People v. Talbert

2023 IL App (1st) 200423-U
No. 1-20-0423
Order filed July 31, 2023.
First Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 12 CR 5124
)
KEITH TALBERT, ) The Honorable
) James B. Linn,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Pucinski and Hyman concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Summary dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition is affirmed where
defendant failed to raise an arguable claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
based on counsel’s failure to interview and procure testimony of a witness or to
retain an expert witness.

¶2 Defendant Keith Talbert appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for relief filed under

the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)). He argues that the

circuit court erroneously dismissed his petition where he made an arguably meritorious claim of
No. 1-20-0423

ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel’s failure to (1) interview defendant’s

cousin, who the State argued instructed defendant to commit the crimes at issue, and (2) retain a

trial expert to opine on the limitations of eyewitness testimony. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

¶3 Following a 2014 jury trial, defendant was found guilty of first degree murder (720 ILCS

5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2010) of Antonio Johnson, attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a)

(West 2010)) of Annette Johnson, and aggravated discharge of a firearm in the direction of another

person (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2010)). He was sentenced to a cumulative term of 100

years’ imprisonment. This court affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Talbert, 2018 IL App (1st)

160157. Because we set forth the evidence in detail in that order, we recount them here only to the

extent necessary to resolve the issues raised in this appeal.

¶4 Prior to trial, the trial court granted, over defendant’s objection, the State’s motion in

limine to present evidence of Richard Talbert’s prior contact with the Johnson-Wardlow family in

order to show motive. The evidence was allowed for the purpose of showing that defendant

committed the crimes at the behest of his cousin, Richard, following an ongoing conflict between

Richard and the family.

¶5 In his opening statement, defense counsel argued that the State’s eyewitnesses

misidentified defendant as the shooter. Counsel further told the jury:

“We’ll present you with four witnesses. Three witness who were standing exactly

in front of the house when the shooting took place. Two of these witnesses actually grew

up with Antonio and were friends of his. Two of these witnesses actually saw the car and

looked at the face of the shooter as this event took place.

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No. 1-20-0423

These witnesses are coming here with detriment to their own lives. They know that

once they go back on the street, there is no protection from the Court, there is no protection

from the State. They are out there on their own.

They decided to come here for this trial in order to prevent the loss of two lives,

Antonio and [defendant] himself.”

¶6 At trial, Annette’s daughter, Ashley Wardlow, testified that, on September 25, 2011, she

and Annette returned to Annette’s house after grocery shopping. 1 Ashley did not see anyone else

in front of the house or across the street. She went inside and heard four or five gunshots coming

from outside, with one bullet coming through the window. Annette said she had been shot in the

arm. Antonio, on the porch, was unresponsive. Ashley called 911, and then spoke with an officer

at the scene. Annette and Antonio were transported to the hospital.

¶7 Anthony testified that “boys” regularly sold drugs in front of the house in 2011. Richard

wanted Anthony to sell drugs for him, but Anthony refused. Prior to the shooting, Richard had told

Annette he would “do something to” Anthony. In early September 2011, Richard told the family,

in front of Annette’s house, that he was going to burn the house down; hours later, someone else

set fire to the home.

¶8 After the fire, the drug sales continued. On September 25, 2011, Anthony and Antonio

were outside the house when defendant, who had short dreadlocks at the time, drove by in a cream

or beige Cadillac. Richard was in the front passenger’s seat. Anthony had seen defendant around

the neighborhood but did not know his name. Richard pointed at Anthony; it “look[ed] like”

1
Because multiple witnesses share the same last name, we refer to certain witnesses by their first
names.

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Richard said to defendant, “that bitch-ass n*** right there.” Defendant “[s]hook his head, like I

got you.” After the Cadillac drove away, Annette and Ashley returned home. The Cadillac returned

five minutes later. Now alone in the car, defendant yelled, “[H]ey, Anthony, get your bitch-ass out

here.” Anthony looked at defendant, who pointed a gun through the car window and fired five or

six shots, striking Antonio in the head and Annette in the arm.

