If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
C-SPINE ORTHOPEDICS, PLLC, UNPUBLISHED
August 17, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 362549
Macomb Circuit Court
AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE CO., LC No. 2020-001709-NF
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and CAVANAGH and MARKEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC, appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting
the motion for summary disposition filed by defendant, Auto Club Group Insurance Company.
The underlying action involves C-Spine’s efforts to collect no-fault benefits from Auto Club
pursuant to certain assignments executed by Adrian Glenn, who was injured in a motor vehicle
accident and received medical treatment from C-Spine. Before initiating this action, C-Spine
assigned its rights to Glenn’s accounts receivable to a number of factoring companies pursuant to
various agreements. Based on C-Spine’s assigning away its interest in Glenn’s accounts
receivable, the trial court ruled that C-Spine was not the real-party in interest and lacked standing
when it filed this action. In so ruling, the trial court noted the existence of alleged
counterassignments in which the factoring companies purportedly conveyed the accounts
receivable back to C-Spine, but the trial court did not address the counterassignments because C-
Spine had “fail[ed] to address any of [Auto Club’s] arguments regarding the alleged counter-
assignments.” In a factually-similar case, this Court in C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive
Mich Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket Nos. 358170 and 358171), lv
pending ___ Mich ___ (Docket No. 165538), recently held that a plaintiff like C-Spine has
standing and is the real party in interest. On the basis of C-Spine Orthopedics, we are compelled
to reverse and remand for further proceedings.
As already stated, the pertinent facts in this case more or less parallel the pertinent facts in
C-Spine Orthopedics—(1) the injured motorist (Glenn) obtained medical treatment from C-Spine
for injuries incurred in the accident; (2) Glenn assigned his rights to obtain no-fault benefits from
the responsible insurer to C-Spine in separate assignments after each visit; (3) C-Spine transferred
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all of its rights and interest in Glenn’s accounts receivable to third-party factoring companies; (4)
C-Spine subsequently commenced this action against the responsible insurer (Auto Club) to
recover no-fault benefits for treatment rendered to Glenn; (5) Auto Club moved for summary
disposition on grounds that, in light of the assignments, C-Spine was not a real party in interest
and lacked standing; (6) C-Spine produced backdated counterassignments from the factoring
companies conveying back to C-Spine the right to collect Glenn’s accounts receivable; and (7) the
trial court granted summary disposition to Auto Club on grounds that C-Spine was not a real party
in interest and lacked standing. See C-Spine Orthopedics, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2-3.
One potential difference between this case and C-Spine Orthopedics, however, is that, in C-Spine
Orthopedics, the trial court was not swayed by the backdated counterassignments because there
was no dispute that they were “done retroactively,” id. at ___; slip op at 3, whereas, here, the trial
court concluded that C-Spine essentially abandoned any argument related to the
counterassignments because it “fail[ed] to address any of [Auto Club’s] arguments regarding the
alleged counter-assignments.”
The majority opinion in C-Spine Orthopedics—again, on highly-similar facts—held that
the plaintiff medical provider had standing and was a real party in interest, explaining:
Under MCR 2.201(B), “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest” subject to several qualifications. This procedural rule requires
that a complaint be brought by the party to whom a claim belongs, or by a party
who has a legal right to bring the action. This concept is distinct from standing,
which asks whether a litigant has a right to have a court consider a claim.
Standing is not a barrier to C-Spine’s case because MCL 500.3112 grants
C-Spine the right to “assert a direct cause of action against an insurer . . . to recover
overdue benefits payable for charges for products, services, or accommodations
provided to an injured person.” As a provider, C-Spine has statutory standing to
bring a claim on its own behalf. Statutory standing, which necessitates an inquiry
into whether a statute authorizes a plaintiff to sue at all, must be distinguished from
whether a statute permits an individual claim for a particular type of relief. Whether
C-Spine has an actionable claim for relief is a different question than whether it has
a right to litigate its current grievance in our courts.
The real-party-in-interest rule does not preclude C-Spine’s suit, either. The
court rule anticipates that situations such as this one might arise. MCR 2.201(B)(1)
provides:
A personal representative, guardian, conservator, trustee of an
express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has
been made for the benefit of another, or a person authorized by
statute may sue in his or her own name without joining the party for
whose benefit the action is brought. [Emphasis added.]
C-Spine is authorized by statute to bring a first-party no-fault claim, and the plain
language of the court rule permits it to do so despite that the action was brought for
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the benefit of the factoring companies, or for the joint benefit of C-Spine and the
factoring companies.
This Court has explained the principle underlying MCR 2.201(B)(1) as
follows: A real party in interest is one who is vested with the right of action on a
given claim, although the beneficial interest may be in another. C-Spine is vested
with the right of action against Progressive based on the assignments from the
[injured motorists], and is authorized by statute to sue in its own name under the
plain language of MCL 500.3112. That the beneficial interest resided with the
factoring companies did not eliminate C-Spine as a real party in interest. [C-Spine
Orthopedics, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3-4 (quotation marks and citations
omitted).]
Applying C-Spine Orthopedics, we are required to conclude that C-Spine, having statutory
standing under MCL 500.3112, has standing and is a real party in interest. Accordingly, we reverse
the trial court’s ruling granting Auto Club’s motion for summary disposition. We note, however,
that because the trial court here did not consider the counterassignments given C-Spine’s failure
to address Auto Club’s arguments related to the counterassignments, C-Spine Orthopedics
suggests that the factoring companies may need to be added to the action as necessary parties on
remand, see MCR 2.205(A), to eliminate the risk of a second lawsuit by the factoring companies.
See C-Spine Orthopedics, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4.
Briefly addressing Auto Club’s argument on appeal, Auto Club argues that this case is
factually distinguishable from C-Spine Orthopedics for three reasons. First, according to Auto
Club, this case is distinguishable because, here, we have the benefit of the actual agreements
entered into between C-Spine and the third-party factoring companies, while this Court in C-Spine
Orthopedics did not. This argument is unconvincing because Auto Club does not explain how the
agreements here are different from how the majority in C-Spine Orthopedics interpreted the
agreements there. See id. at 2 (“These uncertainties do not matter legally because we assume that
the factoring agreements assigned the entirety of C-Spine’s interests in the [injured motorists’]
accounts receivable to one or more factoring companies.”). Second, Auto Club argues that this
case is distinguishable from C-Spine Orthopedics because, here, C-Spine failed to make any claim
on the basis of its statutory right to sue. This not actually a distinction because the same was true
in C-Spine Orthopedics. See C-Spine Orthopedics, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 10 (MARKEY,
J., dissenting). Third, Auto Club argues that the majority’s holding in C-Spine “was based on the
mid-litigation counter-assignments and purchase agreement amendments to permit the plaintiff
provider to maintain it’s action,” whereas, here, “any argument based on [C-Spine] purportedly
re-acquiring rights via any counter-assignments or amendments to the factoring company contracts
has been abandoned.” As already explained, however, this difference does not require a different
outcome; it requires, at most, that the factoring companies be added as necessary parties on
remand.
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Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. We decline
to award taxable costs under MCR 7.219.
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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