ON DENIAL OF REHEARING
BOYLE, Justice.This is an appeal from the first degree murder convictions and death sentences imposed on David Leslie Card for the murders of Eugene and Shirley Morey. In addition to the automatic review required of death penalty cases by I.C. § 19-2827, Card raises many issues on appeal including the constitutionality of the legislative
abolishment of the insanity defense, the constitutionality of the “utter disregard for human life” language contained in I.C. § 19-2515, the limitation on post-conviction relief petitions in capital cases, and the effect of a victim impact statement contained in the presentence report.1
I.
According to the record, during the early morning hours of June 5,1988, Card was in a Circle K convenience store in Nampa, Idaho, and had an argument with the night clerk about death and seeing people die. After the clerk ordered him out of the store, Card went home and retrieved a revolver. Card later returned to the store and found that the clerk with whom he had argued was not working. He then approached a vehicle parked near the store and shot and killed Eugene and Shirley Morey as they were folding newspapers for their morning paper route. According to the record, Card later told a jail cellmate that he originally intended to kill the clerk, but killed the Moreys simply because they were there.
Shortly after Card was charged with two counts of murder, his appointed counsel and the prosecuting attorney filed motions to determine whether Card had the mental capacity to understand the proceedings against him. The district court ordered evaluations of Card by Dr. Mac Webb, a psychologist, and Dr. Michael Estess, a psychiatrist. Both experts agreed that Card, at that time, did not have the mental capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist counsel in his defense. On the basis of those evaluations Card was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed for treatment and evaluation for ninety days pursuant to I.C. § 18-212. During the course of treatment Card was found to be suffering from a type of paranoid schizophrenia and he re*428sponded well to medication and treatment. With the treatment Card received he was subsequently adjudged competent to stand trial.
One of Card’s primary defenses at trial was that he did not have the mental capacity to form the specific intent necessary to commit first degree murder. Two licensed psychiatrists testified in his behalf at trial and expressed opinions that Card suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and as a result of this mental defect had a difficult time distinguishing reality from illusion. Notwithstanding this testimony, the jury found Card guilty of two counts of first degree murder.
A sentencing hearing was held in which the two psychiatrists who testified at trial also testified concerning Card’s mental condition. These expert witnesses testified that Card definitely suffered from a form of mental illness but that his prognosis for treatment was good. A presentence report was submitted to the district court which, among other information, contained a summary of statements made to the presentence investigator concerning the impact of the murders on the Morey family.
After considering the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing the district judge found two aggravating circumstances existed that justified the imposition of the death penalty. First, at the time of each murder the defendant also committed another murder. I.C. § 19—2515(g)(2). Second, that by the murders or circumstances surrounding their commission the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life. I.C. § 19—2515(g)(6). The trial court also determined that the facts supported a finding of several mitigating circumstances. However, the trial court found that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh either of the aggravating circumstances, and imposed the death penalty. This appeal followed, and we affirm.
II.
Card asserts that I.C. § 18-207 is unconstitutional because it violates his constitutional rights to due process and the right to be tried by a jury. Card claims that the insanity defense is so fundamental to our system of justice that its abolishment constitutes a denial of a fundamental constitutional right.
In State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 (1990), we considered the fundamental nature of the insanity defense and addressed the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-207. In Searcy we held:
Accordingly, we conclude, based upon the foregoing authorities, that due process as expressed in the Constitutions of the United States and of Idaho does not constitutionally mandate an insanity defense and that I.C. § 18-207 does not deprive the defendant Searcy of his due process rights under the state or federal Constitution.
118 Idaho at 637, 798 P.2d at 919 (citations omitted) (opinion of Bakes, C.J., Boyle, J. and Woodland, DJ. Pro Tem.)2 In State v. Searcy we cited to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968), and quoted the following:
[TJhis [C]ourt has never articulated a general constitutional doctrine of mens rea. We cannot cast aside the centu*429ries-long evolution of the collection of interlocking and overlapping concepts which the common law has utilized to assess the moral accountability of an individual for his antisocial deeds. The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This process of adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the States.
[Powell v. Texas], 392 U.S. at 535-536, 88 S.Ct. at 2156, 20 L.Ed.2d at 1269 (emphasis added). Justice Marshall, in his Powell opinion, stated that “nothing could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms.”
118 Idaho at 636, 798 P.2d at 918 (footnote omitted).
Card claims that the recent U.S. Supreme Court pronouncement in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), mandates the allowance of an insanity defense in death penalty cases. Specifically, Card relies upon the following language from Penry:
The common law prohibition against punishing “idiots” for their crimes suggests that it may indeed be “cruel and unusual” punishment to execute persons who are profoundly or severely retarded and wholly lacking the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions. Because of the protections afforded by the insanity defense today, such a person is not likely to be convicted or face the prospect of punishment.
