No. 82-111
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982
STATE OF PIIONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs .
RONALD MARVIN TRANGSRUD,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District
In and for the County of Daniels
Honorable Leonard H. Langen, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Allen Beck, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike Greelv, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
M. J. Traynor, County Attorney, Scobey, Montana
Submitted on briefs: August 12, 1982
Decided.: September 22, 1982
N
t.
Clerk
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n delivered t h e Opinion of the
Court.
Def e n d a n t / a p p e l l a n t was convicted of aggravated assau It, a
felony, on J a n u a r y 2 0 , 1982, i n the Fifteenth J u d i c i a l District
of t h e S t a t e of Montana, D a n i e l s County, Montana. On F e b r u a r y
18, 1982, the court sentenced defendant to ten years in the
Montana S t a t e P r i s o n for the aggravated a s s a u l t and ten years,
with the l a s t e i g h t y e a r s suspended, under t h e enhancement sta-
tute. The t r i a l c o u r t o r d e r e d t h a t t h e terms r u n c o n s e c u t i v e l y .
Defendant a p p e a l s from t h i s s e n t e n c e .
D e f e n d a n t was involved i n a d i s t u r b a n c e a t a b a r i n Scobey,
Montana, on O c t o b e r 23, 1981. While p l a y i n g p o o l in M-J's Bar
w i t h h i s f i a n c e e and a g r o u p o f f r i e n d s , d e f e n d a n t b e g a n a r g u i n g
with Trygve Magelssen and a group of seismographers. After
exchanging several vulgar comments the two g r o u p s moved their
discussion outside the bar. From t h e r e e a c h w i t n e s s h a s a d i f -
f e r e n t e x p l a n a t i o n o f what o c c u r r e d n e x t . The g i s t of t h e t e s t i -
mony is that after the t w o g r o u p s had gone o u t s i d e , defendant
w a l k e d a c r o s s t h e s t r e e t and o b t a i n e d a S m i t h and W e s s o n , Model
59, from h i s p i c k u p t r u c k . Defendant then returned t o t h e crowd
with the gun exposed. Magelssen, defendant's fiancee and
d e f e n d a n t ' s companions c o n t i n u e d to exchange words on t h e s t r e e t .
A f t e r one p a r t i c u l a r l y s u g g e s t i v e exchange between M a g e l s s e n and
defendant's financee, defendent fired one shot into the air.
Defendant testified he then uncocked the pistol and placed it
i n t o h i s pocket. M a g e l s s e n and o t h e r s t e s t i f i e d d e f e n d a n t con-
tinued to point the gun at Magelssen's head and upper body.
Finally, M a g e l s s e n b r o k e away from t h e crowd and w a l k e d to h i s
m o t e l , where he s t o p p e d a n a p p r o a c h i n g p o l i c e car and r e l a t e d t h e
d e t a i l s o f t h e i n c i d e n t to t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r . Defendant's group
returned to the bar and defendant left shortly thereafter.
After a jury t r i a l o n J a n u a r y 2 0 , 1 9 8 2 , d e f e n d a n t was found
g u i l t y of aggravated assault. The t r i a l c o u r t set February 18,
1982, as the date for sentencing and ordered a presentence
investigation. A t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8 : 30 a . m . on February 1 8 , 1982,
the court provided a copy of the presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n to
counsel f o r the defense. The s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g b e g a n a t 9 : 18
a .m. The p r e s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n c o n t a i n e d a number of s t a t e -
ments by w i t n e s s e s whose names were o r d e r e d w i t h h e l d from the
d e f e n d a n t by t h e c o u r t . The i n f o r m a t i o n i n c l u d e d s t a t e m e n t s to
the effect that:
1. The Scobey community is apprehensive of d e f e n d a n t and
have voiced t h e i r concern.
2. The d e f e n d a n t threatened a b a r owner i n Scobey in the
summer o f 1 9 8 0 .
3. The d e f e n d a n t t h r e a t e n e d o n e of the witnesses a f t e r the
trial.
