¶ 98. {concurring). The State obtained the bank records of Michelle Popenhagen from local banks after it issued three subpoenas duces tecum, each of which was signed by an Oneida County circuit judge. The process used to obtain these subpoenas is not clear. What is clear, however, is that: (1) the State used the wrong subpoena forms; (2) the State never submitted evidence of probable cause for the subpoenas to the court; (3) the judges made no findings of probable cause for the subpoenas; and (4) the documents obtained from the subpoenas were not returned to the court. Consequently, after two hearings on Popenhagen's motion to suppress her bank records and the incriminating statements she made after being confronted by police with her bank records, Circuit Judge Mark Mangerson suppressed the records and the statements.
¶ 99. I concur in this result. However, because I share some of the concerns voiced in Justice Roggen-sack's dissenting opinion, I write separately to explain my position.
H
¶ 100. The owners of Save More Foods in Minoc-qua terminated Michelle Popenhagen, a longtime employee who worked as their bookkeeper, because they detected financial irregularities at the store. Several weeks later, the owners complained to the Minocqua Police Department that they believed Popenhagen had embezzled a substantial amount of money. In the subsequent investigation, Todd Hanson, a detective with the Minocqua Police Department, "filled out an affidavit" for the Oneida County District Attorney to support subpoenas to local banks to obtain Popenhagen's bank records. In a police report, Hanson stated that he faxed a request for subpoenas "to the Oneida DA on 8/16/04 @ 3:00 p.m."
*649¶ 101. The district attorney's office then prepared three subpoenas, two dated August 18, 2004, and one dated August 31, 2004, to three different banks.
¶ 102. All three subpoenas contain the following language in bold type: "PURSUANT TO SECTION 805.07 OF THE WISCONSIN STATUTES, YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED TO APPEAR IN PERSON AND GIVE EVIDENCE". All three subpoenas give a date and time to appear in circuit court. Two of the subpoenas also state: "In lieu of appearing, copies may be mailed to Sergeant Todd Hanson of the Minocqua Police Department, PO. Box 346,.Minocqua, Wisconsin 54548."
¶ 103. All three subpoenas were served personally on the banks by Todd Hanson. Thereafter, the hanks did not appear in court; instead, they turned over the records to the Minocqua Police Department.
¶ 104. As noted, the subpoenas were issued pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.07. Wisconsin Stat. § 805.07 reads in part as follows:
Subpoena. (1) Issuance and service. Subpoenas shall be issued and served in accordance with ch. 885. A subpoena may also be issued by any attorney of record in a civil action or special proceeding to compel attendance of witnesses for deposition, hearing or trial in the action or special proceeding.
(2) Subpoena requiring the production of mdte-rial. (a) A subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or tangible things designated therein.
(b) Notice of a 3rd-party subpoena issued for dis-' covery purposes shall be provided to all parties at least 10 days before the scheduled deposition in order to preserve their right to object. If a 3rd-party subpoena *650requests the production of books, papers, documents, or tangible things that are within the scope of discovery under s. 804.01(2)(a), those objects shall not be provided before the time and date specified in the subpoena. The provisions under this paragraph apply unless all of the parties otherwise agree.
(3) Protective orders. Upon motion made promptly and in any event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, the court may (a) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive or (b) condition denial of the motion upon the advancement by the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued of the reasonable cost of producing the books, papers, documents, or tangible things designated therein. (Emphasis added.)
¶ 105. Wisconsin Stat. § 805.07(1) refers to "ch. 885." Wisconsin Stat. § 885.01 reads in part:
Subpoenas, who may issue. The subpoena need not be sealed, and may be signed and issued as follows:
(1) By any judge or clerk of a court or court commissioner or municipal judge, within the territory in which the officer or the court of which he or she is the officer has jurisdiction, to require the attendance of witnesses and their production of lawful instruments of evidence in any action, matter or proceeding pending or to be examined into before any court, magistrate, officer, arbitrator, board, committee or other person authorized to take testimony in the state.
(2) By the attorney general or any district attorney or person acting in his or her stead, to require the attendance of witnesses, in behalf of the state, in any court or before any magistrate and from any part of the state. (Emphasis added.)