492 U.S. at 333, 109 S.Ct. at 2954.
We agree with the views of the United States Supreme Court but note that the safeguard referred to in Penry is in place in Idaho. Under Idaho law, an individual must be found competent to stand trial. I.C. § 18-210.3 In addition, those individuals who are incapable of forming the necessary intent needed for the crime are protected by the mens rea requirements of I.C. §§ 18-114,4 18-1155 and 18-207. Finally, those “profoundly or severely retarded” individuals who do not fall under the first two protections and are convicted and who are “wholly lacking capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions” are protected by the sentencing provisions of I.C. § 19-2523. Idaho Code § 19-2523 specifically requires the sentencing court to consider “[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the offense charged.” Accordingly, we hold that the absence of the insanity defense in capital cases does not violate any constitutional protections. State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 (1990).
Card’s argument that I.C. § 18-207 conflicts with I.C. § 18-114 and § 18-115 is also without merit. State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho at 635, 798 P.2d at 917. It is a fundamental law of statutory construction that statutes that are in pari materia are to be construed together, to the end that the legislative intent will be given effect. State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 367, 670 P.2d 463, 468, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1327, 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1983). It is clear that I.C. § 18-114 and § 18-115 do *430not mandate the existence of a defense based upon insanity. State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 710 P.2d 526 (1985). Both I.C. § 18-114 and § 18-115 deal with the intent of the defendant at the time of the crime. While I.C. § 18-115 includes language concerning the discretion and soundness of a defendant’s mind, it is clear that those elements are simply a part of all of the circumstances or conditions which manifest the intent of the defendant. Idaho Code § 18-207 removed the insanity defense as it existed previously6 and reduced the issue of mental condition from the status of a formal defense to that of an evidentiary question. State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 710 P.2d 526 (1985). There is no conflict between these three statutes. State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 (1990); State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 710 P.2d 526 (1985).
Idaho Code § 18-207 does not remove the element of criminal responsibility for the crime. The prosecution is still required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had the mental capacity to form the necessary intent. Idaho Code § 18-207 merely disallows mental condition from providing a complete defense to the crime and may allow the conviction of persons who may be insane by some former insanity test or medical standard, but who nevertheless have the ability to form intent and to control their actions. The statute expressly allows admission of expert evidence on the issues of mens rea or any state of mind which is an element of the crime. See I.C. § 18-207(b). In addition, the statutes require the sentencing judge to consider and receive evidence of the mental condition of the defendant at the time of sentencing. I.C. § 19-2523. This statutory process provides the necessary safeguards and does not offend the principies of due process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 (1990).
Card asserts that the repeal of the insanity defense denies him his right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution. Specifically, Card argues that the jury, not a judge, should hear evidence that as a result of mental disease or defect he is not responsible for his criminal conduct. In light of the foregoing statutory safeguards previously cited we find Card’s argument to be without merit. In Idaho a jury need only determine whether a crime has been committed. Punishment is a duty and responsibility of the trial court not the jury. State v. Scott, 72 Idaho 202, 239 P.2d 258 (1951); see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989).
III.
Card urges us to reconsider our pri- or ruling in State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1073, 109 S.Ct. 1360, 103 L.Ed.2d 827 (1989), concerning the time limitation for post-conviction relief in capital cases. Card argues that there is neither a rational basis nor a compelling state interest which justifies the existing Idaho statutory post-conviction scheme in death penalty cases under I.C. § 19-2719 and, therefore, that the statutory scheme is unconstitutional. Furthermore, Card argues that the statute creates a difficult situation for trial counsel charged with ineffective assistance during the defense of his client. Because of the statute’s procedural and time limitations, *431Card argues, without actually raising an issue of ineffective counsel, that it is impossible for trial counsel charged as “ineffective” to present all of the issues on appeal as well as the issue of his or her own ineffectiveness on a post-conviction petition.
In Beam, we thoroughly and extensively discussed the constitutionality of I.C. § 19-2719 and held that the statute satisfied all required tests and was, therefore, constitutional. After an extensive discussion of the applicable tests to determine constitutionality, we held that the provisions of I.C. § 19-2719 did not violate any of the defendant’s rights.
