UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1367
MARGARET LITTLEPAIGE, Personal representative of the Estate
of Alfred Littlepaige, deceased,
Plaintiff − Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (5:10-cv-00571-H)
Argued: May 14, 2013 Decided: June 12, 2013
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Agee wrote the majority
opinion, in which Judge Duncan joined. Judge Davis wrote a
dissenting opinion.
ARGUED: Peter Joseph Sarda, CREECH LAW FIRM, PA, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Shailika K. Shah, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, W. Ellis Boyle, Assistant United States Attorneys,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
AGEE, Circuit Judge:
Margaret Littlepaige (“Mrs. Littlepaige”) appeals the
district court’s dismissal of her Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”) complaint against the United States. The court
concluded that Mrs. Littlepaige’s complaint sounded in medical
malpractice under North Carolina law, and was therefore barred
in the absence of a state medical malpractice certification,
which had not been filed. For the reasons discussed below, we
affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
In September 2007, Alfred Littlepaige (“Mr. Littlepaige”),
a veteran of the Korean War and husband of Mrs. Littlepaige, was
admitted to the Durham Veterans Administration (“VA”) Medical
Center (“VA Hospital”) in Durham, North Carolina, suffering from
advanced stages of dementia. 1 Mr. Littlepaige was placed on a
“falls precaution,” a procedure which the complaint describes as
a period during which “the [VA Hospital] undertook to provide
special care and observation to prevent [Mr. Littlepaige] from
falling to the ground while hospitalized.” (J.A. 3.)
1
Because this appeal arises out of the grant of a motion to
dismiss, we accept as true all well-pleaded facts and construe
those facts in the light most favorable to Mrs. Littlepaige, the
plaintiff and nonprevailing party. See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009).
3
On September 21, 2007, hospital staff found Mr. Littlepaige
lying on the floor beside his bed. After a cursory examination,
VA Hospital attendants determined that Mr. Littlepaige was not
injured. The next day, Mrs. Littlepaige found Mr. Littlepaige
again lying on the floor, bruised and unable to stand. On
September 25, four days after Mr. Littlepaige was first found on
the floor, he was given an x-ray exam for an unrelated
intestinal problem. In the course of reviewing the x-ray
results, VA physicians discovered that Mr. Littlepaige had a
fractured hip. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Littlepaige underwent
surgery to correct the hip fracture. 2
In 2009, Mrs. Littlepaige, on behalf of her late husband’s
estate, filed an administrative claim with the VA for damages
resulting from the injuries Mr. Littlepaige allegedly suffered
while a patient at the VA Hospital. The VA later denied Mrs.
Littlepaige’s administrative claim, and in 2010, she filed a
complaint against the United States pursuant to the FTCA in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina. In her complaint, Mrs. Littlepaige alleged that as a
“result of the failure of [the VA Hospital] to properly attend
2
Mr. Littlepaige died sometime between September 2007, and
the commencement of this litigation in December 2010. The
record does not reflect his cause of death, but there is no
allegation that the VA Hospital’s alleged negligence contributed
to Mr. Littlepaige’s death.
4
to [Mr. Littlepaige, he] suffered the pain of a hip fracture,
the pain of surgical repair for his broken hip, permanent loss
of use of his leg and continued pain and suffering.” (J.A. 3-
4). Mrs. Littlepaige further alleged that “[f]alls by a patient
under a falls precaution should not occur with the exercise of
due care by Defendant [VA Hospital].” (J.A. 3). The complaint
also included the allegation that “[a]s a direct and proximate
result of the . . . [VA Hospital’s] failure to diagnose the
broken hip and because of [the VA Hospital’s] failure to
properly treat [Mr. Littlepaige, he] suffered pain at the hands
of the [VA Hospital.]” (J.A. 4).
The government filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
because no certification as required by Rule 9(j) of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure was included in the pleadings. 3
Mrs. Littlepaige responded to the motion to dismiss, arguing
that a Rule 9(j) certification is unnecessary because she pleads
only ordinary negligence, not a claim for medical malpractice.
