dissenting.
¶ 38 The question presented in this appeal is whether the legislature intended that A.R.S. § 46-455(B) apply to the State as an *400enterprise “that has assumed a legal duty to provide care.”9 Section 46-455 is part of an extensive statutory scheme that establishes a combination of private and public enforcement to protect and recompense vulnerable adults. See A.R.S. §§ 46-451 to -459. If the majority’s conclusion that the State and DDD (and other state agencies or political subdivisions) qualify as enterprises that have assumed a legal duty to provide care is correct, then it would also have to be true that the legislature intended that the State engage in criminal and civil prosecutions that, if successful, would subject the State to liability for compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees equal to twice the amount of damages. See A.R.S. § 46-455(H)(4). Because neither the statutory language nor legislative history suggests that the legislature intended such an improbable outcome, I dissent.
¶ 39 The majority’s conclusion is premised on its belief that the State and DDD are “enterprise[s] ... that ha[ve] assumed a legal duty to provide caret.]” Section 46-455(B) was enacted in 1989. See 1989 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 118, § 3. This phrasing came from A.R.S. § 46 — 455(A), the criminal analogue to AR.S. § 46-455(B), which was enacted in 1988. The intended meaning of this phrase is unclear from its language, and, unlike the majority, I believe there is some benefit to examining the legislative history underlying the passage and subsequent amendment to A.R.S. § 46-455(A). When originally proposed in 1988 as HB 2399, A.R.S. § 46-455(A)10 provided: “A person who has been employed to provide care, or who has assumed the duty of providing care, or who has been appointed by a court to provide care____” 1988 House Bills Thirty-Eighth Legislature (Sec. Reg. Sess. Vol. 3). Before passage, the bill was amended by insertion of the word “legal” before “duty” to make clear that a volunteer would not be criminally liable unless it was determined that the volunteer had assumed a legal duty to provide care. See Minutes of the Committee on the Judiciary (April 19, 1988); Memorandum to Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee (April 18, 1988). As enacted, A.R.S. § 46-455 provided: “A person who has been employed to provide care, or who has assumed a legal duty to provide care, or who has been appointed by a court to provide care to an incapacitated adult and who causes or permits the life of the adult to be endangered, his health to be injured or to be imperiled by neglect is guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor.” 1988 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 85, § 2. In 1989, the legislature took the existing framework of A.R.S. § 46 — 455(A) and enacted A.R.S. § 46-455(B) to provide vulnerable adults a statutory civil cause of action under the APSA. Then in 1991, the legislature amended A.R.S. § 46-455(A) by substituting the phrase “who is a de facto guardian or de facto conservator” for “who has assumed a legal duty to provide care,” but left unchanged AR.S. § 46 — 455(B). 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 219, § 6. In sum, there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the legislature intended to subject the State or DDD to liability under A.R.S. § 46-455(B) as enterprises11 that have assumed a duty to provide care.
¶ 40 I agree with the majority that neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history expressly excludes the State as an entity that can be said to have “assumed a legal duty to provide care” under A.R.S. § 46 — 455(B). But this does not necessarily mean that the legislature intended the State and its political subdivisions to be liable for money damages under the statute. Instead, *401I believe the intended scope of that phrase in A.R.S. § 46-455(B) can best be gleaned by examining its intended meaning when inserted as part of the criminal statute one year earlier.
¶ 41 The other two categories of persons subject to both criminal and civil liability consist of those who provide care for incapacitated persons based on a contractual obligation or court order. However, many incapacitated people receive care from family members, friends, or other caretakers on a “voluntary” basis. To fill this gap, HB 2399, as originally proposed, would have imposed criminal liability on any person who assumed a duty to provide care. To distinguish a volunteer whose care is casual or infrequent and who therefore should be allowed to withdraw from providing care without facing criminal liability for “neglect” from one who has assumed an ongoing duty to provide care, the bill was later amended to insert the word “legal” in an imperfect attempt to clarify that a person neither employed nor appointed by court order to provide care could be liable only if that person had nonetheless assumed a legal duty to provide care. Subsequently, as already mentioned, AR.S. § 46-455(A) was amended by replacing that language with the phrase “who is a de facto guardian or de facto conservator[.]” Clearly, in the criminal version of the vulnerable adult statute, the State was not an entity that could be said to have assumed a legal duty to provide care.
¶ 42 The majority nonetheless asserts that the State and DDD have “assumed,” in the sense of taking upon oneself, a legal duty to provide care to vulnerable adults because they are statutorily required through the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System to provide services to all qualified disabled persons. AR.S. § 36-2929 (2009); see also A.R.S. § 36-554(A)(l) (2009) (designating DDD as the developmental services authority for the State). Given the historical use of this phrase initially in a criminal context in A.R.S. § 46-455(A), this is not a plausible construction of its intended meaning in AR.S. § 46-455(B). As originally contemplated by the legislature when inserted in the criminal statute, the concept of assuming a legal duty did not include a statutorily mandated duty. Surely, when it borrowed the phrase from a criminal statute, had the legislature intended to expand its meaning so as to make the State and its agencies liable for damages at the same time it was granting primary enforcement power to the State, it would have clearly stated so.
¶ 43 Finally, the legislative purpose in granting the State authority to institute both criminal and civil proceedings to protect vulnerable adults will be undermined if A.R.S. § 46-455(B) is construed as permitting vulnerable adults to file civil actions against the State and DDD. I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the State and DDD.
. As did the trial court, I would also reject the Estate’s alternative claim that it "employed” the State and DDD to provide care for Jacob. Because I believe the legislature did not intend the State to be one of the enterprises included within A.R.S. § 46-455(B), I find it unnecessary to address its remaining arguments.
. Enacted as A.R.S. § 46-455 in 1988; reorganized as A.R.S. § 46-455(A) in 1989.
. As defined in A.R.S. § 46-455(Q), an enterprise "means any corporation, partnership, association, labor union or other legal entity, or any group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity, that is involved with providing care to a vulnerable adult.”