In this case the legislature clearly pointed out a rational basis for I.C. § 19-2719 in the statement of purpose which accompanied the enactment of the statute. The underlying legislative purpose behind the statute stated the need to expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings and recognized the use of dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to “thwart their sentences.” The statute’s purpose is to “avoid such abuses of legal process by requiring that all collateral claims for relief ... be consolidated in one proceeding____” We hold that the legislature’s determination that it was necessary to reduce the interminable delay in capital cases is a rational basis for the imposition of the 42-day time limit set for I.C. § 19-2719. The legislature has identified the problem and attempted to remedy it with a statutory scheme that is rationally related to the legitimate legislative purpose of expediting constitutionally imposed sentences. Accordingly, I.C. § 19-2719 does not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to equal protection, and the trial court correctly denied Beam’s post conviction petition.
Beam, 115 Idaho at 213, 766 P.2d at 683.
We have reviewed our analysis and holding in Beam, and reaffirm the principle established therein. Recently, in State v. Rhoades (Baldwin), 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1991), the Court held:
Therefore we hold that I.C. § 19-2719 provides a defendant one opportunity to raise all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a petition for post-conviction relief except in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated that the issues raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known within the time frame allowed by the statute. The legislature has seen fit to appropriately limit the time frame within which to bring challenges which are known or which reasonably should be known. The process encompassed in I.C. § 19-2719 providing for review by the trial court and then this Court, provides adequate opportunity to present the issues raised and to have them adequately reviewed. Therefore, I.C. § 19-2719 is not unconstitutional under due process analysis.
Id. at 807, 820 P.2d at 677.
Accordingly, we hold that I.C. § 19-2719 provides adequate opportunity to present the issues raised for review and is not unconstitutional under a due process analysis.
IV.
As required by I.C.R. 33.1, a presentence investigator prepared a presentence report prior to the sentencing. In preparation of the report, the presentence investigator interviewed members of the Morey family and ultimately described their situation, including the placement and condition of the Moreys’ minor children.7 The presentence *432investigation report also stated that it “was the consensus of the family that Card should be sentenced to death for his crime.” Card argues that the comments regarding the family of the victims and the opinion of family members concerning a particular sentence was a violation of the constitutional doctrines enunciated in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), and State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 922, 110 S.Ct. 287, 107 L.Ed.2d 267 (1989).
The victim impact statement issue as to the effect of the crime on the children and family members is resolved by a recent holding of the United States Supreme Court. Payne v. Tennessee, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). Left unresolved by Payne, however, is the issue of the family’s feelings and comments concerning the sentence to be imposed. In Payne, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar prohibiting a capital sentencing jury from considering “victim impact” evidence relating to the victim’s personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the murder on the victim’s family. In Payne, the Supreme Court partially overruled South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989), and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987). Likewise, to the extent that our holdings in State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991); State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 798 P.2d 1 (1990); and State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 922,110 S.Ct. 287,107 L.Ed.2d 267 (1989), are to the contrary on the issue of the impact of the crime on the family members they are overruled.
In Payne v. Tennessee, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), the United States Supreme Court analyzed the victim impact issue and held:
We are now of the view that a State may properly conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant. “The State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family.” Booth, 482 U.S., at 517 [107 S.Ct. at 2540] (WHITE, J. dissenting) (citation omitted). By turning the victim into a “faceless stranger at the penalty phase of a capital trial,” Gathers, 490 U.S., at 821 [109 S.Ct. at 2216] (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting), Booth deprives the State of the full moral force of its evidence and may prevent the jury from having before it all the information necessary to determine the proper punishment for a first-degree murder.
We thus hold that if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar. A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. There is no reason to treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence is treated.
*433111 S.Ct. at 2608-09.8
In the instant case the sentencing judge made the following remarks concerning the victim impact statements contained in the report:
I find it interesting, but an apparently factual part of the law in the State of Idaho today, and not only the State of Idaho but under Federal Court edict through the Federal system, that when something like this occurs, they take the position that the survivors or family members of the victim’s family are not permitted to make statements or testify to the Court concerning the effect upon the family that this homicide has had.
They say that that would prejudice the judge or jury in those states where the jury is involved and cause that person or group of persons to make an irrational decision, to reach conclusions that would be based solely upon emotion rather than upon a review of the facts. However, it is perfectly appropriate for the perpetrator of the crime to have his family’s support and members come forth and speak in his behalf. There is no prohibition against that. I find that strange myself, but that seems to be the state of the law.
There can be no spokesman here for Eugene and Shirley Morey. The silence is deafening where they are concerned. But I’m not supposed to be just totally retributive about my attitude. What I have to do is reach a decision whether these mitigating factors I find exist in this case outweigh any of them or collectively outweigh the aggravating factors that exist.
