State v. Taylor

2023 UT App 133

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM LANSING TAYLOR,
Appellee.

Opinion
No. 20210366-CA
Filed November 2, 2023

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Heather Brereton
No. 191903574

Sean D. Reyes and Lindsey L. Wheeler,
Attorneys for Appellant
Freyja Johnson and Emily Adams,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN M. HARRIS
concurred.

LUTHY, Judge:

¶1 This is a witness tampering case. William Lansing Taylor
and a former coworker (Colleague) are both geologists, and they
worked for the same research institute (Employer) until Employer
fired Taylor in the spring of 2018. When Taylor was later charged
with multiple misdemeanors, the charging document for that case
(Information) contained a summary of a statement given by
Colleague that described an interaction the pair had at a
professional conference. Upon reviewing the Information, Taylor
sent Colleague a series of emails accusing her of lying and asking
her to “renounce” her statement. Based on these emails, Taylor
was charged with witness tampering. After a jury convicted
 State v. Taylor

Taylor of this offense, the district court arrested judgment,
concluding that there was insufficient evidence that Taylor had
the mental state necessary to support a witness tampering
conviction. The State now appeals, challenging the court’s order
arresting judgment. We conclude that when the evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, it was
sufficient to support that verdict. We therefore reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In May 2018, sometime after Employer terminated Taylor,
both Taylor and Colleague attended a professional conference.
While there, the pair had an interaction that Colleague found
disturbing. Because of “ongoing problems” between Taylor and
Employer’s staff, Colleague reported the incident to her
supervisor and then to the police.

¶3 Prior to the conference—in April 2018—the police had
begun investigating Taylor. The investigation resulted in charges
being filed against Taylor in a separate case, and Taylor first
appeared in court on those charges on January 15, 2019. Taylor
chose to represent himself at his arraignment, and he was there
presented with the Information that included, in the probable
cause statement, a summary of a statement given by Colleague
describing the incident at the conference. That summary read:

[F]ollowing a presentation [Colleague] gave[,] she
was approached by [Taylor] in the main convention
hall where he blocked her path, not allowing her to
return to [Employer’s] booth. [Colleague] states that
she took an unusual path to avoid [Taylor], but he
sought her out. During the conversation [Taylor]
was irate and unstable. [Colleague] tried to get away
from [Taylor] multiple times, but he stayed with her
and often mentioned other . . . staff members [of
Employer]. [Taylor] only left when he saw
[Colleague’s] coworkers approaching.

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 State v. Taylor

While this summary was included in the Information for Taylor’s
other case, none of the charges filed against Taylor in that case
stemmed from the interaction between Taylor and Colleague at
the conference.

¶4 Soon after he left his arraignment, Taylor began emailing
Colleague. In his first email, sent at 9:33 a.m. the same day, he
wrote:

You provided false testimony. We did not have an
altercation of any sort at [the conference]. I did not
seek you out, I did not block your path, I was neither
irate nor unstable, you did not try to get away
multiple times and I did not pursue you. I can’t
believe you lied. You will now be subpoenaed and
required to recount the true story in front of a Salt
Lake City district cour[t] judge.

A second email contained only an attachment consisting of the
portion of the Information summarizing Colleague’s statement to
police, as quoted above. A third email, sent at 2:44 p.m. on the
same day, said:

Because of your statement, I’m being prosecuted by
the State of Utah[.] I face 2.5 years in prison, fines,
and a permanent criminal record. None of my
interactions with you warrant this attack nor these
consequence[s]. Please renounce your statement.

¶5 Based on these emails, the State charged Taylor—in a case
separate from the misdemeanors—with one count of witness
tampering, a third-degree felony. The witness tampering case is
the subject of this appeal, and it was tried before a jury in October
2019.

¶6 During trial, Colleague provided the following testimony
in response to questioning by the State:

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 State v. Taylor

Q: [B]etween the time that the defendant had been
terminated [by Employer] and this conference in
May, had there been problems between the
defendant and the staff [of Employer]?

A: There have been some emails that have been
received [by] a different staff member and some
ongoing problems.

Q: Okay. So given that, what were your feelings
when you saw the defendant at this [conference] in
May?

A: I was concerned. I was worried . . . .

Q: Okay. And at this conference when you saw him
there, was there some sort of confrontation or
incident that took place?

A: Yeah. We were in the main hall, and he blocked
my path from moving through the hallway. I tried
to move one way, he’d move that way. Again, tried
to move another way, he’d move that way. And
then some things were said, mostly in a very irate
manner by Mr. Taylor.

¶7 The State asked about Colleague’s reaction to Taylor’s
emails, and Colleague responded that she “was scared.” The State
asked why the messages made her feel scared, and she answered
that the incident at the conference “had been a behavioral pattern”
and “[t]here had been other things leading up to that as well.” She
continued, “And so when I got the email saying that I had lied
and that I needed to recant those lies, I was scared.” The State
asked, “And . . . how did it make you feel about going forward
with the statement that you had given to police?” Colleague
responded, “I was scared to go forward.” At this point, Taylor’s
counsel objected as to relevancy, and the court said, “I think it is

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 State v. Taylor

[relevant]. I’ll overrule the objection.” Colleague then further
testified that she “didn’t know whether to phone the police and
say that [she] needed to recant the statement because [she] was
worried of threatening behavior in the future.” The State then
asked, “So calling the police and recanting, is that something you
considered as a result of these emails?” Colleague responded,
“Yes.”