¶ 106. The record shows that the district attorney's office executed three subpoenas pursuant to *651Wis. Stat. §§ 805.07 and 885.01(1). Each subpoena was signed by a judge. Subpoenas issued under these statutes had to be signed by a judge or clerk because there was never "a civil action" in which a subpoena could have been issued by an attorney of record (Wis. Stat. § 805.07(1)) and because the district attorney was seeking "lawful instruments of evidence" (documents), not merely the "attendance" of a witness at a hearing (Wis. Stat. § 885.01(2)). Nonetheless, the district attorney's office used the wrong subpoena forms and followed the wrong procedure, inasmuch as no legal action of any kind was pending when the subpoenas were issued. Moreover, the notice that Wis. Stat. § 805.07(2)(b) requires he given to a "party" concerning a "3rd-party subpoena issued for discovery purposes" was not given to Popenhagen. In addition, Popenhagen alleged that the district attorney's office never asked the court to schedule return dates in court because the district attorney never wanted or expected witnesses to appear in court. The stated return dates were fictitious, and the objects of the subpoena were not brought to court.
¶ 107. In sum, the three subpoenas were defective in every respect. The circuit court was not powerless to address defective subpoenas issued pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.07. The court's authority to quash subpoenas is explicitly provided in Wis. Stat. § 805.07(3).
¶ 108. Probable cause is not required for a subpoena issued pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.07. The reason is that § 805.07 is designed to secure the presence of a witness in a pending action, and the statute permits a "party" in that action to seek a protective order if the subpoena is unreasonable and oppressive.
¶ 109. Here, of course, there was no pending action and thus no opposing "party" to serve with notice. The district attorney erred. Even if the district *652attorney's office could concoct some argument for using subpoenas under § 805.07, it failed to comply with the terms of that statute. A circuit court cannot be denied the power to remedy an obvious and undisputed misuse of its judicial authority by the district attorney.
¶ 110. The parties now appear to agree that the State should have sought subpoenas under Wis. Stat. § 968.135, not § 805.07. Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 reads as follows: •
Subpoena for documents. Upon the request of the attorney general or a district attorney and upon a showing of probable cause under s. 968.12, a court shall issue a subpoena requiring the production of documents, as specified in s. 968.13(2). The documents shall be returnable to the court which issued the subpoena. Motions to the court, including, but not limited to, motions to quash or limit the subpoena, shall be addressed to the court which issued the subpoena. Any person who unlawfully refuses to produce the documents may be compelled to do so as provided in ch. 785. This section does not limit or affect any other subpoena authority provided by law. (Emphasis added.)
¶ 111. To obtain subpoenas under this statute, a district attorney is required to provide the court with "probable cause under s. 968.12," meaning that a district attorney is required to proceed as though he were requesting a search warrant under Wis. Stat. § 968.12.1
¶ 112. The Oneida County District Attorney could have provided the court with a sworn complaint or *653affidavit, or sworn recorded testimony, showing probable cause. Wis. Stat. § 968.12(2). The court would then have responded with a determination whether probable cause for the subpoenas had been shown. Wis. Stat. § 968.12(3)(c). None of this happened. None of this happened because the district attorney's office followed the wrong procedure by using Wis. Stat. § 805.07.
¶ 113. Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 is not the only subpoena statute available to district attorneys. For instance, Wis. Stat. § 885.01 is made applicable in criminal proceedings by Wis. Stat. § 972.11. However, subpoena statutes other than Wis. Stat. § 968.135 appear to require some sort of pending action. Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 does not require a pending action, but it does require the district attorney to follow the same procedures he would use in obtaining a search warrant under § 968.12. Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 provides for subsequent motions to the court. The statute implies that when the procedures in the statute are not followed, the court may deal with a defective subpoena the same way it would deal with a defective search warrant.
¶ 114. Judge Mangerson stated that a subpoena under Wis. Stat. § 968.135 "is directly analogous to a search warrant." He understood — and I agree — that the remedy for a defective subpoena under this statute is analogous to the remedy for a defective search warrant *654under Wis. Stat. § 968.12. That is why I support the court's decision to exclude the specific documents obtained from the three subpoenas and the statements Popenhagen made after she was confronted with these improperly obtained documents.
¶ 115. The State is not entitled to utilize incriminating statements obtained from Popenhagen after she was confronted with her bank records simply because it completely disregarded the applicable statute (§ 968.135) to obtain those bank records.
I — I hH I — I
¶ 116. This brings us to the question of what authority should be employed to suppress Popenhagen's statements without altering longstanding Wisconsin law.
