concurring.
I JOIN the Majority Opinion, and would add the following comments.
I.
I believe that both the Majority Opinion and the Dissenting Opinion fail to address an important aspect of the present issue. Our Supreme Court has declared that “[w]hile we can interpret our own constitution to afford defendants greater protections than the federal constitution does ... there should be a compelling reason to do so.” Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 484-5, 503 A.2d 921, 926 (1985) (emphasis added); accord Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 63-4, 470 A.2d 457, 467 (1983) (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). Thus, while certainly our Constitution may afford greater protections than the U.S. Constitution, Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991), I would submit that a party bears a heavy burden of persuasion in convincing a court that our Commonwealth’s Constitution differs from the Federal Constitution.
We are not interpreting Constitutions from two alien societies: the intellectual climate when the Pennsylvania Constitution was written is substantially similar to that when the United States Constitution was written. The provisions in our Commonwealth’s Constitution are often either identical or very similar to that which appears in our national Constitu*17tíon. To rule without compelling reason that the two Constitutions differ erodes public confidence in the Rule of Law. Cf. Sell, supra, 504 Pa. at 70, 470 A.2d at 470 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting) (“I believe the interest of this nation are best served by maintaining common standards of constitutional law throughout its separate jurisdictions.”) It is precisely for this reason why the Supreme Court set forth four considerations in Edmunds, supra, to assist a court in analyzing whether a provision in Pennsylvania’s Constitution is more expansive than its federal counterpart. Edmunds, supra, 526 Pa. at 390, 586 A.2d at 895. For the reasons eloquently stated in the Majority Opinion, it is apparent that there is no “compelling reason” to interpret our Commonwealth’s Constitution in this instance more broadly than the Federal Constitution.
II.
The Dissenting Opinion characterizes as “thorough and well-reasoned” the dissent in Commonwealth v. Peterfield, 415 Pa.Super. 313, 609 A.2d 540 (1992), app. den., 421 Pa. 215, 618 A.2d 400 (1992). I would agree, for the most part, that the dissent is a superb expression of the opposing viewpoint to that articulated by the majority herein. However, I wish to point out that the dissent in that case erred in one major respect: the dissent inaccurately claimed that where a constitutional right is interpreted to be less expansive than formerly, an intermediate appellate court must await the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ratification of the change and must automatically assume that our Commonwealth’s Constitution affords the more expansive interpretation. As the Peterfield dissent’s legal theory has entered into our deliberations of this case, and acceptance of this theory could have a profound effect on our ability to review claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution, I think it worthwhile to pause to discuss the Peterfield dissent’s theory.
My research indicates that this legal theory has not been articulated by any other court of law. It derives solely from the dissent in Peterfield, wherein the dissent (mis)quoted a *18weekly legal newspaper for this proposition. The relevant passage in the dissent reads as follows:
Echoing the majority’s concern for our proper role as an intermediate court, I would propose that “until a change in federal constitutional requirements is ratified by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, a lower Pennsylvania court must treat an analogous state constitutional claim as a matter of independent constitutional interpretation, no matter how closely federal authority has been followed in the past.”
Peterfield, supra, 415 Pa.Super. at 336, 609 A.2d at 552 (Ford-Elliott, J., dissenting), quoting B. Ledewitz, “The State Constitution Assumes New Importance,” Pennsylvania Law Journal Reporter, Vol. 7, No. 42 (November 5, 1984) at 1, 10 (emphasis added). The original newspaper article quote was identical to the above except it averred that a “... a lower Pennsylvania court may treat an analogous state constitutional claim as a matter of independent constitutional interpretation____” Ledewitz, supra, at 10. The thrust of the passage which is misquoted in the Peterfield dissent thus stands for nearly the opposite proposition: an intermediate appellate court may consider, and presumably reject, independent state grounds as a basis for disposition where there has been a change in federal constitutional law.
