I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1983
DOUGLAS D . SOLBERG, a s P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e
of t h e E s t a t e of D a r r e l B. S o l b e r g , Deceased,
Plaintiff and A p p e l l a n t ,
VS.
COUNTY O F YELLOWSTONE, MONTANA, a n d SIDNEY J .
HAYES, J R . , M.D.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f Y e l l o w s t o n e ,
Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
S a n d a l 1 & Cavan, Billings, Montana
For Respondents:
Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull & Jones, Billings,
Montana
S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : September 9 , 1982
Decided: March 1, 1 9 8 3
M r . Justice John Conway H a r r i s o n delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
This is a w r o n g f u l d e a t h a c t i o n on a p p e a l from t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t i n and f o r t h e County
of Yellowstone. The j u r y found for the defendant, Yellowstone
County. From t h a t a d v e r s e v e r d i c t and judgment, the p l a i n t i f f
appeals.
S o l b e r g had b e e n i n c a r c e r a t e d i n t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e County j a i l
s i n c e mid-day on November 1 9 . On t h a t d a y he was i n v o l v e d i n a
single-car accident. His car left the road, went through a
f e n c e , and came t o rest i n a f i e l d . S o l b e r g was i n t h e c a r when
t h e deputy s h e r i f f a r r i v e d . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e d e p u t y , S o l b e r g was
"quite intoxicated" and "he could b a r e l y walk." He was then
taken to jail and charged with driving while intoxicated and
driving without a valid d r i v e r ' s license. On t h e f o l l o w i n g d a y ,
November 2 0 , 1 9 7 4 , he p l e d g u i l t y to t h e two o f f e n s e s i n j u s t i c e
court. H e was u n a b l e t o p a y t h e f i n e imposed and a s a r e s u l t he
was o r d e r e d t o s e r v e t i m e i n j a i l .
On November 22, 1974, at a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7:30 a.m., Darrel
S o l b e r g was found l y i n g f a c e down on t h e f l o o r of a padded c e l l
i n t h e Yellowstone County j a i l . H e was i m m e d i a t e l y r u s h e d t o t h e
h o s p i t a l and was p r o n o u n c e d dead on a r r i v a l . A t t h e emergency
room h i s t e m p e r a t u r e was r e c o r d e d a t 1 0 7 . 8 d e g r e e s . Later that
m o r n i n g a n a u t o p s y was p e r f o r m e d . The c a u s e of d e a t h w a s d e t e r -
mined to be hyperpyrexia ; the greatly elevated temperature
related to delirium tremens and alcohol withdrawal. The
complaint alleged that the defendant, Yellowstone County,
" n e g l i g e n t l y and c a r e l e s s l y f a i l e d t o p r o m p t l y s e c u r e , o r demand,
a d e q u a t e and p r o p e r m e d i c a l a t t e n t i o n . . ." The j u r y h e l d for
the defendant. The p l a i n t i f f then brought t h i s appeal.
S e v e r a l i s s u e s were r a i s e d on a p p e a l :
1. w h e t h e r t h e j u r y was s e l e c t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e l a w ;
2. whether o r not t h e District Court e r r e d in refusing to
g i v e a n o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n on n e g l i g e n c e as a matter of l a w ; and
3. w h e t h e r or n o t t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t
the verdict?
The first issue relating to the selection of the jury
necessitates a reversal and remand f o r new t r i a l ; however, we
w i l l c o n s i d e r t h e o t h e r i s s u e s i n v i e w o f t h e f a c t t h e case m u s t
be r e t r i e d .
The trial in this cause took place during October 1980.
D u r i n g t h a t same t i m e p e r i o d , w i t h i n weeks of t h e S o l b e r g t r i a l ,
a n o t h e r t r i a l was h e l d i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . The
other case was entitled Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation
District. In that case a jury rendered a verdict which was
appealed t o t h i s Court. We reversed, b e c a u s e t h e j u r y had n o t
been s e l e c t e d i n accordance with law. Dvorak v . H u n t l e y P r o j e c t
I r r i g a t i o n District (1981) -- - -- .- Mont . r 639 P.2d 62, 38
St.Rep. 2176. Specifically, we found violations of sections
25-7-202 and 25-7-204, MCA.
