delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This case is an original proceeding in this Court involving an application for a writ of supervisory control. The issues presented for our determination originated in Fitzpatrick v. School District No. 10, a *46negligence case currently before the Third Judicial District Court. Relators, defendants below, are employees of the original named defendant, School District No. 10. Relators seek relief via supervisory control from the District Court’s order granting plaintiffs leave to belatedly amend their complaint to name relators as defendants in the action below. In the same order, the District Court granted summary judgment dismissing the original defendant, chairman of the board of trustees of the school district, from the action. In a subsequent order, the District Court granted defendant school district’s motion to be dismissed as a party to the suit. Both dismissals were based on the immunity provisions of § 2-9-111, MCA.
At plaintiff’s request, we identified the following issues for determination upon supervisory control:
1) Whether this is a proper case for this Court’s consideration upon a writ of supervisory control?
2) Whether the District Court erred in granting plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint pursuant to Rule 15(c) to name the school district employees as new parties after expiration of the statute of limitations?
3) Whether §§ 2-9-111(2) and (3), MCA, grants immunity from tort liability to a school district and its employees for conduct by the latter admittedly within the course and scope of their employment and not involving the use of a motor vehicle, aircraft, or other means of transportation?
After careful consideration of these issues and the facts of this case, we conclude this case is appropriate for determination upon the writ. Further, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the amendment; however, the recent case law interpreting § 2-9-111, MCA, clearly renders the relators immune from suit.
On March 4th, 1985 plaintiff Mary Fitzpatrick fell down the alley stairs leading down to the Memorial Gymnasium in Anaconda, Montana. The gym is owned by School District No. 10. On August 26, 1987 plaintiffs Mary and Frank Fitzpatrick filed a complaint against School District No. 10 and the District’s chairman of the board of trustees Ty Tyvand. The complaint alleged that defendants were negligent in failing to properly light and remove ice and snow from the stairway. Defendants filed an answer on October 7, 1987. Pursuant to stipulation, defendants amended their Answer to plead the affirmative defense of immunity from plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to § 2-9-111, MCA. Defendants filed their amended answer more than *47three (3) months before the running of the statute of limitations. On July 7, 1988, plaintiffs moved for leave to amend their complaint to name Robert Eccleston and Kevin Sullivan, the school janitors, and Elmer Carsone, the school principal, as defendants in the suit. The motion was filed four months after running of the statute of limitations. On July 29, 1988, the original defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on their immunity defense.
In September 1988 the District Court dismissed Chairperson Tyvand based on § 2-9-111, MCA, but not School District No. 10. In the same order, the court also granted plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint adding employee relators as defendants, concluding that the amendment related back to the lawsuit’s filing date under Rule 15(c), M.R.Civ.P., and thus was not barred by the three year statute of limitations. The relators and school district immediately moved for dismissal of the amended complaint on immunity and statute of limitations grounds. On December 19, 1988 the District Court granted the motion with respect to School District No. 10 but denied it as to relators. On January 25, 1989 relators filed the present application for writ of supervisory control. The sole issue raised in the application is whether the District Court erred in determining that the amendment related back to the original filing date.
In opposing the application, plaintiffs suggested that the relation-back issue will eventually become moot because the District Court erred in dismissing the school district on immunity grounds and because recovery against the school district will bar the claims against relators under § 2-9-305(5), MCA. Plaintiffs requested “the opportunity to fully brief the immunity issues” to avoid “piecemeal appeals” and to place the Court “in a position of rendering a decision with the benefit of all relevant facts and argument.” On May 9,1989 this Court entered an order identifying the issues listed above for oral argument.
I.
Article VII, Section 2 of the Montana Constitution gives this Court “original jurisdiction to issue, hear, and determine writs . . . .” The same section also gives us “general supervisory control over all other courts” in the State. Art. VII, Sec. 2, Mont.Const. Recently, we summarized the standards for granting a writ of supervisory control. See State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. District Court (1985), 217 Mont. 106, 114, 703 P.2d 148, 153-54. One of the functions of *48the writ is to control the course of litigation in lower courts, where those courts are proceeding within their jurisdiction but under mistake of law by doing a gross injustice, and there is no appeal or the remedy by appeal is inadequate. State ex rel. Shores v. District Court (1903), 27 Mont. 349, 71 P. 159; State ex rel. Whiteside v. District Court (1900), 24 Mont. 539, 63 P. 395.
