dissenting.
I dissent. Russell Ernest Smith was convicted of willfully and intentionally making a materially false statement on the form required for the purchase of a firearm, Code § 18.2-308.2:2. He answered “no” to Question 11(b), which asked: “Are you under indictment or information in any court for a felony, or any other crime, for which the judge could imprison you for more than one year?” (Emphasis in original). He had been indicted for a felony two days earlier.
No evidence showed that prior to completing the form the defendant had received any form of notice of indictment. The letters received from his attorney advised that the charge was certified to the grand jury and that a trial date was set, but the term indictment appeared in neither letter. It never appeared in any written or oral form, statement, or instruction that the defendant saw, read, or heard. The defendant had no previous experience with a felony prosecution. He only appeared one time during these proceedings and that was in district court where he waived his preliminary hearing. At most, the evidence shows that the defendant knew he had *177been charged but nothing suggests he had any appreciation that he would be indicted or that he had been indicted.
The majority does not convict the defendant for willfully and intentionally answering Question 11(b) falsely. It convicts him for the manner in which he answered the question; for answering without knowing the meaning of a term used in the query. Answering a question without understanding the meaning of the term employed is a form of deceit, but it is not the falsehood that this statute proscribes.
The defendant did not need to know the meaning of indictment, a precise legal term of art, to have answered the question of whether he was under indictment for a felony. To be under indictment is a precise legal status. To have that status before the law either applies to a person or it does not. An understanding of the indictment process is not necessary to answering a question of whether the status applies. The falsity proscribed by Code § 18.2-308.2:2 does not relate to one’s comprehension of the question but to one’s consciousness of the existence of the status. The material falsehood must address the fact of whether the applicant is under indictment.
No evidence showed that on November 15, 2007, the defendant was aware that he was under indictment for a felony. No evidence indicated the defendant purposely avoided knowing that his status before the law was that of a person indicted for a felony through action of a grand jury. It did not directly or indirectly show the defendant willfully and intentionally made the false statement. I would reverse.