Unlike the victim impact statements in Booth and Charboneau which were detailed, the statements in this case briefly stated that although it has been difficult to deal with the loss, the two children had been placed in the home of an uncle, appeared to be adjusting to their new environment and doing well in school. Such statements constituted feelings that one could assume loved ones would experience in the circumstances. See State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991). In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Payne v. Tennessee, we hold that the victim impact statement as to the impact on family members contained in the presentence report was not improper and did not violate Card’s constitutional rights.
Contained in the presentence report is a statement that the Morey family members felt that Card should receive the death penalty. Although the Supreme Court did not address this issue because no evidence was presented in that case, we do so because it is an issue before us. We have carefully reviewed the entire record and are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentencing judge imposed the death penalty in this case based on the evidence and without regard to the opinions of the Morey family and the statements contained in the presentence investigation report regarding the nature of the sentence. See Payne v. Tennessee, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991); State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 798 P.2d 1 (1991); Parker v. Dugger, 537 So.2d 969 (Fla.1988); People v. Jones, 123 Ill.2d 387, 123 Ill.Dec. 944, 528 N.E.2d 648 (1988). We, therefore, hold that the victim impact statements contained in the presentence report, including the comments contained in the report as to an appropriate sentence, are not error and do not require that the case be remanded for resentencing.
It is clear from reading the record that the sentencing judge was aware of and knew the state of the law and that he did *434not consider the statements made by the family members in imposing sentence.
V.
Card argues that the “utter disregard for human life” language of I.C. § 19-2515(g)(6) is unconstitutionally vague.9 Relying upon Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the mitigating circumstance of “outrageous or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman” conduct allowed “standardless discretion” and the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty, Card argues that the “utter disregard” language of I.C. § 19-2515(g)(6) is similarly vague. Card also argues that because the trial court did not define its use of the term “utter disregard,” its findings are insufficient to show that the imposition of death in this case is reasoned and objective.
Under the Eighth Amendment of the federal Constitution, a claim of vagueness is analyzed by determining whether the challenged aggravating circumstance adequately informs the sentencer what it must find in order to impose the death penalty, or whether it leaves the sentencer with unchanneled discretion to make an arbitrary and capricious decision. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356,108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991). Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990), and Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), clarified the requirement for clearly defined aggravating circumstances. In Lewis the United States Supreme Court stated:
Our capital punishment doctrine is rooted in the principle that “ ‘[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be ... wantonly and ... freakishly imposed.’ ” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (joint opinion) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2762, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Furman, supra, at 313, 92 S.Ct., at 2764 (White, J., concurring) (invalidating capital punishment statute where “there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not”). Accordingly, “where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” Gregg, 428 U.S., at 189, 96 S.Ct., at 2932.
This principle requires a State to “channel the sentencer’s discretion by ‘clear and objective standards’ that provide ‘specific and detailed guidance,’ and that ‘make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.’ ” Godfrey, supra, 446 U.S., at 428, 100 S.Ct., at 1764 (footnotes omitted). A State’s definitions of its aggravating circumstances—those circumstances that make a criminal defendant “eligible” for the death penalty—therefore play a significant role in channeling the sentencer’s discretion____
We have reiterated the general principle that aggravating circumstances must be construed to permit the sentencer to make a principled distinction between *435those who deserve the death penalty and those who do not. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3162, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984) (“If a State has determined that death should be an available penalty for certain crimes, then it must administer that penalty in a way that can rationally distinguish between those individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not.”); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (“[A]n aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder”)
110 S.Ct. at 3099-3100 (footnote omitted).
In Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), the United States Supreme Court stated the manner in which a statute must be reviewed to determine its constitutionality.
When a federal court is asked to review a state court’s application of an individual statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstance in a particular case, it must first determine whether the statutory language defining the circumstance is itself too vague to provide any guidance to the sentencer. If so, then the federal court must attempt to determine whether the state courts have further defined the vague terms and if they have done so, whether those definitions are constitutionally sufficient, i.e., whether they provide some guidance to the sentencer.
110 S.Ct. at 3057 (emphasis in original).
The United States Supreme Court in Walton v. Arizona, further stated, in terms of the language of the Arizona statute, that the “definition of an aggravating factor of this nature is not susceptible of mathematical precision,” and that a statute will be constitutionally sufficient if it “gives meaningful guidance to the sentencer.” 110 S.Ct. at 3058.
In State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981), we recognized that there was a “need for clear standards to guide the discretion of the sentencing body in death penalty cases” to conform with the guidelines of the United States Supreme Court’s mandate outlined in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho at 417, 631 P.2d at 199. The clear standards were necessary to “channel the sentencing decision” so that a “pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman [v. Georgia ]” would not occur. Thus, “a limiting construction is indispensable if the state is to meet its constitutional obligation to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.” In State v. Osborn, we held:
Under Gregg, it is apparent that the language contained in I.C. §§ 19-2515(f)(5) and (6) [now I.C. §§ 19-2515(g)(5) and (6)] is facially constitutional. However, inasmuch as a reasonable person could fairly characterize any murder as “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity” and as exhibiting an “utter disregard for human life,” it is equally apparent under Godfrey [v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980)] that this court must place a limiting construction upon these statutory aggravating circumstances so as to avoid the possibility of their application in an unconstitutional manner.
