In re Det. of D.H.

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FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED
FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
JULY 27, 2023
IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
JULY 27, 2023
ERIN L. LENNON
SUPREME COURT CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

)
) No. 100716-7
In the Matter of the Detention of )
D.H., ) En Banc
)
Petitioner. )
Filed: July 27, 2023

WHITENER, J.—This case concerns the test and remedy for when the State

“totally disregards” the involuntary treatment act (ITA). 1 See RCW 71.05.010(2).

DH was taken into emergency custody on an involuntary 72-hour hold as

authorized by former RCW 71.05.153(1) (2019). Under the statutory scheme, at the

end of 72 hours, the person shall be released, unless detained pursuant to a court

order or referred for voluntary treatment. See former RCW 71.05.210(1)(b) (2019).

Instead of filing for a 14-day commitment court order, the State let the 72-hour hold

expire and did not release DH, although he had been asking to leave for days. The

State kept him detained overnight and evaluated him again the next morning for a

1
The consolidated cases of In re Detention of A.C., No. 100668-3, and In re Detention of
N.G., No. 100690-0, share this issue of “total disregard” as companion cases.
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In re Detention of D.H., No. 100716-7

new 72-hour hold and filed a petition for a 14-day commitment. At DH’s subsequent

14-day hold hearing, he argued that he was entitled to dismissal because the State

had totally disregarded the requirements of the ITA. The court denied the motion to

dismiss and granted the new 14-day petition.

We hold that the State totally disregards the ITA when it detains, or continues

to detain, someone without authority of law under the ITA. Therefore, in this case,

the State totally disregarded the requirements of the ITA when it failed to release

DH at the end of the 72-hour period as mandated by statute. It is unacceptable and

constitutes a total disregard of the ITA to intentionally allow the statutory time limit

to expire and keep someone overnight against their will and without authority under

the ITA in order to then file a new petition on the same grounds. 2 The trial court

abused its discretion when it did not so hold and did not dismiss the new petition.

Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for

dismissal of the petition and any further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We also granted review of whether failure to inform a committed person about

a loss of firearm rights for involuntary treatment constitutes a “manifest error

affecting a constitutional right” such that this court should review the unpreserved

2
Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we are not adopting a “‘negligence-plus’ standard,”
nor are we creating an intent requirement. Dissent at 4 n.1. We highlight the intentional failure to
follow the statutory directives in this case because it is problematic and analogize to the so-called
“negligence-plus” standard to help illustrate what would constitute total disregard.
2
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In re Detention of D.H., No. 100716-7

issue under RAP 2.5(a)(3). Given our resolution of dismissal of the petition we

decline to reach this issue.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On Wednesday, April 29, 2020, DH’s mother referred DH for evaluation

because of concerns regarding DH’s labile mood, delusions, paranoia, vague threats

toward his family, and lack of sleep. A designated crisis responder (DCR) contacted

the mother and DH and concluded that DH should be detained. DH was detained and

brought to Allenmore Hospital under a 72-hour hold for involuntary treatment due

to grave disability pursuant to former RCW 71.05.153(1). He was admitted at 9:48

p.m. that night. During his admission, DH was informed that he “will be released

within a period of 72 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, unless a

judicial hearing is held. The hearing must be held within 72 hours after your initial

detention to determine whether there is a [(sic)] probable cause to detain you for up

to an additional 14 days.” Sealed Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 33. Under this timeline,

DH’s 72-hour hold was set to expire on Monday, May 4, 2020 at 9:48 p.m. The State

initiated emergency detention proceedings.

On April 30, 2020, DH was evaluated for a petition for 14 days of involuntary

treatment. The evaluator observed that DH was alert and oriented to where he was

and the purpose of the evaluation. The evaluator ultimately did not file a 14-day

petition because “[DH] stated very clear[ly] he would like to further accept inpatient

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In re Detention of D.H., No. 100716-7

psychiatric treatment and he refused to return to his mother’s home.” Sealed

Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 15. DH was then transferred to Wellfound

Behavioral Health Hospital. Although DH could have been transferred as a voluntary

patient, Allenmore transferred him as an involuntary patient.

The Wellfound ITA treatment court supervisor, Ian Callahan, met with DH

shortly after he arrived at Wellfound on the evening of April 30, 2020. DH informed

Callahan that he was upset and did not want to be in the hospital and that he wanted

to leave.

Callahan initially thought that DH was transferred as a voluntary patient but

learned in the morning of May 1, 2020, that DH was transferred as an involuntary

72-hour hold patient. Callahan was initially “anxious because [he] didn’t know that

someone had already done a 14-day evaluation and decided not to file.” Id. at 26. He

then spoke to the evaluator for more information about the situation.

Callahan later interacted with DH, who was again upset and asking to leave.

Callahan testified that he did not think that DH would be a “good fit” for a voluntary

patient given his outbursts and delusions regarding treatment. Id. at 28. When asked

why he did not file his own 14-day petition at that point, Callahan testified,

It was our understanding that we couldn’t do back to back detention
investigations or detentions and so it was our understanding that we had
to allow the current 72-hour hold to elapse, and during that time it was
our job to continue to try to engage the patient in voluntary treatment
services with the hope that the patient would stay voluntarily or
stabilize.
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....

It was our understanding that we could not refer the individual back to
for [sic] a new 72-hour detention or any type of commitment
proceeding until the hold had expired and then that person was
reevaluated by a mental health professional and a new assessment was
filed.

Id. at 29.

DH’s 72-hour hold expired on Monday, May 4, 2020, at 9:48 p.m., but

Wellfound did not release him as required under the statute.

On May 5, 2020, DH was evaluated again by another DCR. That DCR

concluded that DH met the criteria again for a 72-hour hold and filed a new 72-hour

notice of emergency detention under a new cause number. Callahan and the DCR

then filed a 14-day petition for involuntary treatment, over a week after DH was

initially detained. DH moved for dismissal of the petition “for a total disregard of

the statutory requirements and rights set forth in Ch. 71.05 RCW” because he was

held longer than 72 hours without a judicial determination. CP at 17, VRP at 46-47.

The motion was heard on May 19, 2020—20 days after his initial detention.

In the ruling, the court noted, “[I]t’s distressing that I do know I have more

than one of these motions pending.” VRP at 55. Nonetheless, the court denied the

motion to dismiss, finding that there was not a total disregard for the statute,

reasoning, “If there is any criticism of Wellfound in this case, it would be that they

kept trying to honor his request to go on a voluntary status.” Id.