¶9 Anthony gave the police a detailed description of the shooter and told them of the drug

sales that had been taking place. On September 26, 2011, Anthony identified defendant as the

shooter in a photo array and identified Richard as the man who had, shortly before the shooting,

pointed Anthony out to defendant. On February 9, 2012, Anthony identified defendant in a lineup

as the shooter, although his appearance had changed since the shooting. 2

¶ 10 Annette testified that, prior to the shooting, she had asked Richard to stop sending minors

to sell drugs in front of her house. The drug sales continued. Annette called 911, provided

information to Detective James Sajdak, and allowed police to conduct surveillance from her attic.

Richard repeatedly came to the house. In early September 2011, hours before the house was set on

fire with family members inside, Richard argued with Anthony outside the house, and Richard

said, “burn the bitch.”

¶ 11 On September 25, 2011, after Annette and Ashley came home from the grocery store, she

was speaking with her sons on the porch when she saw a brown-skinned young man with

dreadlocks and “a scar in his eyebrow” pointing a gun at them from where he sat in the driver’s

2
Based on our review of photographs admitted as exhibits at trial, defendant did not have dreadlocks
when he appeared in the physical lineups.

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seat of a car. He fired five or six shots, one of which hit Annette in the left arm. She fell to the

ground and Antonio fell on top of her. Ashley called 911.

¶ 12 At the hospital, Annette told Detective David March what she had seen, including that the

vehicle from which defendant was shooting was light-colored, possibly gray or beige. The next

day, she identified defendant from a photo array as the shooter. On February 9, 2012, she identified

him from a lineup as the shooter; he no longer had dreadlocks. In court, she identified defendant

as the shooter and testified she had not seen him before the shooting.

¶ 13 March, a detective assigned to the shooting, testified that, when he arrived on the scene,

Anthony described the shooter as a black man in his twenties, about six feet, one inch tall, with a

medium complexion and dreadlocks. Anthony told March that he had seen the shooter in the

neighborhood several times; that he fired eight or nine times from the older cream-colored, four-

door Cadillac he was driving; and that, shortly before the incident, he had driven past the house

with Richard. Anthony also told March his family had ongoing tensions with Richard.

¶ 14 When March interviewed Annette, she said that she recalled three or four shots being fired

and believed the car was light-colored or gray. March obtained an arrest warrant. Defendant was

arrested in Milwaukee and transported to Chicago on February 9, 2012, on which date Annette and

Anthony each identified him in a physical lineup as the shooter.

¶ 15 Officer Matthew Gordon testified that only family members provided information at the

scene, and that, in the area where the shootings occurred, “[s]ome” in the neighborhood “are

reluctant” to offer information on criminal activity.

¶ 16 Detective Patrick Deenihan testified that, shortly after the incident, he went to the hospital

and learned that Antonio was in critical condition. Annette gave a detailed description of the

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shooting, describing the shooter as a thin black male with a medium complexion and dreadlocks

who was driving a gray vehicle. Through investigation and a police database search, Deenihan

learned that Richard and defendant were associated with the same residential address. Defendant’s

photograph was consistent with the descriptions of the shooter provided by Anthony and Annette.

A photo array was prepared from which Anthony and Annette identified defendant as the shooter.

From another photo array, Anthony identified Richard as the other individual in the car that drove

by the house shortly before the shooting. Officers later learned the location of the subject vehicle

from the Department of Revenue and towed it for processing.

¶ 17 Defense counsel presented four witnesses. Darrin Murdock, who was 16 years old at the

time of the incident, testified that on the afternoon of the shooting she greeted Antonio while

walking past the house. She testified that she was about three houses away, but also that she was

around the corner, at the time of the shooting, and that after the shooting she went “back around

the corner.” She saw the vehicle, which was gray or silver, but not the driver. She had seen

defendant in the neighborhood but did not know him. Anthony was known for having a “bad

attitude.” She left the area before the police arrived.