102 Idaho at 417-18, 631 P.2d at 199-200.
Therefore, in Osborn we described the following limiting construction on the “utter disregard” language of I.C. § 19-2515(g)(6):
To properly define this circumstance, it is important to note the other aggravating circumstances with which this provision overlaps. The second aggravating circumstance, I.C. § 19—2515(f)(2) [now I.C. § 19-2515(g)(2) ], that the defendant committed another murder at the time this murder was committed, obviously could show an utter disregard for human life, as could the third aggravating circum*436stance, I.C. § 19-2515(f)(3) [now I.C. § 19—2515(g)(3) ], that the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. The same can be said for the fourth aggravating circumstance, I.C. § 19-2515(f)(4) [now I.C. § 19-2515(g)(4) ], that the murder was committed for remuneration. Since we will not presume that the legislative intent was to duplicate any already enumerated circumstance, thus making I.C. § 19-2515(f)(6) mere surplusage (See, e.g., Norton v. Dept. of Employment, 94 Idaho 924, 500 P.2d 825 (1972)), we hold that the phrase “utter disregard” must be viewed in reference to acts other than those set forth in I.C. §§ 19-2515(f)(2), (3), and (4). We conclude instead that the phrase is meant to be reflective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer. With such an interpretation, it is our conclusion that this aggravating circumstance meets the constitutional requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court.
102 Idaho at 418-19, 631 P.2d at 200-01 (emphasis added).
In State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 774 P.2d 252 (1989), we further distinguished the “utter disregard” language of I.C. § 19-2515(g)(6) from the “heinous, atrocious or cruel” language of I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5). We stated:
[T]he “utter disregard” factor refers not to the outrageousness of the acts constituting the murder, but to the defendant’s lack of conscientious scruples against killing another human being.
The particularly cold-blooded killer need not act sadistically or in a particularly outrageous fashion in order to commit a killing with utter disregard for human life. One who commits a crime in an especially heinous way is punished for the heinousness of his crime, not because he acted with utter disregard for human life, although it may be expected that most especially heinous, atrocious or cruel murders will have been committed with utter disregard for human life.
116 Idaho at 99, 774 P.2d at 269.
Since Osborn, we have reiterated our definition of “utter disregard for human life” and affirmed its constitutionality in other capital cases. See State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991); State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 798 P.2d 1 (1990); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989); State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 774 P.2d 252 (1989); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (1986); State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 706 P.2d 456 (1985); State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 676 P.2d 31 (1984); and State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983). In addition, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho has upheld on at least two occasions in reviewing a death penalty case on collateral review this Court’s limiting definition of “utter disregard” as constitutionally sufficient. See Fetterly v. Paskett, 747 F.Supp. 594 (D.Idaho 1990); Beam v. Paskett, 744 F.Supp. 958 (D.Idaho 1990).
Recently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the “utter disregard” language of I.C. § 19-2515(g)(6) is unconstitutionally vague. Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873, as amended October 16, 1991 (Trott, Circuit Judge dissenting from order denying rehearing en banc, joined by Kozinski and T.G. Nelson). In light of Creech v. Arave, we must look to the record to determine whether there is evidence to support the trial court’s finding of the other aggravating circumstance.
It is presumed that when a trial judge considers the death penalty, he or she will apply the aggravating circumstances in such a manner to avoid the freakish and arbitrary application of the death penalty. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). Our review of the record satisfies us that the circumstances of this case are sufficiently aggravating to warrant imposition of the death penalty. It is clear from the record before us that the defendant killed two people he had never met. The acts and circumstances of this murder as *437contained in the record confirm the trial court’s finding that Card was a conscienceless, pitiless slayer who killed two innocent persons in cold blood without reason or provocation. The sentencing court stated:
One thing that stands out about this case, in my mind, is that it has been—I personally have been involved as a judge or a lawyer in a significant number of murder cases, and this is the first case with which I have had any contact in which there was not some type of a connection between the perpetrator and the victim. Now, in some of those cases, those connections may have arisen on the basis of human motives and from the most despicable of human qualities, but there was a basis. Maybe it was an irrational, unreasonable sexual drive of some kind that caused the defendant in a particular case to do the thing he did; maybe it was revenge; maybe it was a real or perceived threat of some kind. But in every case the person, or in this case the person killed, had some kind of a connection with the perpetrator.