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After further testimony as to DH’s mental state, the court found that DH

“suffer[s] from [a] mental disorder and that [he’s] gravely disabled.” VRP at 79. In

doing so, the court granted the petition for a 14-day involuntary hold. The court then

stated, “[Y]ou have now lost your right to possess a firearm or have a concealed

weapons permit.” Id. At no point prior to the ruling did the trial court inform DH

that he would lose his right to possess firearms if he was involuntarily committed as

required under former RCW 71.05.240(2) (2019).

DH appealed, alleging that the State had totally disregarded the requirements

of the ITA and asking for the petition to be dismissed. In addition, for the first time

on appeal, DH argued that the trial court erred when it did not give him the

mandatory written and oral advisement that if he was involuntarily committed he

would lose his right to possess firearms but that this could be avoided if he agreed

to treatment voluntarily.

The Court of Appeals, Division Two, applied its recent test for whether the

State has totally disregard the ITA as created in companion case, In re Detention of

N.G., 20 Wn. App. 2d 819, 503 P.3d 1 (2022). Under this test, the court looks to the

totality of the circumstances, considering four factors:

(1) whether the violation of the statutory requirements occurred
knowingly, willfully or through gross negligence; (2) the extent of the
deprivation of the committed person’s liberty; (3) the extent to which
the petitioner’s conduct and the committed person’s requested remedy
are protective of the committed person’s health and safety and reflect
appropriate treatment for the committed person; and (4) the extent to
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which the petitioner’s conduct and the committed person's requested
remedy are protective of the safety of the public.

Id. at 837. In considering these factors, the Court of Appeals held that “Wellfound

did not willfully violate the ITA” but “tried in good faith to comply with the ITA in

a situation not expressly covered by ITA provisions,” that the “improper deprivation

of liberty was relatively minimal,” and that “immediate release would have posed a

serious risk to public safety.” In re Det. of D.H., 20 Wn. App. 2d 840, 850, 502 P.3d

1284 (2022). The Court of Appeals then held the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in ruling that any violation of the ITA did not constitute total disregard of

the ITA.

As to the firearm advisement, although the Court of Appeals acknowledged

that the State conceded that the trial court did not give the mandatory advisement,

the court nonetheless declined to review the issue. The court held that this error was

not “manifest” and therefore did not meet the RAP 2.5(a)(3) threshold of a “manifest

error affecting a constitutional right.” Id. at 851-52.3

DH appealed, and this court granted review, setting this case as a companion

case to two consolidated cases, In re Detention of A.C., No. 100668-3 (Wash. ___,

2023), and In re Detention of N.G., No. 100690-0, that share the issue of the test of

3
The Court of Appeals also held that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s factual finding that DH was gravely disabled. In re Det. of D.H., 20 Wn. App. 2d at 853-
54. DH did not appeal this issue.
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whether the State has totally disregarded the ITA requirements and, if so, what the

proper remedy is. DH also appeals the failure to give the firearm loss advisement.

We accepted an amici brief in support of DH from the American Civil

Liberties Union of Washington, Disability Rights Washington, King County

Department of Public Defense, and Washington Defender Association.

ANALYSIS

I. Background of the ITA and DH’s Holds
In enacting the ITA, the legislature intends

(a) To protect the health and safety of persons suffering from
behavioral health disorders and to protect public safety through use of
the parens patriae and police powers of the state;

(b) To prevent inappropriate, indefinite commitment of persons
living with behavioral health disorders and to eliminate legal
disabilities that arise from such commitment;

(c) To provide prompt evaluation and timely and appropriate
treatment of persons with serious behavioral health disorders;

(d) To safeguard individual rights;

(e) To provide continuity of care for persons with serious
behavioral health disorders;

(f) To encourage the full use of all existing agencies, professional
personnel, and public funds to prevent duplication of services and
unnecessary expenditures; and

(g) To encourage, whenever appropriate, that services be
provided within the community.

RCW 71.05.010.

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Under former RCW 71.05.153(1), a DCR could order a person who, “as the

result of a mental disorder, presents an imminent likelihood of serious harm, or is in

imminent danger because of being gravely disabled,” be taken into emergency

custody for up to 72 hours, excluding weekends and holidays. 4 See also former RCW

71.05.180 (2019). Within this statute there were timelines related to steps that must

be taken within the first 12 hours of an emergency detention. See former RCW

71.05.153(5). The statute set forth that by the end of the initial 12 hours, the DCR

“must determine whether the individual meets detention criteria” and, if so, must file

the detention petition. Id. After the DCR petitions for detention, “the facility shall

then evaluate the person’s condition and admit, detain, transfer, or discharge such

person in accordance with [former] RCW 71.05.210.” Former RCW 71.05.170

(2016).

Former RCW 71.05.210 set forth the procedures that must occur within the

72-hour detention for “[e]ach person involuntarily detained and accepted or admitted

at an evaluation and treatment facility . . . .” Therefore, this statute applied to and set

forth required timelines for all involuntary commitments, which would include those

emergent 72-hour holds as set forth in former RCW 71.05.153. More specifically,

the statute discussed requirements related to who must evaluate an involuntarily

4
This statute has been amended to extend the time for an emergency hold from 72 hours
to 120 hours. See RCW 71.05.153(1).
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detained person and in what time frame, mandated treatment and care, and allowed

for refusal of medication within 24 hours of an appearance before a judge. Former

RCW 71.05.210.

Further, the statutory scheme mandated that

[t]he person shall be detained up to seventy-two hours, if, in the opinion
of the professional person in charge of the facility, or his or her
professional designee, the person presents a likelihood of serious harm,
or is gravely disabled. A person who has been detained for seventy-two
hours shall no later than the end of such period be released, unless
referred for further care on a voluntary basis, or detained pursuant to
court order for further treatment as provided in this chapter.

Former RCW 71.05.210(1)(b) (emphasis added).

Former RCW 71.05.230 (2018) further authorized that a person under a 72-

hour hold could be involuntarily committed for up to 14 days if certain conditions

were met. “If a petition is filed for fourteen day involuntary treatment . . . , the court

shall hold a probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours of the initial detention

of such person as determined in RCW 71.05.180, or at a time determined under RCW

71.05.148.” Former RCW 71.05.240(1).

