commencing of c r i m i -
nal actions. S e c t i o n 46-11-403(1), MCA, which a p p l i e s t o
amendments made a f t e r a n a c t i o n b e g i n s , would be c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l under t h i s a n a l y s i s . The second u s a g e of t h e t e r m ,
i n s t i t u t e and c a r r y f o r w a r d , would make t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n
provision applicable t o a l l s t e p s i n the information f i l i n g
p r o c e s s i n c l u d i n g t h e f i l i n g o f amendments. S e c t i o n 46-11-
4 0 3 ( 1 ) would be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
o f p r o s e c u t e a s i t a l l o w s amendments w i t h o u t l e a v e of c o u r t
i n d i r e c t c o n f l i c t with the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision.
Given t h i s a m b i g u i t y , t h e S t a t e c o n t e n d s we must l o o k
t o o t h e r means o f i n t e r p r e t i n g A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 20, t o
d e t e r m i n e i t s meaning. W e do n o t f i n d i t n e c e s s a r y t o do s o
b e c a u s e w e a r e n o t p e r s u a d e d by t h e S t a t e ' s argument t h a t
t h e t e r m " p r o s e c u t e d " i s ambiguous. The t e r m s " p r o s e c u t e "
and " p r o s e c u t i o n " have l o n g been d e f i n e d i n t h e j u d i c i a l
setting. A s l o n g ago a s 1821, Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l s a i d ,
"To commence a s u i t , i s t o demand something by t h e i n s t i t u -
t i o n of p r o c e s s i n a c o u r t o f j u s t i c e ; and t o p r o s e c u t e t h e
s u i t , i s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e common a c c e p t a t i o n of l a n g u a g e ,
t o c o n t i n u e t h a t demand." Cohens v . ~ i r g i n i a( 1 8 2 1 ) , 1 9
U.S. 264, 408, 5 L.Ed. 257, 292, 6 Wheat. 264. S i n c e Cohens,
numerous o t h e r c o u r t s have a l s o d e f i n e d p r o s e c u t e o r p r o s e -
c u t i o n t o mean i n s t i t u t e and c a r r y f o r w a r d . For example,
t h e V i r g i n i a Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d :
" I n common and o r d i n a r y a c c e p t a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g
t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n g i v e n by l e x i c o g r a p h e r s , and
a u t h o r i t i e s g e n e r a l l y , t h e word ' p r o s e c u t i o n '
means t h e i n s t i t u t i o n and c a r r y i n g on of a s u i t
o r p r o c e e d i n g t o o b t a i n o r e n f o r w some r i g h t
o r t h e p r o c e s s of t r y i n g f o r m a l c h a r g e s a g a i n s t
an offender before a l e g a l tribunal.
" I n c r i m i n a l law, i t i s t h e means a d o p t e d t o
b r i n g a supposed c r i m i n a l t o j u s t i c e and punish-
ment by due c o u r s e o f law, and c o n s i s t s of a
series o f p r o c e e d i n g s from t h e t i m e f o r m a l ac-
c u s a t i o n i s made by swearing o u t a w a r r a n t , t h e
f i n d i n g of a n i n d i c t m e n t o r i n f o r m a t i o n i n a
c r i m i n a l c o u r t , t h e t r i a l , and f i n a l judgment.
[ C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ] " Sigmon v. Commonwealth
( 1 9 5 8 ) , 2 0 0 Va. 258, 1 0 5 S.E.2d 1 7 1 , 178.
See a l s o : F l o r i d a e x r e l . Shevin v . Exxon Corp. (5th C i r .
1 9 7 6 ) , 526 F.2d 266, 270, f o o t n o t e 1 6 , c e r t . d e n i e d 429 U.S.
829; Commonwealth v. F a t t i z z o ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 223 Pa.Super. 378, 299
A.2d 22, 28, f o o t n o t e s 15-16; S t a t e v . Harvey ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 281
N.C. 1, 187 S.E.2d 706, 717; Thacker v . M a r s h a l l (Okla.
1 9 5 8 ) , 331 P.2d 488, 492, f o o t n o t e 4 ; S t a t e v . Shushan
( 1 9 4 4 ) , 206 La. 415, 1 9 So.2d 185, 192; S t a t e v. Bowles
(1905) , 70 Kan. 821, 79 P. 726, 728.
I n Montana w e have n o t y e t been s o e x p l i c i t i n a d o p t i n g
a d e f i n i t i o n of " p r o s e c u t i o n " o r " p r o s e c u t e . " However, w e
d i d speak t o t h e i s s u e i n Rosebud County v . F l i n n (1940) ,
109 Mont. 537, 98 P.2d 330. There, w e h e l d t h a t w h i l e t h e
term p r o s e c u t i o n was n o t broad enough t o encompass i n v e s t i -
g a t i o n before f i l i n g a complaint o r information, t h e t e r m
was b r o a d enough t o t a k e i n t h e t r i a l and o t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s
previous t o t r i a l . 109 Mont. a t 541-42, 98 P.2d a t 333-34.
