(dissenting).
[¶ 17.] The majority authors are fond of stating the test for reviewing whether the trial court abused its discretion: *
We are not to determine whether the judges of this court would have made an original like ruling, but rather whether we think a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances of the particular case, could reasonably have reached such a conclusion.
A judicial mind could reasonably reach the trial court’s conclusion.
Stated another way, a trial court’s findings of fact and the subsequent application of discretion shall not be disturbed unless there is clearly no basis in reason or evidence to support that finding.
We should not disturb the trial court ruling because clearly there was a basis in reason and in evidence to support that decision.
[¶ 18.] Under this standard, how can the majority opinion claim that no judicial *611mind could find this unrelated piece of clothing irrelevant? In fact, the victim’s own testimony establishes its irrelevancy.
[¶ 19.] Therefore, I dissent.
[¶20.] I also join Justice Amundson’s dissent because the majority opinion’s de novo decision to stigmatize this defendant ignores the proper standard of review and will prevent Bunger from receiving a fair trial on the facts of the case.
See Estate of Kamen, 2000 SD 32, ¶ 9, 607 N.W.2d 32 (Miller, C J.); Carpenter v. City of Belle Fourche, 2000 SD 55, ¶ 7, 609 N.W.2d 751 (Konenkamp, J.); State v. Anderson, 2000 SD 45, ¶ 93, 608 N.W.2d 644 (Gilbertson, J.).