Contrary to the mandatory directive under former RCW 71.05.210(1)(b), DH

was not released at the end of his initial 72-hour hold but was instead held overnight.

The following day he was evaluated again by a different DCR under a new cause

number, although relying on the same grounds as the first 72-hour hold.

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II. Total Disregard of the ITA
This case concerns the interpretation of RCW 71.05.010(2)’s “totally

disregarded” language and the proper remedy if a person’s rights have been violated

because of the State’s total disregard of the ITA. Interpretation of the ITA is a

question of law we review de novo. See Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn,

LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). We review the trial court’s application

of the law to disputed facts for abuse of discretion. In re Det. of A.C., No. 100668-

3, at 7 (citing State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 620, 290 P.3d 942 (2012)). We

find an abuse of discretion when the trial court decision is manifestly unreasonable

or exercised on untenable ground or for untenable reasons. State v. Rohrich, 149

Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003). This includes a decision reached “by applying

the wrong legal standard.” Id.

In interpreting a statute, “[t]he court’s fundamental objective is to ascertain

and carry out the Legislature’s intent, and if the statute’s meaning is plain on its face,

then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative

intent.” Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 9-10. To do so, we look to “all that the

Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes.” Id. at 11.

“Because civil commitment statutes involve a deprivation of liberty, they

should be construed strictly.” In re Det. of C.W., 147 Wn.2d 259, 272, 53 P.3d 979

(2002). “However, courts must ‘keep in mind the need to satisfy the intent of the

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statute while avoiding absurd results.’” Id. (quoting In re Det. of Swanson, 115

Wn.2d 21, 28, 804 P.2d 1 (1990)).

Under RCW 71.05.010(2),

When construing the requirements of this chapter the court must focus
on the merits of the petition, except where requirements have been
totally disregarded, as provided in In re C.W., 147 Wn.2d 259, 281
(2002). A presumption in favor of deciding petitions on their merits
furthers both public and private interests because the mental and
physical well-being of individuals as well as public safety may be
implicated by the decision to release an individual and discontinue his
or her treatment.

(Emphasis added). Under the plain language of the statute, the court focuses on the

merits except where requirements have been totally disregarded. It follows that the

merits of the petition is a wholly separate analysis from the analysis of whether the

ITA has been totally disregarded.

The “totally disregarded” language comes from Swanson. In that case, this

court looked at the 72-hour ITA hold and the timing of the required judicial hearing.

Swanson, 115 Wn.2d at 26. Swanson’s case was heard after the 72 hours had elapsed,

but the court calendar had begun before the 72 hours had elapsed. In applying a strict

construction of the ITA, and looking at the stated purposed of the ITA and the

unpredictability of court calendars, the court held that the statute requires that the

calendar, not the individual hearing, must have started before the 72-hour mark. Id.

at 31. The court indicated that “[i]f Harborview had totally disregarded the

requirements of the statute or had failed to establish legal grounds for Swanson’s
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commitment, certainly dismissal would have been proper. Indeed, it would have

been required.” Id. (emphasis added). “However, if the intent of the statute is to be

fulfilled and absurd results are to be avoided, dismissal cannot turn on the vagaries

of scheduling, especially in these unpredictable and sensitive proceedings.” Id. This

court reiterated that time limits under the ITA must be strictly construed. Id.

However, we nonetheless held that

in the civil commitment context, a hearing begins when the court
calendar begins and the parties’ attorneys are ready to proceed. We take
care to note, however, that our holding is expressly limited to this
context, recognizing that it rests upon, and is guided by, the stated intent
of the civil commitment statute.

Id.

In C.W., 147 Wn.2d 259, this court looked at the violation of a different ITA

time limit under RCW 71.05.050. The court ultimately concluded that dismissal can

be a proper remedy when the State totally disregards statutory requirements of the

ITA. See id. at 283 (“allowing dismissal in cases where the professional staff totally

disregarded the statutory requirements serves as a general safeguard against abuse”).

However, we also concluded that “Swanson does seem to suggest that in determining

whether a case is to be dismissed, courts should focus on the merits of the petition,

the intent of the statute, and whether the State ‘totally disregarded the requirements

of the statute.’” Id. at 281 (quoting Swanson, 115 Wn.2d at 31). Again, this would

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imply that the determination of the merits of the petition is a separate analysis from

whether the requirements have been totally disregarded.

As set forth above, the legislature then codified the “totally disregarded”

language and indicates that courts must focus on the merits of the petition as set forth

in C.W., except when the requirements of the ITA have been totally disregarded.

LAWS OF 2015, ch. 269, § 1; RCW 71.05.010(2). The legislature has given no

direction on what constitutes a total disregard of the ITA requirements, nor does it

define “totally” or “disregarded.” Therefore, we look to dictionary definitions to

discern their meaning. Nissen v. Pierce County, 183 Wn.2d 863, 881, 357 P.3d 45

(2015).

“Disregard” means “to treat without fitting respect or attention,” “to treat as

unworthy of regard or notice,” and “to give no thought to : pay no attention.”

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 655 (2002). Whereas “totally”

means, “in a total manner : COMPLETELY, WHOLLY.” Id. at 2415. Analogizing to the

“admittedly very different context of negligent homicide,” our companion case

recognizes that we have held, “‘To drive with disregard for the safety of others,

consequently, is a greater and more marked dereliction than ordinary negligence. It

does not include the many minor inadvertences and oversights which might well be

deemed ordinary negligence under the statutes.’” A.C., No. 100668-3, at 14 (quoting

State v. Eike, 72 Wn.2d 760, 765-66, 435 P.2d 680 (1967)).

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Relying on these definitions and analogous reasoning, it follows that total

disregard is not a mere oversight but amounts to a complete failure to treat the ITA

with respect or attention. Holding someone without authority of law cannot be

acceptable under the ITA, and a failure to follow those mandatory directives to

ensure there is authority of law to involuntarily detain someone amounts to a

complete failure to treat the ITA as worthy of attention. Therefore, consistent with

the majority in A.C., we hold that “the requirements of the ITA have been totally

disregarded when a person is involuntarily detained without legal authority under

the act.” A.C., No. 100668-3, at 14. 5 Further, “[t]he requirements of the ITA are not

totally disregarded in every case where some aspect of the act has been violated.”