In this case, there was none. The reason that Eugene and Shirley Morey are dead is because they just happened to be there. Whoever else might have been sitting at that place at that time would have suffered the same fate. There is not one shred, not one iota of evidence in any form of provocation, or in any form of retribution or revenge, real or imagined, as it relates to the Defendant and Eugene and Shirley Morey.
That makes the killing in this case unique in my own experience. So it almost belies human comprehension as to how this could occur with no provocation, absent total, literal insanity, as most of us non-psychiatrically trained people think of insanity. The interesting thing raised in this case is the contention of diminished mental capacity. It to me is the most significant mitigating factor that is raised here.
I find that by the evidence adduced at the trial of this case, as well as the evidence adduced here or discussed here, that beyond a reasonable doubt there are two aggravating factors involved in this case, the first and most obvious being that in the commission of the murder a second murder was committed. That goes without saying.
I find also that because, at least in large part because of the lack of any provocation whatsoever, that by the murder and circumstances surrounding it, that the commission of this murder by the perpetrator exhibited utter and total disregard for human life. In my view, absent some excuse or justification, it was a cold-blooded, pitiless killing.
The evidence in this case as it relates to the Defendant, as argued by the State, indicates a walking-up to the car of these two people wrapping their newspapers, no announcements, no apparent statements, no nothing, just shooting each of them in the head and walking away, hesitating momentarily, walking back to the other side of the car and shooting them both again. It was an execution, in my judgment, of these people.
In addition to the trial court’s finding that the defendant displayed “utter disregard for human life” pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515(g)(6), there was another aggravating circumstance present in this case. The evidence in the record of the instant case clearly shows that “another murder” was committed as contemplated by I.C. § 19-2515(g)(2). At the time Eugene Morey was murdered, Shirley Morey was also murdered. Therefore, without addressing whether the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is correct in its conclusion that the “utter disregard for human life” language in I.C. § 19-2515(g)(6) is unconstitutionally vague, we hold that the record before us supports the trial court’s finding that at the time each of the respective victims were killed, “another murder” was committed as contemplated by I.C. § 19-2515(g)(2). That finding, having been weighed against the mitigating circumstances, is sufficient to sustain the trial court’s consideration of the death penalty and it is not necessary that we address the constitutionality of I.C. § 19-2515(g)(6).
Our decision in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989), *438requires that the sentencing judge weigh the cumulative mitigating circumstances against each of the aggravating circumstances separately. Here, the sentencing judge found five mitigating circumstances: 1) the defendant suffers at least some mental illness or aberration; 2) the defendant has been a good and faithful employee and worker; 3) until the perpetration of the crimes of which he has been convicted, the defendant had no prior history of violent behavior; 4) the defendant has no record of prior felony convictions; and 5) while in pre-trial confinement at the Secured Medical Facility at the Idaho State Penitentiary the defendant responded positively to medical and psychiatric treatment. The sentencing judge followed Charboneau by finding that “all the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating circumstances found” and that the imposition of the death penalty was not unjust. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho at 153, 774 P.2d at 323. The sentencing judge stated: “I am not convinced that these mitigating factors collectively or individually outweigh either one of the aggravating factors.” We have reviewed the record and find that the evidence supports the sentencing judge’s findings in this regard. Furthermore, we find that the trial judge’s written findings of fact were sufficiently detailed to insure that the death penalty was imposed in a reasonable and objective manner as is constitutionally required. Since the record is sufficient and the findings of the district court are set forth with reasonable exactitude this Court has been able to fulfill the function of “meaningful appellate review” as required by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this Court. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 415, 631 P.2d 187, 197 (1981).
VI.
We are required by I.C. § 19-2827(c) to independently review the sentence and determine 1) whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; 2) whether the evidence supports the judge’s findings of a statutory aggravating circumstance; and 3) whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
We have reviewed the record of the sentencing hearing and find that the sentencing judge appropriately followed the mandate of I.C. § 19-2515. We hold that the sentence of death in this case was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. The evidence supports the sentencing judge’s finding of two statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. We have also reviewed this case and compared it with other first degree murder cases in which the death penalty was imposed10 as well as those cases in *439which the death penalty was not imposed.11 From our review of these cases it does not appear that the sentence of death in this case is excessive or disproportionate.