4. The defendant physically abused his former wife and
daughter.
5. The d e f e n d a n t was in possession of a concealed weapon
d u r i n g t h e l a s t c o u r t s e s s i o n b e c a u s e t h e s h e r i f f had f a i l e d to
s e a r c h him.
6. The d e f e n d a n t t h r e a t e n e d a S c o b e y P o l i c e O f f i c e r and h i s
family.
Defendant objected to the court's consideration of these
statements and f u r t h e r objected to the a d m i s s i o n of a police
r e p o r t r e l a t i n g t o a n i n c i d e n t on O c t o b e r 1 7 , 1 9 7 4 , where d e f e n -
d a n t pled guilty t o misdemeanor assault. The c o u r t o v e r r u l e d
defendant's o b j e c t i o n s and a f t e r a l l o w i n g d e f e n d a n t t o t e s t i f y ,
e n t e r e d judgment and s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t to t e n y e a r s i n p r i s o n
f o r a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t and t e n y e a r s , w i t h t h e l a s t e i g h t s y e a r s
suspended, under section 46-18-221(1), MCA, the enhancement
statute. Defendant a p p e a l s .
The i s s u e p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w is w h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
erred by making findings of fact and conclusions of law and
imposing sentence on the b a s i s of private out-of - c o u r t i n £ or-
mation gathered by t h e presentence investigation o f f i c e r where
t h e d e f e n d a n t had no o p p o r t u n i t y t o c r o s s - e x a m i n e t h e p e r s o n s who
s u p p l i e d t h e i n £o r m a t i o n .
D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by w i t h h o l d i n g some
o f t h e names o f w i t n e s s e s who s u p p l i e d i n f o r m a t i o n to t h e p r e s e n -
tence investigation officer. D e f e n d a n t claims he h a s t h e r i g h t
t o con£ r o n t and c r o s s - e x a m i n e a l l w i t n e s s e s who p r o v i d e n e g a t i v e
i n £o r m a t i o n t o t h e s e n t e n c i n g j u d g e . We disagree.
Defendant cites a number of cases and s t a t u t e s which have
s i n c e been o v e r t u r n e d o r r e p e a l e d . The cases o f S t a t e v. Harney
( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 6 0 Mont. 5 5 , 499 P.2d 802; S t a t e v. Sintob (1969), 154
Mont. 2 8 6 , 462 P.2d 8 7 3 ; and Kuhl v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the F i r s t
Judicial District ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 1 3 9 Mont. 5 3 6 , 3 6 6 P.2d 347, a l l held
a defendant has a r i g h t t o a sentencing hearing i n open c o u r t .
T h e s e c a s e s were d e c i d e d u n d e r s e c t i o n 94-7814 R.C . M . 1 9 4 7 , which
stated circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of sentence
". . . m u s t be p r e s e n t e d b y t e s t i m o n y o f w i t n e s s e s examined i n
o p e n c o u r t . . ." However, t h i s s e c t i o n was r e p e a l e d by s e c t i o n
95-2205, R.C.M. 1947, now c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n 46-18-113, MCA,
which states :
" --- i l a b i l i t y -- f
Ava -- o - eport
r t o -e f e n d a n t --
d-- and
o--h e r s .
.- t (1) The judyg may, in his
d i s c r e t i o n , make t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e p o r t --07
p a r t s o f i t available t o the defendants o r
o t h e r s , w h i l e c o n c e a l i n g t h e i d e n t i t y of p e r -
s o n s who p r o v i d e d c o n £ i d e n t i a l i n £ o r m a t i o n .
