State v. Thill

SABERS, Justice

(dissenting).

I dissent. While a traffic stop may not require probable cause, it does require “at least articulable and reasonable suspicion” of a violation of the law. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Anderson, 331 N.W.2d 568, 570 (S.D.1983). This means something more than “mere ... idle curiosity” about the driver. Anderson, supra (quoting People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 420, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 74, 330 N.E.2d 39, 44 (1975)).

Here, as the majority opinion concedes, the officer “observed no moving violations or erratic driving by Thill.” The officer’s “sole reason for stopping Thill’s vehicle was the fact he had turned prior to going through the roadblock.”

There is no law against executing a lawful turn before reaching a roadblock, even if the purpose of the turn is avoidance. In fact, part of the reason that stationary checkpoints are constitutional and “random roving-patrol stops” are not is that Station*90ary checkpoints provide advance notice of their presence to approaching motorists, giving them the “option ... to avoid the checkpoints.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3083, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2486, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990).

Certainly the officer was within his rights to follow Thill after he turned away from the roadblock, but since he never did observe any illegal or even unusual behavior by Thill, he continued to have no articu-lable or reasonable suspicion that Thill was doing anything wrong.

The majority opinion strains to suggest otherwise. Saying that the officer had a “reasonable suspicion” does not make it so. The officer must be able to articulate something about a defendant’s behavior before making the stop which reasonably leads the officer to suspect a specific crime may have been committed. Nothing of the sort happened here.

Thill’s vehicle was seized unreasonably in violation of U.S. Const, amend. IV and South Dakota Const, art. VI, § 11. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.