concurring.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for assault in the third degree (assault III), ORS 163.165, and assigns error to the trial court’s instruction to the jury that it could convict defendant of assault III if it found that he had “aided another who was actually present in causing physical injury.” We review jury instructions for errors of law, State v. Reese, 156 Or App 406, 409, 967 P2d 514 (1998), and will reverse only if, when considered as a whole, the instruction “ ‘created an erroneous impression of the law in the minds of the ljury] which affected the outcome of the case.’ ” State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248, 266, 971 P2d 879 (1999) (quoting Waterway Terminals v. P.S. Lord, 256 Or 361, 370, 474 P2d 309 (1970)). We affirm by an equally divided court. I write separately to explain why I concur in that result.
Because the facts are disputed and because we are reviewing the propriety of jury instructions, I state both parties’ versions of the facts, beginning with the state’s version. State v. Davis, 116 Or App 654, 657, 842 P2d 463 (1992) (defendant is entitled to have jury correctly instructed on his theory of the case if there is evidence to support the theory). In July 1998, Stemson, the victim, clocked out of work at 2:15 a.m. after working the swing shift at Oak Harbor Freight Lines. As he drove away from work, he saw defendant and defendant’s brother, Pine, at the end of the driveway. Stemson honked at the brothers and continued to drive away. Pine got into his car and followed Stemson. Pine passed Stemson and stopped in front of Stemson’s vehicle, forcing Stemson to drive off the road. Pine then got out of his car, approached Stemson, who was still seat belted into his car, and punched him five times. Stemson got out of the car, and Pine continued to hit Stemson in the face about 10 more times. Defendant, who had followed Pine on his motorcycle, was present during the encounter but initially stood by his motorcycle. Stemson then grabbed Pine by the throat and tripped Pine so that he landed on his back. Stemson was about to kick Pine when defendant ran up and kicked Stemson in the groin. Stemson fell down on all fours, and defendant and Pine continued to kick and punch Stemson. The beating stopped when a truck approached and Stemson *107ran to it, jumped in, and was driven away. Stemson was later taken to the hospital where he received stitches above his left eye and was treated for a broken nose.
Defendant’s version of the facts is that he was waiting with Pine in a cul-de-sac outside of Oak Harbor Freight Lines for some of Pine’s coworkers. While they were waiting, Stemson drove by and Pine jumped into his car and began to follow Stemson. Defendant followed Pine on his motorcycle. He then saw Stemson and Pine fighting. When he saw Stemson on top of Pine, he grabbed Stemson and “rolled him off’ of Pine. Defendant testified that, as he rolled Stemson off, he “kind of threw him,” and Stemson began to retreat. At that point, the truck approached and Stemson ran over to it, jumped in, and was driven away. Defendant denied kicking Stemson in the groin or hitting and kicking Stemson in general.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault III. ORS 163.165.1 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court’s instruction concerning the elements of assault III was erroneous. The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of assault III and also on the lesser-included offense of assault IV, ORS 163.160.2 When attempting to clarify the two offenses to the jury, the trial court gave the instruction that “[assault III] requires proof that the defendant either caused physical injury while being aided by another who was actually present, or * * * aided another who was actually present in causing physical injury.” (Emphasis added.) Defendant argues that the italicized portion of the instruction was legally insufficient. Specifically, defendant contends that, in instances where a person merely “aids” a primary assailant in causing physical injury, only the primary assailant who caused the physical injury “while being aided by another person” (conduct which, without the aiding, would be punishable only as an assault IV) is guilty of assault *108III. Therefore, defendant argues, if the jury believed his testimony that he merely assisted Pine while Pine caused physical injury to Stemson, then the most that he could be criminally liable for is assault IV on an aiding and abetting theory.
Defendant’s argument, as I understand it, is that, under his version of the facts, he could not be directly liable for assault III because he was not “aided by another person” and he did not personally “cause[] physical injury to another.” See ORS 163.165(l)(e). Second, defendant argues that that result is unchanged under the state’s aiding and abetting theory of liability because, under the circumstances, the criminal conduct that he aided constituted assault IV, not assault III. See ORS 161.155(2)(b) (describing aiding and abetting accomplice liability).
Before addressing the merits of defendant’s argument, I highlight several material considerations that are not in dispute. First, the relevant difference between the assault IV and assault III provisions at issue is that the assault III statute adds an additional element — “[w]hile being aided by another person actually present” — that elevates the crime from assault TV to assault III. Second, defendant acknowledges that, even under his version of the facts, he is guilty of assault IV for aiding and abetting Pine’s assault of Stemson. See ORS 161.155(2)(b) (person is “criminally liable for the conduct of another person” if, inter alia, he “[a]id[s] or abets or agrees or attempts to aid or abet such other person in planning or committing the crime”). Third, defendant does not dispute that he aided Pine and was “actually present” during Pine’s assault of Stemson. Finally, the state can satisfy the “causes physical injury to another” element of the assault III statute by showing either that defendant committed that conduct directly or that defendant aided and abetted Pine in that conduct. Id.-, see also ORS 161.150 (“A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by [his] own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which [he] is criminally liable, or both”) (Emphasis added.)
