OPINION
DAVIS, Commissioner.Appeal is taken from a conviction for attempted capital murder. Punishment was assessed by the jury at twenty-eight years.
Appellant contends that the indictment was fatally defective. The indictment alleges in pertinent part:
“That Joyce Hobbs on or about the 25 day of July, A.D. 1975 . . .did then and there attempt knowingly to cause the death of James Leon Hobbs by promising remuneration, to-wit: promising to pay Virgil McCuller $100.00 to kill the said James Leon Hobbs by shooting him with a gun.”
If the charging instrument does not allege that an offense was committed by the accused, it is insufficient in law to support a verdict of guilty and any conviction based thereon is void and may be challenged at any time. American Plant Food Corporation v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 508 S.W.2d 598.
“Attempt” is defined by V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 15.01, as follows:
“(a) A person commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended.”
“Murder” is defined by V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 19.02, in pertinent part:
“(a) A person commits an offense if he: (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual.”
“Capital murder” is defined by V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 19.03, in pertinent part:
“(a) A person commits an offense if he commits murder as defined under Section 19.02(a)(1) of this code and: ⅜ ⅜! ⅜ ⅛ # ⅜:
(3) the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of *886remuneration or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration.” [Emphasis supplied.]
In the recent case of Colman v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 542 S.W.2d 144, it was contended that the indictment upon which an attempted capital murder conviction was based was fatally defective. The indictment, in pertinent part, read:
“ . . . then and there, with the specific intent to commit the offense of capital murder, attempt to cause the death of Terry L. Graves, hereinafter called complainant, by shooting the said Terry L. Graves with a pistol and the said complainant was a peace officer then and there acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty to-wit: attempting to arrest said defendant and the said defendant then and there knew the said complainant to be a peace officer.”1
This Court held that the indictment was not fatally defective for failure to allege the phrase in Sec. 15.01, supra, “amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended.” The indictment in Col-man clearly alleged facts which showed “more than mere preparation” in committing the offense of attempted capital murder.
The facts constituting an offense denounced by a statute should be alleged so that the conclusion of law may be arrived at from the facts stated. Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162 (1977), and numerous cases cited therein. Does the instant indictment allege facts which would lead to the legal conclusion that appellant did “more than mere preparation” in committing the offense of attempted capital murder?
The indictment does nothing more than aver a promise to pay a named individual to kill James Leon Hobbs by shooting him with a gun. This factual allegation is not such as would lead to the legal conclusion that the accused committed acts “amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended.”
We note that the allegation of “promise to pay” set forth in the indictment does not meet the requirement of Section 19.03(a)(3) that the accused “ . . employs another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration.” The term “employ” is defined to be equivalent to “hiring” or “to engage the services of another, usually by contract or agreement for the performance of the services and the payment of a compensation therefor.” Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3rd ed. 1969); see Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968). The indictment purports to charge appellant with attempted capital murder on the basis of a promise to pay McCuller $100.00 to kill Hobbs, without reciting that appellant hired or employed McCuller2 or that McCuller accepted the offer of employment or that McCuller did any act demonstrating that he relied on the promise. Thus, the indictment alleges only a unilateral act by appellant, the promise to pay for the killing of Hobbs.
The State points to the fact that appellant had filed a motion to quash the indictment and that the State had advised appellant in open court that it was going to request permission from the court to withdraw its announcement of ready unless appellant withdrew her motion to quash. The appellant then announced to the court that she was willing to waive any defect in the indictment. On the basis of this waiver, the State urges that this Court “can do nothing more than conclude that the appellant was well aware of the charges pending against her.” Notice to appellant of the charges pending against her is not the problem. The deficiency in the instant indictment is a fundamental one, the failure of the charging instrument to allege the of*887fense upon which appellant was convicted. See American Plant Food Corporation v. State, supra. Appellant’s waiver does not cure this fundamental impediment.
The judgment is reversed and the prosecution ordered dismissed.
Opinion approved by the Court.
. See V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 19.03(a)(1).
. See New Texas Penal Code Forms, Sec. 1903C (W. Morrison and T. Blackwell); 2 Branch’s Annotated Penal Statutes, Sec. 1903 (3rd ed. 1974).