Upon r e v i e w o f t h e s u p p l e m e n t a l t r a n s c r i p t of p r o c e e d i n g s i n
Dvorak, w h i c h h a v e become p a r t o f the record i n t h i s case, w e
f i n d t h e f o l l o w i n g t e s t i m o n y of Charmaine F i s h e r , a Deputy C l e r k
o f Court f o r t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l District:
"Q. Have you s a t on o t h e r cases w h e r e j u r i e s
were s e l e c t e d i n t h e same p r o c e d u r e ? A. Yes.
"Q. Was there a case called Solberg? A.
Yes.
"Q. And was t h e j u r y s e l e c t e d i n t h a t c a s e i n
t h e same m a n n e r ? A. Yes ."
A l s o t h e t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e p r o c e d u r e had b e e n u s e d
i n t h e d i s t r i c t f o r many y e a r s .
"Q. And is that [the jury selection
procedure 1 commonly used in Y e l l o w stone
County? A. Y e s , has been f o r , w e l l I c a n ' t
i m a g i n e how many y e a r s I know a t l e a s t
twenty. . ."
Here, a p p e l l a n t ' s a r g u m e n t is s i m p l y : Dvorak and t h i s case
--
were tried in the same judicial district, both having juries
s e l e c t e d w i t h t h e same p r o c e d u r e s and s i n c e - - was r e v e r s e d
Dvorak
-
because of such p r o c e d u r e s , this case s h o u l d a l s o be reversed.
W e agree.
Respondent s t r e n u o u s l y argues that appellant's objection is
not timely. I n ---
Dvorak t h e a p p e l l a n t made h i s o b j e c t i o n known a
week a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t had b e e n e n t e r e d b u t b e f o r e h i s m o t i o n f o r
a new t r i a l . I n t h i s case, a p p e l l a n t f i r s t o b j e c t e d to t h e j u r y
s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s i n h i s i n i t i a l b r i e f ; more t h a n o n e y e a r s i n c e
the trial. The r e s p o n d e n t -
i n Dvorak a r g u e d that objections to
t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s had come t o o l a t e . We held otherwise,
stating:
" [ t j h e b a s i c f l a w i n t h i s c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t
counsel f o r the [appellant] did not discover
t h e d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n pro-
c e s s u n t i l a week a f t e r t h e t r i a l . Further,
c o u n s e l had no r e a s o n , p r i o r to h i s i n q u i r i e s ,
t o s u s p e c t t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s were
not being followed. I n o t h e r words, the
'means of knowledge1 were n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r
c o u n s e l t o o b j e c t b e f o r e or d u r i n g t h e t r i a l .
" I n L e d g e r v. McKenzie ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 0 7 Mont. 3 3 5 ,
85 P.2d 352, this Court discussed the
n e c e s s i t y o f o b j e c t i n g t o t h e i m p a n e l i n g of a
j u r y i n a t i m e l y manner. T h i s Court held:
I' I
. . . t h a t i f c o u n s e l does n o t have t h e
k n o w l e d g e , or means o f k n o w l e d g e , o f t h e ir-
r e g u l a r i t y i n t h e d r a w i n g of t h e j u r y o r t h e
p a n e l f r o m w h i c h it is s e l e c t e d u n t i l a f t e r
t h e v e r d i c t , t h e q u e s t i o n may be r a i s e d f o r
t h e f i r s t t i m e on m o t i o n f o r new t r i a l . I 85
P.2d 3 5 3 . " Dvorak, Mont. a t - -- - 639
P.2d a t 6 4 , 3 m T ~ e p - r 2179. at
Respondent asserts that since the issue was not raised on
m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l , a n y o b j e c t i o n was l o s t . The r u l e c a n n o t
be so construed. The rule s i m p l y states that if counsel was
w i t h o u t k n o w l e d g e o r means of knowledge d u r i n g t r i a l h e may, upon
g a i n i n g k n o w l e d g e of s e l e c t i o n i r r e g u l a r i t i e s , make h i s o b j e c t i o n
known i n a motion f o r new trial. The r u l e d o e s n o t l i m i t the
t i m e period f o r making the objection, rather it d e f i n e s a par-
ticular point a s being timely. In this case w e m e r e l y d e f i n e
a n o t h e r p o i n t a s being timely.
