dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the broad sweep of the majority opinion erroneously provides fertile soil for the total erosion of the clear language of the legislature on this question.
The issue is whether the one-year personal injury statute or the two-year motor vehicle reparations act limitation applies to a cause of action arising from injuries received in a collision between a motorcycle and a pickup truck.
This appeal is from a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court which had dismissed the complaint because it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations as provided in KRS 413.140.
In this Court the case has endured a tortured existence. On November 26,1986, the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed by an equally divided court. One of the justices, who has since retired, did not sit on the case because he had served on the Court of Appeals panel which had reviewed the matter. Reconsideration, as distinguished from rehearing was granted on January 12, 1987, and the new majority opinion has now emerged.
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed because the plain literal language of KRS 304.39-040(3) of the No Fault Act excludes operators and passengers on motorcycles from receiving basic reparations benefits unless optional coverage has been purchased. The statute provides that notwithstanding any other provisions of the act, no operator or passenger on a motorcycle is entitled to basic reparations benefits unless such benefits have been purchased as optional coverage.
Notwithstanding is a common English word easily understood by the general public and defined by the dictionary as meaning in spite of or nevertheless. The meaning and the manner of use employed in the statute is abundantly clear and totally unambiguous. Here, it introduces certain conditions placed on motorcycle operators and passengers.
Therefore, it was the responsibility of Troxell to make a proper showing of coverage in order to place himself within the protection of the MVRA and its two-year statute of limitations.
Floyd v. Gray, Ky., 657 S.W.2d 936 (1983) requires that a case must fall within the purview of the MVRA in order to be subject to the two-year limitations provisions. The nofault act is of statutory origin. The legislative enactment giving rise to it must be literally followed. The MVRA has been interpreted with literal statutory language. See Fann v. McGuffey, Ky., 534 S.W.2d 770 (1975).
Bailey v. Reeves, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 832 (1984) is not applicable to this situation. In that case a collision between a truck and a cow held that the owner of the cow was subject to the two-year statute. Neither the cow nor its owner had a specific statutory exclusion as does the motorcycle operator or passenger. The same distinction is true of Goodin v. Overnight Transportation Co., Ky., 701 S.W.2d 131 (1985).
Bailey, supra, reasoned that:
When one looks to the policy and purposes behind the Act, KRS 304.39-010, it is evident that the legislature intended to encourage those injured in auto accidents to look first to their no-fault benefits and then pursue a tort claim if necessary. This approach presupposes the need for a longer statute of limitations _ (Emphasis added.)
Where, as here, the injured motorcyclist has elected not to purchase BRB, he cannot be encouraged to look first to his no-fault benefits and then pursue a tort claim if necessary. The logical underpinning for the two-year statute of limitations simply does not exist.
It is abundantly clear that KRS 304.39-040(3) creates a statutory exemption for an operator or passenger on a motorcycle and *530requires that class of persons to make specific provisions in order to come within the application of the no-fault act.
Among the policies and purposes enumerated by the legislature for the enactment of our no-fault law, KRS 304.39-010 provides that the intent of the act is:
(1) To require owners, registrants and operators of motor vehicles in the Commonwealth to procure insurance covering basic reparation benefits and legal liability arising out of ownership, operation or use of such motor vehicles;
(2) To provide prompt payment to victims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to whose negligence caused the accident in order to eliminate the inequities which fault-determination has created;
(3) To encourage prompt medical treatment and rehabilitation of the motor vehicle accident victim by providing for prompt payment of needed medical care and rehabilitation;
(4) To permit more liberal wage loss and medical benefits by allowing claims for intangible loss only when their determination is reasonable and appropriate;
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Thus the protection afforded by the availability of basic reparation benefits (BRBs) lies at the heart of the no-fault system. As stated in the official commentary to the 1972 Uniform Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 14 § 3 at 61 (West, 1980): ‘The requirement that basic reparation benefits be paid without reference to fault is an explicit statement of that which is implicit throughout this Act.’ Therefore one not entitled to BRBs is outside the scope of the no-fault act and not entitled to use its limitations provision.
KRS 304.040(3) is the crux of this appeal. It states:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subtitle, no operator or passenger on a motorcycle is entitled to basic reparation benefits from any source for injuries arising out of the maintenance or use of such a motorcycle unless such reparation benefits have been purchased as optional coverage for the motorcycle or by the individual so injured.
This section of the law mandates that, unless by appropriate proof the operator or passenger on a motorcycle shows he has acquired optional coverage entitling him to basic reparations benefits, he is excluded from the operation of the no-fault act. A careful review of the record discloses no such showing in this case, and we must conclude that Troxell does not come within the protection of the no-fault act. The trial judge properly applied the one-year personal injury statute of limitations, KRS 413.-140, to bar the claim and the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
The majority also overrules portions of Hurley v. Downing, Ky., 717 S.W.2d 225 (1986) and Ashby v. Money, Ky., 717 S.W.2d 223 (1986) as they relate to the two-year statute of limitations. This would appear to be a pattern of this Court substituting the word “two” for “one” when it appears in these sections of the law. In my view it is not the function of this Court to substitute one time-frame for the one specified by the legislature. The matter is not open to interpretation. It is clearly a legislative decision.
In Reda Pump Company v. Finch, Ky., 713 S.W.2d 818 (1986) this Court said:
We have long adhered to the rule in this jurisdiction that statutes will be construed according to the plain meaning of the words contained in the statute.
In Burrell v. Electric Plant Board, Ky., 676 S.W.2d 231 (1984) we applied the rule and held the statute in question must be “held to mean what it plainly expresses.” Id. at 234.
In Gateway Construction Company v. Wallbaum, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 247 (1962) we expressed the rule in the following language:
The best way in most cases to ascertain such intent or to determine the meaning of a statute is to look to the language used,_The primary rule is to ascertain the intention from the words employed in enacting the statute and not to guess what the Legislature may have *531intended but did not express.... Resort must be had first to the words, which are decisive if they are clear.... The words of the statute are to be given their usual, ordinary, and everyday meaning.... Id. at 249.
In Bedinger v. Graybill’s Executor and Trustee, Ky., 302 S.W.2d 594, 599 (1957), we said:
The Courts are bound by statutory law as written and cannot write into it an exception which the Legislature did not make.
The majority tames the twin tigers of logic and mathematics by simple judicial fiat. One of the first principles of jurisprudence is stability in the law. In addition the law should try to reflect common sense. Replacing the word “one” with the word “two” does not comply with either maxim.