United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 22-1910
KRISTIN DICROCE,
individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
MCNEIL NUTRITIONALS, LLC and JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Kayatta, Gelpí, and Montecalvo,
Circuit Judges.
John Peter Zavez, with whom Noah Rosmarin, Brendan M.
Bridgeland, and Adkins, Kelston & Zavez, P.C. were on brief, for
appellant.
Hannah Y. Chanoine, with whom Kayla N. Haran, Matthew D.
Powers, and O'Melveny & Myers LLP were on brief, for appellees.
September 18, 2023
GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Kristin
DiCroce ("DiCroce") challenges the district court's dismissal of
her complaint against McNeil Nutritionals, LLC and Johnson &
Johnson Consumer, Inc. (collectively, "Appellees") for their
allegedly misleading labeling and marketing of Lactaid
supplements. We agree with the dismissal outcome, albeit on
different grounds. Therefore, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Given that "[t]he maze of detail" in DiCroce's complaint
is clearly laid out in the district court's opinion,1 we recite
only the facts needed "for purposes of th[is] appeal." Dukes
Bridge LLC v. Beinhocker, 856 F.3d 186, 187 (1st Cir. 2017).
Lactose intolerance is "characterized by abdominal
cramps and diarrhea after consumption of food that contains
lactose," a sugar found in dairy products. Lactose Intolerance,
Stedmans Medical Dictionary 452780, Westlaw (databased updated
Nov. 2014). Individuals who suffer from lactose intolerance do
not produce enough lactase -- an enzyme that aids in the digestion
of lactose. See id. Lactaid is a tablet form of the enzyme
lactase -- made and distributed by Appellees -- that claims to
prevent "gas," "bloating," and "diarrhea" "associated with
digesting dairy," among other things.
1 DiCroce v. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC, 640 F. Supp. 3d 182
(D. Mass. 2022).
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DiCroce lives in Massachusetts and has purchased Lactaid
supplements "on multiple occasions within the past four years."
DiCroce filed this putative class action in October 2021
challenging certain statements on the packaging of Lactaid
products.2 Her general argument proceeds as follows:
(1) Lactose intolerance is a disease, per 21 C.F.R.
§ 101.93(g)(1)'s definition of a "disease";
(2) Lactaid, although marketed as a dietary supplement,
claims to treat the disease of lactose intolerance, thereby
violating 21 U.S.C § 343(r)(6), and making it a drug, per
§ 101.93(f);
(3) Because Lactaid is a drug under the relevant federal laws,
it is misleading, and thus violative of state law, for
Appellees to misbrand Lactaid as a dietary supplement, and to
make statements on Lactaid's label disclaiming Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") approval, thereby implying that FDA
approval is not required;
(4) Had Lactaid's product not claimed to treat the disease of
lactose intolerance, DiCroce would not have been misled into
2 DiCroce's complaint claims that: (1) Appellees engaged in
deceptive acts or practices in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
93A (the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act); (2) that
Appellees engaged in false advertising in violation of Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 266, § 91; and (3) that Appellees were unjustly enriched
because, by buying Lactaid, DiCroce conferred an economic benefit
on Appellees. The district court granted Appellees' initial motion
to dismiss for lack of standing, concluding that DiCroce had failed
to plausibly allege an injury in fact because her claims that
Lactaid's labeling "affected her purchasing decisions" were
"vague," and, thus, she had no Article III standing.
With leave of court, DiCroce later filed an amended complaint,
adding to her original allegations that she paid an "unwarranted
premium" for Lactaid products because the products' "illegal
disease claims" led her to reasonably believe that they were worth
more than less expensive lactase supplements. DiCroce noted that
Lactaid products cost $0.20 per dosage, while alternative
products, which she cited specific examples of, cost at least $0.11
less. We draw the relevant facts from her amended complaint.
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purchasing Lactaid products, which are more expensive than
other lactase supplements.
The district court granted Appellees' second motion to
dismiss, despite finding that DiCroce's amended complaint
sufficiently alleged an injury in fact for purposes of Article III
standing. DiCroce, 640 F. Supp. 3d at 185, 187-88. The district
court held that DiCroce's false advertising and deceptive trade
practices claims both failed because "no reasonable consumer could
find Lactaid's product labels deceptive, nor has DiCroce
identified a misrepresentation of fact." Id. at 188. Nor was the
district court convinced by DiCroce's disclaimer argument,
explaining that her "conclusory allegation d[id] not accord with
the language of the disclaimers" and that no "reasonable consumer's
purchasing decision" would be swayed by the fact that the product
required FDA evaluation given that the label disclosed that the
product is not FDA approved. Id. at 188-89.
DiCroce timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Before we proceed to the merits of DiCroce's appeal, we
pause to address the issue of standing. See United States v.