I f t h e c o u r t d i s c l o s e s t h e i d e n t i t y of p e r -
s o n s who p r o v i d e d i n £ o r m a t i o n , t h e j u d g e may,
i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , allow t h e d e f e n d a n t t o
c r o s s - e x a m i n e t h o s e who r e n d e r e d i n £ o r m a t i o n
. . ." (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )
Thus, the r i g h t of cross-examination a t a presentence hearing
is a discretionary matter of the trial court and will not be
overruled without a showing of abuse of that discretion. In
S t a t e v. O r s b o r n ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 0 Mont. 4 8 0 , 5 5 5 P.2d 5 0 9 , w e s t a t e d :
" S u c h a c h a n g e of p o l i c y is r e f l e c t i v e of t h e
t r e n d towards d i s t i n g u i s h i n g e v i d e n t i a l proce-
d u r e a t t r i a l from t h a t a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g
stage. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n
W i l l i a m s v . N e w York , 337 U.S. 2 4 1 , 247, 6 9
-
S . C t . 107% 1 m 3 , - T ~ . ~ 1 3.3 7 , 1 3 4 2 , s t a t e d :
d
'I' . . . a s e n t e n c i n g j u d g e , h o w e v e r , is n o t
c o n f i n e d to t h e narrow i s s u e of g u i l t . His
t a s k w i t h i n f i x e d l i m i t s is to d e t e r m i n e t h e
t y p e and e x t e n t o f p u n i s h m e n t a f t e r t h e i s s u e
o f g u i l t h a s been determined. Highly r e l e v a n t
- i f n o t e s s e n t i a l - t o h i s s e l e c t i o n of a n
a p p r o p r i a t e s e n t e n c e is t h e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e
f u l l e s t information possible concerning the
d e f e n d a n t ' s l i f e and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . And
--
modern
--- -- --
c- n c e p - --i v i d u a l i-- -.p u n i s h m e n t
.
o- -t s ind zing . -
-
--
have - - h more -
made i t a l l -t -- e -- n e c e s s a r y - a
-- - that
s e n t e n c i n-- i u d q e - -- - n i e d -- -- ~ ~ o r t u n i t v
q n o t be de - an o
.
-
- a
p -
a
-- b a-
m e n t - r i g i d --d h e r e n c e t o r e s t r i c t i v e r u l e s
of a
-
--
t- -t a i n- -. e r t i n e n t .i n f o r m a t i o n --y - - r e q u i r e -
o o b-
-r to t
o f e v i d e n c e -p r o p e- t y a p p l i c a b l e - -- h e - a lt r i-
--
. . . I (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )
"However, t h i s d o e s n o t mean t h a t t h e s p i r i t
o f Kuhl is d e a d .
- A convicted defendant still
h a s a due p r o c e s s g u a r a n t e e a g a i n s t a s e n t e n c e
p r e d i c a t e d on m i s i n f o r m a t i o n ."
170 Mont at .
4 8 5 , 555 P.2d a t 512.
I n -r s- r n w e found t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s g u a r a n t e e of d u e p r o c e s s
O-b o
was p r o t e c t e d b e c a u s e t h e d e f e n d a n t was r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l a t
the t i m e the sentencing i n f o r m a t i o n w a s made known t o him, the
d e f e n d a n t had the opportunity to rebut the information and the
d e f e n d a n t c h o s e t o a f f i r m t h e a c c u r a c y of the i n f o r m a t i o n . Here
t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d h a v e c o u n s e l p r e s e n t and had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to
rebut the i n f o r m a t i o n a l t h o u g h he c h o s e t o d e n y t h e a c c u r a c y o f
the information. T h u s , we f i n d d e f e n d a n t ' s g u a r a n t y of d u e p r o -
c e s s was p r o t e c t e d .
It is a g e n e r a l r u l e t h r o u g h o u t t h i s c o u n t r y t h a t when m a t -
ters contained in a presentence report are contested by the
defendant, t h e defendant has an a f f i r m a t i v e duty t o p r e s e n t evi-
d e n c e showing t h e i n a c c u r a c i e s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e r e p o r t . S t a t e v.
Radi (1979), Mont . - , 6 0 4 P.2d 318, 36 S t . R e p . 2345.
