dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to Division 2 of the majority opinion. I do not agree that summary judgment in favor of Emory should be reversed because Mrs. Allrid has a viable wrongful death claim which is not barred by the statute of limitations.
In Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470 (298 SE2d 484) (1983) our Supreme Court held that the two-year statute of limitation for medical malpractice actions, OCGA § 9-3-71 (Code Ann. § 3-1102), is unconstitutional as applied to actions for wrongful death. The complaint in the instant case was amended to include a wrongful death action, and the majority holds that that cause of action has been revived by the Supreme Court’s decision in Clark v. Singer. I disagree.
After Mr. Allrid’s death, appellant was substituted as the party plaintiff. She filed an amendment to the complaint “individually and as Executrix of the Estate of James Barber Allrid, deceased...,” and she alleged in the amendment that the actions of appellee resulted in Allrid’s death. The Supreme Court in Allrid v. Emory Univ., supra, had before it all the issues raised in the trial court on summary judgment (including the products liability claim) and chose to send *137the case back to the trial court only on the issue of products liability. That issue has been decided in Division 1 of the majority. We must assume, however, that the wrongful death issue was decided adversely to appellant by the Supreme Court.
Summary judgment is a decision on the merits of the case, and once a final ruling is made on a motion for summary judgment all issues respecting the motion have been adjudicated. The plaintiff here was obligated to assert in resisting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, every theory of recovery available in the case before the Supreme Court determined that summary judgment was correctly granted. The ruling by the Supreme Court was binding in all subsequent proceedings in this case in the trial court. Ansley v. Atlanta Suburbia Estates, 231 Ga. 640, 641 (203 SE2d 861) (1974). See also Southern R. Co. v. Overnite &c. Co., 225 Ga. 291 (168 SE2d 166) (1969). The duty of each party at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment is to present his case in full; and a party against whom summary judgment has been granted is in the same position as if he suffered a verdict against him. Summer-Minter v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 604 (203 SE2d 173) (1974). Hart v. Eldridge, 250 Ga. 526 (299 SE2d 560) (1983) does not require a different result because the issue regarding the wrongful death claim was on certiorari to the Supreme Court and still a viable claim.
I recognize that my position regarding Mrs. Allrid’s wrongful death claim appears harsh in view of the decision in Clark v. Singer. However, the Court of Appeals is not a court to correct the errors of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Only that court can correct its own errors, and that opportunity is still available. We cannot correct inequities at the cost of violating what I view as the law of the case. I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Quillian, Judge Birdsong and Judge Carley join in this dissent.