¶ 18 Murdock’s mother, Nicole Payton, testified that she was walking home from the store

shortly before the shooting when she saw Antonio with his mother and friend Tyler on the porch

of the house and Anthony in the doorway. Payton ducked when the shooting occurred. She was

unsure whether a red car that she saw passed before the shooting or after. She ran home and did

not speak to the police. She had no issues with defendant and did not see him on the day of the

shooting. She knew that Anthony “argued with a lot of people.”

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No. 1-20-0423

¶ 19 Khadijah Ricks testified that she was Murdock’s sister and a friend of Antonio’s. While

walking with her mother, Payton, Ricks saw Antonio, Tyler, and Annette on the porch of the house

and Anthony in the doorway. Ricks and Payton continued walking and encountered Murdock.

After the shooting, Ricks ran home without looking back and did not see the shooter. She did not

recall whether she saw any cars drive by. She did not come forward to talk to the police because

she feared Anthony, whom she described as being “very angry” and as “always hav[ing] a mug on

his face.” Ricks knew defendant, but did not associate with him, and she did not see him on the

date of the shooting.

¶ 20 Lukeba Wright testified she was at a bus stop when the shooting occurred. She ducked and

saw a dark gray vehicle drive by. She did not know Antonio, Anthony, or defendant. After the

shooting, she boarded a bus home. She had been reluctant to come to court, but had done so to

avoid being subpoenaed or punished.

¶ 21 During closing argument, defense counsel noted that the four defense witnesses had been

reluctant to be present for trial. Counsel noted that an officer testified that “people are not

forthcoming” in the neighborhood; that Murdock heard the shooting and saw a gray car go by; and

that Payton and Ricks did not see defendant or the car identified by Anthony and Annette at the

time of the shooting. Counsel also stressed that witnesses saw a gray car, whereas the police

identified a cream-colored car as the vehicle driven by defendant. Counsel further stressed that

defendant did not have a scar near his eyebrow, which Annette testified the shooter had.

¶ 22 The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and

aggravated discharge of a firearm.

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No. 1-20-0423

¶ 23 Defendant retained new counsel and filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, in part, that his

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present the exonerating testimony of the four witnesses

as promised in the opening statement. At the motion hearing, new counsel noted that the witnesses

whom trial counsel called “did not support what the defense attorney promised the jury.” The court

observed that trial counsel “got flipped,” explaining the witnesses told trial counsel “one thing” in

advance of trial but said something different on the witness stand.

¶ 24 New counsel stated that he was not confident trial counsel had interviewed the defense

witnesses before trial, that he had not spoken with the witnesses himself, and that he had reached

out to trial counsel for their contact information. Defendant’s new counsel suggested that trial

counsel should have sought a sidebar or a recess “to interview the remaining witnesses instead of

calling them one after the other to basically say we didn’t see anything, we’re not witnesses in the

case, which is contrary to what [he] told the jury during opening statements.” Asked by the court

whether the defense witnesses had been identified in the police report as having been present, new

counsel answered in the negative. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial.

¶ 25 Defendant was sentenced to 100 years of imprisonment: 44 years for murder plus 25 years

as an enhancement for personally discharging a firearm, to be served consecutively to a 31-year

sentence for attempted murder but concurrently with a 15-year sentence for aggravated discharge

of a firearm. The trial court denied his motion to reconsider sentence.

¶ 26 On direct appeal, defendant argued, in part, that his trial counsel had been ineffective in

promising in his opening statement to present exonerating testimony and then failing to elicit it.

Talbert, 2018 IL App (1st) 160157, ¶ 47. We affirmed, noting that the record supported the

undisputed fact that the defense witnesses did not testify in the manner counsel promised, but did

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No. 1-20-0423

not support a finding that counsel had failed to speak to and sufficiently investigate them. Id. ¶ 52.