Thus, it appears that a misquote from a weekly legal newspaper was given credence as a doctrine of law in a Superior Court panel dissent. Only the most severe of repercussions could result from following this error in the future. Federal Constitutional law is not static: it is announced, refined and changed by various federal courts in an ongoing process. The implication of the Peterfield dissent is that we must adhere to the high-water mark of expansive federal constitutional interpretation until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court says otherwise. However, determining the high-water mark is a feat in itself. Not all courts or commentators can agree what the federal constitutional law is presently or was at certain point, let alone what it should be in the future. Trying to figure out what the law was at a certain point will be judicially unmanageable and waste the resources of both prac*19titioner and judge alike. Constitutional tides come in and they go out. I believe the only relevant inquiry is where the tide is now, not its ebb and flow.
The dissent in Peterfield assumes that the high-water mark of constitutional jurisprudence is normative, such that we should presume that the Supreme Court would disfavor a more restrained approach. Such an assumption is unwarranted. There is no reason to think that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not follow federal law in interpreting our state constitution in any a particular instance. See Gray, supra, 509 Pa. at 485, 503 A.2d at 926 (1985) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court fails to find persuasive that Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause applies under the Pennsylvania Constitution rather than the more recent federal test articulated in Illinois v. Gates). Moreover, and in any event, there exists no articulable reason why, without guidance from our Supreme Court, we should voluntarily limit our ability to review (and reject) claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution.1 I would trust in the institutional capacity of this intermediate court to correctly interpret a claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution. In conclusion, I feel it is of the utmost importance that we nip at the bud this novel legal theory of dubious origins before it takes on a life of its own.
III.
The final consideration that Edmunds, supra, mandates is public policy. I would like to propose an additional reason to believe public policy is best served by following Hodari: the investigatory function of the police is severely handicapped by a the fungible definition of “seizure” articulated in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). As the Majority Opinion notes, the Mendenhall test is as follows: “[a] person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the *20circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” As the Majority Opinion notes, what is reasonable is subject to differing interpretations. Under that test, the mere articulation by a police officer of the word “stop” has been considered akin to a seizure. See In the Interest of Barry Williams, (No. 2961 Phila.1990, filed April 9, 1992) (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting).* This cannot be.
The tenor of the Dissenting Opinion posits that flight is a reasonable reaction to police presence. I disagree, and see no constitutional reason why the police should be discouraged from following a person who may have or currently may be engaging in criminal activity. The plain fact is that those who flee the police often have something to hide. In the present case, the fleeing appellee possessed 47 packets of crack cocaine. In the three companion cases which follow, the persons fleeing the police were attempting to hide either drugs or unlawfully-carried weapons secreted on their person. Although the case is obviously not before us today, one could imagine a scenario where the police are prevented from following someone fleeing their presence who later turns out to be a violent felon. I believe experience shows that when a person flees at the sight of the police, it is frequently to prevent the detection of criminal activity. “The wicked flee when no man pursueth.” Proverbs 28:1, as quoted in Hodari, supra, 499 U.S. at - n. 1, 111 S.Ct. at 1549 n. 1, 113 L.Ed.2d at 695-6 n. 1.
I would compare this to the danger the Dissenting Opinion claims is presented by the Hodari definition of seizure. The Dissenting Opinion cites Justice Stevens’ dissent in Hodari for the worry that the Hodari definition of seizure encourages the police to use a “slow chase” as an evidence-gathering technique. See Dissenting Opinion at 417. This concern is rather hypothetical, as it would be certainly very difficult for a “chase” to be made “slowly.” In any event, this potential concern pales in comparison to the very real threat mentioned. *21above that persons who flee the police are concealing criminal activity.
Our police departments are more than just entities that keep statistics of victimization after the fact. They take an active role, consistent with the constitution, in investigating possible criminal activity. Fleeing the police at their very sight is not constitutionally protected, nor should it be. While a civilized society should not tolerate police misconduct by any means, a civilized society also should not be so wary of police misconduct that it encourages flight from legitimate law enforcement authorities, a type of lawlessness that contradicts fundamental notions of what is a civilized society.
TAMILIA and HUDOCK, JJ., join.. I would presume, given that the Supreme Court carefully set forth a mode of analyzing state Constitutional claims in Edmunds, supra, that the Court has attempted to facilitate, not discourage, lower courts’ analysis of claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Opinion withdrawn. Case later heard and decided en banc. See In the Interest of Barry Williams, 423 Pa.Super. 549, 621 A.2d 669 (1993).