Id. at 14-15. When the State totally disregards the ITA, the remedy is dismissal. Id.

at 13 (citing Swanson, 115 Wn.2d at 31).

Turning to the facts in the present case, the applicable statute reads, “[a]

person who has been detained for seventy-two hours shall no later than the end of

such period be released, unless referred for further care on a voluntary basis, or

detained pursuant to court order for further treatment as provided in this chapter.”

Former RCW 71.05.210(1)(b) (emphasis added). At the end of the 72-hour hold,

because treatment providers deliberately failed to file a petition for a 14-day hold,

5
As the majority in A.C. also observes, this holding is not intended to describe the only
way in which the ITA can be totally disregarded but instead is focusing on the specific facts
surrounding DH’s detention.
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and because DH did not agree to voluntary treatment, the only option was to release

DH at or before 9:58 p.m., on Monday, May 4, 2020. Wellfound’s willful failure to

follow the statute is problematic and constitutes a total disregard of the ITA.

The dissent contends that the applicable statute is not former RCW

71.05.210(1)(b) but rather former RCW 71.05.153. This is incorrect. While it is true

that DH was detained and taken to Allenmore under the authority of former RCW

71.05.153, this statute applies only until the detained person has been evaluated and

a DCR has made the determination as to whether the person meets the criteria for

detention and files the detention petition. Under former RCW 71.05.170, once the

DCR files a detention petition, the facility must follow the directives in former RCW

71.05.210. In the present case, the petition for initial detention is dated April 29,

2020. CP at 30-32. From that point forward, DH’s detention was governed by former

RCW 71.05.210, not former RCW 71.05.153.

In addition, former RCW 71.05.153(5) does not apply because the timeliness

requirements within the statute do not concern release. Instead, the timeliness

requirements refer to the time by which one must be examined by medical

professionals and the time by which medical professionals must determine if the

person meets criteria for involuntary detention. While former RCW 71.05.153

mentions that a person cannot be held for more than 72 hours, former RCW

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71.05.210(1)(b) concerns what happens when the 72 hours elapses and is therefore

the appropriate statute under which to analyze this case.

However, even if former RCW 71.05.153(6) applied, we would come to the

same conclusion. Former RCW 71.05.153(6) reads,

Dismissal of a commitment petition is not the appropriate remedy for a
violation of the timeliness requirements of this section based on the
intent of this chapter under RCW 71.05.010 except in the few cases
where the facility staff or designated mental health professional has
totally disregarded the requirements of this section.

(Emphasis added.) Therefore, even if this statute were to control, it contains

language that dismissal is not appropriate unless the requirements have been totally

disregarded, as we conclude they have been here.

The Court of Appeals makes much of the fact that the voluntariness of DH’s

commitment was in question, but it is not as questionable as the Court of Appeals

concludes. DH was evaluated for a 14-day hold on Thursday, April 30, the day after

his admission, and the evaluator chose not to file the 14-day order because DH

agreed to go voluntarily. Nonetheless, the evaluator had him transferred to

Wellfound on the 72-hour hold, and the paper work indicated that the intake and

transfer was as an involuntary patient. Almost immediately upon arrival at

Wellfound later that day, on April 30, DH indicated that he wanted to leave. That

DH agreed to treatment and only hours later changed his mind and indicated his

desire to leave does not make the time requirements of the ITA evaporate or make

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them any less mandatory. Wellfound arguably lost a few hours when DH said he

would go voluntarily, but, due to the weekend, the hospitals had five days to comply

with the requirements of the ITA. Not so much time was lost that Wellfound could

not have, at the very least, attempted to comply with the statutory requirements to

the best of its ability. Instead, Wellfound chose to let the time expire and to hold DH

without authority of law and then began new proceedings under which he was held

for weeks before being heard on the merits before a judge. As required by statute,

DH should have been released before commencing a new petition.

The State contends that because the second 72-hour hold was done under a

new cause number and because there are no violations as to the current detention,

there is no basis to dismiss this current petition. Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 13. However,

we cannot allow the State to hold people without authority of law and avoid

repercussions simply by starting a new case. The new filing is materially

indistinguishable from the original, and so we will not treat it as a new petition.

Further, the filing of a new petition does nothing to remedy that the new case was

not allowed to be filed under the statute as the option for a new petition after the 72-

hours is filing a 14-day hold, not filing a consecutive 72-hour hold. Nor does a new

petition remedy that DH was held overnight without authority of law when the

treatment providers deliberately failed to pursue a 14-day order and that the only

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In re Detention of D.H., No. 100716-7

option available under the statute at the end of the 72-hour hold was for DH to be

released.

The trial court abused its discretion when it held that the State did not totally

disregard the requirements of the ITA under the facts of this case. The trial court

should have granted DH’s motion to dismiss.

Because we reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that DH’s motion to

dismiss should have been granted, we decline to reach the issue of whether the failure

to give him the statutorily mandated firearm rights advisement is reviewable under

RAP 2.5(a)(3).

CONCLUSION

We reverse the Court of Appeals. The State totally disregarded the

requirements of the ITA when it intentionally allowed DH’s emergency hold to

expire, held him overnight without authority of law, and began new proceedings on

the same grounds as the initial petition without releasing him as mandated by statute.

When the State totally disregards the requirements of the ITA, the petition must be

dismissed. We therefore remand to the trial court for dismissal of the petition and

any other proceedings necessary consistent with this opinion.

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In re Detention of D.H., No. 100716-7

WE CONCUR.

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In re Det. of D.H.

No. 100716-7

MADSEN, J. (dissenting)—The involuntary treatment act (ITA) states that the

requirements of the chapter must be construed such that petitions are decided on the

merits, “except where requirements have been totally disregarded.” RCW 71.05.010(2)

(emphasis added). The legislature adopted the phrase “totally disregarded” from a

decision of this court, In re Detention of C.W., which provides that dismissal is not an

appropriate remedy for every violation but “may be appropriate in the few cases where

[providers] ‘totally disregarded the requirements of the statute.’” 147 Wn.2d 259, 283,

53 P.3d 979 (2002) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Det. of Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 31,

804 P.2d 1 (1990)). Here, the majority agrees with the holding of its companion case, In

re Detention of A.C., No. 100668-3 (Wash. ____, 2023), to conclude that a total disregard

occurs when a person is involuntarily detained without legal authority under the ITA,

requiring dismissal. Majority at 14-15. I disagree.