Catala, 870 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 2017) ("Because Article III
standing is a sine qua non to federal judicial involvement, a
federal court must resolve any doubts about such standing before
proceeding to adjudicate the merits of a given case."). Contested
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by the parties is whether DiCroce has plausibly pled an injury in
fact, as required for Article III and statutory standing, under
chapter 93A of the Massachusetts General Laws. See Hochendoner v.
Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 731 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining the
injury requirement for standing in the Article III context);
Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc., 865 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2017)
(discussing cognizable injuries under chapter 93A). We begin with
DiCroce's Article III standing.
"[A]t the pleading stage, the plaintiff bears the burden
of establishing sufficient factual matter to plausibly demonstrate
h[er] standing to bring the action." Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at
731. For an injury in fact to be plausibly pled, it "must be both
concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical." Id. (cleaned up). Concreteness
requires that the injury "actually exist[s]." Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340
(2016)). And particularization demands that, in addition to
alleging "injurious conduct attributable to the defendant," a
plaintiff must also claim to be "among the persons injured by that
conduct." Id. at 731-32.
DiCroce's second amended complaint satisfies both
requirements. DiCroce claims that she personally purchased
Lactaid supplements on multiple occasions during the four years
preceding the complaint. She further alleges that Lactaid
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supplements cost at least $0.11 more per tablet than other brands
and that she was misled into purchasing overpriced lactase
supplements because of Appellees' purportedly unlawful marketing
statements. Put another way, DiCroce claims that she has
personally suffered economic harm in the past as a result of
Appellees' alleged misconduct. At the pleading stage, we find
these allegations sufficient to meet the minimal plausibility
standard for establishing Article III standing. See In re Evenflo
Co., Inc., Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 54 F.4th 28,
35 (1st Cir. 2022) ("This court has repeatedly recognized
overpayment as a cognizable form of Article III injury.");
Gustavsen v. Alcon Lab'ys, Inc., 903 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2018)
(holding that plaintiffs sufficiently pled a concrete, actual,
particularized injury for standing purposes where they claimed
that they, themselves, had suffered "out-of-pocket loss of money"
in the past because of defendants' conduct).
Appellees' remaining standing arguments are statutory in
nature, insofar as they pertain to whether DiCroce "has a cause of
action" under chapter 93A. Catala, 870 F.3d at 10. Because
statutory standing is not determinative of "a court's power to
adjudicate a case," we choose to forgo this inquiry, "in the
interest of efficiency," given our ultimate conclusion that
DiCroce's claims were properly dismissed by the district court.
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See id. Having "resolve[d] any doubts" about DiCroce's Article
III standing, we proceed to the merits. Id. at 9.
We review de novo the district court's order granting a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Sullivan v. etectRx, Inc., 67 F.4th 487, 491 (1st Cir. 2023).
Accordingly, "we ask whether the well-pleaded factual allegations,
viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, . . . 'plausibly narrate a claim for relief.'" Id.
(quoting Germanowski v. Harris, 854 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 2017)).
In reaching a conclusion, we are not tied to the district court's
reasoning "but may affirm the order of dismissal on any ground
made manifest by the record." González v. Vélez, 864 F.3d 45, 50
(1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 71
(1st Cir. 2012)).
Before us, DiCroce argues that the district court's
ruling was incorrect and continues to press her claim that
Lactaid's label is misleading because it fails to comply with
federal labeling requirements. DiCroce further contends that the
district court should have allowed the matter of whether lactose
intolerance is a disease to go beyond the pleading stage. Such
arguments lack merit. DiCroce's claims are impliedly preempted by
the FDA's statutory enforcement authority.
We begin with the relevant regulatory background. The
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") was enacted to protect
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consumers from "harmful products." In re Zofran (Ondansetron)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 57 F.4th 327, 330 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009)). The FDA regulates
dietary supplements through the FDCA, as amended by the Dietary
Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 ("DSHEA") and FDA
regulations.3 Ferrari v. Vitamin Shoppe Indus. LLC, 70 F.4th 64,
67–68 (1st Cir. 2023) (citing Dietary Supplement Health and
Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325, 4325–
26 (1994)). In Ferrari, we examined the legislative history
related to DSHEA before concluding that "Congress intended dietary
supplements to escape the regulatory gauntlet that drugs must go
through." Id. at 73-74 ("It enacted the DSHEA to 'ensur[e] that
the Federal Government erects no barriers that impede the ability
of consumers to improve their nutrition through the free choice of
safe dietary supplements' and 'to clarify that dietary supplements
are not drugs . . . [and] should not be regulated as drugs.'"
(alterations in original) (quoting S. Rep. No. 103-410 (1994),
1994 WL 562259, at *2)).4 Unlike dietary supplements, drugs, which
3 DSHEA defines a dietary supplement as a product that is
"intended to supplement the diet" and that contains certain
"dietary ingredients." 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff).
4 Under the FDCA and DSHEA, manufacturers are allowed to make
"structure/function claims" about dietary supplements. Kaufman v.
CVS Caremark Corp., 836 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir. 2016). DiCroce does
not allege that Lactaid does not perform as advertised in the
label. Therefore, we need not delve into whether Appellees possess
substantiation for Lactaid's label claims.
