IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IMO THE ESTATE OF )
MARILYN RUTH WEIL ) ROW Folio No. 25057-SEM
ORDER
WHEREAS, Marilyn Ruth Weil (the “Decedent”) died on December 3, 2021,
leaving behind a last will and testament dated September 9, 2020 (the “Will”);1
through the Will, the Decedent nominated her son, William S. Weil (the “Executor”)
as executor and directed the disposition of her estate to four beneficiaries: the
Executor; the Decedent’s grandsons, Kyle Steven Bassett (the “Exceptant”) and
Corey Myles Bassett; and the Decedent’s daughter, Linda R. Bassett; 2
WHEREAS, on January 11, 2022, the Sussex County Register of Wills
admitted the Will to probate and issued letters testamentary to the Executor; 3
WHEREAS, the Executor filed an inventory on July 21, 2022 and a first and
proposed final accounting on January 6, 2023 (the “Accounting”); 4 a notice of the
Accounting (the “Beneficiary Notice”) was sent to all beneficiaries by the Register
of Wills on January 11, 2023; 5 the Beneficiary Notice was on the standard form
1
See Docket Item (“D.I.”) 2.
2
D.I. 7.
3
D.I. 8–9.
4
D.I. 18–20, 22.
5
D.I. 27.
which provides that the Accounting will be open for any exceptions for three (3)
months from the date the notice was mailed; 6
WHEREAS, the three-month deadline to file exceptions to the Accounting
expired on April 11, 2023; on April 19, 2023 (eight days after the applicable
deadline), the Exceptant filed exceptions (the “Exceptions”) with a cover letter
explaining the delay; 7 the Exceptant contends he never received the Beneficiary
Notice, he learned of it for the first time in late January, and, at his request, a second
notice was sent, which he received on January 25, 2023;8 the Exceptant provided a
copy of the second notice (the “Second Notice”), which was on the same standard
form and noted at the bottom the original mailing date of January 11, 2023, but that
it was “sent again” on January 19, 2023;9
WHEREAS, the Executor requested, via letter, that the Exceptions be
dismissed as time-barred under 12 Del. C. § 2302(d);10 that request was heard on
June 14, 2023, at which time I reserved decision and gave the Exceptant two weeks
6
Id.
7
See D.I. 30–32.
8
D.I. 31.
9
Id.
10
D.I. 33.
2
to file a brief regarding the timeliness of the Exceptions (due June 28, 2023); 11 the
Exceptant timely filed his brief, to which the Executor responded on July 11, 2023;12
WHEREAS, interested parties of an estate are conferred the right to file
exceptions to an accounting under the Delaware Constitution, which provides, in
pertinent part, that “[e]xceptions may be made by persons concerned to both sides
of every such account . . . and the exceptions shall be heard in the Court of Chancery
for the County; and thereupon the account shall be adjusted and settled according to
the right of the matter and the law of the land;”13 that right is qualified in 12 Del. C.
§ 2302(d) and Court of Chancery Rule 197, which both impose a three-month limit
triggered from the date the Beneficiary Notice is mailed; 14
WHEREAS, Court of Chancery Rule 6 governs motions to extend a deadline
in the Court’s rules; thereunder, a motion made after the deadline has passed will
only be granted if the moving party demonstrates both good cause and that the failure
to act timely was the result of excusable neglect; 15 excusable neglect refers to
“neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the
11
D.I. 37.
12
D.I. 38–39. I have carefully considered all factual averments and arguments in the
parties’ submissions, even if not restated herein.
13
Del. Const. art. IV, § 32.
14
12 Del. C. § 2302(d); Ct. Ch. R. 197.
15
Ct. Ch. R. 6(b).
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circumstances;”16 this Court asks two questions in addressing excusable neglect:
“(1) whether a party has demonstrated reasonable diligence; and (2) whether the
opposing party will be improperly prejudiced by an extension;”17 the “excusable
neglect” standard applies to all those appearing in this Court, even self-represented
parties; 18
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 30th day of October 2023, as follows:
1. The Exceptant’s request for an extension should be DENIED, the
Executor’s request to dismiss should be GRANTED, and the Exceptions should be
DISMISSED as untimely.
2. I accept the Exceptant’s representations that the first Beneficiary Notice
did not reach him, and I appreciate his frustration with mailing delays. But the
deadline for filing exceptions is triggered from mailing, not receipt. The Exceptant
was informed of the Beneficiary Notice shortly after it was mailed, and the Second
Notice was sent to him without delay. Further, the Second Notice expressly noted
16
In re Amelia Noel Living Tr., 2022 WL 2833918, at *1 (Del. Ch.) (quoting Encite LLC
v. Soni, 2011 WL 1565181, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2011), aff’d, 2023 WL 2436285 (Del.
2023).
17
Id. at *1 (quoting Mennen v. Fiduciary Tr. Int’l of Delaware, 167 A.3d 507, 511 (Del.
2016)).
18
See In re Wolhar v. Wolhar, 2018 WL 2758377, at *2 (Del. Ch.) (“The Court has the
discretion to allow pro se litigants some leniency, and also to address untimely objections
to accountings if the exceptant provides an adequate explanation for her untimeliness.”)
(citations omitted), aff’d, 2018 WL 2758377 (Del. Ch. June 7, 2018).
4
the earlier mailing and did not extend the applicable deadline; the Exceptant’s
argument that it implicitly did, or that staff at the Register of Wills communicated
as much, is rejected as unsupported and unpersuasive. The Second Notice represents
a clear and unequivocal message that the Exceptions remained due within three (3)
months of the original mailing. Reasonable diligence would have led any person,
even a self-represented party, to meet that deadline or seek an extension before the
deadline passed. Such remains true even accepting that the Exceptant was attempting
to resolve his concerns before, or in lieu of, filing the Exceptions. The Exceptant
failed to act with reasonable diligence to timely file the Exceptions and has not
demonstrated excusable neglect supporting an extension of time.
3. On excusable neglect, alone, I would recommend the extension be
denied. But I further find the estate would be prejudiced by granting the extension.
Doing so would impose increased attorneys’ fees and costs on an estate that
otherwise should be closed; I am not inclined to impose these costs where the
moving party failed to demonstrate good cause for an extension nor that he acted
diligently in seeking relief from the deadline to do so.
4. This is a final report under Court of Chancery Rule 143 and exceptions
may be filed under Court of Chancery Rule 144.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Selena E. Molina
Magistrate in Chancery
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