I would hold that ITA requirements are totally disregarded only when the action or

inaction complained of thwarts the fundamental purposes of the act. Here, dismissal is
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No. 100716-7
Madsen, J., dissenting

not warranted, and instead, the remedy is filing a new commitment petition as was done

in this case. More importantly, regardless of how “totally disregarded” is defined, the

statute under which D.H. was detained expressly states that “[d]ismissal of a commitment

petition is not the appropriate remedy for a violation of the timeliness requirements of

this section.” Former RCW 71.05.153(6) (2019) (emphasis added).

I would also affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision not to address the trial court’s

failure to advise D.H. that involuntary commitment would result in the loss of his firearm

rights. I respectfully dissent.

DISCUSSION

The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Campbell

& Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). A court’s fundamental objective is to

ascertain and carry out the legislature’s intent. Id. at 9-10. If the statute’s meaning is

plain, then we give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent. Id.

at 10. Plain meaning is derived from what the legislature has said in the statute, related

statutes, and context of the statutory scheme as a whole. Id. at 11; Lake v. Woodcreek

Homeowners Ass’n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). Absent a specific

statutory definition, words in a statute are given their ordinary meaning and we may

discern that meaning from the dictionary. State v. Chester, 133 Wn.2d 15, 22, 940 P.2d

1374 (1997); State v. Kintz, 169 Wn.2d 537, 547, 238 P.3d 470 (2010). Washington’s

civil commitment statutes involve a deprivation of liberty, therefore, they should be

strictly construed. C.W., 147 Wn.2d at 272. But courts must also “‘keep in mind the

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No. 100716-7
Madsen, J., dissenting

need to satisfy the intent of the statute while avoiding absurd results.’” Id. (quoting

Swanson, 115 Wn.2d at 28).

“Totally Disregarded”

Subsection (2) of RCW 71.05.010 provides the language at issue: “When

construing requirements of this chapter the court must focus on the merits of the petition,

except where requirements have been totally disregarded, as provided in In re C.W.”

(Emphasis added.) The ITA does not define “totally disregarded.” Nevertheless, we

have guidance from the dictionary and our decision in C.W.

First, Webster’s defines the verb to “disregard” as “to treat without fitting respect

or attention,” “to treat as unworthy of regard or notice,” and “to give no thought to : pay

no attention.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 655 (2002). The

word “totally” is defined as “in a total manner : COMPLETELY, WHOLLY,” and the word

“total” is defined as “unqualified in extent or degree : ABSOLUTE, UTTER.” Id. at 2414-

15. Together, the terms “totally disregarded” mean to treat something as utterly or

wholly unworthy of regard or notice. Under chapter 71.05 RCW, the ITA is totally

disregarded when it is treated as wholly unworthy of respect or notice.

Next, we know from our decision in C.W. that if provisions of the act are violated,

the court should “focus on the merits of the petition, the intent of the statute, and whether

the State ‘totally disregarded the requirements of the statute’” when fashioning a remedy.

147 Wn.2d at 281 (quoting Swanson, 115 Wn.2d at 31). Here, the majority rejects the

guidance from both Webster’s and our case law.

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Rather than adopting the terms’ plain meaning from Webster’s, the majority agrees

with its companion case, A.C., analogizing “disregard” to the mental state of negligent

homicide—a “‘more marked dereliction than ordinary negligence.’” A.C., No. 100668-3,

at 14 (quoting State v. Eike, 72 Wn.2d 760, 765-66, 435 P.2d 680 (1967)). 1 While I

disagree that C.W.’s total disregard standard includes a mental element, “totally

disregard” surely means more than the majority’s “enhanced” negligence standard.

The majority also rejects C.W. in defining the standard set by that case, and

instead asserts that “the merits of the petition is a wholly separate analysis from the

analysis of whether the ITA has been totally disregarded.” Majority at 12. In C.W., we

explained that “in determining whether a case is to be dismissed, courts should focus on

the merits of the petition, the intent of the statute, and whether the State ‘totally

disregarded the requirements of the statute.’” 147 Wn.2d at 281 (emphasis added)

(quoting Swanson, 115 Wn.2d at 31). Releasing an individual who is in need of

1
While the majority says it is not adopting this “negligence-plus” standard, its acceptance of the
analogy from A.C. does little to alleviate the confusion of what total disregard means. In
accepting the “analogous reasoning” of negligence plus, the majority appears to create an intent
requirement for the “total disregard” standard. Majority at 14. The majority reasons that
Wellfound Behavioral Health Hospital “intentionally” allowed the 72-hour hold to expire and
“deliberately failed to pursue a 14-day order.” Majority at 18, 15. But under either a negligence
or intentional standard, Wellfound’s actions did not demonstrate a total disregard for the act.
D.H. told hospital staff that he wanted to leave immediately after arriving at Wellfound, contrary
to D.H.’s earlier statement accepting voluntary treatment. Upon discovering that no 14-day
involuntary petition had been filed for D.H., Wellfound staff sought guidance from the Pierce
County Prosecutor’s Office. On that advice, the staff knowingly allowed D.H.’s original 72-hour
hold to elapse. Sealed Verbatim Rep. of Proc. at 29, 35. These actions are far from “the very
least, attempt[ing] to comply with the statutory requirements to the best of [Wellfound’s]
ability.” Majority at 18. Rather, Wellfound was attempting to comply with ITA requirements,
even seeking legal advice.

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No. 100716-7
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behavioral health treatment without regard for their provider’s reasoning contained in the

petition conflicts with the “tacit presumption” of the ITA—to decide cases on the merits

in order to further the well-being of individuals and public safety. In re Det. of G.V., 124

Wn.2d 288, 296, 877 P.2d 680 (1994). 2

The presumption that petitions be decided on their merits furthers public and

private interests because releasing an individual who is in need of treatment implicates

the well-being of those individuals as well as public safety. RCW 71.05.010(2). These

dual purposes are reflected in the legislative intent of the ITA: to protect the health and

safety of persons suffering from behavioral health disorders and protecting public safety;

preventing inappropriate and indefinite commitments; providing prompt evaluation and

timely and appropriate treatment; safeguarding individual rights; providing continuity of

care; and encouraging full use of existing agencies, personnel, and public funds to

prevent duplication of services. RCW 71.05.010(1)(a)-(f).