R e s p o n d e n t a l s o a r g u e s t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s c o u n s e l is a v e t e r a n
t r i a l a t t o r n e y and m u s t h a v e b e e n aware of t h e p r e s e l e c t i o n p r o -
cess, t h u s c o u n s e l m u s t h a v e had knowledge o r means of k n o w l e d g e
of selection irregularities. Although a p p e l l a n t ' s c o u n s e l knew
t h a t t h e j u r y was p r e s e l e c t e d , i t d o e s n o t f o l l o w t h a t h e knew or
s h o u l d h a v e known t h a t t h e p r o p e r p r o c e d u r e s were n o t f o l l o w e d .
A s we said i n Dvorak, Mont. at - -. 639 P.2d a t 6 5 , 38
St.Rep. a t 2179, " c o u n s e l had a r i g h t to r e l y on t h e j u d g e and
c l e r k to f o l l o w t h e i r s t a t u t o r y d u t i e s ."
Next, appellant c o n t e n d s error f o r f a i l u r e of t h e District
Court to give his offered jury instruction number 28, which
reads:
"You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s f o u n d
a s a matter o f l a w t h a t Y e l l o w s t o n e County w a s
n e g l i g e n t i n i t s care and t r e a t m e n t of Darrel
S o l b e r g and t h e r e f o r e no f i n d i n g on t h i s
q u e s t i o n is r e q u i r e d o f y o u . The o n l y
remaining i s s u e with respect t o Yellowstone
C o u n t y is f o r you to f i n d w h a t d a m a g e s , i f a n y
were proximately caused by Yellows t o n e
County s n e g l i g e n c e . "
I n s u p p o r t o f t h e a b o v e i n s t r u c t i o n w e are c i t e d t o A z u r e v .
C i t y o f B i l l i n g s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 2 Mont. 234, 5 9 6 P.2d 460. In that
case we upheld the District Court's ruling that the City of
Billings was negligent as a m a t t e r of law i n view of section
53-24-303(2), MCA. A p p e l l a n t would h a v e t h i s C o u r t d e c l a r e t h e
s t a t u t e a p p l i c a b l e i n t h i s c a s e , h o w e v e r , w e c a n n o t d o so. The
s t a t u t e reads:
"A p e r s o n who a p p e a r s to be i n c a p a c i t a t e d b y
a l c o h o l s h a l l be t a k e n i n t o p r o t e c t i v e c u s t o d y
b y t h e p o l i c e and f o r t h w i t h b r o u g h t to a n
approved public treatment facility for
emergency t r e a t m e n t . I f no a p p r o v e d p u b l i c
t r e a t m e n t f a c i l i t y is r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e , h e
s h a l l be t a k e n t o a n e m e r g e n c y m e d i c a l s e r v i c e
c u s t o m a r i l y used f o r i n c a p a c i t a t e d p e r s o n s .
The p o l i c e , i n d e t a i n i n g t h e p e r s o n and i n
t a k i n g him t o a n a p p r o v e d p u b l i c t r e a t m e n t
facility, are t a k i n g him i n t o p r o t e c t i v e
c u s t o d y and s h a l l make e v e r y r e a s o n a b l e e f f o r t
t o p r o t e c t h i s h e a l t h and s a f e t y . In taking
the person into protective custody, the
d e t a i n i n g o f f i c e r may t a k e r e a s o n a b l e s t e p s to
p r o t e c t h i m s e l f . N o e n t r y o r o t h e r r e c o r d may
b e made t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e p e r s o n t a k e n i n t o
c u s t o d y under t h i s s e c t i o n h a s been a r r e s t e d
or charged with a crime."
Appellant's a r g u m e n t is s i m p l y t h i s , the s t a t u t e established
a d u t y on Yellowstone County t o t a k e S o l b e r g t o a t r e a t m e n t f a c i -
l i t y or e m e r g e n c y m e d i c a l s e r v i c e , and s i n c e t h i s was n o t d o n e
t h e d e f e n d a n t was n e g l i g e n t as a matter o f l a w .