Furthermore, the fact that counsel opted to present witnesses who had not been named in the police

report “strongly suggest[ed] that counsel did investigate those witnesses.” Id. We concluded that,
I
“[t]o the extent that defendant has evidence of trial counsel’s alleged deficiency that exists outside

the record,” a postconviction petition under the Act “may provide a more appropriate means of

seeking redress.” Id.

¶ 27 On December 10, 2019, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition under the Act. He

alleged, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective in having failed to interview, investigate, or

subpoena Richard in order “to refute the hearsay and speculative testimony offered by the

prosecution.” Additionally, defendant argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing or

refusing to retain an expert witness “to provide information to the jury about the scientific basis of

various relevant aspects of perception and memory, to provide a tool for the jury to help assess the

reliability of whatever eyewitness memory is relevant to the case.”

¶ 28 Defendant attached to the petition a notarized affidavit dated November 18, 2019, in which

he averred he was innocent of “the shooting of Antonio” and stated:

“I asked my attorney to look at cases where guys who were accused of a crime were later

proven to be falsely identified. There was testimony from Annette Johnson that the shooter

had a scar over his eye. She was very certain that the shooter had such a scar. I do not have

any scars over either of my eyes. Richard was reluctant to get involved because he had

some problems with Anthony in the past. I asked my attorney to talk to Richard and hear

what he had to say about Anthony. Richard had information that Anthony had many

enemies and was known to shoot at people from his front porch. My attorney always had

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No. 1-20-0423

the same response, that he would look into the matter, or that we didn’t need witnesses who

would ‘muddy the water.’ ”

¶ 29 The circuit court summarily dismissed defendant’s petition on January 7, 2020. In its oral

ruling, the court briefly addressed the sufficiency of the evidence. The court stated, in relevant

part, that defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance were unsupported and that the “quality” of

the State’s witnesses had been “well considered by the jury,” as well by this court on direct appeal.

The circuit court also stated that “[n]one of [the claims] show[ed] any cause or prejudice that would

have affected the outcome of the case,” and that the petition was “denied without merit.”

¶ 30 We allowed defendant’s motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal and ordered the

appointment of appellate counsel.

¶ 31 On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his

petition because he raised an arguable claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on

counsel’s failures to (1) interview Richard, who had pertinent information about Anthony, and (2)

retain an expert to opine generally on the limitations of eyewitness testimony.

¶ 32 The Act “provides a mechanism for criminal defendants to challenge their convictions or

sentences based on a substantial violation of their rights under the federal or state constitutions.”

People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 354 (2010).

¶ 33 The Act establishes a three-stage process for adjudicating a postconviction petition. People

v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 23. The circuit court here dismissed defendant’s petition at the first

stage of proceedings. At the first stage, the circuit court must determine whether the petition “is

frivolous or is patently without merit” such that summary dismissal is warranted. 725 ILCS 5/122-

2.1(a)(2) (West 2018).

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¶ 34 One basis for summary dismissal is the defendant’s failure to comply with section 122-2

of the Act, which provides that “[t]he petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or

other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached.” 725 ILCS

5/122-2 (West 2018). Failure to attach such materials may be “fatal” to a petition. People v.

Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 66 (2002). Noncompliance with section 122-2 may be excused, however,

where the defendant’s allegations are “uncontradicted and supported by the record.” People v.

Harmon, 2013 IL App (2d) 120439, ¶ 30 (citing People v. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176, 191 (1998)).

Summary dismissal is also warranted if the petition alleges only “nonfactual and nonspecific

assertions that merely amount to conclusions.” People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 354 (2010).

¶ 35 Otherwise, however, summary dismissal of a pro se petition is generally appropriate “only

if the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact”—that is, when it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1,

11-12 (2009). We review de novo the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition at the first

stage (People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 10) and may affirm the dismissal on any ground that

appears in the record (People v. Thompson, 2022 IL App (1st) 1196604, ¶ 24).