Considering these purposes, dismissal should be used only in those few cases

where the action or inaction complained of totally disregards the fundamental purposes

and intent of the ITA. See C.W., 147 Wn.2d at 283. This standard considers the

2
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, it does not follow that reviewing the merits of a petition is
separate from determining whether the ITA has been totally disregarded. Majority at 12. RCW
71.05.010(2) states that courts must focus on the merits of a petition except when the ITA has
been totally disregarded as provided in C.W., 147 Wn.2d at 281. C.W. lists, as factors to be
considered for purposes of dismissal, the merits of a petition, the intent of the ITA, and whether
the act’s requirements have been totally disregarded. 147 Wn.2d at 281. Thus, C.W. does not
support the majority’s narrow and out-of-context interpretation of .010(2). Together, .010(2) and
C.W. support a court considering all three factors when the remedy sought is dismissal.

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No. 100716-7
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presumption in favor of deciding petitions on the merits, the goals of the ITA, and

whether the requirements of the ITA have been treated as wholly unworthy of respect or

notice. 3

Dismissal Is “Not the Appropriate Remedy” for Violating Timeliness
Requirements, RCW 71.05.153(5)

Setting aside, for the moment, the definition of “totally disregarded,” former RCW

71.05.153(6) (2019) says that “[d]ismissal of a commitment petition is not the

appropriate remedy for a violation of the timeliness requirements of this section based on

the intent of this chapter under RCW 71.05.010 except in the few cases” where the

requirements of the section were “totally disregarded.” (Emphasis added.) 4 Here, the

designated crisis responder found that D.H. was gravely disabled and took D.H. into

emergency custody on April 29, 2020, which is authorized by RCW 71.05.153. Sealed

3
In examining whether the action or inaction complained of disregards the fundamental purposes
and intent of the ITA, it may be appropriate to consider some of the factors outlined by the Court
of Appeals. These factors may include the extent to which the petitioner’s conduct and the
committed person’s requested remedy safeguard the committed person’s health and safety,
ensure appropriate treatment, and are protective of public safety. Other considerations may be
whether the petitioner has a process in place to comply with statutory requirements; the extent to
which the petitioner attempted to comply with that process; and the actions of the petitioner upon
discovering a statutory violation—which concern the safeguarding of individual rights. See
Suppl. Br. of N. Sound Telecare E&T Ctr. at 16 (Wash. No. 100668-3 (2022)); RCW
71.05.010(1)(d). Relevant considerations should reflect the legislative intent of the ITA as set
out in RCW 71.05.010(1).
4
RCW 71.05.153 was subsequently revised, resulting in subsection (6) becoming subsection (5)
in the current provision. The legislature has not changed the language expressing its intent that
dismissal “is not the appropriate remedy for a violation of the timeliness requirements of this
section.” RCW 71.05.153(5).

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No. 100716-7
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Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 40. That statute governs the procedure for emergency detentions

of persons with behavioral health disorders, providing:

When a designated crisis responder receives information alleging that a
person, as the result of a mental disorder, presents an imminent likelihood
of serious harm, or is in imminent danger because of being gravely
disabled, after investigation and evaluation of the specific facts alleged . . .
the designated crisis responder may take such person . . . into emergency
custody . . . for not more than seventy-two hours as described in RCW
71.05.180.[5]

Former RCW 71.05.153(1) (2019) (emphasis added). The majority mentions subsection

(6), the legal basis for the commitment but, instead, relies on former RCW

71.05.210(1)(b) (2019): “‘A person who has been detained for seventy-two hours shall no

later than the end of such period be released, unless referred for further care on a

voluntary basis, or detained pursuant to court order.’” Majority at 10 (quoting former

RCW 71.05.210(1)(b)). While former .210 discusses the 72-hour hold, D.H. was not

detained under that provision. D.H. was taken into emergency custody and transferred to

Wellfound Behavioral Health Hospital pursuant to former .153. CP at 40. Relying on

former .210 for the mandatory release language, as the majority does here, disregards the

statutory authority under which D.H. was detained and ignores that provision’s express

direction that violations of its timeliness requirements do not warrant dismissal of a

commitment petition. 6

5
RCW 71.05.180 states that computation of RCW 71.05.153’s emergency detention time period
excludes Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays.
6
The majority explains that it is relying on former .210 because that provision provides the
procedure for what must occur within and after a 72-hour detention. Majority at 9-10, 16-17.

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No. 100716-7
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Indeed, former RCW 71.05.153(6) resolves this matter. It is true that D.H. was

held over the 72-hour commitment period, violating the statute’s timeliness requirements.

But, the legislature expressed its clear intent that such violations do not result in dismissal

except in the few cases where the requirements of the section have been totally

disregarded. Former RCW 71.05.153(6). Thus, “total disregard” must mean something

other than violations of the timelines in .153.

Instead of considering the provision under which D.H. was detained, the majority

concludes that the ITA has been “totally disregarded” under former RCW

71.05.210(1)(b). Majority at 15. But even if that section controlled, this misses the

point.

The subsequent actions of a facility are, as the majority notes, governed by former .210. But the
question before us is whether authority of law exists to detain someone, which the majority
agrees is the issue, and former .210 does not answer that question. The majority concludes,
contrary to former .210(1)(b), D.H. was not released at the end of his initial 72-hour hold but
instead held overnight, which means the ITA has been totally disregarded. Majority at 16.
Failure to release after 72 hours may violate former .210, but that does not mean the detention
lacked all legal authority under the ITA. The majority merely identifies a statutory violation.
The majority also dismisses former .153 by saying it “mentions” a person cannot be held for
more than 72 hours but only .210 deals with what happens when the 72-hour period is up.
Majority at 16-17. In other words, .210 requires a patient to be released. Yet both former .153
and former .210 set a 72-hour timeline, and .153 alone provides emergency detention authority.
The majority essentially holds that any and all violations of the ITA are now a total disregard of
the statute. That cannot be the test. Moreover, the existence of another statute that outlines other
procedures does not supplant the provision enabling the involuntary detention in the first place.
Instead of reconciling the two statutes, the majority circumvents the controlling statute—former
RCW 71.05.153 and its presumption against dismissal—by simply selecting former .210 as
applicable and interpreting that provision. See Cerrillo v. Esparza, 158 Wn.2d 194, 201, 142
P.3d 155 (2006) (reviewing courts cannot rewrite unambiguous statutory language under the
guise of interpretation).
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No. 100716-7
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There is no dispute that the 72-hour emergency period expired and D.H. was held

over in violation of the ITA. The question before us is whether dismissal is the

appropriate remedy. It is not. Where a person is still in need of treatment, is receiving

treatment, and is appropriate for a new commitment period, the failure to timely refile for

a new commitment period is not a “total disregard” of the purposes of the ITA meriting

dismissal. See RCW 71.05.010(2); former RCW 71.05.153(6) (2019).