There are no written regulations or laws respecting our power of supervisory control. Rather, we have proceeded on a case-by-case basis being careful not to substitute the power of supervisory control for an appeal provided by statute. State ex rel. Reid v. District Court (1953), 126 Mont. 489, 255 P.2d 693. However, if a relator will be deprived of a fundamental right, both justice and judicial economy require us to assume jurisdiction and resolve the issue in favor of the relator. Thus, if the cause below is mired in procedural entanglements and appeal is not an adequate remedy, we will issue a writ of supervisory control. State ex rel. Levitt v. District Court (1977), 172 Mont. 12, 560 P.2d 517.
In the case at bar, the lack of any issue of material fact clearly renders this case appropriate for disposition upon summary judgment. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., The problem confronted by the District Court in this case is whether the law, specifically § 2-9-111, MCA, does in fact provide immunity to the individual employee relators, thereby entitling them to summary judgment. Determination of this question will directly bear on the propriety of the District Court’s refusal to dismiss the relators and may also determine the propriety of the amendment naming relators as parties to the lawsuit below. Therefore, we conclude that a writ of supervisory control is appropriate in this case for the purpose of clarifying the law and in the interests of judicial economy.
II.
Defendants rely primarily on Kilkenny v. Arco Marine, Inc. (9th Cir. 1986), 800 F.2d 853, in contending that the amendment adding them should not relate back under Rule 15(c), M.R.Civ.P. The Rule provides:
“Rule 15(c). Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom *49a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him
Rule 15(c), M.R.Civ.P. See also Schiavone v. Fortune (1986), 477 U.S. 21, 29, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 2384, 91 L.Ed.2d 18, 27. Kilkenny holds that the extent of the information the pleader obtains respecting another as a potential defendant, after filing of the original complaint and before the limitations period expires, is relevant to whether the potential defendant knew or should have known that they would be named but for a mistake in identity. Kilkenny, 800 F.2d at 857.
The defendants point out that the Fitzpatricks had deposed and taken statements from the relators prior to expiration of the statute of limitations. Defendants argue further that plaintiffs had notice of their mistake in naming the proper parties when defendant school district amended its answer to assert the immunity defense. Relators contend that the extent of this information held by the plaintiffs caused them to believe that they were not named because of strategic reasons rather than as a result of mistaken identity.
However, Kilkenny can be distinguished from the case at bar. The amended answer in Kilkenny not only alleged that the original named defendant was not a proper party to the suit; it also identified the parties who were the proper defendants to the suit. In this case defendants’ amended answer merely notified plaintiffs of the possible impropriety of the school district as a defendant. The amended answer did not indicate that the relators alone might be or were in fact the proper parties to the suit. Furthermore, because the immunity issue presents a novel question under the facts of this case, plaintiffs did not know that the school district is immune from suit under § 2-9-111(2), MCA. In fact, they still contend that the district is not immune. Thus, the first time that the plaintiffs had an indication that the relator employees were the proper parties to the suit is when the District Court dismissed the school district and Chairperson Tyvand after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Thus, our determination should focus on the threshold question of whether the proposed defendants knew or should have *50known that but for a mistake in identity of the proper parties the suit would have been brought against them.
In this regard the defendant employees are the personification of the school district. They were deposed and involved in the litigation from the outset and cannot claim that they did not have notice of the institution of the action. Considering the obvious link between the district employees and the school district itself, and in light of the arguably unsettled immunity question presented in this case, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that:
“there was no mistake as to the identity of the District employees who were involved in the circumstances that led to the filing of this lawsuit. However there was a mistake as to the identity of the proper parties to this lawsuit as contemplated by Section 15(c), M.R.Civ.P. . . . (Emphasis by the District Court.)”
Order of December 15, 1988. The mistake in this case being related to the identity of the proper parties and the relators having ample notice of the action so as not to be prejudiced, we find no abuse of discretion by the District Court in allowing the amendment.
III.