A s we s a i d i n Azure, t o u p h o l d n e g l i g e n c e p e r se t h r o u g h s t a -
t u t e , " t h e p l a i n t i f f m u s t be a member of t h e c l a s s i n whose f a v o r
a d u t y was imposed b y t h e s t a t u t e . . . and t h e d e f e n d a n t m u s t be
a member o f t h e c l a s s a g a i n s t whom a d u t y is imposed ." Azure,
1 8 2 Mont. a t 240-241, 5 9 6 P.2d a t 464. W e hold t h a t the plain-
t i f f was n o t a member o f t h e p r o t e c t e d class. W e do n o t reach
t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r Y e l l o w s t o n e C o u n t y was a member of the
c l a s s on whom t h e d u t y was imposed.
The underlying f o c u s of s e c t i o n 53-24-303 ( 2 ) , MCA, is set
f o r t h i n a l e g i s l a t i v e s t a t e m e n t of p o l i c y :
" I t is t h e p o l i c y o f t h e s t a t e of Montana t o
r e c o g n i z e a l c o h o l i s m as a n i l l n e s s and t h a t
a l c o h o l i c s and i n t o x i c a t e d p e r s o n s may n o t be
s u b j e c t e d t o c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n b e c a u s e of
t h e i r c o n s u m p t i o n of a l c o h o l i c b e v e r a g e s b u t
r a t h e r s h o u l d be a f f o r d e d a c o n t i n u u m o f
t r e a t m e n t i n o r d e r t h a t t h e y may l e a d n o r m a l
l i v e s as p r o d u c t i v e members o f society."
S e c t i o n 53-24-102, MCA.
I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had i n mind t h e p r o t e c t i o n of
those i n d i v i d u a l s whose o n l y f a u l t is a n a f f i n i t y for alcohol.
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e p o l i c e are o b l i g a t e d to f u r t h e r t h a t p u r p o s e by
placing i n p r o t e c t i v e c u s t o d y t h o s e who a p p e a r to be incapaci-
t a t e d by a l c o h o l , and " [ n ] o e n t r y or o t h e r r e c o r d may be made to
indicate that the person taken into custody . . . has been
arrested or charged with a crime ." Too of t e n in the past,
i n t o x i c a t e d or i n c a p a c i t a t e d p e r s o n s were t h r o w n i n j a i l t o s l e e p
it o f f and i n v a r i a b l y were c h a r g e d with some c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e
i n d i c a t i n g t h e community's d i s p l e a s u r e . T h i s is w h a t h a p p e n e d i n
Azure.
Solberg w a s not i n t h e p r o t e c t e d class. He was arrested for
d r i v i n g u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l and f o r d r i v i n g w i t h o u t a
valid license. He pled g u i l t y to b o t h of these offenses. The
s t a t u t e i s n o t i n t e n d e d t o p r o t e c t i n c a p a c i t a t e d p e r s o n s who h a v e
c o m m i t t e d or are s u s p e c t e d o f c r i m i n a l a c t s ; o n l y t h o s e who b y
reason of their incapacitation, are in need of protective
custody. Azure was in the protected class. After being
a s s a u l t e d , p o l i c e found him i n a s e e m i n g l y i n t o x i c a t e d c o n d i t i o n .
He showed o b v i o u s s i g n s o f i n j u r y ; two b l a c k e y e s , a l a r g e b r u i s e
o n h i s f o r e h e a d , and d r i e d b l o o d o n h i s l i p s and t e e t h . H e was
i n j a i l f o r s i x t e e n h o u r s b e f o r e being t a k e n to t h e h o s p i t a l . He
had committed no crime. P o l i c e had r e s p o n d e d t o w h a t seemed to
be an attempted burglary. H e was c h a r g e d w i t h p u b l i c intoxica-
t i o n and t r e s p a s s . C l e a r l y , --- was among t h e p r o t e c t e d c l a s s .
Azure
The f o r e g o i n g d o e s n o t p r e c l u d e a common law d u t y . In Pretty
o n Top v . C i t y of H a r d i n ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 2 Mont. 3 1 1 , 3 1 5 , 5 9 7 P.2d 58,
60-61, we s t a t e d :
"A j a i l e r owes a d u t y t o t h e p r i s o n e r t o k e e p
h i m s a f e and t o p r o t e c t him from u n n e c e s s a r y
harm. R e a s o n a b l e and o r d i n a r y care m u s t be
e x e r c i s e ~ f o r t h e l l ~ a n d - h x t of t h e p r i -
h
soner. ( C i t a t i o n s omitted. ) ' A s h e r i f f owes
a p r i s o n e r p l a c e d i n h i s c u s t o d y a d u t y to
k e e p t h e p r i s o n e r s a f e l y and f r e e from harm,
t o r e n d e r him m e d i c a l a i d when n e c e s s a r y , and
t o t r e a t him h u m a n e l y and refrain from
oppressing him.'"