Even under the Majority’s Definition of “Totally Disregarded,” the Remedy of
Dismissal to the Subsequent, Properly Filed Petition Is Improper

The majority elects to apply its dismissal remedy, not to the initial petition on

which D.H. was held over but to the second, properly filed petition. The parties do not

assert that new petitions for evaluation and treatment are precluded by prior ITA

violations. The ITA permits the use of a person’s recent history to determine whether

that person should be civilly committed, that is, whether they are gravely disabled,

present a likelihood of serious harm, or are in need of treatment. RCW 71.05.245(1).

This history can include violent acts and, relevant here, “recent history of one or more

commitments” under the ITA or equivalent provisions in another state. RCW

71.05.245(3)(a)-(b). Consideration of past commitments, irrespective of whether those

commitments included ITA violations, aligns with the ITA’s intent. It furthers the goals

of protecting persons with behavioral health disorders based on their current behavior and

recent history, which also aids in preventing inappropriate commitments. RCW

71.05.010(1)(a), (b).

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No. 100716-7
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In light of these provisions, I disagree with the majority’s decision to treat D.H.’s

new commitment petition (filed after the original 72-hour hold elapsed) as

“indistinguishable” from the prior filing for purposes of dismissal. Majority at 18. 7 In

order to detain a person for involuntary treatment, a designated crisis responder must

conduct an evaluation. RCW 71.05.153(1). The crisis responder must make a point-in-

time determination of whether a person, as a result of a behavioral health disorder,

presents an “imminent likelihood of serious harm, or is in imminent danger because of

being gravely disabled.” Id. The fact that a person is in continuing need of treatment due

to a continuing behavioral health disorder does not make a new petition, when conducted

in accordance with the ITA as was done here, legally the same as a prior petition.

It is clear that D.H. could be released and immediately detained for involuntary

commitment if D.H. met the criteria. See Wash. Sup. Ct. oral argument, In re Det. of

D.H., No. 100716-7 (Oct. 6, 2022), at 17 min., 35 sec., video recording by TVW,

Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, https://tvw.org/video/washington-state-

supreme-court-2022101094/. These new commitment proceedings could properly

include the individual’s most recent commitment history under RCW 71.05.245. While

the majority’s holding would provide D.H. with liberty, it is a fleeting liberty.

Apparently, the majority would have mental health providers wait at the door for D.H.,

7
Unlike the majority in A.C., the majority here recognizes that it is applying its dismissal remedy
to a new, properly filed commitment petition.
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No. 100716-7
Madsen, J., dissenting

who was clearly in need of continued treatment, to be released and then refile for D.H.’s

continued detention. The majority’s solution is an empty remedy.

Even if the majority’s test for total disregard is correct—that a person is detained

without authority of law—it should not apply in this case. Here, the mental health

provider for D.H. filed a new commitment petition when the original hold expired. D.H.

does not argue that new petitions could not be filed. The majority applies its rule not just

to the previously expired petitions but to the new petitions as well, attaching not only to

actions taken without “authority of law” but to actions that are wholly compliant with the

ITA.

Instead, the remedy of commencing a new petition while an individual is detained

is sensible and does not undermine the ITA’s goal of preventing indefinite commitments.

The commencement of new petitions involves numerous safeguards. Designated crisis

responders file petitions only after they determine the person meets the criteria for civil

commitment. RCW 71.05.150, .153. Holding a person past the expiration of their

original commitment orders does not create indefinite commitments. That individual is

entitled to multiple reviews of their current mental and behavioral status, from the

designated crisis responder to a judicial officer. At each point in this process, the

detained individual must be found to meet criteria for continued commitment or be

released. E.g., RCW 71.05.260 (mandating release if a professional determines the

person no longer meets criteria for detention). The individual’s need for treatment drives

the process, which requires additional safeguards as the potential commitment period

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No. 100716-7
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becomes longer. In re Det. of E.S., 22 Wn. App. 2d 161, 179, 509 P.3d 871 (2022) (“The

act is intended to be applied ‘in stages,’ with increasing terms of involuntary treatment

and detention to be accompanied by increasing procedural protections.” (quoting In re

Det. of Dydasco, 135 Wn.2d 943, 947, 959 P.2d 1111 (1998))).

In civil commitment cases, courts must balance the interests of the detained person

with the interests of the State, as detailed in the ITA. See C.W., 147 Wn.2d at 281. When

persons are in obvious need of behavioral health services and pose serious risks of harm

to themselves or others, like the individual in this case, the ITA’s purpose counsels

continued detention for treatment rather than release. Release without regard for the

individual’s needs and safety or that of the public conflicts with the foundational

purposes of the ITA.

D.H.’s Hold-Over Detention Did Not Totally Disregard the ITA

On April 29, 2020, D.H.’s mother referred D.H. for an involuntary treatment

evaluation, with concerns about D.H.’s labile mood, delusions, threats toward D.H.’s

family, and lack of sleep. D.H. was reportedly acting out and speaking incoherently,

“obsessed with his family being imposters and the CIA.” CP at 30. The designated crisis

responder concluded that D.H. exhibited symptoms of mania and delusions, a labile and

anxious mood, agitated behavior, disorganized thought process, and impaired judgment

among other things, meeting the criteria for grave disability. D.H. was brought to

Allenmore Hospital on a 72-hour hold under former RCW 71.05.153(1).

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The next day, April 30, 2020, D.H. was evaluated by another crisis responder for

an additional 14 days of treatment. The responder found that D.H. was calm and

oriented, and would accept voluntary treatment. Therefore no 14-day petition was filed.

D.H. was transferred to Wellfound as an involuntary patient for the remaining hours of

the original 72-hour hold.

Upon arriving at Wellfound, D.H. informed staff that he wanted to leave.