With those considerations in mind, the issues narrow considerably. Defendant acknowledges that he is guilty, via an aiding and abetting theory of liability, for Pine’s conduct. It follows, therefore, that, because defendant does not *109dispute that he aided and abetted Pine in physically injuring Stemson, the physical injury element of the assault III statute is satisfied here. ORS 161.150.3 Thus, the only true issue here is whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that defendant would be guilty of assault III if he “aided” Pine. Resolution of that issue turns on whether a person who is “actually present” and aids another in assaulting a third person is necessarily also “aided by” the primary assailant for purposes of ORS 163.165(l)(e).
Defendant argues that such a construction is inconsistent with the plain language of ORS 163.165(l)(e) by stating:
“The state’s proposed construction would require the insertion of the words ‘aiding, or’ into the definition of assault in the third degree provided by ORS 163.165(l)(e), to create the alternate definition of the crime of which the jury was instructed. Under the state’s construction, the crime would then cover situations where a person while aiding, orbeing aided by, another person actually present, *110intentionally or knowingly causes physical injury to another. See ORS 163.165(l)(e). The legislature, however, did not include this language, and this court cannot insert it without violating the rules of statutory construction.” (Emphasis in original.)
Thus, in defendant’s view, the “while being aided by another person” language plainly and unambiguously distinguishes between those who aid and those who are aided. I disagree.
Defendant is correct insofar as he suggests that ORS 163.165(l)(e) can be read to distinguish between individuals who merely “aid” the primary assailant and those who are “aided by” another. Defendant is incorrect, however, in suggesting that no other plausible readings exist. In particular, ORS 163.165(l)(e) increases criminal liability for individuals who are “aided” by another in circumstances where more than one potential assailant is “actually present.” As a legal term of art,4 “aid” means “[t]o support, help, assist or strengthen. Act in cooperation with; supplement the efforts of others.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 68 (6th ed 1990). Thus, the “aided by” language in ORS 163.165(l)(e), read in conjunction with the “actually present” language, suggests that the legislature sought to address situations in which multiple persons assist or strengthen one another in a common effort to injure a third party physically. Given that context, one plausible reading of the “aided by another person actually present” language is that all individuals involved in a multiassailant assault simultaneously “aid” and are “aided by” one another in committing that assault. Because the text and context of ORS 163.165(l)(e) is ambiguous as to whether all individuals involved in and present during the assault of a victim are “aided by” one another in that common endeavor, I turn to the applicable legislative history. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).5
*111ORS 163.165(l)(e) was adopted in 1991 with the passage of House Bill 2018, which was proposed by then-Assistant Attorney General Terry Ann Leggert to “increase the penalty for an assault committed by two or more persons.” Testimony, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, HB 2018, March 19, 1991, Ex B (statement of Leggert). In an exchange with Representatives Johnson and Brian, Leggert clarified the intent with respect to the bill’s “while being aided by another person actually present” language:
Johnson: “You have the word ‘aided’ in here ‘while being aided by another person.’ I read that as being your intent that two people actually both hit the victim.”
Leggert: “Or one person holds and the other one hits— things like that.”
Johnson: “There’s two people in this thing?”
Leggert: “Right.”
Johnson: “Not just being aided in terms of cheering or anything like that? I want to get a good idea of your intent here * *
Brian: “On that same question, wouldn’t ‘aided’ include a lookout?”
Leggert: “* * * What I tried to do is parrot the language of the robbery statutes. The person has to be there actually, actively participating. It would be different that someone in a comer over here, soliciting for instance. Where you would be guilty of the primary action but I’ve just solicited or encouraged you to commit the crime. I would think that, my intent is anyway, that you want to *112have this be people who are actively participating in it. That is how I understand the robbery II statute [ORS 164.405(l)(b)] has been interpreted, so I thought it would be good to just parallel that language. But you are right. You want someone who is there actually helping out. In some cases, it may be that they prevent the victim’s escape. They surround the person and three or four are beating him up, and the guy tries to get away and they block their path. So it may be that kind of participation, which I believe is also why we want to add the language ‘actually present,’ to make sure we just get all of those people who are there.” Tape recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, HB 2018, March 19,1991, Tape 56, Side A (testimony of Leggert) (emphasis added).
Leggert later gave similar testimony during a House Judiciary Committee work session, when she indicated that either preventing a victim’s escape or chasing a victim constituted aiding sufficient to subject all of the assailants to liability under the statute:
“If you prevent them from escaping, then you are aiding the person who is assaulting them, and I think that should be covered. * * * I would agree also that [a person who pursues a victim prior to the assault] should be covered, because it is the idea of tracking the prey down, and grabbing them to facilitate the assault. So that should be covered.” Tape recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, HB 2018, March 19,1991, Tape 55, Side B (testimony of Leggert).