In the alternative, Mrs. Littlepaige contended that even if she
was raising a medical malpractice claim, her complaint falls
3
In essence, Rule 9(j) requires that, prior to the filing
of a medical malpractice complaint in North Carolina, a
plaintiff must certify that an expert has reviewed the medical
malpractice claim and is prepared to testify that the defendant
did not meet the standard of care (i.e., that the medical
malpractice claim has merit).
5
within an exception to Rule 9(j) for pleadings that “allege[]
facts establishing negligence under the existing common-law
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule
9(j)(3).
The district court granted the government’s motion to
dismiss, finding that Mrs. Littlepaige’s “claims about
defendant’s execution of its falls precaution plan and failure
to properly diagnose his injuries is a medical malpractice
action under North Carolina law.” (J.A. 41). The court also
held that “the exception for res ipsa loquitur does not apply
here.” (J.A. 42).
Mrs. Littlepaige noted a timely appeal, and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
Mrs. Littlepaige argues on appeal that the district court
erred in dismissing her FTCA complaint for two reasons: (1) her
complaint sounded in ordinary negligence, thus obviating the
need for a Rule 9(j) certification; and (2) in the alternative,
her complaint adequately stated a claim for medical malpractice
under the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, thus falling
into an exception to Rule 9(j). For the following reasons, we
disagree with Mrs. Littlepaige and affirm the judgment of the
district court.
6
A.
This Court reviews de novo the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Coleman v. Md.
Ct. App., 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
B.
A plaintiff may recover against the United States only to
the extent that it has expressly waived sovereign immunity.
Welch v. United States, 409 F.3d 646, 650 (4th Cir. 2005)
(citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)).
Congress waived the sovereign immunity of the United States for
certain torts committed by federal employees when it enacted the
FTCA in 1946. Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 194 (4th
Cir. 2009) (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994)).
However, the FTCA is a limited waiver of immunity, imposing tort
liability on the United States only “in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances,” 28 U.S.C. § 2674, and only to the extent that “a
private person[ ] would be liable to the claimant in accordance
7
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,”
id. § 1346(b)(1). In other words, a claimant “has an FTCA cause
of action against the government only if she would also have a
cause of action under state law against a private person in like
circumstances.” Miller v. United States, 932 F.2d 301, 303 (4th
Cir. 1991). Thus, the substantive law of each state establishes
the cause of action. Kerns, 585 F.3d at 194; Unus v. Kane, 565
F.3d 103, 117 (4th Cir. 2009). In the case at bar, that
substantive law is the state law of North Carolina.
Pursuant to Rule 9(j),
[a]ny complaint alleging medical malpractice by a
health care provider . . . shall be dismissed unless:
(1) [t]he pleading specifically asserts that the
medical care and all medical records pertaining to the
alleged negligence that are available to the plaintiff
after reasonable inquiry have been reviewed by a
person who is reasonably expected to qualify as an
expert witness . . . and who is willing to testify
that the medical care did not comply with the
applicable standard of care.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j). As the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has explained,
[t]he legislature specifically drafted Rule 9(j) to
govern the initiation of medical malpractice actions
and to require physician review as a condition for
filing the action. The legislature’s intent was to
provide a more specialized and stringent procedure for
plaintiffs in medical malpractice claims through Rule
9(j)’s requirement of expert certification prior to
the filing of a complaint.
Thigpen v. Ngo, 558 S.E.2d 162, 166 (N.C. 2002).
8
In an action under the FTCA, “[w]e must rule as the North
Carolina courts would, treating decisions of the Supreme Court
of North Carolina as binding, and departing from an intermediate
court’s fully reasoned holding as to state law only if convinced
that the state's highest court would not follow that holding.”
Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir. 2002)
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). As to Rule
9(j), the Supreme Court of North Carolina has stated that
“medical malpractice complaints [in North Carolina] have a
distinct requirement of expert certification.” Thigpen, 558
S.E.2d at 165 (emphasis added). The district courts in this
circuit are also unanimous that a Rule 9(j) certification is
required to sustain a medical malpractice action under the FTCA
in North Carolina. See, e.g., Lauer v. United States, No.
1:12cv41, 2013 WL 566124, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Feb 13, 2013); Baker
v. United States, No. 5:11-CT-3070-D, 2013 WL 211254, at *5
(E.D.N.C. Jan. 18, 2013); Hall v. United States, No. 5:10-CT-
3220-BO, 2013 WL 163639, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2013);
Muhammad v. United States, No. 5:11-CT-3126-FL, 2012 WL 3957473,
at *3 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 10, 2012). It thus appears that, where
applicable, a Rule 9(j) certification is a mandatory requirement
for a plaintiff in a North Carolina medical malpractice action.
We turn first, therefore, to Mrs. Littlepaige’s contention
that her complaint sounded in ordinary negligence, thus avoiding
9
the Rule 9(j) expert certification requirement. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals has provided a helpful (if not
precedential) distinction between ordinary negligence and
medical malpractice under North Carolina law in the context of a
medical malpractice case.
According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.11, “the term
‘medical malpractice action’ means a civil action for
damages for personal injury or death arising out of
the furnishing or failure to furnish professional
services in the performance of medical, dental, or
other health care by a health care provider.” When
nurses make “medical decision[s] requiring clinical
judgment and intellectual skill,” they are providing
professional services, and therefore the action
against them must be certified per Rule 9(j).
Sturgill v. Ashe Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 652 S.E.2d 302,
306 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007), rev. denied, 658 S.E.2d 662
(N.C. 2008). Corporate negligence actions brought
against hospitals which pertain to clinical patient
care sound in medical malpractice, while such actions
which arise out of policy, management, or
administrative decisions sound in ordinary negligence.
Estate of Waters v. Jarman, 547 S.E.2d 142, 145 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2001). Examples of policy, management, or
administrative decisions include “granting or
continuing hospital privileges, failing to monitor or
oversee performance of the physicians, credentialing,
and failing to follow hospital policies[.]” Id. “In
determining whether or not Rule 9(j) certification is
required, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held
that ‘pleadings have a binding effect as to the
underlying theory of plaintiff's negligence claim.’”
Sturgill, 652 S.E.2d at 305 (quoting Anderson v.
Assimos, 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (N.C. 2002)).
Deal v. Frye Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 691 S.E.2d 132 (table), 2010
WL 522727, at *2 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2010) (alterations in
original).
10
i.
Applying these standards to the case at bar, it is clear
that Mrs. Littlepaige’s complaint sounds in medical malpractice,
not ordinary negligence. Mrs. Littlepaige’s complaint alleges,
inter alia,
• “From September 18 through September 25, 2007, [Mr.
Littlepaige] was under a “falls precaution” during which
the defendant undertook to provide special care and
observation to prevent the defendant from falling to the
ground while hospitalized.” (J.A. 3 (emphasis added).)
• “Falls by a patient under a falls precaution should not
occur with the exercise of due care by the Defendant[.]”
(J.A. 3.)
• “As a direct and proximate result of [the VA Hospital’s]
failure to provide adequate supervision, because of [the VA
Hospital’s] failure to diagnose the broken hip and because
of the [VA Hospital’s] failure to properly treat [Mr.
Littlepaige, he] suffered pain at the hands of [the VA
Hospital].” (J.A. 4 (emphasis added).)
The plain language of the complaint demonstrates that Mrs.
Littlepaige’s action is one for medical malpractice as that term
is applied under North Carolina law. As recounted above, the
North Carolina statute defines “medical malpractice action” as
“[a] civil action for damages for personal injury or death
11
arising out of the furnishing or failure to furnish professional
services in the performance of medical, dental, or other health
care by a health care provider.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-
21.11(2)a. The allegations in the complaint in this case fit
squarely within that definition. The complaint describes the
falls precaution as a “special duty” that can only arise as a
consequence of the provision of professional medical services.
The complaint alleges harm as a consequence of the “failure to
diagnose” and “failure to treat” Mr. Littlepaige. In short, the
complaint sought damages “arising out of the furnishing or
failure to furnish professional services in the performance of
. . . health care by a health care provider.” N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 90-21.11(2)a. It thus alleged medical malpractice, not
ordinary negligence.
Furthermore, North Carolina law leaves no room for pleading
in the alternative under the facts of this case. The facts
alleged in the complaint are that the VA Hospital is a “health
care provider,” and that, as a result of its provision of
“professional services” Mr. Littlepaige suffered injury. Even
the most liberal construction of Mrs. Littlepaige’s complaint
cannot escape the ambit of Rule 9(j) because it plainly pleads a
“medical malpractice action” under North Carolina law.
Our conclusion that Mrs. Littlepaige’s complaint sounds in
medical malpractice is consistent with Deal, a persuasive
12
opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals. 4 In Deal, the
court considered and rejected a claim virtually identical to
that brought by Mrs. Littlepaige here. The Deal plaintiff
brought a claim that a hospital’s failure to conduct a “Fall
Risk Screen Assessment” resulted in injury. Deal, 2010 WL
522727 at *1. The plaintiff failed to file a Rule 9(j)
certification, the complaint was dismissed, and the plaintiff
argued on appeal that the case sounded in ordinary negligence
only. The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected that
contention, concluding that the fall risk screening process
involved “the rendering of professional services” that required
“clinical judgment and intellectual skill.” Id. at *4.
Accordingly, Rule 9(j) certification was required.
We see little to distinguish this case from Deal. In
determining whether the VA Hospital staff properly implemented
4
Pursuant to North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure,
citation to unpublished opinions of the North Carolina Court of
Appeals is “disfavored,” except where the “unpublished opinion
has precedential value to a material issue in the case and . . .
there is no published opinion that would serve as well.” N.C.
R. App. P. 30(e)(3); see also State ex rel. Moore Cnty. Bd. of
Educ. v. Pelletier, 606 S.E.2d 907, 909 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)
(“[C]itation to unpublished opinions is intended solely in those
instances where the persuasive value of a case is manifestly
superior to any published opinion.”). In this instance, the
facts of Deal are so closely aligned with the facts of this case
that we believe that “no published opinion . . . would serve as
well” as Deal to support the proposition that Mrs. Littlepaige’s
complaint sounds in medical malpractice as a matter of law. See
N.C. R. App. P. 30(e)(3).
13
the falls precaution plan, the district court would undoubtedly
have to resolve issues related to standards of medical care and
the medical judgment of VA Hospital staff. This is not a
premises liability action or an action challenging some non-
medical aspect of hospital management. Cf. Estate of Waters v.
Jarman, 547 S.E.2d 142, 145 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
the reasonably prudent person standard of care applies in suits
claiming negligence on the part of the hospital for
administrative or management deficiencies). Rather, by the
plain terms of the complaint, Mrs. Littlepaige challenged
aspects of her husband’s medical care. We conclude on these
facts that the claim sounds in medical malpractice, the
strictures of Rule 9(j) apply, and Mrs. Littlepaige failed to
comply with that rule.
ii.
In the alternative, Mrs. Littlepaige argues that if her
claim sounds in medical malpractice, she was not required to
file a Rule 9(j) certification because she adequately pled under
the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accordingly, she
argues that her claim falls into an exception to Rule 9(j). See
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j)(3). Notwithstanding the fact
that Mrs. Littlepaige did not mention the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in her complaint in this case, we do not agree that the
14
facts alleged would give rise to application of that common law
doctrine.
Res ipsa loquitur is an exception, not the rule, to medical
malpractice cases in North Carolina.
To warrant the submission of a malpractice case to the
jury there must be proof of facts or circumstances
which permit a legitimate inference of actionable
negligence on the part of the physician, surgeon, or
dentist. A showing of an injurious result is not
enough. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be
relied on to supply deficiencies in the proof.
Boyd v. Kistler, 155 S.E.2d 208, 210 (N.C. 1967). The North
Carolina Court of Appeals “has determined that in medical
malpractice cases, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be
restrictively applied, because the average juror is unfit to
determine whether a plaintiff's injury would rarely occur in the
absence of negligence.” Rowell v. Bowling, 678 S.E.2d 748, 751
(N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Previously, this Court has held that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur applies in situations where the
facts or circumstances accompanying an injury by their
very nature raise a presumption of negligence on the
part of a defendant. It is appropriate to use the
doctrine when no proof of the cause of an injury is
available, the instrument involved in the injury is in
the exclusive control of a defendant, and the injury
is of a type that would not normally occur in the
absence of negligence.
Id. (internal quotation marks, quotation marks, citation, and
alterations omitted). Accordingly, there is a strong
15
presumption under North Carolina law that, in the medical
malpractice context, res ipsa loquitur will not apply.
For the doctrine to apply in a medical malpractice
claim, a plaintiff must allege facts from which a
layperson could infer negligence by the defendant
based on common knowledge and ordinary human
experience. Diehl v. Koffer, 536 S.E.2d 359, 362
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000); see Bowlin [v. Duke Univ.], 423
S.E.2d [320,] 323 [(N.C. Ct. App. 1992)] (concluding
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
inappropriate where a layperson, without the benefit
of expert testimony, would have no basis for
concluding the physician was negligent in extracting
bone marrow merely because the plaintiff's nerve was
injured during the procedure); Grigg v. Lester, 401
S.E.2d 657, 659 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply in a case
involving a tear in the plaintiff's uterus during a
caesarean section because a layperson would not be
able to determine that the force exerted by the
physician during the procedure was improper or
excessive).
Smith v. Axelbank, 730 S.E.2d 840, 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
North Carolina courts have thus articulated a bright-line rule
that a malpractice claim may not be brought on a theory of res
ipsa loquitur unless the facts alleged are such that “the
negligence complained of must be of the nature that a jury—
through common knowledge and experience—could infer.” Diehl v.
Koffer, 536 S.E.2d 359, 362 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
We have reviewed the complaint and conclude that the facts
alleged, even when construed liberally, are not such that a
layperson could infer negligence on the part of the VA Hospital
based on common knowledge. Mrs. Littlepaige alleged that Mr.
16
Littlepaige was placed on a falls precaution, was twice found on
the floor, and some days later an injury was diagnosed. On the
allegations in the complaint, Mr. Littlepaige could have been
injured prior to his admission to the VA Hospital, or his
injuries could have come about notwithstanding the exercise of
due care by VA Hospital staff. While Mrs. Littlepaige need not
eliminate every cause, other than the VA Hospital’s negligence,
for Mr. Littlepaige’s injuries, the universe of uncertainties in
this case is so vast as to defeat the inference of negligence
necessary to advance a claim under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. We therefore conclude that Mrs. Littlepaige has not
adequately pled res ipsa loquitur, and thus the exception to
Rule 9(j) does not apply. Because a private person under like
circumstances would not be liable for medical malpractice under
North Carolina law, the district court did not err in dismissing
Mrs. Littlepaige’s FTCA complaint.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
17
DAVIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Because, in one fell swoop, my friends in the majority
manage to misapply both federal procedural law and North
Carolina substantive law, I respectfully dissent.
“[R]eading the complaint ‘liberally in favor of the
plaintiff,’” Sciolino v. City of Newport News, Va., 480 F.3d
642, 651 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Anderson v. Found. for
Advancement, Educ. and Emp’t of Am. Indians, 155 F.3d 500, 505
(4th Cir. 1998) (citing, inter alia, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8)), Mrs.
Littlepaige states a claim for ordinary negligence. She alleges
that her husband was “under the exclusive care of [the VA
Hospital],” the VA Hospital failed to “observe and monitor
[him],” her husband fell from his bed, and he “suffered a broken
hip and bruises and contusions.” J.A. 2–3. “[A] jury [is] fully
capable without aid of expert opinion to apply the standard of
the reasonably prudent man” to any evidence in support of these
allegations. Norris v. Rowan Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 205 S.E.2d 345,
348 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974). Indeed, such assertions are quite
similar to claims of ordinary negligence that arise out of a
hospital’s decision not “to offer a cane to a patient who has
trouble walking,” Horsley v. Halifax Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 725
S.E.2d 420, 422 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012); a hospital’s alleged
failure “to raise the bed rails on [a patient’s] bed” or
“instruct her to use the bedside call button to obtain
18
assistance in going to the bathroom,” Norris, 205 S.E.2d at 348;
or a nursing home’s alleged failure to “observ[e] and
supervis[e] . . . [a resident] . . . smok[ing] in [a] designated
smoking area” to prevent her from burning herself, Taylor v.
Vencor, Inc., 525 S.E.2d 201, 203 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). In
short, the allegations in the complaint quoted in this paragraph
did not arise “out of the furnishing or failure to furnish
professional services in the performance of medical, dental, or
other health care by a health care provider,” where
“professional services” means “an act or service arising out of
a vocation, calling, occupation, or employment involving
specialized knowledge, labor, or skill, and the labor [or] skill
involved is predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than
physical or manual.” Lewis v. Setty, 503 S.E.2d 673, 674
(N.C.App. 1998) (emphasis, citations, and internal quotations
omitted). 1
1
In Lewis, the court held that damages claims based on the
negligent movement of a patient from an examination table to a
wheelchair in a physician’s office did not sound in medical
malpractice. The court explained its holding as follows, in
part:
In this case, the removal of the plaintiff from the
examination table to the wheelchair did not involve an
occupation involving specialized knowledge or skill,
as it was predominately a physical or manual activity.
It thus follows that the alleged negligent acts of the
defendant do not fall into the realm of professional
medical services. Any negligence which may have
(Continued)
19
That the pleading also asserts facts giving rise to a
medical malpractice claim does not warrant dismissal of the
entire complaint for failure to comply with Rule 9(j) of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which, under the fulsome progeny of
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), governs pleading
in this federal action, 2 permits a party to “set out 2 or more
statements of a claim,” and “as many separate claims . . . as it
has, regardless of consistency.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). Moreover,
“[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice,” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(e), and “[a]n overly restrictive reading of a
complaint is inconsistent with th[is] mandate,” Starks v.
occurred when the defendant and Ms. Norris attempted
to move the plaintiff from the examination table back
to his wheelchair falls squarely within the parameters
of ordinary negligence. See Angela Holder, Medical
Malpractice Law 175 (1975) (actions involving falls
from beds or examining tables, equipment failures, or
other types of accidents in a doctor’s office differ
from medical malpractice actions because they do not
involve negligent treatment).
Lewis, 503 S.E.2d at 674. This reasoning from a reported,
precedential opinion of the North Carolina intermediate
appellate court should count for more than Deal v. Frye Reg’l
Med. Ctr., Inc., 691 S.E.2d 132 (table), 2010 WL 522727 (N.C.
Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2010), on which the majority inexplicably
relies.
2
Thus, the majority’s assertion that “North Carolina law
leaves no room for pleading in the alternative under the facts
of this case,” ante, at 12, misses the mark by a wide margin.
20
Perloff Bros., Inc., 760 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1985). Because the
complaint in this case can be construed (indeed, it is
impossible to construe it any other way) to allege a claim of
ordinary negligence, we should reverse the district court’s
order dismissing the complaint and remand this case for further
proceedings.
21