concurring:
I concur because the well-reasoned majority opinion is grounded in the Kentucky Constitution, specifically § 110(5)(b), which states in pertinent part: “The Chief Justice shall submit the budget for the Court of Justice (COJ) and perform all other necessary administrative functions.” This particular provision controls disposition of the issue at hand, namely “when a COJ appointing authority refuses to terminate an employee whose conduct merits dismissal, who has the authority to act?” The dissent counters that the full Supreme Court must take part in the employee’s dismissal, citing § 116 of the Kentucky *75Constitution, a provision that, in pertinent part, gives this Court authority to make “rules for the appointment of commissioners and other court personnel_” Certainly, the Court has rule-making authority in this area and, indeed, it has exercised that authority by adopting personnel policies. But the Court has never adopted a policy that addresses the particular scenario of a local appointing authority unwilling to act when confronted with grounds for dismissal of a COJ employee. The dissent refuses to acknowledge this crucial fact and then suggests that the Chief Justice, in taking a personnel action deemed to be in the best interests of the Court of Justice and public, must be amending or overriding the Court’s personnel policies. Dissent at p. 78. He plainly did neither of those things. There is an interstice created by the absence of a controlling personnel policy and that interstice is properly filled by the Chief Justice exercising his power under § 110 to make a “necessary administrative” decision. Moreover, to suggest that the full Court must convene to decide the termination issue completely misperceives the fundamental difference between rule-making power and administration. The Court could have adopted a personnel policy that addressed this scenario (and perhaps it will do so in the future) but having either declined to do so or failed to do so, the Chief Justice is not powerless to engage in necessary administrative acts, and he most certainly is not obligated to convene the full Court to address a personnel scenario which they failed to address or chose not to address in the first instance.
Oversight of the Court of Justice is a solemn and, indeed, awesome responsibility and a myriad of circumstances have arisen, and will arise, which have not been anticipated, requiring prompt action in the interest of the Court of Justice and the public we serve. We have elected a Chief Justice and have reposed confidence in him to act in those matters. The dissent proposes a management-by-committee approach to Court administration in these circumstances which is not supported by the law and which has been rejected by the overwhelming majority of the Court— indeed, six of the seven sitting Justices since we may rightfully presume that our current Chief Justice acted with the same well-grounded understanding of the law as does the majority in this case. To state that in reaching our decision, the majority has “diminish[ed] respect for this Court and the rule of law,” id. at p. 80, and to suggest that only the lone dissenter has honored the Constitutional oath and declined to abdicate responsibilities, id. at p. 80, is entirely inappropriate.