¶ 36 In this court, defendant first argues the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his

petition because he set forth an arguable claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

interview Richard, who, according to defendant’s affidavit, had “problems with Anthony in the

past” and “was reluctant to get involved,” but had “information that Anthony had many enemies

and was known to shoot at people from his front porch.”

¶ 37 The State responds that summary dismissal of this claim was appropriate. Specifically, the

State maintains that defendant’s claim that his trial counsel’s failure to call Richard arguably

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resulted in prejudice is speculative because defendant failed to provide Richard’s affidavit to

demonstrate the substance of his testimony.

¶ 38 The right of effective assistance of trial counsel is constitutionally guaranteed. U.S. Const.,

amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); People

v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526-27 (1984) (adopting Strickland standard for challenges to

effectiveness of both retained and appointed counsel); People v. Rogers, 2021 IL 126163, ¶ 23.

Where a postconviction petition asserts ineffective assistance of counsel as the basis for relief,

summary dismissal is not appropriate if it is at least “arguable” that both (1) counsel’s performance

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, rendering his performance deficient, and (2)

the defendant was prejudiced as a result. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17. “Prejudice” is deemed to result

from counsel’s deficient performance if “there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” People v.

Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 496-97 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

¶ 39 After reviewing the record, we find that the circuit court did not err in summarily

dismissing defendant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview Richard,

because defendant cannot show that he was arguably prejudiced by counsel’s actions where he did

not support his claim with Richard’s affidavit. As noted, section 122-2 requires that the petition

include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or state why the same are

not attached. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2018). An evidentiary affidavit pursuant to this provision

serves not only to provide the petition’s factual basis by showing the allegations to be “capable of

objective or independent corroboration,” but also to “identify with reasonable certainty the

sources, character, and availability of the alleged evidence supporting” those allegations. (Internal

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quotations omitted.) People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 32 (citations omitted); see also Collins,

202 Ill. 2d at 67 (affidavits, records, or other evidence required by section 122-2 “shows that the

verified allegations are capable of objective or independent corroboration”).

¶ 40 Defendant did not attach Richard’s affidavit to the petition or explain therein the reasons

for its absence. Summary dismissal of a petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel

based on failure to interview a witness is appropriate where the defendant failed to supply an

evidentiary affidavit of such witness. People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 380 (2000) (“A claim that

trial counsel failed to investigate and call a witness must be supported by an affidavit from the

proposed witness.”); see also People v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115, 142 (2007) (circuit court did not

abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing petition; “[the d]efendant’s affidavit was not

sufficient to satisfy Enis’s requirement”) (citing Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 380). “In the absence of such

an affidavit, a reviewing court cannot determine whether the proposed witness could have provided

testimony or information favorable to defendant,” rendering further review of the claim

unnecessary. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 380.

¶ 41 Defendant nevertheless urges this court to excuse the absence of Richard’s affidavit on the

grounds that: defendant’s own affidavit serves the statutory purpose of section 122-2 of the Code;

defendant, “an indigent pro se defendant filing a petition from prison, *** cannot be expected to

track down and interview Richard”; and the absence of Richard’s affidavit can be “easily” rectified

upon appointment of postconviction counsel for second stage proceedings. We disagree.

¶ 42 First, defendant’s affidavit does not serve the statutory purpose that Richard’s might.

“[C]ommon sense dictates that a defendant’s own affidavit is not at all objective or independent.”

People v. Teran, 376 Ill. App. 3d 1, 3-4 (2007). Second, defendant’s incarceration does not excuse

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the requirement. The Act applies to defendants “imprisoned in the penitentiary,” and the provision

governing supportive evidence recognizes no exception in the condition of incarceration. 725 ILCS

5/122-1; 122-2 (West 2018). Third, the possibility that postconviction counsel could in future

obtain Richard’s affidavit for second stage review does not remedy this court’s present inability

to undertake first stage review. See Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 380.