Wellfound staff were unsure how to proceed. They consulted the Pierce County

Prosecuting Office, concluding that Wellfound had to allow the current 72-hour hold to

elapse and continue to engage D.H. in voluntary treatment services in the hope that D.H.

would stay voluntarily or stabilize. D.H.’s 72-hour hold expired on Monday, May 4,

2020, and Wellfound continued to detain D.H.

On May 5, 2020, D.H. was evaluated by another designated crisis responder, who

imposed a second 72 hour emergency hold. Later that week, Wellfound filed a 14-day

involuntary treatment petition for D.H. At the hearing for that petition, D.H. moved to

dismiss for total disregard of the ITA’s 72-hour time period. The court denied D.H.’s

motion and committed D.H. for the additional 14 days.

Detaining D.H. past the original 72 hours was not a total disregard of the ITA,

neither under the plain language of RCW 71.05.153(5) nor when considering the intent

and purpose of the act. D.H.’s delusions centered on family members: at the April 30,

2020 evaluation, D.H. stated, “I’m sure my mother and b[r]other poisoned me and people

are pretending to be people I know.” CP at 55. D.H. has a history of unspecified

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No. 100716-7
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schizophrenia and psychotic disorders. Those disorders worsened due to substance use

and COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019) stress. D.H.’s conversation with the crisis

responder indicated delusional thinking—D.H. reported his family and friends were

replaced by strangers out to get D.H., his body parts were replaced by other people’s

body parts, D.H. was in a coma, and the world was virtual. D.H. used cannabis every day

and smoked cigarettes but believed that they were fake because people put “in other

drugs to poison” D.H. Id. at 56. D.H. was sleeping poorly, had little appetite, and poor

concentration.

In light of D.H.’s delusions and statements, D.H.’s mental health provider

recommended continued hospitalization in order to protect the safety of D.H.’s family.

D.H. was dangerous to others, had homicidal ideation, and was not safe to be discharged.

Continuing to detain D.H. protected the health and safety of the general public,

specifically D.H.’s mother with whom D.H. lived and whom he had threatened. RCW

71.05.010(1)(a). Immediately commencing new commitment procedures when the 72-

hour hold expired prevented inappropriate and indefinite commitment, and provided

prompt evaluation and appropriate treatment by recalling a designated crisis responder

for a new evaluation and subsequent judicial oversight. RCW 71.05.010(1)(b)-(c). It

also ensured continuity of care, allowing providers familiar with D.H. to continue

treatment. See RCW 71.05.010(1)(e).

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Loss of Firearm Rights

As to D.H.’s argument that the failure to advise him of the potential loss of his

firearm rights, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the issue is not manifest

under RAP 2.5(a)(3). In re Det. of D.H., 20 Wn. App. 2d 840, 850-51, 502 P.3d 1284

(2022). The State concedes that at the beginning of the 14-day probable cause hearing,

D.H. was not provided with the statutorily required notice that his firearm rights would be

lost if he was involuntarily committed. RCW 71.05.240(2); Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 30.

D.H. did not object at the hearing. D.H. later raised the issue for the first time at the

Court of Appeals, arguing the statutory violation requires reversal of the 14-day detention

order.

Under RAP 2.5(a)(3), a claim of error may be raised for the first time on appeal if

it involves a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. The issue affected D.H.’s

constitutional right to bear arms. U.S. CONST. amend. II; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24. An

error is manifest if the appellant makes a plausible showing that the error had “‘practical

and identifiable consequences.’” State v. A.M., 194 Wn.2d 33, 38, 448 P.3d 35 (2019)

(quoting State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99, 217 P.3d 756 (2009)). RAP 2.5(a)(3)’s

requirements are distinct from the requirements for establishing an actual violation of a

constitutional right or for showing a lack of prejudice for harmless error if a violation of a

constitutional right has occurred. Id. at 39.

In D.H.’s case, the Court of Appeals held the error was not manifest on three

grounds. D.H., 20 Wn. App. 2d at 852. First, evidence indicated that D.H. knew he

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No. 100716-7
Madsen, J., dissenting

would lose his firearm rights if involuntarily committed even though the court did not

inform him at the 14-day hearing. The 14-day petition stated that D.H. had been

informed of the loss of firearm rights, which D.H. did not deny. The record also shows

that D.H. had been committed in October 2019 and, presumably, D.H. was advised at the

time that he had lost his firearm right due to involuntary commitment. Id.

Second, the record indicates that D.H. would not have agreed to voluntary

treatment even if he had been advised of the loss of his firearm rights. As discussed

above, D.H. had agreed to voluntary treatment but, upon transfer to Wellfound, decided

he did not want treatment and wished to leave. D.H. continued to decline treatment

throughout his 72-hour hold as the staff attempted to stabilize him. Id.

Finally, the Wellfound staff testified that D.H. did not own firearms, and there was

no indication that the loss of those firearm rights would have influenced D.H.’s decision

to accept voluntary treatment to maintain his rights. Id. at 852-53.

D.H. argues that it was possible that the trial court’s failure to inform him of the

loss of his firearm rights would have “practical and identifiable consequences,” but D.H.

does not show that error was plausible as RAP 2.5(a)(3) requires. Accordingly, I would

uphold the Court of Appeals’ ruling on this issue.

CONCLUSION

The majority adopts a bright-line rule that dismissal of new commitment petitions

is required if individuals were detained under the ITA without authority of law in

previous petitions. Our case law and the ITA itself do not require such a rule. Instead,

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we should consider whether the action or inaction complained of prevents the

fundamental purposes of the ITA when determining whether the act’s requirements have

been totally disregarded. See RCW 71.05.010(2). I would hold that the continued

detention of D.H. was not a total disregard of the ITA and that dismissal was not the

appropriate remedy. 8 Regarding the firearm warning, I agree with the Court of Appeals

that the issue was not manifest under RAP 2.5(a)(3) and would not reach it for the first

time on appeal.

With these considerations in mind, I respectfully dissent.

8
While dismissal is a remedy to be rarely used, persons held over their commitment periods are
not without recourse. Relevant here, detention “for more than the allowable number of days”
can result in civil damages. RCW 71.05.510. As the State details in A.C., other remedies may
be sought such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, habeas corpus or personal restraint petitions, and
professional discipline for providers who fail to abide by the ITA. Unlike dismissal, these
remedies better serve the legislative intent to focus on the merits of the petition, the needs and
safety of the individual, and the safety of the public.

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