(dissenting). I agree with the observations and conclusions of Justice Cavanagh. I, too, am concerned with the inconsistencies between this majority and the majorities in Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531; 377 NW2d 300 (1985), and White v General Motors Corp, 431 Mich 387; 429 NW2d 576 (1988). Moreover, I believe that the question of the appropriate accrual date in unemployment compensation must be addressed— whether explicitly or inexplicitly — in this case. The very words "retroactive” and "prospective” are inherently relative. It follows that the use of these words has no value in determining the application of a statutory amendment unless a point of reference is designated. The majority’s unreflected quotation of § 32 of the act provides no assistance in determining the correct accrual date for the rights of claimants, since it merely allows redeterminations of eligibility and qualification. The question begged by the majority is the following: What law is applicable in the determination or redetermination of eligibility and qualification? I would answer, as has Justice Cavanagh, that the applicable law is presumed to be the law in effect on the date of unemployment.1
I agree with Justice Cavanagh that the Employment Security Act is analogous in this respect to the law of workers’ compensation where the accrual date has long been held to be the date of injury. Hurd, supra. See also Welch, Workers’ Compensation in Michigan: Law & Practice, §§ 2.01-2.04. I would add that this conclusion flows from the nature of the statute in question. Unem*501ployment compensation, like workers’ compensation, is essentially an insurance scheme. As we are reminded by § 2 of the act, this scheme functions through "[t]he systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment by the setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed . . . .” MCL 421.2; MSA 17.502. Contributions to these accumulated funds are based upon actuarial studies conducted by the commission at the direction of the advisory council. See MCL 421.3a; MSA 17.503(1). If benefit levels ordinarily fluctuate on the basis of changes in the law after the date of unemployment, after the accumulation of funds, this legislation is in peril. No insurance scheme can long survive if the adjustment of claims is based merely upon post hoc notions of sound public policy.
This concept has not eluded the Legislature. The history of the act shows a consistent assumption on the part of the Legislature that the applicable law is presumed to be that in effect on the date of unemployment.
Section 66(1) of 1974 PA 104, MCL 421.66(1); MSA 17.569(16)(1),2 provides as a general rule that the effective date of the amendment is immediate, or more precisely, the first day of the calendar week containing the thirtieth day after it became law.3 The effective date is not, of course, the ac*502crual date. As was recently explained in White:
"Effective dates are inserted by the Legislature in all kinds of statutes. When it wishes to address the question of retroactivity, the Legislature has specifically done so in addition to providing for an effective date.
"For example, when the Legislature passed the new rule for a claim and delivery action, in 1976 PA 79, it provided in enactment § 2 that '[t]his amendatory act shall apply to all actions pending or commenced on or after the effective date of this act.’ Enactment §3 of the same statute provided: 'This amendatory act shall take effect July 1, 1975.’ Because the Legislature in connection with other statutes in enactment sections has specifically addressed retroactivity in addition to providing an effective date, we are unable to agree that the mere insertion of an effective date, standing alone, is dispositive of the prospective/retroactive effect of 1981 PA 194.” [White, supra, 398-399 (Riley, C.J.), quoting with approval, Selk v Detroit Plastic Products, 419 Mich 1, 35, n 2; 345 NW2d 184 (1984).]
To be more specific, the use of an "effective date” in any legislation merely serves to negate the presumption under Const 1963, art 4, §27 which would otherwise provide an effective date ninety days after the end of the legislative session. What is of more significance in determining questions of retrospective or prospective application is the use of the phrase "shall apply.”
This phrase can also be found in 1974 PA 104, §66(4):
Notwithstanding subsection (1), the provisions of sections 17(c)(iii) and 27(j), in effect prior to this amendatory act, shall apply until January 1, 1975. [MCL 421.66(4); MSA 17.569(16)(4). Emphasis added.]
*503By implication, the new act, 1974 PA 104, applies to all claims after that date. Thus, the applicable law for all claims regarding § 17(c)(iii) and 27(j) after January 1, 1975 is 1974 PA 104, regardless of the accrual date.