W a g a i n c i t e d t h e r u l e i n A z u r e , t h a t " l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i-
e
c i a l s h a v e a d u t y t o o b t a i n m e d i c a l c a r e when n e c e s s a r y f o r p e r -
sons in their care o r in their custody." Azure, 1 8 2 Mont. at
243, 596 P.2d a t 465. A p p e l l a n t claims t h a t e v e n u n d e r common
l a w p r i n c i p l e s t h e d e f e n d a n t was n e g l i g e n t as a m a t t e r of law,
thus, apart from the s t a t u t e discussed above, the trial court
should have given his proposed instruction. However, we hold
t h a t while t h e r e was a d u t y owed, it became a f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n
for the jury whether or not that duty was breached:
" O r d i n a r i l y it is f o r t h e j u r y to d e c i d e ,
u n d e r a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h e i s s u e of
w h e t h e r t h e r e h a s b e e n a n e g l i g e n t b r e a c h of a
l e g a l duty. (Citations omitted. ) Negligence
and b r e a c h of d u t y a r e f o r t h e c o u r t t o d e t e r -
m i n e o n l y i f t h e e v i d e n c e is u n d i s p u t e d o r
s u s c e p t i b l e o f b u t o n e c o n c l u s i o n by reaso-
n a b l e men." S u h r v. S e a r s Roebuck Co. ( 1 9 6 9 ) ,
1 5 2 Mont. 3 4 4 , 3 4 8 , 450 P.2d 8 7 , 8 9 . See also
L a w l o r v. C o u n t y o f F l a t h e a d ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont.
5 0 8 , 582 P.2d W .
75\
We find that the issue of breach of d u t y was p r o p e r l y a jury
issue. Reasonable men could reach d i f f e r e n t conclusions, thus
n e g l i g e n c e as a matter o f l a w d i d n o t e x i s t .
We now reach the third issue, whether or not there is
s u b s t a n t i a l evidence to support the v e r d i c t .
" I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of e v i d e n c e we
a p p l y a l i m i t e d s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w . Where a
f a c t i s s u e is p r e s e n t e d b e f o r e a c o u r t s i t t i n g
w i t h a j u r y , and t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e
to support the jury verdict, the verdict w i l l
stand .
" E v i d e n c e may be i n h e r e n t l y weak and s t i l l be
deemed s u b s t a n t i a l , and s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e
may c o n f l i c t w i t h o t h e r e v i d e n c e . " Gunnels v.
Hoyt ( 1 9 8 1 1 , Mont . I
1 1 8 7 , 1 1 9 1 , 3 8 ~ x . ~ e p1492-,- 1493.----
.
, 6 3 3 P.2d
V o l u m i n o u s e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d b y b o t h p a r t i e s c o n c e r n i n g
S o l b e r g ' s c o n d i t i o n p r i o r to h i s d e a t h . Medical e x p e r t s d i f f e r e d
on the precise nature of d e l i r i u m tremens and whether or not
Solberg may have crossed the fine line between alcoholic
w i t h d r a w a l , which is n o t l i f e - t h r e a t e n i n g , and t r u e d e l i r i u m tre-
mens, which is. T h e r e is no d o u b t t h a t S o l b e r g was c o m p l e t e l y
d i s o r i e n t e d a t times, h o w e v e r , it was v i g o r o u s l y d i s p u t e d as to
w h a t t h i s symptom m e a n t i n terms of how a r e a s o n a b l e j a i l e r would
act. Appellant contended that Solberg's behavior was clearly
i n d i c a t i v e of D T 1 s . However, r e s p o n d e n t p r e s e n t e d t e s t i m o n y i d i -
cating that the kind of symptoms t h a t Solberg exhibited could
o c c u r w h i l e a p e r s o n was g o i n g t h r o u g h a l c o h o l w i t h d r a w a l . In
o t h e r words, t h e s e symptoms d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y mean a p e r s o n is
i n t h e l i f e t h r e a t e n i n g c o n d i t i o n of D T ' s .