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are also regulated under the FDCA, require prior FDA approval
before they can be sold or marketed to consumers. In re Zofran,
57 F.4th at 330 (explaining that the FDA reviews a drug's efficacy
and proposed label).
Importantly, only the FDA may enforce the FDCA, meaning
that the FDCA provides no private right of action. 21 U.S.C.
§ 337(a); see Plourde v. Sorin Grp. USA, Inc., 23 F.4th 29, 33
(1st Cir. 2022) (explaining that § 337(a)'s "language shows 'that
Congress intended that the [FDCA] be enforced exclusively by the
Federal Government.'" (quoting Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal
Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001))).
DiCroce's legal action hinges on her assumption that
Lactaid's labels violate the FDCA's labeling requirements and are
therefore misleading to consumers. But we have made it clear that
"§ 337(a) preempts any state-law claim that exists 'solely by
virtue' of an FDCA infraction." Plourde, 23 F.4th at 33.
In Buckman, plaintiffs claimed injuries related to the
placement of "orthopedic bone screws" in their spines. 531 U.S. at
343. Specifically, they alleged that a consulting company made
fraudulent representations to the FDA during the screws' approval
process, resulting in the FDA's subsequent approval of the devices.
Id. The Court concluded that plaintiffs' "state-law fraud-on-the
FDA" claims were impliedly preempted because "[p]olicing fraud
against federal agencies is hardly 'a field which the States have
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traditionally occupied'" and said claims conflicted with the
federal statutory scheme, which "amply empowers the FDA to punish
and deter fraud against the Administration." Id. at 347-48
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
More recently, we had the opportunity to consider
Buckman's holding in the food-labeling context, in Dumont v. Reily
Foods Company. 934 F.3d 35, 41-43 (1st Cir. 2019). There, we
applied, without formally adopting, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits'
test for deciding whether a state-law claim avoids preemption:
"The plaintiff must be suing for conduct that violates the FDCA
(or else his claim is expressly preempted by [the FDCA's medical
device preemption provision, 21 U.S.C. § 360k], but the plaintiff
must not be suing because the conduct violates the FDCA (such a
claim would be impliedly preempted under Buckman))." Dumont, 934
F.3d at 42 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Medtronic, Inc.,
Sprint Fidelis Leads Prod. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th
Cir. 2010)) (citing Perez v. Nidek Co., 711 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th
Cir. 2013)). We explained that, based on this test, a "complaint
is preempted unless the conduct it pleads: (1) violates FDCA
labeling requirements and (2) would also violate chapter 93A even
if the FDCA did not exist."5 Id. at 42. We approvingly referred
5States are prohibited from imposing food labeling
requirements beyond what the FDCA requires. Kaufman, 836 F.3d at
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to this test again in Plourde, where we were confronted with state-
law negligence and failure-to-warn claims related to a medical
device. 23 F.4th at 33-34.
Returning to DiCroce's complaint, we hold that her state
law claims -- for unfair or deceptive trade practices, false
advertising, and unjust enrichment6 -- "exist[] 'solely by virtue'
of an FDCA infraction" and thus are impliedly preempted. Id. at
33. DiCroce, like the plaintiffs in Buckman, is alleging fraud
under the FDCA, given that her claim that Lactaid's label is
misleading is premised entirely on her belief that said label
violates the FDCA.7 See id. And DiCroce provides no other grounds
on which her claims could survive. She does not contend that
Lactaid did not perform as promised, nor does she provide any
basis, independent of federal labeling laws, from which we could
conclude that a consumer would be misled by Lactaid's label. In
fact, DiCroce's complaint acknowledges that Lactaid's disclaimer
91 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(5)). Thus, if a manufacturer
complies with the FDCA's labeling requirements, a plaintiff has no
cause of action under state law for labeling claims. Id. at 92.
6 An unjust enrichment claim that "rests on the same improper
conduct alleged in another claim . . . will stand or fall with the
related claim." Kaufman, 836 F.3d at 96 (quoting Cleary v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 2011)).
7 While "state-law claim[s] based on 'traditional state tort
law' that happen[] to 'parallel' the FDCA" are not necessarily
preempted, Plourde, 23 F.4th at 33 (quoting Buckman, 531 U.S. at
353), DiCroce does not plead such a claim here.
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statements are "literally true" before arguing that they are
nevertheless misleading because they violate the FDCA.
If Lactaid's label conflicts with the FDCA's labeling
requirements -- an issue we decline to take a position on -
- Congress tasked the FDA with addressing said violations when it
enacted § 337(a), not private citizens. See Blackman, 531 U.S. at
348; Plourde, 23 F.4th at 33.
III. CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that violation of the FDCA "is a
critical element in [DiCroce's] case," we hold that her claims are
impliedly preempted. Blackman, 531 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added).
Thus, the district court's dismissal of DiCroce's amended
complaint is
Affirmed.
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