¶ 77. (concurring). Although I concur with the mandate, I write separately to address the majority's discussion of the discovery rule adopted by this court in Hansen v. A. H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 560, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983). While I recognize that the Hansen discovery rule is relevant to the issue presented, I conclude that the extensive analysis by the majority is unnecessary, since the majority acknowledges that "the Tomczaks learned of their 'injury' well before the period of repose expires." Majority op. at 264 n.10. The majority also fails to recognize and consider the lead opinion and a concurring opinion in Estate of Makos v. Wisconsin Masons Health Care Fund, 211 Wis. 2d 41, 564 N.W.2d 662 (1997).
¶ 78. Writing separately in Makos, I concluded that the statute of repose as applied in that case violated Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Specifically, I concluded that the statute of repose at issue deprived that plaintiff of "the right to a remedy in violation of Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution," id. at 60, because the plaintiff "could not have discovered the injury until after the statute of repose had run." Id. at 59. In reaching that conclusion, I urged that:
courts should consider the following three principles, along with the nature of the cause of action, in *282determining whether an individual has been denied the right to a remedy in violation of art. I, § 9 through the legislature's modification, reduction, or elimination of a right to bring a cause of action: (1) whether the legislature modified, reduced, or eliminated a post-constitutional cause of action created by the legislature itself; (2) whether the legislature modified, reduced, or eliminated a common law or pre-constitutional statutory cause of action and provided a reasonable alternative; and (3) whether, if the legislature did not provide a reasonable alternative, it has established that an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right exists, and that no reasonable alternative exists.
Id. at 67. Applying this test to the facts in Makos, I concluded that there are circumstances under which the legislature cannot eliminate a plaintiffs right to bring a cause of action pursuant to a statute of repose without violating Wis. Const, art. I, § 9.
¶ 79. The Hansen discovery rule and Wis. Const, art I, § 9 are not equivalent legal theories, but are both related to the right to bring a claim. In tort actions where the legislature has not expressly created a discovery rule, the Hansen discovery rule sets forth the date that a plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, his/her injury as the date of the accrual of a claim. Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides "[e]very person is entitled to a certain remedy. . .for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or character." The theories are distinct; however, the Hansen discovery rule, and Wis. Const, art I, § 9 in the context of a statute of repose, both address the plaintiffs discovery of his/her injury and ultimately may provide a plaintiff with the right to bring a claim.
*283¶ 80. The majority's statement that the Hansen discovery rule cannot be applied to a statute of repose fails to recognize that under the Wisconsin Constitution a statute of repose may not bar a claim where the plaintiff had no opportunity to discover the injury. As a practical matter, a Wis. Const, art I, § 9 argument may necessarily be raised in an instance where a plaintiff s cause of action is barred by the expiration of statute of repose because the plaintiff had no opportunity to discover his/her injury. At least two Justices of this court concluded that Wis. Const, art I, § 9 provides a remedy in such an instance. See Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 44 (Steinmetz, J.), 211 Wis. 2d at 60 (Crooks, J., concurring).
¶ 81. I also write separately to address Justice Geske's concurrence, which states that Makos has no precedential value. I disagree. I recognize that this court has previously stated that "a majority [of judges] must have agreed on a particular point for it to be considered the opinion of the court." State v. Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d 192, 194, 352 N.W.2d 660 (1984). However, I submit that the appropriate rationale for interpreting a plurality opinion is that adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
¶ 82. In Marks, the United States Supreme Court reviewed a decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Sixth Circuit had determined that a relevant United States Supreme Court case "never became the law" because the standard set forth in that case "never commanded the assent of any more than three Justices at any one time." Id. at 192. The Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's reasoning:
*284When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of [a majority of] Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds. . . .' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 [ ] (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
Id. at 193. Since its holding in Marks, the United States Supreme Court has re-affirmed the principle of law that the narrowest grounds of a plurality opinion constitute the opinion of the Court. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 n.9 (1988) (rejecting the argument that a plurality opinion is "not good law" and restating the holding of Marks).
¶ 83. The lead and concurring opinions in Makos concededly encompassed distinct rationales, making a determination of the "narrowest grounds" arguably complex. However, this does not negate the fact that Makos is of precedential value. In Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745 (1994), the Supreme Court again revisited the "narrowest grounds" holding of Marks and applied it to the Court's fragmented decision in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980). The Supreme Court recognized that several lower courts had "decided that there is no lowest common denominator or 'narrowest grounds' that represents the Court's holding [in Baldasar)." Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745. Still other courts had reached differing conclusions regarding which Justice's opinion in Baldasar set forth the opinion of the Court. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745. Rather than ignore Baldasar by concluding it has no precedential value, the Supreme Court restated its holding in Marks and concluded that a confusing plu*285rality opinion should be reexamined and clarified by the Court, not disregarded. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 746.
¶ 84. Because the plurality opinion in Makos is unnecessary to the majority opinion given the facts in the present case, I decline to examine Makos beyond reasserting the discussion of Wis. Const, art I, § 9 and advocating for the application of the three-part test discussed above. I do, however, urge this court to recognize that a plurality opinion of this court is in no way devoid of any precedential value. Cf. Marks 430 U.S. at 193; Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745-46.
¶ 85. In sum, I conclude that the lengthy discussion of the Hansen discovery rule is unnecessary given the facts presented in this case. Moreover, I strongly disagree with the majority's holding that the "Hansen discovery rule cannot be applied to a statute of repose" due to the majority's failure to address Wis. Const, art I, § 9.1 also urge this court to consider in future cases, where applicable, the adoption of the three-part test suggested in Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 67. Finally, I assert that the opinion of this court in Makos is of preceden-tial value, and that its legal authority should be determined in accord with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Marks.
¶ 86. For the reasons set forth, I concur.