(concurring in part; dissenting in part). Although I have signed the opinion of Justice Ryan because it provides a detailed analysis of the majority’s Part III approach to the "No-Fault” Insurance Act (MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq.), I concur also with Justice Fitzgerald’s forthright opinion. In addition, I express a separate concern which embraces the whole of this heretofore unperceived constitutional doctrine, today born full grown without benefit of facts, briefs, oral arguments, prior consideration of any lower court and without knowledge of the plaintiffs or defendants.
*671I
Justice Williams writes the truth when he says:
"The interest of plaintiffs that is affected by compulsory no-fault insurance is not a previously recognized common-law or constitutional right.”
He also truly warns:
"We are deeply aware that our holding not only directly affects the problems of motorists and the insurance business in this state, but that it also substantially affects our entire system of civil justice.” (Emphasis added.)
Indeed it does. It is a giant step towards government management of private enterprise through judicial mandate. With no facts and little or no claimed expertise in the insurance industry, the majority assumes a stance of power and sweeps out to transform the management of an entire private industry into a state function and therefore subject. to such regulation as has been reserved for state agencies. The majority finds that "[t]his legislation goes beyond a grant of monopoly or an attempt to regulate a utility” and so the action of the automobile insurance industry must "be treated as that of the state itself’.
Like modern day legal alchemists, the Court has managed to transform the insurance rate-setting process from what was essentially a series of private actions with some governmental supervision to that magical "state action” which opens the door to "state action” constitutional controls. The astonishing display of bootstrapping used to achieve this feat — because the state requires the public to purchase a certain product from a pri*672vate business as a prerequisite to engaging in a certain private activity, the action of that business is thus state action — dangerously blurs the necessary and important distinction between private enterprise and public government.
By analogies of "apples and oranges”1 (as described in the other minority opinions) and an analysis based on a factual vacuum and highly questionable premises,2 a new face has been *673painted on the concept of "due process”.3 It is not becoming. It is not practical. It is dangerous.
II
It is unbecoming and even dangerous because it is precedent for the Michigan Supreme Court sua sponte to contrive an "issue” and to use it as a vehicle to "affect the entire system of civil justice” and, incidentally, freedom of the marketplace in Michigan.
If four people can, unsolicited, manipulate the Constitution so as to dictate to the Legislature in precise terms the method of removing one industry effectively from the competitive field of free enterprise, what business or industry will be next?4
The opinion lays the groundwork for government (judicial?) regulation of private industry such as our people have never countenanced. "Super-regulation” would be a suitable — and kind — name for the concept.
Ill
The opinion as to Part III is not only unbecom*674ing to the judiciary and dangerous to a free society, but it is impractical because it uses a costly "blunderbuss to kill a fly”. For instance, it creates a right in every dissatisfied motorist (in 1975 there were 5.7 million vehicles registered in Michigan and 6.0 million licensed drivers) to obtain a "prompt and effective administrative review” of an insurer. Because this Court lacks the experience and expertise within its membership or the means peculiar to the Legislature of acquiring it, we cannot assess the financial impact upon the customers and taxpayers in general (often the same people).
At a minimum, we must anticipate for this requirement alone a corps of additional administrative law judges, attorneys for both sides, court reporters and other staff, quarters, equipment and other necessities.
Note also that "all rights accrued by individuals against their insurers or against the 'Automobile Placement Facility’ ” will "remain valid” until the order of the Court is entered, so a formidable backlog already will exist at the very beginning.
In any event, this requirement alone can be calculated to raise costs to taxpayers and raise premium costs which even at the present high level are a bargain nationally for unexcelled coverage.5
*675Such Part III requirements are certainly not necessary under any present concept of constitutional law. Nor are they necessary to accomplish the ends of fairness (see fn 2).
Perhaps all of us, including the insurance companies, would like to see some changes in the act. Even without this extraordinary judicial tack, changes are likely to take place where they should —in the Legislature.
Be that as it may, the majority imposes upon us its philosophy of "the more governmental regulation, the better”. I believe that broader, rather than tighter, regulatory perimeters are basic to efficient, less expensive, more competitive production. In fact, business — especially small and medium-sized business — already is sinking in a sea of bureaucratic, costly red tape.
While trying to kill the fly, we may be crippling or dealing a mortal blow to a free marketplace. We cannot know the complete impact of this decision upon this and other business. The Legislature and the Governor have been making studies and holding hearings to determine what changes are indicated in the act after the first five years of experience. We should not sua sponte usurp their functions.
IV
In summary, my greatest and separately ex*676pressed concern with the majority opinion is twofold: (1) Part III is precedent for our Court to make decisions removing the very foundations of our legal process without any facts, briefs, arguments of counsel, lower court consideration or knowledge of the parties, and (2) in the course of such show of power, it becomes precedent also for a blurring almost to extinction of the lines between private enterprise and governmental action. Indeed, the opinion converted a private industry into a function of the government and warned us of more to come — and all this quite unnecessary to the desired end.
Although I do not agree with — or even understand6 — some of the other arguments and requirements, my concern runs so deeply towards enhancing, and not undermining, our basic freedoms, including that of the marketplace, that I have focused briefly and quickly (after having read all *677other opinions and references)7 upon this basic flaw in the principal opinion.