In determining whether the sentence of death is proportional we compare the “gravity of the offense,” which is understood to include not only the injury caused, but also the defendant’s moral culpability with the “harshness of the penalty.” See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 343, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2959, 106 L.Ed.2d 256, 294 (1989) (Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3010, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)). It is clear that a mental defect may diminish an individual’s culpability for a criminal act. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct. at 2956. In Idaho a sentencing court is required to consider any claim of mental illness in sentencing and determine:
(a) The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill;
(b) The degree of illness or defect and level of functional impairment;
(c) The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation;
(d) The availability of treatment and level of care required;
(e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public, if at large, or the absence of such risk;
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the offense charged.
I.C. § 19-2523(1).
In this case Card argued that his mental state was sufficiently severe that it should foreclose the possibility of the death penalty. The district court considered the mental condition of Card and stated:
I am not convinced that there is enough certainty, enough reliability and psychiatric opinion to explain away what otherwise appears to be a well-thought-out, deliberately planned and intentional shooting and killing of two people—for those reasons, I am not convinced that these mitigating factors collectively or individually outweigh either one of the aggravating factors.
The district court further expressly stated that he understood the importance of considering the mental state of the defendant at the time of sentencing since I.C. § 18-207 absolved the insanity defense. The district court noted that the diminished capacity circumstance was the most significant mitigating factor but that it was not sufficient to outweigh either of the aggravating circumstances in this case. Thus, we are satisfied that the district court properly considered the mitigating circumstances and weighed those factors separately against each aggravating circumstance. After reviewing the record, we hold that Card’s mental condition has been considered and that issue is insufficient to make the imposition of the death penalty in this case disproportionate. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989).12
*440VIL
We have reviewed all of the issues raised by Card and have conducted our independent review of the record as required by I.C. § 19-2827. We find no reversible error and specifically uphold the validity of I.C. § 18-207 regarding the insanity defense as well as the existence of an aggravating circumstance pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515(g)(2). In light of Payne v. Tennessee, we hold that the victim impact statements contained in the presentence report were not error, and whereas the statements as to sentence were not considered by the district judge in imposing the death penalty, we find no reversible error. We hold that the provisions of I.C. § 19-2719 are constitutional and do not violate the defendant’s due process rights. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and death sentences for first degree murder.
The judgment entered and sentence imposed are affirmed. Upon issuance of the remittitur the district court shall set a new execution date. I.C. § 19-2719(11).
BAKES, C.J. concurs and McDEVITT, J. concurs specially.. Many of the issues raised by Card have been extensively addressed in other recent cases decided by this Court, e.g. State v. Rhoades (Baldwin) 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1991); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991); State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 798 P.2d 1 (1990); State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 (1990). In addition, the recent decision of the United States Supreme court in Payne v. Tennessee, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), resolves the victim impact statement issue raised by Card on this appeal.
. Card has questioned the validity of Supreme Court decisions wherein pro tem district judges sit in the place of a member of this Court. Idaho Constitution art. 5, § 6 provides that "[i]f a justice of the Supreme Court shall be disqualified from sitting in a cause before said court, or be unable to sit therein, by reason of illness or absence, the said court may call a district judge to sit in said court on the hearing of such cause.” This section gives the appointed pro tem district judge the same authority and powers as a Supreme Court Justice for the cause in which he or she is sitting. In First National Bank v. Crane Creek Sheep Co., 47 Idaho 149, 273 P. 945 (1928), a district judge acting as a pro tem Justice wrote the opinion of the Court. The Idaho Supreme Court stated that "this court has the power to call a district judge to sit in a cause in place of a justice ... and, in such a case, the district judge possesses all the power of a justice of the supreme court with respect to the cause.” 47 Idaho at 156, 273 P. at 947. Thus, the decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court in Searcy and State v. Rhoades (Baldwin), 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1991), as well as any other cause heard by this Court is not diminished in any respect because of the appointment and participation of a pro tem Justice.
. 18-210. Lack of capacity to understand proceedings—Delay of trial.—No person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures.
. 18-114. Union of act and Intent.—In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence.
. 18-115. Manifestation of intent.—The intent or intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense, and the sound mind and discretion of the accused. All persons are of sound mind who are neither idiots or lunatics, nor affected with insanity.
. The Act adopting I.C. § 18-207 repealed the former versions of I.C. §§ 18-207, 18-208, 18-209, 18-213 and 18-214. 1982 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 368, at 919. Former I.C. § 18-207 set forth the elements of the insanity defense in Idaho as the following:
Mental illness as defense—(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this act, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
This test is substantially the same test now required by the sentencing guidelines of I.C. § 19— 2523.
. The presentence report specifically states:
VICTIM’S STATEMENT: The victims in this case are deceased. I interviewed members of Mrs. Morey’s family. Her parents, Ada and Edward Stillwell, her brother, Roy Stillwell and a sister, Nancy Brown.