¶ 43 We reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 (1993), wherein our

supreme court recognized that appointed counsel filing an amended postconviction petition had,

at second stage review, the obligation to attempt to obtain affidavits of witnesses named in a pro

se petition. See Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d at 245. The supreme court did not consider whether, as relevant

here, defendant’s failure to attach such affidavits would have warranted summary dismissal at the

first stage. See id. In the present case, defendant’s failure to demonstrate that Richard would have

testified in a manner useful to the defense by supplying his affidavit to this effect, or to explain its

absence, warranted summary dismissal. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2018); Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 380.

¶ 44 Defendant’s second argument in support of his ineffective assistance claim is that his trial

counsel failed or refused to retain an expert to opine on the limitations of eyewitness testimony.

Defendant neither names nor provides an affidavit from such an expert, but asserts in his appellate

brief that one “could have testified to” (1) “the low correlation between a witness’ confidence and

the accuracy of [the] identification,” (2) the reduced reliability of an identification when a weapon

is present (sometimes called “weapon focus”), (3) the impact of stress on memory, (4) the “inherent

weaknesses in identifying strangers,” and (5) the tendency of a “significant number” of

eyewitnesses to reaffirm identification in a lineup after having falsely identified an innocent person

from a photograph (known as “mugshot commitment”).

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¶ 45 In support of his argument, defendant points out that, by the time of his trial in late 2014,

the fallibility of eyewitness testimony was widely recognized, and appellate courts had reversed

convictions upon finding that trial courts abused their discretion in denying motions to admit

expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identification. See, e.g., People v. Navarro,

2021 IL App (1st) 190483, ¶ 13 (noting supreme court’s 1990 holding “that expert testimony on

the issue of eyewitness identification was admissible in certain circumstances,” such that “the

claim that *** counsel was ineffective for failing to offer” such testimony “was available” at the

time of direct appeal in 2007) (citing People v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264 (1990)); see also People v.

Allen, 376 Ill. App. 3d 511, 526 (2007) (remanding for new trial given the specific circumstances

of the case and given the trial court’s failure to engage in “careful scrutiny” or “meaningful inquiry

into” proposed testimony of defense expert in eyewitness testimony).

¶ 46 In response, the State argues, first, that defendant forfeited any argument that trial counsel

was ineffective in failing to call an expert, because he could have raised this issue on direct appeal,

as it was evident that the State’s case relied on eyewitness testimony.

¶ 47 In his reply brief, defendant counters that no forfeiture occurred, because trial counsel’s

“reasoning” for failing to call an expert is a “matter outside the record.” See People v. Brown, 2014

IL App (1st) 122549, ¶ 41 (noting that “a postconviction claim that depends on matters outside the

record *** is not ordinarily forfeited,” because such matters could not have been raised on direct

appeal) (citing English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22).

¶ 48 We decline to find a forfeiture here. Postconviction proceedings are limited to

“constitutional matters that have not been, nor could have been, previously adjudicated.” People

v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115, 124 (2007). Thus, issues that could have been raised on direct appeal,

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but were not, are generally forfeited in proceedings under the Act. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d at 499.

However, the forfeiture doctrine is relaxed where the facts relating to the issue do not appear on

the face of the original appellate record. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22. Our supreme court has

recognized that the Act permits a defendant to assert a postconviction claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel based on “the collection and presentation of ‘affidavits, records, or other

evidence’ not contained in the record.” People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶ 33 (quoting 725 ILCS

5/122-2 (West 2018)).

¶ 49 We find persuasive People v. Pellegrini, 2019 IL App (3d) 170827. In Pellegrini, the court

reversed the dismissal of a postconviction petition following an evidentiary hearing at the third

stage of proceedings at which two experts testified. Id. ¶¶ 36-38, 50. Where the petitioner alleged

that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to retain the experts, the State argued that the defendant

could have raised this claim on direct appeal. Id. ¶ 50. This court determined that defendant had

not forfeited the claim, because it was “wholly based on information absent from the original

appellate record, and thus could not have been raised on direct appeal.” Id.