Here t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d a l l o w d e f e n d a n t t o t a k e t h e s t a n d and
r e p l y t o the statements contained i n the presentence investiga-
tion report. If defendant felt t h e r e was not enough time to
acquire witnesses t o adequately rebut the in£ormat i o n c o n t a i n e d
in the report he should have requested a continuance from the
court. However, the record shows no such continuance was
requested. T h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t r e v i e w a matter r a i s e d f o r the
f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l . P e t e r s v . Newkirk ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont . -- -
I
6 3 3 P.2d 1 2 1 0 , 38 S t . R e p . 1526. That defendant did not have
t i m e t o p r e p a r e t o r e b u t t h e p r e s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e p o r t was
something which should have been put to the trial court and
d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o do so p r e v e n t s a n y r u l i n g by t h i s C o u r t t o
remedy t h e s i t u a t i o n .
Judgment and sentence of the District Court is affirmed.
W e concur:
Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea d i s s e n t i n g .
I dissent.
A defendant is a s much e n t i t l e d to due p r o c e s s i n s e n t e n c i n g
a s he is a t t r i a l , and he h a s been d e n i e d t h a t due p r o c e s s h e r e .
Here, d e f e n d a n t , a s majority s t a t e s , denied t h e a c c u r a c y of the
i n f o r m a t i o n which found i t s way i n t o t h e p r e s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a -
tion report. But, t h e f a c t t h a t he d e n i e d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n d o e s
n o t d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t he was g i v e n due p r o c e s s . He could o n l y
h a v e b e e n g i v e n d u e p r o c e s s by a p r o c e s s which g a v e him o p p o r -
tunity to t e s t t h e a c c u r a c y of the information given. If the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e l i e d i n any way on t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i n imposing
t h e s e n t e n c e , d e f e n d a n t h a s been p r e j u d i c e d . That p r e j u d i c e can
o n l y be c u r e d by g i v i n g him a n o p p o r t u n i t y to d i r e c t l y c o n f r o n t
those whose names were secreted from defendant by the trial
court. Where names a r e n o t d i s c l o s e d i n a p r e s e n t e n c e i n v e s t i g a -
tion report, and t h e t r i a l c o u r t d o e s n o t g i v e t h e d e f e n d a n t a n
o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e b u t a l l t h e e v i d e n c e d i s c l o s e d , a p r e s u m p t i o n of
the prejudice a r i s e s which c a n o n l y be cured by another sen-
tencing hearing------wfih- a d e q ua t-e proced u r a l s a f e g uad s .
I dissent f o r y e t another reason -- a ground n o t r a i s e d by
defendant. Defendant has been s u b j e c t e d to d o u b l e j e o p a r d y by
t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h e a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t " w i t h a weapon" s e n t e n c e
and t h e f u r t h e r i m p o s i t i o n of a s e n t e n c e f o r u s e of a f i r e a r m o r
d a n g e r o u s i n s t r u m e n t i n c o m m i t t i n g a crime. I n e f f e c t , defendant
h a s b e e n twice p u n i s h e d f o r t h e same a c t -- t h e u s e of a weapon.
Defendant was charged under section 45-5-202 (1) c ) of
( the
a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t s t a t u t e which s t a t e s : "A p e r s o n c o m m i t s the
offense of aggravated assault if he purposely or knowingly
causes : ( c ) r e a s o n a b l e a p p r e h e n s i o n of s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y i n
a n o t h e r - -u s e o f a weapon - - -
by - - . . ." U s e of a weapon i s t h e e s s e n c e
of this section -- i f no weapon was used t h e r e c a n be no a g g r a -
vated assault. I n s t e a d , t h e c h a r g e would be a m i s d e m e a n o r . The
misdemeanor a s s a u l t s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 45-5-201(1) ( d ) p r o v i d e s : A
p e r s o n c o m m i t s t h e o f f e n s e of assault if he: ( d ) purposely o r
knowingly causes reasonable apprehension of bodily i n jury in
another . . ." It is c l e a r , therefore, that the act to be
punished, because of its p o t e n t i a l f o r harm, is t h e use of a
weapon. Here t h e t r i a l c o u r t p u n i s h e d t h e d e f e n d a n t f o r t h e u s e
of the weapon by sentencing him to ten years in prison.
