(concurring).
I agree with the opinion of Chief Justice Jones that the recall provisions of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter are unconstitutional. I am unable, however, to agree with the reasoning of the opinion of Chief Justice Jones and hence this concurring opinion.
All legislative enactments, including the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, are presumed to be constitutional. This presumption can be rebutted if the recall provisions of the Charter “clearly, palpably and plainly” violate the Constitution. Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897, 900 (1975).
*32Article VI of the Pennsylvania Constitution deals with “Public officers” and their removal. This article has two specific sections dealing with removal of “public officers” which read as follows:
Article VI, §6:
“The Governor and all other civil officers shall be liable to impeachment for any misbehavior in office, but judgment in such cases' shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of trust or profit under this Commonwealth. The person accused, whether convicted or acquitted, shall nevertheless be liable to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to law.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Article VI, § 7:
“All civil officers shall hold their offices on the condition that they behave themselves well while in office, and shall be removed on conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime. Appointed civil officers, other than judges of the courts of record, may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed. All civil officers elected by the people, except the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, members of the General Assembly and judges of the courts of record, shall be removed by the Governor for reasonable cause, after due notice and full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of the Senate.” (Emphasis supplied.)
These two sections of the Constitution are the only ones that speak to the issue of removal of civil officers. The opinion of Chief Justice Jones believes that any removal procedure can be constitutional as long as removal is based on cause. It is my opinion that any removal procedure not specifically mentioned in the Constitution is invalid.
*33The opinion of Chief Justice Jones and the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Eagen and Mr. Justice Pomeroy speak of the distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional officers. In Milford, Township Supervisors’ Removal, 291 Pa. 46, 139 A. 623 (1927), this court held that nonconstitutional officers could be removed in a legislatively provided manner, even though the procedure was not mentioned in the Constitution. I find it impossible to reconcile Milford Township 1 with the Constitution and sound principles of constitutional construction.
It is well settled that a state constitution, as opposed to the Federal Constitution, is a limiting instrument. As this court stated in Com. v. Benn, 284 Pa. 421, 432, 131 A. 253, 256 (1925), “ . . . the power of a state legislature is supreme in all matters, except in so far [sic] as it may be restricted by the Constitution . . . .” As Article VI, §§ 6 and 7 must be construed as restricting the allowable methods for removal of all civil officers, it becomes clear that the “recall” provisions of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter are unconstitutional.
This court, in the past, has used Article VI, § 1, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides: “All officers, whose selection is not provided for in this Constitution, shall be elected or appointed as may be directed by law,” in distinguishing constitutional from nonconstitutional officers for purposes of removal from office. In Weiss v. Ziegler, 327 Pa. 100, 104, 193 A. 642, 644 (1937), this court, in speaking of Article XI, Section 1 (the forerunner to Article VI, Section 1), stated:
“. . . The authority so conferred to provide for the election or appointment of other officers neces*34sarily involves and implies legislative power to annex conditions of tenure.” (Emphasis supplied.)
While Article VI, Section 1, implies the power to provide for conditions of tenure for nonconstitutional officers, said conditions cannot include methods of removal, because Article VI, Sections 6 and 7, specifically enumerate the methods and the reasons for removal of all civil officers. It is well settled that a conflict between specific and general provisions in the Constitution will be resolved in favor of ddie specific provisions. Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 93 A.2d 834 (1953).
I believe that the specific language on removal in Article VI, §§ 6 and 7, controls and, therefore, removal is not a “condition of tenure” that would permit a different method of removal for nonconstitutional officers. Viewed in this light, I believe the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional officers is irrelevant on the removal question.
The removal provisions in Article VI relate to all civil officers. As our Constitution must be viewed as an instrument restricting the powers of the legislature, inclusion of the removal provisions necessarily restricts the legislature from providing for other methods. In Com. ex rel. Smillie v. McElwee, 327 Pa. 148, 158-159, 193 A. 628, 633 (1937), this court stated:
“ . . . No principle is more firmly imbedded in our law than that when the Constitution expressly provides a single method for accomplishing a particular purpose that method is exclusive. . . . The abolition of certain offices is a legislative function, but the abolition of officers is not.” (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)
It is my opinion that the constitutional scheme of removal is reasonable and comprehensive, covering all civil officers both elected and appointed. Statutes which attempt to legislate in areas covered by the Constitution *35must meet the test of the Constitution rather than the Constitution meeting the test of the statutes.
I realize that removal by the constitutionally allowed method may be cumbersome. The legislature and the courts, however, cannot allow procedures proscribed by the Constitution. I express no opinion on the wisdom or necessity of “recall”. If the people of this commonwealth desire that “recall” be allowed, I believe the Constitution must be amended to allow it.
. My research indicates that since Milford Township was decided, only one case has dealt with the removal of a nonconstitutional elected official in a legislatively created method. See Marshall Impeachment Case, 360 Pa. 304, 62 A.2d 30 (1948). All other cases deal with removal of appointed officials. Since the issues in those cases involve different questions, I express no opinion on them.