¶ 50 Similarly, here, the record is wholly silent as to the topic of any expert on eyewitness

testimony. Therefore, we find that the rule of forfeiture is inapplicable.

¶ 51 The State alternatively argues that summary dismissal was proper because defendant’s

failure to identify an available expert who would testify on the matters he describes renders his

claim wholly speculative.

¶ 52 Defendant replies that requiring him to identify an expert for postconviction proceedings

places him in a “Catch-22,” as there is “no conceivable way” he could have secured an expert

through trial counsel who failed to investigate and retain one.

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¶ 53 As noted, the failure to supply a potential witness’s affidavit may constitute a failure to

identify with reasonable certainty the sources and availability of evidence supporting the

petitioner’s allegations or to show the allegations capable of objective corroboration. Allen, 2015

IL 113135, ¶ 32. In an unpublished opinion, a panel of this court recently affirmed the summary

dismissal of a postconviction petition where the defendant alleged that unnamed experts on

firearms and the conduct of assault victims would have impeached the testimony of the State’s

witnesses, but failed to append affidavits of such experts to his petition. People v. Williams, 2022

IL App (1st) 200644-UB, ¶¶ 42-45 (“[The] defendant’s failure to comply with the pleading

requirements of section 122-2 of the Act is ‘fatal’ to his postconviction petition and alone justified

the circuit court’s summary dismissal.”) (quoting People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 255 (2008)). 3

¶ 54 However, whether the absence of an affidavit is fatal to a postconviction claim depends on

the facts of the case. As noted, noncompliance with section 122-2 may be excused where the

defendant’s allegations are “uncontradicted and supported by the record.” Harmon, 2013 IL App

(2d) 120439, ¶ 30 (citing Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d at 191).

¶ 55 Accordingly, in People v. Hayes, 2022 IL App (1st) 190881-B, which defendant cites in

his reply brief, this court reversed the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition alleging that

counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate or call an expert who, according to the defendant,

could have opined on the weaknesses in the testimony of the State’s eyewitnesses. Id. ¶¶ 2, 36-37.

This court, without addressing the defendant’s apparent failure to name or supply an affidavit of

such an expert, concluded that the record did not completely contradict the defendant’s claim that

3
Citing as persuasive authority pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023)
(“a nonprecedential order entered under subpart (b) of this rule on or after January 1, 2021, may be cited
for persuasive purposes”).

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the proposed testimony of such an expert would have been relevant and admissible. Id. ¶ 36 (citing

Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16). This court could not discern “how, on first-stage review, a [circuit]

court could say for sure how the [trial] court’s discretion ought to have been exercised without

further factual development as to the expert’s proposed testimony.” Id. Accepting the defendant’s

allegations as true, this court agreed that counsel should have investigated and sought admission

of the expert, “given the facts” of the case. Id. ¶ 37.

¶ 56 However, the facts of Hayes are dissimilar to those in the case at bar. In Hayes, counsel

presented an alibi defense, calling the defendant and two other witnesses to testify that he was with

them at a party at the time of the shooting and did not leave the party until after the shooting. Id.

¶ 12. In postconviction proceedings, the defendant argued that the testimony of the eyewitness-

identification expert would have “bolstered his alibi defense” while “undermin[ing]” the six

eyewitnesses who testified for the State. Id. ¶ 22.