We now come to the determinative issue in this case requiring issuance of the writ. The issue involves the scope of the immunity granted by § 2-9-111, MCA, to a school district and its employees for torts committed within the course and scope of employment and not involving the use of a motor vehicle, aircraft, or other means of transportation. The statute provides:
“2-9-111. Immunity from suit for legislative acts and omissions.
“(1) As used in this section: (a) the term ‘governmental entity’ includes the state, counties, municipalities, and school districts; (b) The term ‘legislative body’ includes the legislature . . . and any local governmental entity given legislative powers by statute, including school boards.
“(2) A governmental entity is immune from suit for an act or omission of its legislative body or a member, officer, or agent thereof.
“(3) A member, officer, or agent of a legislative body is immune from suit for damages arising from the lawful discharge of an official duty associated with the introduction or consideration of legislation or action by the legislative body.
“(4) The immunity provided for in this section does not extend to *51any tort committed by the use of a motor vehicle, aircraft, or other means of transportation.”
Section 2-9-111, MCA.
Plaintiffs argue that the past cases construing the statute and relied upon by defendants are distinguishable from the case at bar. See e.g., Limberhand v. Big Ditch Co. (1985), 218 Mont. 132, 706 P.2d 491; W.D. Construction Inc. v. Board of County Commissioner’s of Gallatin County (1985), 218 Mont. 348, 707 P.2d 1111; Bieber v. Broadwater County (Mont. 1988), [232 Mont. 487,] 759 P.2d 145, 45 St.Rep. 1218; Peterson v. Great Falls School District No. 1 and A (Mont. 1989), [237 Mont. 376,] 773 P.2d 316, 46 St.Rep. 880, [8 Ed.Law 61,] Plaintiffs contend that Barnes and W.D. Construction can be distinguished because those cases involved clearly legislative rather than administrative functions. This contention carries no weight. Our recent decisions in Bieber and Peterson, clearly disposed of this issue. While the statute is entitled “Immunity from suit for legislative acts and omissions”, we held in Peterson and Bieber that the plain meaning of the statute’s actual language is much broader in that “action by the legislative body need not be legislative in nature to afford immunity.” Peterson, 773 P.2d at 318. Accordingly, we decline to give credence to the plaintiffs’ distinction between administrative and legislative acts “because the plain language of the statute makes no such distinction”. Bieber, 759 P.2d at 147. We will not delve outside the plain meaning of the words used in a statute. W.D. Construction, 707 P.2d at 1113, Barnes v. Koepke (Mont. 1987), 226 Mont. 470, 736 P.2d 132, 134, 45 St.Rep. 810, 812.
Plaintiffs also contend that § 2-9-111, MCA, does not grant immunity to the relators in this case. They argue that the statute requires involvement by a legislative body, i.e. the school board, before immunity can arise. Plaintiffs concede that the school district is a governmental entity and the school board is a legislative body under Subsection (1). However, plaintiffs argue that the school district, not the school board, owns the gymnasium and employs the custodians and the principal. Thus, plaintiffs argue the operative provision of Subsection (3) has no application to the case at bar as no member, officer, or agent of any legislative body is being sued.
We disagree. Clearly, the relators in this case are agents of the school board:
“(2) A servant is an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the *52service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master. (Emphasis added.)”
Restatement 2d of Agency, § 2. Thus, an agent includes one who performs only manual labor as a servant. Restatement 2d of Agency, § 1, comment (e). The board of trustees for each school district has the power to:
“(2) Employ and dismiss administrative personnel, clerks, secretaries, teacher aides, custodians, maintenance personnel, school bus drivers, food service personnel, nurses, and any other personnel deemed necessary to carry out the various services of the district . . . (Emphasis added).”
Section 20-3-324, MCA. A school “district” is defined as:
“. . . the territory, regardless of county boundaries, organized under the provisions of this title to provide public educational services under the jurisdiction of the trustees prescribed by this title . . . . (Emphasis added).”
Section 20-6-101 (1), MCA. Thus, the school board is the governing body — i.e., the legislative body — of the governmental entity, the school district. The janitors cannot be said to be agents of either the board or district to the exclusion of the other. Rather, they are agents of the district as manifested by their agency with the district’s governing school board. It simply does not make sense to say that relators are agents of the district but not the board responsible for hiring them and governing the district and the district’s employees.
