dissenting on State’s Petition for Discretionary Review.
Rather than slog and slop through the semantic quagmire this Court created out of Article 1.14(b), V.A.C.C.P., in Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), we need not venture beyond the sound, safe bank of judicial discretion the State asserted to the court of appeals that the trial court abused in dismissing the indictment in this cause. State v. Turner, 868 S.W.2d 351, at 352, 355 (TexApp. — Houston [14th] 1993, 1994).
The State contends that “[t]he only way to bring such a defect to the attention of the trial court ‘in order to preserve any error ’ is to comply with Article 1.14(b).”1 State’s Ap*309pellate Brief, at 4.2 Preservation of error is a moot point here; the appellee is not appealing from an adverse ruling.
The prosecution is aggrieved because the trial court rejected its contention that the motion by accused was “untimely filed ” and, further, in that the court of appeals “construed Yount as allowing an objection on the day of trial, but before the trial commenced.” Majority opinion, at 305. Nevertheless, the majority dismisses the latter aspect, characterizing it as an issue “not raised by the parties.” Id., n. 4., at 306. For his part, Judge Baird addresses and also rejects that contention for reasons given in his own separate opinion, and for all we know the trial judge may well have construed the statute just as Judge Baird does.
Under the circumstances presented, I am satisfied the trial court was not stripped of its jurisdiction, power and authority to hear and determine the matter merely because the motion was not filed the day before.
Whatever the statute may prescribe for an accused, neither it nor any other proscribes a trial court from entertaining a pretrial matter of pleading coming to the attention of the judge presiding that may doom further prosecution of the cause. It is axiomatic that a court “invest[ed] with jurisdiction of the cause ” still possesses power and authority to determine whether there is yet a bar in law precluding prosecution of the alleged offense. See State v. Johnson, 821 S.W.2d 609, at 612 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); Garcia v. Dial, 596 S.W.2d 524, at 527-528 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).3 That a trial court thus exercises its jurisdiction, power and authority to dismiss a cause upon a questionable interpretation of applicable law would not adversely affect the propriety of its making a decision. Ibid.
Accordingly, the court below properly exercised its discretion to determine from the face of the indictment that the instant prosecution was barred by limitations. The court of appeals reasonably resolved questions raised by the State — ones not all that compelling or controlling in my view.
Therefore, because the Court does not affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, I respectfully dissent.
. All emphasis throughout this opinion is mine unless otherwise indicated here.
. The State’s internal quote, underscored above, is from State v. Yount, 853 S.W.2d 6, at 8 (Tex. Cr.App.1993). The State also quotes from my dissenting opinion in Yount, at 15, viz: "In view of Studer, ... unless raised in the trial court in a timely manner, limitations will not operate to divest the trial court of authority to convict.” In the course of recording in Studer that my own "understanding of a matter of 'substance' [would avoid] many problems that arise when 'substance' is construed in Article 1.14(b), supra, strictly in terms of Article 27.08, supra,” we contemplated this very question and protested against the anticipated answer expected by the Studer court. Id., at 292-293.
. Early on Texas courts accepted law dictionary definitions of "cause," viz:
"... A suit or action; any question civil or criminal contested before a court of justice.” Tolle v. Toole, 101 Tex. 33, 104 S.W. 1049, at 1050 (1907), quoting Bouvier; City of Big Spring v. Garlington, 88 S.W.2d 1095-1096 (Tex.Civ. App. — Eastland 1935), quoting Black, adding, "Case and cause are synonyms,” quoting Blyew v. United States, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 581, 20 L.Ed. 638 (1871), and citing other authorities including Tolle v. Tolle, supra; Eppoleto v. Bournias, 764 S.W.2d 284, at 285 (Tex.App. — Waco 1988); see also Garner, Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage 104 (1987) (both terms used to describe litigated actions).