Therefore, I dissent in part and concur in part.
E.g., compare with the issuance of driver’s licenses, liquor licenses, etc. discussed in Justice Fitzgerald’s opinion.
(1) The Insurance Code protects against "excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminating rates”, a standard commonly employed throughout the country and in Michigan. Nevertheless, the majority finds the standard a "mere exhortation” in the absence of “legislative definition” and "without any history of prior court interpretation”. First, like "fair and equitable prices”, any single "definition” is unlikely to cover the innumerable factual possibilities. Facts and circumstances are necessary against which to test the standards. Facts are lacking here, so understandably we were, not expected by the parties to test the statutory protection in a vacuum. The Commissioner of the judiciary will be able to judge fairly what is an "excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory rate”. The words are ordinary and widely used in statutes and regulations. Even if it were true that there is "no history of court interpretation” of this standard, one has to ask, "How does such a history begin?”
Noting that the same standards apply to all insurance in Michigan, and have for many years, I wonder how this finding of inadequacy will affect all other areas of the industry.
(2) The majority say that there are inadequate statutory provisions for a motorist attacking the validity of an individual rating decision. I see no bar to an individual’s attack upon the base rate nor an attack upon an arbitrary or capricious individual premium or assignment of risk.
Also the Uniform Trade Practices Act in MCL 500.2027; MSA 24.12027 specifically includes within its protection discrimination against individuals. Among other prohibitions are
"(a) Refusing to insure, or refusing to continue to insure, or limiting the amount of coverage available to an individual or risk because of any of the following:
"(i) Race, color, creed, marital status, sex, or national origin * * * .
"(ii) The residence, age, handicap, or lawful occupation of the individual or the location of the risk * * * .”
See (iii) for additional property insurance protections, including refusal to insure or to continue to insure and charging of different rate.
(3) The third complaint is similar to the second alleging "no *673adequate statutory provision permitting an individual to challenge insurance refusal, discriminatory cancellation, or assignment to the 'Automobile Placement Facility’ with its presumptively higher rates”. In addition to the Uniform Trade Practices Act, see MCL 500.3220, 500.3244; MSA 24.13220, 24.13244, for statutory procedure for insurance cancellation. An even more strict bill is being argued in the Legislature at this writing.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”.
In Michigan, Const 1963, art 1, § 17 provides:
"No person shall be * * * deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”
I suspect it may be the remainder of the insurance industry.
A recent State Insurance Bureau report to the Governor (the 1977 report is cited by the majority) concluded:
"No-fault insurance is paying more benefits to more accident victims in a more timely manner than any other automobile insurance system in the country. No-fault is also saving about $45 million per year in insurance costs because of benefit coordination with a potential savings of at least $105 million.
"No-fault collision is also providing people with more options to control their insurance rates through self-insuring portions of their coverage. It also increases equity by making more people pay only for repairing their own car and not for repairing the average car. * * *
"Finally, no-fault has not been directly responsible for increases in *675insurance rates. The increase in insurance rates in Michigan has been consistent with the rate increases in other comparable states — both tort and no-fault. Also, insurance rates in Michigan over the past several years have not increased as rapidly as the prices of products the insurance purchases. In addition, no-fault has saved almost $70 million per year from the costs of a tort system. The public is concerned about rate increases, but this is a national phenomenon, independent of no-fault.” Insurance Bureau, A Report to the Governor: No-Fault Insurance in Michigan: Consumer Attitudes and Performance (1978), pp 60-61.
E.g., Part III sets forth certain requirements, § 2 of which seems to contradict itself. Subsection (a) requires that premiums be set "without regard to factors assertedly warranting differences in premiums”. Subsection (b), however, requires a statement of factors which may be considered by the insurer in differentiating premiums among those insured and (c) requires "the amount of differential appropriate for each such factor”.
Does the 2(a) requirement mean that all premiums for the same coverage be the same as to each person (as to the same company)? Do 2(b) and (c) allow specified classifications for specified risks at specified amounts? If so, how does (a) correlate with (b) and (c)?
Also, it is not clear whether a consumer is expected to "shop around” among competing companies for one willing to take a greater risk or charge a lesser premium. The words seem to provide that anyone ("every motorist”) who feels aggrieved by the first offer can demand a full-scale hearing before an administrative law judge and subsequent rights of appeal as provided by the Administrative Procedures Act.
The expectations of the purchaser are not at all like expectations of a person shopping for the automobile, from which these new constitutional (?) rights spring.
Justice Williams attempts to legitimatize discussion of the due process sufficiency of the act’s regulatory scheme by reference in fn 14 of his opinion to plaintiff counsel’s statement at oral argument requesting this Court to utilize the briefs filed in the Court of Appeals "on any issues that were otherwise inadequate or deñcient in this reviewing court”. (Emphasis added.) There was no such issue before this “reviewing court” to be "inadequate” or "deficient”.
(The only .due process issue raised below concerning the act’s regulatory scheme was based on the theory of an improper delegation of legislative authority. The entitlement doctrine and state action theories used by the majority today were not issues below.)