A p p e l l a n t r e l i e s h e a v i l y on h i s e x h i b i t number two which is a
training manual used i n Yellowstone County to e d u c a t e j a i l e r s
c o n c e r n i n g t h e p r o b l e m s of special prisoners. A pertinent part
o f t h a t manual r e a d s :
"Probably t h e s p e c i a l p r i s o n e r s e e n most o f t e n
b y t h e j a i l e r is t h e ' d r u n k . ' And s i n c e t h e s e
p e o p l e are f r e q u e n t l y p u t i n j a i l , o f f i c e r s
o f t e n t e n d t o become c a s u a l i n t h e i r t r e a t m e n t
o f them, a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e y o n l y need t o
' s l e e p it o f f . ' T h i s may be t r u e of some
a l c o h o l i c s , b u t t h e r e a r e many o t h e r s who
m i g h t become s e r i o u s l y i l l o r e v e n d i e i f
m e r e l y l e f t a l o n e to ' s l e e p it o f f .
" W h i l e c h e c k i n g t h e i n t o x i c a t e d p r i s o n e r s , you
should ask yourself: ARE ANY OF THE
PRISONERS TREMBLING AND SHOWING SIGNS OF
EXPERIENCING STRANGE HALLUCINATIONS?
" I f a p r i s o n e r t r e m b l e s i n f e a r t h i n k i n g h e is
b e i n g a t t a c k e d by such t h i n g s as s p i d e r s ,
snakes, i n s e c t s , etc. , h i s condition--far
from being s i l l y or amusing--is extremely
serious. H e may be s l i p p i n g i n t o a c o n d i t i o n
commonly known a s D ' s ( d e l i r i u m t r e m e n s )
T .
" I f you r e c o g n i z e t h e a b o v e symptoms: CALL A
PHYSICIAN IMMEDIATELY AND DESCRIBE THE
PRISONER'S CONDITION TO H I M . THEN: FOLLOW
HIS INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY. "
A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e j a i l e r s , a l l of whom were r e q u i r e d
t o p a s s a c o u r s e which used t h e manual, should have recognized
t h e d a n g e r t o S o l b e r g , and s i n c e t h e y d i d n o t , they d i d n o t act
reasonably. However, there was evidence to establish that
S o l b e r g d i d n o t e x h i b i t a n y symptoms of b e i n g f e a r f u l . A medical
expert testified that the e l e m e n t of uncontrollable fear is a
p r e r e q u i s i t e t o being i n life-threatening DT's .
This case is factually difficult. With hindsight it is
tempting to say that the jailers should have recognized the
s e r i o u s n e s s of S o l b e r g ' s c o n d i t i o n . However, i n v i e w o f t h e e v i -
dence a jury could have logically concluded that the jailers
a c t e d r e a s o n a b l y and w i t h o u t n e g l i g e n c e . " [ O l n l y when t h e r e is a
c o m p l e t e a b s e n c e of p r o b a t i v e f a c t s to s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t d o e s
e r r o r occur." S t r o n g v. S t a t e ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . ----I I 600
P.2d 1 9 1 , 1 9 4 , 36 S t . R e p . 1665, 1669.
F o r t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , we r e v e r s e and d i r e c t t h e c o u r t to
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea, concurring:
I join in the opinion and simply point out that in
holding that a party can challenge the selection of a iury
panel by raising the issue for the first time on appeal, we
have impliedly overruled our holding in State v. Fitzpatrick
(1977), 178 Mont. 530, 536, 569 P.2d 383, 387-388. Although
we reversed defendant's conviction and the conviction of a
co-defendant on other grounds and sent the case back for
retrial, we held in Fitzpatrick that "defendants cannot
challenge the jury for the first time on appeal on the ground
that the District Court failed to select and draw panels in
accordance with applicable Montana law." In reaching our
decision here this Court should have addressed Fitzpatrick
and the two other cases relied on in Fitzpatrick for the
proposition which we are impliedly overruling today.