Further exploration of §66(4) reveals why the Legislature would prefer that these provisions be applied as of January 1, 1975, to ongoing claims or assessments. Section 17(c)(iii) of the prior act, 1971 PA 231, provided that "the solvency account shall be credited . . . with all reimbursements and benefits paid under subsection (c) of Section 11 . . . .” In turn, 1971 PA 231, § 11(c) authorized the commission to enter reciprocity agreements with other states for the exchange of accumulated benefits. Among other changes, 1974 PA 104, § 11(g) allows reciprocity agreements only if the commission finds the agreement to "be fair and reasonable as to all affected interests.” In this respect, 1974 PA 104, § 11(g) does not affect substantive rights but does change procedure for distribution of benefits. Since the amendment, in this respect, is procedural and not substantive, it is presumed to apply retroactively. White, supra, 397-398. That result might, however, conflict with prior reciprocity agreements entered by the commission. It was therefore necessary for the Legislature to give this provision limited prospective application, and that was accomplished by way of the "shall apply” language of 1974 PA 104, § 66(4). If, on the other hand, the Legislature had preferred an accrual date corresponding with the date of each benefit payment, it would have been unnecessary to make § 17(c)(iii) applicable as of January 1, 1975, since the effective date of § 11(g) was January 1, 1975, under 1974 PA 104, § 66(3).
The Legislature’s presumption of an unemployment accrual date is further demonstrated by *504examining § 27(j) of the prior act, 1971 PA 231. As I have previously noted, § 27(j) of the prior act also remained applicable until January 1, 1975, under 1974 PA 104, § 66(4). Section 27(j) of the prior act was, however, a substantive provision restricting the rights of certain employees of institutions of higher education to benefits between academic years or terms within an academic year. The 1974 amendment extended the restrictions to certain employees of primary and secondary institutions, if notified of the layoff seven days prior to the end of the term. See 1974 PA 104, § 27(i). Since 1974 PA 104 had an effective date of June, 1974, some employees laid off after that date would have been affected by the amendment and, of course, it would have been impossible for employers to comply, in the same cases, with the seven-day notice requirement. It was therefore necessary to phase-in this legislation at the close of the following term, which corresponded with the end of the calendar year, 1974. Again, the applicable law language of 1974 PA 104, §66(4) was used to override the presumption of prospective application based upon the date of the unemployment. If, as the majority assumes, the accrual date of substantive rights under the act is the date of each payment, it would have been unnecessary to extend the applicability of 1971 PA 231, § 27(j), since the new provisions of the 1974 amendment, 1974 PA 104, § 27(i), are expressly made effective January 1, 1975, in 1974 PA 104, § 66(3).4
This examination of 1974 PA 104, § 66 demonstrates two important matters of legislative intent. First, consistent with the insurance nature of the *505scheme, ordinary rules of statutory interpretation and this Court’s own prior decisions, the Legislature presumes that substantive rights under the act accrue as of the date of unemployment, while procedural provisions are fully retroactive. Second, and most germane to this litigation, the Legislature chose to expressly override these presumptions as to §§ 17(c)(iii) and 27(j). Both common sense and the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Stowers v Wolodzko, 386 Mich 119, 133; 191 NW2d 355 (1971),5 thus indicate that the Legislature chose not to override these presumptions as to § 29(8) of the same amendment. Therefore, in accordance with our prior decisions in White, Hurd, and Selk, supra, the substantive amendment of §29(8) should be given only prospective application based upon an accrual date corresponding with the date of unemployment for these employees.
I respectfully dissent._
This is not to say that the Legislature is without power to enact retrospective amendments, see MCL 421.57; MSA 17.561, but only that the applicable law is presumed to be that in effect at the date of unemployment unless otherwise specified. However, the majority does not suggest that the section of 1974 PA 104 in question is expressly retroactive.
While only 1974 PA 104, § 66 is used to demonstrate the proper accrual date in this opinion, this legislation is by no means unique. See 1975 PA 110, § 67, MCL 421.67; MSA 17.569(17).
1974 PA 104, § 66(1) provides:
If this 1974 amendatory act is given immediate effect, the effective date of this amendatory act shall be the first day of the calendar week containing the thirtieth day after it is approved by the governor or becomes law without his approval.
The act was approved by the Governor on May 16,1974.
The majority’s treatment of 1974 PA 104, § 66(4) renders the entire paragraph nugatory, contrary to the general rule of statutory interpretation. State Bar of Michigan v Galloway, 422 Mich 188, 196; 369 NW2d 839 (1985).
See also 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, §47.23, p 194.