¶ 117. In State v. Raflik, 2001 WI 129, 248 Wis. 2d 593, 636 N.W.2d 690, this court stated:
The suppression of evidence is not a constitutional right, but rather it is a judge-made rule used to deter misconduct by law enforcement officials. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976). Suppression is only required when evidence has been obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights, State v. Hochman, 2 Wis. 2d 410, 419, 86 N.W.2d 446 (1957), or if a statute specifically provides for the suppression remedy. State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court of Rock County, 51 Wis. 2d 434, 439-40, 187 N.W.2d 354 (1971); see also State ex rel. Peckham v. Krenke, 229 Wis. 2d 778, 787, 601 N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Verkuylen, 120 Wis. 2d 59, 61, 352 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1984).
Id., ¶ 15 (emphasis added).
¶ 118. The Raflik court went on to explain that there is no specific statutory remedy provided for the failure to record a telephonic search warrant application *655under Wis. Stat. § 968.12. Id. "Thus, the only question that remains is whether the failure to record the warrant application and the subsequent reconstruction of the application violated a constitutional right." Id.
¶ 119. In my view, a violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.12 procedure permits but does not require the remedy of suppression in situations where an error by the state does not violate a constitutional right. The decision whether to suppress evidence is informed by Wis. Stat. § 968.22, which reads: "Effect of technical irregularities. No evidence seized under a search warrant shall be suppressed because of technical irregularities not affecting the substantial rights of the defendant."
¶ 120. Wisconsin Stat. § 968.22 implies that evidence can be suppressed by a court if the court determines that a statutory irregularity cannot reasonably be described as "technical" or if the statutory irregularity has affected the substantial rights of the defendant.
¶ 121. This view is supported by the cases. In State v. Tye, 2001 WI 124, 248 Wis. 2d 530, 636 N.W.2d 473, the state obtained a search warrant for the defendant's residence. Id., ¶ 4. The state presented probable cause for the warrant to the court. Id., ¶ 5. However, the investigator who prepared the affidavit to support the warrant failed to sign and swear to the truth of the affidavit. Id. The circuit court subsequently suppressed evidence seized at the residence. Id., ¶ 2. This court affirmed, concluding that the failure to sign the affidavit and swear to its truthfulness was "a matter of substance, not form, and it is an essential component of the Fourth Amendment and legal proceedings." Id., ¶ 19. The court's holding stated black letter law about the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights.
*656¶ 122. A different kind of defect was noted in State v. Meier, 60 Wis. 2d 452, 210 N.W.2d 685 (1973). Police executed a search warrant for Meier's residence on Wednesday, April 26, 1972, at 9 p.m. Id. at 455. The warrant was "returned" to the clerk of court on Monday, May 1, 1972, at 12:06 p.m. Id. Meier claimed that authorities had violated Wis. Stat. § 968.17 by failing to return the warrant "within 48 hours after execution" to the clerk designated in the warrant, and that evidence from the search had to be suppressed. See id. at 456. This court disagreed. In computing time, the trial court excluded the weekend — the period from 4:30 p.m. Friday to 8 a.m. Monday — from the 48-hour period. Id. at 459. The court said: "The trial court's construction of sec. 968.17, Stats., is reasonable in view of the fact that the time requirement contained therein is of a ministerial nature and that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the rights of the defendant were in any way prejudiced." Id. at 459-60 (emphasis added).
¶ 123. This theme was echoed in State v. Elam, 68 Wis. 2d 614, 229 N.W.2d 664 (1975), where the defendant moved to suppress evidence because a transcript of the search warrant testimony was not filed within the time limit — "within 5 days" after the execution of the search warrant — prescribed in Wis. Stat. § 968.17(2). Id. at 618-19. The trial court suppressed the evidence because the transcript was not filed until more than ten months after the execution of the warrant, even though it found the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay. Id. at 619. This court reversed, saying: "[Wisconsin Stat. § 968.22], together with the finding of no prejudice to the defendant ... would dispose of the issue.. .. The time for filing... is ... a ministerial duty, a violation of which does not invalidate the search absent prejudice to the rights of the defendant." Id. at 620 (emphasis added).
*657¶ 124. In State v. Nicholson, 174 Wis. 2d 542, 497 N.W.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1993), police obtained a search warrant for an upper east apartment in a two-story, multi-family apartment building at 1512 State Street in Racine. Id. at 544-45. Although police executed the warrant at the correct apartment, the address turned out to be 1510 State Street, so that the address in the warrant was not correct. Id. at 545. The circuit court and court of appeals upheld the warrant and refused to suppress evidence. The court of appeals cited Wis. Stat. § 968.22 and stated: "The warrant's recital of the 1512 State Street address was a technical irregularity under the facts of this case. We agree with the trial court that this irregularity did not affect any substantial right of Nicholson." Id. at 549 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
¶ 125. In the Raflik case, where the government mistakenly failed to record the application for a warrant by telephone, the circuit court did not suppress the evidence because the search warrant was grounded in probable cause, and the search was not unreasonable because the court promptly took steps to reconstruct the application. Raflik, 248 Wis. 2d 593, ¶¶ 8-10. This court affirmed. Id., ¶ 57. The inadvertent failure to record the application did not prejudice the defendant. See id., ¶¶ 42, 52.