Leggert’s testimony is significant because it evinces a legislative intent to subject all individuals involved in a multiassailant assault to liability for assault III, regardless of whether they were the “aiders” or the “aided.” In other words, in instances where multiple assailants are actually present at the scene of an assault that results in physical injury to the victim, all of the assailants are, in effect, “aiding” one another in furthering the assault and are “aided by” their co-assailants.6
*113That legislative history is dispositive. Defendant, by being present and participating in the assault of Stemson, was both aiding Pine and was aided by Pine in committing the assault. Thus, even if the jury relied on the trial court’s instruction and found that defendant “aided” Pine in assaulting Stemson, that finding is effectively also a finding that defendant was “aided by” Pine. Accordingly, I concur that the jury instruction that defendant complains about — in which the trial court suggested that the jury could convict defendant if he “aided” or was “aided by” Pine — was correct.
Deits, C. J., and Linder, J., and Ceniceros, S. J., join in this concurrence.ORS 163.165(l)(e) provides that a person commits the crime of assault III if the person “[w]hile being aided by another person actually present, intentionally or knowingly causes physical injury to another!.]”
ORS 163.160(l)(a) provides that a person commits the crime of assault IV if the person “[i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes physical injury to another!.]”
Judge Haselton’s dissent takes me to task for what it characterizes as my “mix-and-match” approach of employing both direct and aiding and abetting theories to explain why the given jury instruction was appropriate. 181 Or App at 122 (Haselton, J., dissenting). That analytical approach, however, is explicitly allowed by ORS 161.150, which states that a person is “guilty of a crime if it is committed by the person’s own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which the person is criminally liable, or both." (Emphasis added.)
To the extent that the language in ORS 161.150 — and particularly “or both”— might be considered ambiguous, the legislative history confirms that my approach comports with the legislature’s intent in enacting ORS 161.150. The legislative history establishes that ORS 161.150 was based on, inter alia, the criminal liability provisions of the Michigan Revised Criminal Code of 1967. Minutes, Senate Committee on Criminal Law and Procedures, SB 40, February 23,1971, p 5. In particular, ORS 161.150 is materially indistinguishable from section 401 ofthe Michigan Revised Criminal Code of 1967, which states that “[a] person may be guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own behavior or by the behavior of another person for which he is legally accountable as provided in this chapter, or both.” Commenting on the application of that provision, the official Committee commentary to section 401 explains that “[t]his section affirms the basic principle that liability is based on behavior, coupled with the equal affirmation that one may be accountable for the behavior of another. When such accountability exists, it is and should be immaterial whether defendant’s own behavior, that for which he is accountable, or both in combination present the elements of the crime charged.” Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed Michigan Revised Criminal Code, Final Draft (September 1967), § 401, 44-45. (Emphasis added.) That commentary suggests that my “mix-and-match” analysis in this case, far from being “deeply troubling,” see 181 Or App at 122 (Haselton, J., dissenting), is exactly what the legislature contemplated when it enacted ORS 161.150.
See McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 431, 909 P2d 846 (1996) (“Analysis of text also includes reference to well-established legal meanings for terms that the legislature has used.”).
Judge Haselton’s dissent agrees with defendant that ORS 163.165(l)(e) is unambiguous. 181 Or App at 120 (Haselton, J., dissenting). As noted, defendant reads ORS 163.165(l)(e) without reference to the well-established legal meaning for the term “aid.” Thus, defendant and the dissent ignore one key clue for identifying the legislature’s intent in enacting ORS 163.165(l)(e). In addition, our role in *111analyzing a statute is not to refrain from resorting to legislative history simply because statutory language is only marginally ambiguous. Rather, under the PGE framework, a review of legislative history is necessary any time a “court can discern one most likely statutory meaning from the text and context, but cannot rule out other plausible meanings.” Martin v. City of Albany, 320 Or 175, 184, 880 P2d 926 (1994) (describing the application of the PGE framework in Weidner v. OSP, 319 Or 295, 301, 877 P2d 62 (1994)). Tellingly, Judge Haselton’s dissent does not explain why the two potential constructions of ORS 163.165(l)(e) that I have identified are not, at least, “plausible.”
My conclusion that all persons involved in a multiple person assault that results in injury to the victim are guilty of assault III comports with the history and *113case law relating to the robbery II statute, the statute after which Leggert modeled the assault III statute at issue. See State v. Howe, 26 Or App 743,746,554 P2d 605, rev den 276 Or 555 (1976) (suggesting that each confederate to a robbery is aiding another person actually present, and thus is guilty of robbery II); Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report (July 1970), §§ 148, 149 (indicating that, in instances where two unarmed persons accost a victim and one of the persons demands the victim’s money, both of the perpetrators are guilty of robbery II); see also State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Greenwood, 107 Or App 678, 681, 813 P2d 58 (1991) (youth could face accomplice liability for robbery II where evidence supported theory that youth aided her sister in robbery).