Furthermore, in Bieber we construed the phrase in Subsection (3) of § 2-9-111, MCA, “with the introduction and consideration of legislation or action by the legislative body” to be disjunctive. Thus, Subsection (3) grants immunity to members, officers, or agents of a legislative body for “the lawful discharge of an official duty associated with the introduction or consideration of legislation or action by the legislative body.” Peterson, 773 P.2d at 317-318.
Here, the omission by relators arose from the lawful discharge of an official duty associated with alleged omissions by the legislative body. A failure to take legislative action, i.e., a legislative omission, will give rise to the immunity afforded by the statute. Section 2-9-111(2), MCA. Limberhand, 706 P.2d at 498. Any alleged failure by the school district to provide sufficient funding for maintenance of the stairs and employment of additional custodians are omissions by its legislative body, the school board. The omissions of the relators occurred during the lawful discharge of duties associated with these *53omissions by the board. Thus, the relators are immune under Subsection (3) of the statute.
Plaintiffs also contend that Subsection (2) of § 2-9-111, MCA, does not grant immunity to the school district in this case. Once again, we disagree. Subsection (2) of the statute clearly affords immunity to a governmental entity “for an act or omission of its legislative body or a member, officer, or agent thereof.” In the case at bar, the act complained of was an omission by agents of the school board — i.e., failure by the janitors to remove snow and failure by the principal to supervise the janitors. Under the plain language of Subsection (2) the school district is clearly itnmune for an omission by an agent of the school board. The District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to the school district on its immunity defense.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the interpretation given the statute violates the rule that any reinstatement of governmental immunity must be strictly construed. Plaintiffs rely on B. M. v. State (1982), 200 Mont. 58, 649 P.2d 425, 33 A.L.R. 4th 1157, where we held that it is “our duty to strictly construe any attempted governmental immunity — that is, every act expanding statutory immunity must be clearly expressed.” In B.M., the plaintiffs sued the State for negligence in placing a six-year old child in a special education program for educable mentally retarded children. The State was granted summary judgment based on immunity under § 2-9-111, MCA. We reversed on the grounds that the legislature had not enacted legislation to limit the liability of school boards in the administration of special education programs. We held that in the absence of a clear statutory declaration granting immunity it is this Court’s duty to permit rather than to deny an action for negligence. B.M., 649 P.2d at 427.
The plain meaning of the actual language used in § 2-9-111, MCA, was not discussed in our decision in B.M. v. State. We have decided several other immunity cases since our 1982 decision in B.M. In the process, we have arrived at the current construction of § 2-9-111, MCA, on a case-by-case basis. B.M.’s rule of strict construction still holds true. However it is now clear, particularly after our decisions in Bieber and Peterson, that the plain language of the statute constitutes a clear statutory declaration granting immunity to the relators in this case.
Earlier in this opinion we held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint because of the uncertainty of the law regarding immunity. We *54also held that a writ of supervisory control should issue in this case in order for us to clarify the immunity question. We recognize that for us to first hold that the confusion regarding immunity requires supervisory control and then to hold that the statute clearly grants immunity to the relators may seem a bit contradictory.
In this regard, we are not asserting in this opinion that the statute is unequivocally clear at first glance. Indeed, several interpretations of § 2-9-111, MCA, have been argued in the line of cases that have come before us since the statute’s adoption. However, it is this line of cases, particularly our recent decisions in Bieber and Peterson that has given a specific and reasonable interpretation to the statute based on the plain meaning of the actual language used. Moreover, this interpretation of § 2-9-111, MCA, leads us to but one conclusion: the statute grants immunity to both the school district and its individual employees in this case.
The writ is granted and the amendment naming the relators relates back to the original filing date. However, as discussed above, § 2-9-111, MCA, grants immunity to both the school district and the relators in this case. The school district already being dismissed on summary judgment, we direct the District Court to dismiss the relators based on the immunity granted by § 2-9-111, MCA.
The cause is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE and JUSTICES HARRISON, BARZ and WEBER concur.