¶ 57 In contrast, here, defendant can make no such claim, where he did not raise an alibi defense

and where he called his own eyewitnesses to the offense at trial. Defendant does not allege in these

proceedings that counsel was ineffective in calling those eyewitnesses. Further, defendant failed

to explain how, if the expert testimony would discredit the State’s witnesses, it would not similarly

discredit the defense eyewitnesses’ testimony. Expert testimony regarding the unreliability of

eyewitness testimony necessarily calls into question the fallibility of both the State and defense

eyewitnesses. Counsel told the jury that two defense eyewitnesses looked at the shooter’s face,

suggesting they would testify they saw someone other than defendant shoot the victim. Although

they did not do so, counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness must be “ ‘evaluate[d] *** from counsel’s

perspective at the time’ ” of the allegedly deficient performance—here, pretrial decision-making—

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and not “ ‘with the distorting effects of hindsight.’ ” People v. Fields, 2017 IL App (1st) 110311-

B, ¶ 23 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698).

¶ 58 This court is cognizant of our supreme court’s admonition that “strategy” arguments are

not an appropriate basis for summary dismissal (Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 22), constituting an

exception to the general rule that matters of trial strategy are immune from claims of ineffective

assistance (People v. Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 51 (citing People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319, 327

(2011))). However, in Tate, the defendant argued that counsel was ineffective in not calling alibi

witnesses and an eyewitness, not an expert on eyewitness identification, and the record did not

present a scenario suggesting the proposed testimony of those witnesses would have undermined

any aspect of the defense. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶¶ 3-5. Furthermore, unlike defendant herein, the

defendant in Tate appended to his petition the affidavits of the proposed witnesses whose

testimony he sought to introduce. Id. ¶ 4.

¶ 59 Here, defendant describes general areas of proposed expert testimony on the infirmity of

eyewitness observations, but fails to specify what, at the time of the failures that allegedly rendered

counsel’s performance ineffective, counsel should have reasonably expected the expert to have

opined as to any aspect of any eyewitness’s testimony. Our supreme court, in reviewing the denial

of a defense motion to allow expert testimony on eyewitness identifications, observed that such

testimony is relevant and appropriate where “the State’s case against defendant hangs 100% on

the reliability of its eyewitness identifications” and neither a confession nor physical evidence ties

the defendant to the offense. People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496, ¶ 26 (circuit court abused its

discretion in denying the defendant’s motion). The State’s case was similar here. However, where

four of the six eyewitnesses were called by the defense, where counsel’s decision to call them is

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unchallenged in these postconviction proceedings, and where defendant fails to provide an expert

affidavit or to otherwise allege the impact of the expert’s testimony on the credibility of any of

them, we cannot conclude that counsel’s failure to retain such an expert arguably rendered

counsel’s performance deficient or prejudiced defendant. See Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17.

¶ 60 Nor can we conclude that counsel’s performance was arguably deficient in that he failed

to investigate such an expert, given that, “ ‘[w]here circumstances known to counsel at the time do

not reveal a sound basis for further inquiry in a particular area, it is not ineffective for the attorney

to forgo additional investigation.’ ” People v. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 39 (quoting

People v. Williams, 2017 IL App (1st) 152021, ¶ 38). As noted, counsel’s decision to call the

defense eyewitnesses is unchallenged, and the relevant time for assessing the potential deficiency

of counsel’s performance is the time of the alleged failure and not in hindsight. Fields, 2017 IL

App (1st) 110311-B, ¶ 23 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698).

¶ 61 Finally, we consider defendant’s contention that the circuit court improperly applied a

“cause and prejudice” standard in noting, in the summary dismissal order, that none of defendant’s

claims “show[ed] any cause or prejudice that would have affected the outcome of the case.” As

defendant notes, it is only in seeking leave to file a successive postconviction petition that the

defendant must show “cause” for his failure to raise the claim in the original petition, and

“prejudice” resulting from such failure. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018); People v. Smith, 2014

IL 115946, ¶ 33.

¶ 62 However, we discern from the record no misapprehension by the circuit court that the

petition under consideration was a successive one and conclude that the court misspoke. In any

event, such an error by the circuit court would not affect our ruling because, in reviewing the

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summary dismissal de novo, we afford “no deference to the postconviction court’s judgment or

reasoning.” People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶ 28 (citing People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 14

(2007)).

¶ 63 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 64 Affirmed.

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