B u t t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h e n i n v o k e d a n o t h e r s t a t u t e and g a v e t h e
d e f e n d a n t a second ten-year s e n t e n c e t o r u n c o n s e c u t i v e l y to t h e
f i r s t ten-year sentence. E i g h t y e a r s o f t h e s e c o n d s e n t e n c e were
suspended, which resulted in a twelve-year prison sentence.
S e c t i o n 46-18-221(1) provides:
" A p e r s o n who h a s b e e n f o u n d g u i l t y of a n y
offense and who, while engaged in the
commission of t h e o f f e n s e , knowingly d i s p l a y e d ,
brandished, o r o t h e r w i s e used a f i r e a r m ,
d e s t r u c t i v e d e v i c e , as d e f i n e d i n 4 5 - 8 - 3 3 2 ( 1 ) ,
o r o t h e r d a n g e r o u s weapon, s h a l l , i n a d d i t i o n
-- o t h e - m e n t -----m m i s s i o n
t punish provided f o r theco
o f - c h o f f e n s e , b e s e n t e n c e d t o a term o f
s u-
imprisonment - - - t a t e prisoii-of- - - -e s s
7
in t h es notl
--
t h a n t w o y e a r s o r - - -e n y e a r s -- --
( ~ m p h a x a d d e d )-
s
more t h a n t . . ."
I n f i l i n g t h e c h a r g e s t h e s t a t e p u t t h e d e f e n d a n t on n o t i c e
t h a t it would i n v o k e s e c t i o n 46-18-221 i n t h e e v e n t of a c o n v i c -
tion. The information alleged in part: "The maximum s e n t e n c e
f o r s a i d o f f e n s e is t w e n t y ( 2 0 ) y e a r s p l u s a n a d d i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e
o f two y e a r s minimum and n o t to e x c e e d t e n y e a r s maximum f o r u s e
of a firearm." ~ e f e n d a n t k ounsel,
c however, a f t e r defendant's
conviction, raised no issue with respect to i m p o s i t i o n of an
additional sentence for use of a firearm or other dangerous
instrument. The effect is that defendant has been sentenced
u n d e r t h e a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t s t a t u t e f o r u s e of a f i r e a r m , and h e
h a s a g a i n been punished under s e c t i o n 46-18-221(1), MCA, for u s e
of a firearm. That -- is d o u b l e j e o p a r d y .
The jury could not have convicted d e f e n d a n t of aggravated
assault unless it found that he had used a weapon (a firearm
h e r e ) t o p l a c e t h e v i c t i m i n r e a s o n a b l e a p p r e h e n s i o n of serious
bodily injury. Conviction of that charge came about because
d e f e n d a n t u s e d a weapon. The t r i a l c o u r t s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t to
t e n y e a r s b e c a u s e h e u s e d a weapon. I f a i l t o see, h o w e v e r , that
t h e c o u r t c o u l d impose a p e n a l t y on t o p of t h i s p e n a l t y -- f o r
u s e of a weapon. The u n d e n i a b l e f a c t i s t h a t i f d e f e n d a n t had
n o t u s e d a weapon ( a f i r e a r m h e r e ) h e c o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n con-
v i c t e d of aggravated a s s a u l t . Defendant h a s been s u b j e c t e d to a
d o u b l e p e n a l t y f o r t h e same a c t -- p o i n t i n g a weapon ( a f i r e a r m )
a t another. T h i s d o u b l e p e n a l t y f o r t h e same a c t , v i o l a t e s t h e
double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Montana
Constitutions.
I would s t r i k e the additonal penalty imposed under s e c t i o n
46-18-221. The a d d i t i o n a l p e n a l t y , as a p p l i e d to t h e f a c t s of
t h i s case, is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .