State v. White

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA22-369

Filed 16 May 2023

Union County, Nos. 18 CRS 56328, 19 CRS 313

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

ORIENTIA JAMES WHITE

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 26 August 2021 by Judge

Jonathan Wade Perry in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals

21 February 2023.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Wendy J.
Lindberg, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Nicholas
C. Woomer-Deters, for defendant-appellant.

ZACHARY, Judge.

Defendant Orentia1 James White appeals from judgments entered upon a

jury’s verdicts finding him guilty of felony larceny; conspiracy to commit felony

larceny; and obtaining property by false pretenses; and upon his guilty plea to having

attained habitual felon status. After careful review, we conclude that Defendant

received a fair trial, free from error.

1 The judgments appealed from spell Defendant’s name as “Orientia” but the record reflects
that Defendant’s name is spelled “Orentia.”
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Opinion of the Court

I. Background

On 17 December 2018, when they arrived for work at approximately 7:00 a.m.,

employees of the Walmart in Monroe discovered that a locked display case in the

electronics department had been opened and nearly emptied. The display case, which

was usually filled to its capacity with Beats and Apple merchandise, was later

determined to be missing 70 items worth a total of $9,898.80.

Walmart management contacted the Monroe Police Department and

instructed the store’s asset protection department “to conduct video surveillance to

find out what happened[.]” Meanwhile, an employee found a Beats speaker on the

floor in the crafts department, the section of the store adjacent to the electronics

department. There, the employee also discovered a car seat out of its box, which “was

unusual because [Walmart] cannot sell car seats out of the box.”

Surveillance footage captured between 1:03 and 1:48 a.m. showed the actions

of three suspects: two men—one of whom would later be identified as Defendant—

and a woman.2 The three individuals entered the store and the two men headed to

the electronics department. The unidentified female suspect approached the two male

suspects pushing a shopping cart that contained a plastic storage bin and a child’s

car seat box. The two unidentified suspects pushed the shopping cart past the Beats

display case and turned into the adjacent aisle, where they removed the car seat box

2 The two other suspects appear not to have subsequently been identified or charged.

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Opinion of the Court

from the shopping cart and placed it out of the camera’s view. Defendant followed

behind them, stopping at the display case. As Defendant perused the display case,

the two unidentified suspects pushed the shopping cart—now containing only the

plastic storage bin without the car seat box—and walked away. About a minute later,

the unidentified male suspect joined Defendant at the display case; Defendant had

his back to the camera, obscuring his actions at the display case. The two men then

moved away from the display case, and Defendant walked alone up the aisle where

the car seat box had been placed. Over the next few minutes, the suspects appeared

to browse as lone shoppers, periodically disappearing from the surveillance footage

and reappearing soon thereafter.

The unidentified female suspect reappeared with the shopping cart containing

the plastic storage bin, and pushed it up to the display case. She placed the plastic

bin on the ground in front of the display case and emptied its merchandise into the

plastic bin while Defendant browsed in the adjacent aisle. She then pushed the plastic

bin up the adjacent aisle, where she met Defendant, who crouched down next to her.

The female suspect then returned to the now-empty shopping cart and pushed it out

of the camera’s view while Defendant remained crouching near the plastic bin in the

adjacent aisle. After a few minutes, the female suspect reappeared, pushing the

empty shopping cart up to Defendant, who placed the car seat box in the shopping

cart before the female suspect pushed the cart away. Defendant walked up the other

end of the aisle and followed after her on his own.

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Opinion of the Court

A few minutes later, another surveillance camera captured the female suspect

approaching an exit door, pushing the shopping cart containing the car seat box.

However, due to the early morning hour, the door did not open, so she pushed the

cart away from the door. A few minutes later, another surveillance camera recorded

the three suspects apparently purchasing the car seat at a self-checkout kiosk.

Cameras in the parking lot captured the three suspects exiting the store, loading the

car seat box into a vehicle in the parking lot, and driving off together.

On 8 April 2019, a Union County grand jury returned true bills of indictment

charging Defendant with one count each of felony larceny, conspiracy to commit

felony larceny, obtaining property by false pretenses, and having attained habitual

felon status. The grand jury returned superseding indictments on the same charges

on 4 November 2019.

On 23 August 2021, the matter came on for trial in Union County Superior

Court. At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss the charges

against him, which the trial court denied. Defendant did not present any evidence,

and he renewed his motion to dismiss at the close of all evidence. The trial court again

denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

The trial court instructed the jury on the offenses of felony larceny, conspiracy

to commit felony larceny, and obtaining property by false pretenses. The jury

returned guilty verdicts for all three offenses. Thereafter, Defendant pleaded guilty

to attaining the status of habitual felon.

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Opinion of the Court

The trial court entered two judgments, sentencing Defendant as a habitual

felon in the mitigated range to two consecutive terms of 75 to 102 months in the

custody of the North Carolina Division of Adult Correction, and ordering that court

costs and restitution of $9,898.80 to Walmart be entered as a civil judgment.

Defendant gave oral notice of appeal.

II. Discussion

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss

because there was insufficient evidence to support the charges of both felony larceny

and obtaining property by false pretenses. Alternatively, in the event that this Court

finds that his motion to dismiss argument was not preserved for appellate review,

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on both the charge

of felony larceny and the charge of obtaining property by false pretenses.

A. Preservation

“Rule 10(a)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure provides

that, in a criminal case, to preserve an issue concerning the sufficiency of the State’s

evidence, the defendant must make a motion to dismiss the action at trial.” State v.

Golder, 374 N.C. 238, 245, 839 S.E.2d 782, 787 (2020) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted); N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(3). Our Supreme Court recently held that “Rule

10(a)(3) does not require that the defendant assert a specific ground for a motion to

dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence.” Golder, 374 N.C. at 245–46, 839 S.E.2d at

788. Accordingly, “a defendant preserves all insufficiency of the evidence issues for

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Opinion of the Court

appellate review simply by making a motion to dismiss the action at the proper time.”

Id. at 246, 839 S.E.2d at 788.

In the case at bar, Defendant moved to dismiss all charges at the close of the

State’s evidence, and he renewed his motion to dismiss at the close of all evidence.

Accordingly, Defendant properly preserved this issue, and we need not address his

alternative argument. See id.

B. Standard of Review

Our standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss is well

established:

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court need
determine only whether there is substantial evidence of
each essential element of the crime and that the defendant
is the perpetrator. Substantial evidence is the amount
necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a
conclusion. In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction, the evidence must be
considered in the light most favorable to the State; the
State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every
reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. In other
words, if the record developed at trial contains substantial
evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a
combination, to support a finding that the offense charged
has been committed and that the defendant committed it,
the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be
denied. Whether the State presented substantial evidence
of each essential element of the offense is a question of law;
therefore, we review the denial of a motion to dismiss de
novo.

State v. Blagg, 377 N.C. 482, 487–88, 858 S.E.2d 268, 273 (2021) (citation omitted).

C. Analysis

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Opinion of the Court

Defendant argues that the trial court should have dismissed either the charge

of felony larceny or the charge of obtaining property by false pretenses under the

“single taking rule.” “The ‘single taking rule’ prevents a defendant from being charged

or convicted multiple times for a single continuous act or transaction.” State v.

Buchanan, 262 N.C. App. 303, 306, 821 S.E.2d 890, 892 (2018). “[A] single larceny

offense is committed when, as part of one continuous act or transaction, a perpetrator

steals several items at the same time and place.” State v. Adams, 331 N.C. 317, 333,

416 S.E.2d 380, 389 (1992) (citation omitted). The “single taking rule” also applies to

indictments charging the offense of obtaining property by false pretenses. Buchanan,

262 N.C. App. at 306, 821 S.E.2d at 892.

In Adams, for example, the defendant was charged with both felonious larceny

of a firearm and felonious larceny of property stolen pursuant to a breaking or

entering. 331 N.C. at 332, 416 S.E.2d at 388. The evidence at trial tended to show

that the firearm that was the subject of the first larceny charge was among the

property that was the subject of the second larceny charge. Id. Our Supreme Court

concluded that the “defendant was improperly convicted and sentenced for both

larceny of a firearm and felonious larceny of that same firearm pursuant to a breaking

or entering.” Id. at 333, 416 S.E.2d at 389.

However, in each of the cases upon which Defendant relies, including Adams,

the defendant was charged with either larceny offenses or obtaining property by false

pretenses, but not both. See id.; see also State v. Posner, 277 N.C. App. 117, 120, 857

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Opinion of the Court

S.E.2d 870, 873 (2021) (one count of felony larceny of property pursuant to a breaking

or entering and one count of felony larceny of a firearm); Buchanan, 262 N.C. App. at

308, 821 S.E.2d at 893 (two counts of obtaining property by false pretenses); State v.

Boykin, 78 N.C. App. 572, 577, 337 S.E.2d 678, 682 (1985) (three counts of larceny of

firearms and one count of felony larceny). Unlike those cases, in the case before us

Defendant was charged with both larceny and obtaining property by false pretenses.

This Court has recognized that “the crimes of larceny and obtaining property

by false pretenses . . . are separate and distinguishable offenses.” State v. Kelly, 75

N.C. App. 461, 463, 331 S.E.2d 227, 229 (1985). “The essential elements of larceny

are that the defendant (1) took the property of another; (2) carried it away; (3) without

the owner’s consent; and (4) with the intent to deprive the owner of his property

permanently.” State v. Campbell, 373 N.C. 216, 221, 835 S.E.2d 844, 848 (2019)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, obtaining property by

false pretenses comprises the following elements: “(1) a false representation of a

subsisting fact or a future fulfillment or event, (2) which is calculated and intended

to deceive, (3) which does in fact deceive, and (4) by which one person obtains or

attempts to obtain value from another.” State v. Pierce, 279 N.C. App. 494, 499, 865

S.E.2d 335, 339 (2021) (citation omitted). “A key element of obtaining property by

false pretenses is that an intentionally false and deceptive representation of a fact or

event has been made.” Kelly, 75 N.C. App. at 464, 331 S.E.2d at 230. This reveals a

significant distinction between the two offenses: “A false and deceptive

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Opinion of the Court

representation is not an element of larceny.” Id.

Here, Defendant made such a “false and deceptive representation of a fact”: he

represented to Walmart3 that he was purchasing a car seat for $89.00, rather than

$9,898.80 worth of misappropriated merchandise secreted inside the car seat’s box.

As the State persuasively argues in its appellate brief, had Defendant and his co-

conspirators attempted to take the merchandise and carried it out of the store without

involving the car seat box, under the “single taking” rule “the proper charges would

have been one count of felony larceny and one count of conspiracy to commit felony

larceny, not 70[.]”

However, as the State correctly observes, Defendant and his co-conspirators

committed the separate and distinguishable offense of obtaining property by false

pretenses “by removing an infant car seat from its box, loading that box with the

stolen [merchandise], and taking that box to the checkout counter, where they paid

the value for an infant car seat knowing that it was not the value of the items inside

the box.” By selecting a large box and removing its original contents, Defendant and

his co-conspirators were able to represent to Walmart that they were purchasing an

item worth less than one percent of the actual value of the merchandise it contained.

As the State notes: “Defendant’s actions by paying the value for a box that

represented an $89.00 item knowing there were multiple, more valuable items inside

3 For the purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100, the term “person” includes a “corporation.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-100(c) (2021).

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Opinion of the Court

the box at the time was conduct sufficient to support a false representation being

made.” We agree with the State’s contention that it “provided substantial evidence of

every element of both crimes” of felony larceny and obtaining property by false

pretenses.

Defendant further argues that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100 prohibited the trial

court “from submitting felony larceny and obtaining property by false pretenses as

two separate counts for the jury to consider independently and return two separate

verdicts on.” For support, Defendant points to the portion of § 14-100(a) that provides:

[I]f, on the trial of anyone indicted for [obtaining property
by false pretenses], it shall be proved that he obtained the
property in such manner as to amount to larceny or
embezzlement, the jury shall have submitted to them such
other felony proved; and no person tried for such felony
shall be liable to be afterwards prosecuted for larceny or
embezzlement upon the same facts.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(a) (2021).

Our Supreme Court has interpreted this provision with respect to

embezzlement, holding:

Where . . . there is substantial evidence tending to support
both embezzlement and false pretenses arising from the
same transaction, the State is not required to elect between
the offenses. Indeed, if the evidence at trial conflicts, and
some of it tends to show false pretenses but other evidence
tends to show that the same transaction amounted to
embezzlement, the trial court should submit both charges
for the jury’s consideration. In doing so, however, the trial
court must instruct the jury that it may convict the
defendant only of one of the offenses or the other, but not
of both. If, on the other hand, the evidence at trial tends

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Opinion of the Court

only to show embezzlement or tends only to show false
pretenses, the trial court must submit only the charge
supported by evidence for the jury’s consideration.

State v. Speckman, 326 N.C. 576, 579, 391 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1990).

Defendant posits that because N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(a) “applies equally to

‘larceny or embezzlement,’ the Speckman discussion is equally relevant in the larceny

context.” Accordingly, Defendant contends that, “[a]t most, the trial court in this case

was authorized under Speckman to submit felony larceny and obtaining property by

false pretenses as mutually exclusive options for the jury to return a verdict on.” We

disagree.

Defendant overlooks a critical principle underlying the Speckman Court’s

reasoning: the crimes of embezzlement and obtaining property by false pretenses are

mutually exclusive. As the Speckman Court explained, in order “to constitute

embezzlement, the property in question initially must be acquired lawfully, pursuant

to a trust relationship, and then wrongfully converted”; in order to constitute false

pretenses, however, “the property must be acquired unlawfully at the outset,

pursuant to a false representation.” Id. at 578, 391 S.E.2d at 166–67 (emphases

added). Because “property cannot be obtained simultaneously pursuant to both lawful

and unlawful means, guilt of either embezzlement or false pretenses necessarily

excludes guilt of the other.” Id. at 578, 391 S.E.2d at 167. This mutual exclusivity was

the basis for the Speckman Court’s holding that “a defendant may not be convicted of

both embezzlement and false pretenses arising from the same act or transaction[.]”

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Opinion of the Court

Id.

By contrast, the crimes of larceny and obtaining property by false pretenses

are not mutually exclusive. As previously discussed, “the crimes of larceny and

obtaining property by false pretenses . . . are separate and distinguishable offenses.”

Kelly, 75 N.C. App. at 463, 331 S.E.2d at 229. Accordingly, Defendant is incorrect to

assert that Speckman “is equally relevant in the larceny context.” As we previously

explained: “A false and deceptive representation is not an element of larceny.” Kelly,

75 N.C. App. at 464, 331 S.E.2d at 230.

In the larceny indictment, the State alleged that Defendant did “steal, take

and carry away a quantity of headphones and an I-Pod, without the consent of the

possessor and knowing that he was not entitled to it, with the intent to deprive the

possessor of its use permanently[.]” And in the indictment for obtaining property by

false pretenses, the State alleged that Defendant obtained “a quantity of headphones

and an I-Pod” by the following false and intentionally deceptive scheme:

[D]efendant took a car seat out of [its] box while in Wal-
Mart. . . . [D]efendant placed a quantity of headphones and
an I-Pod in the empty car seat box. . . . [D]efendant then
rang up and paid for the car seat box knowing a car seat
was not in the box and he never paid for the quantity of
headphones and I-Pod that were actually in the box. This
was a false representation of a material fact which was
intended to deceive, and which did in fact deceive.

(Emphasis added).

The offenses of larceny and obtaining property by false pretenses are not

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Opinion of the Court

mutually exclusive, neither in their elements, as explained above, nor as alleged in

the instant indictments. Furthermore, as previously discussed, viewed in the light

most favorable to the State, we conclude that the State presented “substantial

evidence of each essential element of [each] crime and that [D]efendant is the

perpetrator.” Blagg, 377 N.C. at 487, 858 S.E.2d at 273 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, or

in submitting both offenses to the jury “to consider independently and return two

separate verdicts on.”

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Defendant received a fair trial, free

from error.

NO ERROR.

Judges FLOOD and RIGGS concur.

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