Although Rosebud County d o e s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e which
p a r t s o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f a c r i m i n a l a c t i o n are i n c l u d e d
i n t h e " p r o s e c u t i o n " of t h e a c t i o n , t h e broad l a n g u a g e used
t o d e f i n e p r o s e c u t i o n i n d i c a t e s Montana i n t e n d e d t o a d o p t
t h e g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n o f p r o s e c u t i o n t h a t would i n c l u d e
amendments t o a c r i m i n a l i n f o r m a t i o n .
The above a n a l y s i s i l l u s t r a t e s t h e c l e a r and unambigu-
o u s meaning of A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 20, 1972 Montana C o n s t i -
tution. A l l criminal actions prosecuted--initiated and
c a r r i e d forward--by i n f o r m a t i o n must be examined and com-
m i t t e d by a m a g i s t r a t e o r must be c a r r i e d forward a f t e r
l e a v e g r a n t e d by t h e c o u r t . Thus, a l l s t a g e s of p r o c e e d i n g
by i n f o r m a t i o n i n c l u d i n g amendments t o t h e i n f o r m a t i o n must
b e reviewed by t h e c o u r t . Any s t a t u t e t h a t a l l o w s f o r
amendments w i t h o u t l e a v e o f c o u r t c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h i s con-
s t i t u t i o n p r o v i s i o n and must f a l l . S e c t i o n 46-11-403(1)
a l l o w s f o r amendment of c r i m i n a l i n f o r m a t i o n s w i t h o u t j u d i -
c i a l supervision. The s t a t u t e , t h e r e f o r e , c o n f l i c t s w i t h
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n and must be d e c l a r e d i n v a l i d . W e now s o
hold.
I n d e c l a r i n g t h e s u b s t a n t i v e amendment w i t h o u t l e a v e of
c o u r t s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , w e do n o t i n t e n d t o t o t a l l y
p r e c l u d e s u b s t a n t i v e amendments t o c r i m i n a l i n f o r m a t i o n s .
I t h a s l o n g been h e l d t h a t a n i n f o r m a t i o n c a n be amended
b o t h a s t o form and s u b s t a n c e . U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Smith (D.C.
Pa. 1 9 5 2 ) , 107 F.Supp. 839. On amendment of a n i n f o r m a t i o n ,
however, c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d s must b e imposed. The
above d i s c u s s i o n i n d i c a t e s amendments of s u b s t a n c e c a n o n l y
be f i l e d w i t h l e a v e of c o u r t . This safeguard i s necessary
n o t o n l y t o comply w i t h Montana' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e -
ments, b u t a l s o t o e n s u r e a d e f e n d a n t r e c e i v e s a n e u t r a l
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p r o b a b l e c a u s e f o r d e t e n t i o n under t h e
amended c h a r g e s . See G e r s t e i n v . Pugh ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 420 U.S. 103,
95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54. Another p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d
involves n o t i c e t o t h e defendant. One f u n c t i o n of a n i n f o r -
mation is to notify a defendant of the offense charged,
thereby giving the defendant an opportunity to defend.
State v. ~ r o p f(1975), 166 Mont. 79, 88, 530 P.2d 1158,
1163; State v. Heiser (1965), 146 Mont. 413, 416, 407 P.2d
370, 371. This function of the information cannot be dis-
pensed with when the information is amended as to substance.
The defendant must be notified of the change and afforded a
reasonable time after the amendment to prepare a defense.
Further, when an amended information is filed substantively
changing the charges against a defendant, the defendant
should be arraigned under the new charges. State v. Butler
(19691, 9 Ariz.App. 162, 450 P.2d 128, 131; Hanley v. Zenoff
(19651, 81 Nev. 9, 398 P.2d 241, 242. See also, State v.
DeWolfe (1904), 29 Mont. 415, 417-19, 74 P. 1084, 1085. We
see no bar to substantively amending criminal informations
if these procedures are followed.
Having found the amendment without leave of court statute
unconstitutional, we are constrained to dismiss the amended
information filed here. Section 46-11-403(1) being uncon-
stitutional, the amended information should have been dis-
missed by the District Court on the original motion by
Cardwell, and he should not have proceeded to trial on the
charges in the amended information. Since the District
Court failed to dismiss the amended information, we must
do so now. However, in ordering the dismissal of the amended
information, we do not mean to preclude the State from re-
filing charges against Cardwell with proper judicial super-
vision. We see no merit to Cardwell's argument that the
State did not have probable cause to file any charges against
him and are reversing this conviction based solely on the
~istrictCourt's improper ruling on the constitutional claim.
The cause is reversed and the amended information
against defendant ordered dismissed.
We concur:
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Chief ~ u s t i c e
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Justices