They described their family as very closely knit. If someone needed help or moral support whether family member or stranger, Shirley and Eugene would lend a helping hand. They stated “they were poor but they would give what ever they had to help others. It has been very difficult to deal with the loss.”
They stated the two surviving children of the Morey couple, Terry, age 16 and Tammy age 13 are residing with an uncle, Clawrence Still-well, and his wife in Rockland, Idaho, a small community near American Falls. The family, as a whole, decided on the placement with *432Clawrence who could provide better financially for the children and also they felt a change of environment away from the constant reminders of their parents would be beneficial to them. They stated the children are both in counseling and seem to be adjusting to their environment and are doing well in school. It is the consensus of the family of the victims, Shirley and Eugene Morey, that the defendant, Mr. Card, should be sentenced to death for his crime. It is their opinion that if he could shoot to death two total strangers with no provocation whatsoever, he could do it again just as easily.
Mrs. Ada Stillwell stated, “As a mother, my heart goes out to Mr. Card’s mother. I know she is suffering her own grief and heartache for her son also.
. The special concurring opinion of Justice O’Connor provides clarification and guidance for trial courts involved in capital sentencing:
We do not hold today that victim impact evidence must be admitted, or even that it should be admitted. We hold merely that if a State decides to permit consideration of this evidence, "the Eighth Amendment erects no perse bar.” Ante, [111 S.Ct.] at 2609. If, in a particular case, a witness’ testimony or a prosecutor’s remark so infects the sentencing proceeding as to render it fundamentally unfair, the defendant may seek appropriate relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
. Subsequent to oral argument in the instant case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873 as amended October 16, 1991 (Trott, Circuit Judge dissenting from order denying rehearing en banc, joined by Kozinski and T.G. Nelson), which addressed the "utter disregard for human life” language of I.C. § 19—2515(g)(6), and held it to be unconstitutionally vague. We will address the applicability and effect of Creech v. Arave later in this decision following our review of the cases emanating from this Court and the United States Supreme Court.
. State v. Rhoades (Baldwin), 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665, (1991); State v. Pizztito, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991); State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 798 P.2d 1 (1990); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 781 P.2d 197 (1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3295, 111 L.Ed.2d 803 (1990); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989); McKinney v. State, 115 Idaho 1125, 772 P.2d 1219 (1989); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 766 P.2d 701 (1988); State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964, 107 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed.2d 408 (1986); State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989, 107 S.Ct. 582, 93 L.Ed.2d 585 (1986); State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 715 P.2d 833 (1985); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 1202 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 870, 107 S.Ct. 239, 93 L.Ed.2d 164 (1986); State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 710 P.2d 526 (1985); State v. Bainbridge, 108 Idaho 273, 698 P.2d 335 (1985); State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 690 P.2d 293 (1984); State v. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 687 P.2d 570 (1984); State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 676 P.2d 31 (1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 3592, 82 L.Ed.2d 888 (1984); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 675 P.2d 33 (1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 3592, 82 L.Ed.2d 888 (1984); State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 3591, 82 L.Ed.2d 887 (1984); State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983); State v. Major, 105 Idaho 4, 665 P.2d 703 (1983); State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 660 P.2d 1336, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 934, 103 S.Ct. 2101, 77 L.Ed.2d 308 (1983); State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 648 P.2d 203 (1982); State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981); State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 130 (1979); State v. Lindquist, 99 Idaho 766, 589 P.2d 101 (1979).
*439The cases cited above are capital cases decided subsequent to the adoption of I.C. § 19-2827. In addition to the foregoing cases we also reviewed earlier capital cases in our proportionality analysis and find no disproportionality. State v. Gerdau, 96 Idaho 516, 531 P.2d 1161 (1975); State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 537 P.2d 1369 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1089, 96 S.Ct. 881, 47 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976); State v. Hokenson, 96 Idaho 283, 527 P.2d 487 (1974); State v. Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 286, 460 P.2d 711 (1969); State v. Gonzales, 92 Idaho 152, 438 P.2d 897 (1968); State v. Koho, 91 Idaho 450, 423 P.2d 1004 (1967); State v. Clokey, 83 Idaho 322, 364 P.2d 159 (1961); State v. Snowden, 79 Idaho 266, 313 P.2d 706 (1957); State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953) (considered only in terms of crime committed and penalty imposed), overruled on substantive law point in State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 486 P.2d 82 (1971).
. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 807 P.2d 610 (1991); State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 (1990); State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 792 P.2d 916 (1990).
. In Penry, the United States Supreme Court indicated that the imposition of the death penalty on a twenty-two-year-old who had the mental age of a six-year-old convicted of a capital crime would not be prohibited per se by the eighth amendment.