¶ 126. These cases, together with Wis. Stat. § 968.22, suggest that evidence must not be suppressed for a mere statutory violation or a technical irregularity of search warrant procedure unless the violation or irregularity is material or the violation or irregularity has prejudiced the defendant or affected the defendant's substantial rights. Conversely, if a statutory violation or statutory irregularity of search warrant procedure is material or if the violation or irregularity has prejudiced *658the defendant or affected the defendant's substantial rights, the court has implicit, if not explicit, statutory authority to suppress the tainted evidence. Id. This is not new ground. It is a reasonable synthesis of prior law.
¶ 127. Suppression of evidence is a drastic remedy. Suppression is required when evidence has been obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. Raflik, 248 Wis. 2d 593, ¶ 15. Suppression of evidence obtained in violation of a statute is not permitted unless a statute either authorizes or requires suppression. See id.; Verkuylen, 120 Wis. 2d at 61.
¶ 128. In evaluating statutory irregularity with respect to a search warrant or a Wis. Stat. § 968.135 subpoena, the court should weigh the gravity of the statutory violation against the strong public interest in the availability of reliable evidence. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 424 (1977) (weighing the deterrent effect of suppression against "the strong interest under any system of justice of making available to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence" (citation omitted)). Suppression of evidence is intended to deter misconduct. Raflik, 248 Wis. 2d 568, ¶ 15. The public interest is not served by the suppression of evidence resulting from conduct that is inadvertent or unintentional unless that conduct results in prejudice to the defendant.
¶ 129. In this case, the State's misuse of the subpoena statutes was serious and material, not technical. The State used the wrong subpoena forms, pursuant to the wrong statute (Wis. Stat. § 805.07), and it failed to accord the protections required by that wrong statute. It could not bootstrap its position by trying to bring the subpoenas under the applicable subpoena statute (Wis. Stat. § 968.135) because it totally disregarded the procedures and protections in that statute. *659In addition, the defendant was prejudiced by the State's errors when she blurted out incriminating statements after being confronted with her improperly obtained bank records. Finally, the court's authority was abused. In this case, then, suppression of Popenhagen's statements is a sanction for the improper use of the subpoena power by the district attorney's office.
IV
¶ 130. The last sentence of Wis. Stat. § 968.135 should not be overlooked. It reads: "This section does not limit or affect any other subpoena authority provided by law." Wis. Stat. § 968.135.
¶ 131. In my view, the State is entitled to use Wis. Stat. § 885.01 for subpoenas duces tecum of bank records at Popenhagen's trial. Popenhagen's bank records are business records. These records can be obtained from the banks by following proper procedure. The owners of Save More Foods and their insurer could also obtain Popenhagen's bank records if they sued her to recover their damages. In short, excluding the defendant's statements will not permit the defendant to escape unscathed.
V
¶ 132. The circuit court's suppression of Popenhagen's bank records and incriminating statements was appropriate. The State used the wrong subpoena forms and followed the wrong procedure. As a result, its subpoenas were defective. However, the State's subpoena access to these records is not limited to access under Wis. Stat. § 968.135. The State is entitled to use Wis. Stat. § 885.01(1) after it has filed a criminal charge. *660The State can do over the subpoenas of the bank records. It cannot do over its blunders in obtaining Popenhagen's statements. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.
Wisconsin Stat. § 968.12 reads in part as follows:
Search warrant. (1) Description and issuance. A search warrant is an order signed by a judge directing a law enforcement officer to conduct a search of a designated person, a designated *653object or a designated place for the purpose of seizing designated property or kinds of property. A judge shall issue a search warrant if probable cause is shown.
(2) Warrant upon affidavit. A search warrant may be based upon sworn complaint or affidavit, or testimony recorded by a phonographic reporter or under sub. (3)(d), showing probable cause therefor. The complaint, affidavit or testimony may be upon information and belief.
Wis. Stat. § 968.12(l)-(2).