¶8 On cross-examination, Taylor’s counsel asked Colleague
whether Taylor’s statement that the pair “did not have an
altercation of any sort” was correct, and Colleague testified that
while there was no physical altercation, she “believe[d] that an
altercation is any kind of aggressive behavior toward” a person
and she “viewed [Taylor] blocking [her] path as aggressive.”
Taylor’s counsel referred to Taylor’s first email as describing his
“version of events” and asked Colleague whether it was “fair to
say that [she] disagree[d] with Mr. Taylor as to what happened
that day.” Colleague said, “Yes.” Taylor’s counsel then said,
“Right. So . . . maybe there’s a car wreck. Someone says the light’s
red. Someone says the light’s green. They just think different
things. So you believe that he viewed that differently?” Colleague
responded, “I don’t think he did. I think he’s saying he did.”

¶9 Taylor’s counsel later asked Colleague, “Now, did [Taylor]
ask you to tell a false story?” Colleague responded, “He has in the
[third] email.” Counsel replied, “No, no. But—no. He didn’t say
tell a false story, right?” Colleague responded, “Well, he says you
need to recant the story . . . .” Counsel asked, “He said recant . . .
what story?” Colleague responded, “The true story.” Counsel also
asked, “Did he ever say ‘Don’t answer a subpoena, don’t respond
to court’?” Colleague answered, “That’s in the third [email], yes.”
Counsel pressed, “Where did he say don’t go to court?” Colleague
responded, “When it says ‘Please renounce your statement.’”

¶10 After the State presented its case, Taylor’s counsel moved
for a directed verdict, arguing that the State had produced no
evidence that Taylor had the intent “to induce or otherwise cause
a person to testify or inform falsely,” see Utah Code § 76-8-508(1),

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 State v. Taylor

because Taylor had merely said, in effect, “I want you to tell the
true story. I believe your previous statement was false.” The court
indicated that it would take the motion under advisement but it
would also proceed with the remainder of the trial.

¶11 Taylor testified in his defense. When asked why he accused
Colleague of providing false testimony, he said, “Because I
believed that the summary statement describes events that did not
occur, and they were being used to charge me with a crime I did
not commit.” He read aloud from his first email his version of the
events at the convention center. He also described how the alleged
incident occurred in “[a] giant room” accommodating “[t]en
thousand people,” and he then testified that he “[a]bsolutely” did
not block Colleague’s path. He presented his statements in the
third email as “correct factual statement[s]” and his asking
Colleague to “[p]lease renounce [her] statement” as a request to
“come to court, bring your statement with you and say that it has
inaccuracies, that it’s not a valid representation of the events that
transpired on that day.”

¶12 After Taylor testified, his counsel renewed his motion for a
directed verdict. The court denied the motion, saying, “I do think
that . . . it is a jury determination to determine Mr. Taylor’s intent,
also to consider the meaning of those words when taken in
conjunction with each other, and I do find that a reasonable jury
could interpret that [third] email as meeting the prima facia case
for witness tampering.” The jury then found Taylor guilty of
witness tampering.

¶13 Before sentencing, Taylor moved to arrest judgment.
Taylor again insisted that “the evidence shows only that the two
had different perspectives about what had occurred, that Mr.
Taylor believed [Colleague] was lying, and that he urged her to
tell the truth.”

¶14 After hearing oral argument on the motion, the district
court informed the parties that it thought “that [it] erred” in
admitting Colleague’s testimony about how she felt upon

20210366-CA 6 2023 UT App 133
 State v. Taylor

receiving the emails. The court explained, “The issue is . . .
Taylor’s mens rea, . . . whether he believed her statement was true
and he was inducing her to change it,” and said, “I don’t think
there’s evidence by which a reasonable jury could find that[,] and
that testimony . . . I believe was elicited from her . . . in error.” The
court said that without that testimony, it did not “think that there
was enough evidence for the jury to make a determination that
witness tampering occurred beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Accordingly, the court granted Taylor’s motion to arrest
judgment.

¶15 The State moved the court to reconsider its oral ruling. It
argued that “[i]n considering different, competing inferences
drawn from the evidence, this Court supplanted the jury as fact
finder[], and thus substituted the Court’s preferred reading of the
evidence for the jury’s” and that “[d]oing so was a violation of
governing precedent and the . . . legal standard” applicable to a
motion to arrest judgment, “which calls on courts to construe the
evidence in one way only—as favorably as possible to the
rendered verdict.”

¶16 In its written ruling addressing both motions, the court
determined that “a reasonable jury could not conclude that the
elements of witness tampering had been met”—either “when
considering the emails together” or when considering “the third
email standing alone.” The court concluded that “[b]ecause the
evidence presented in this case does not sustain a reasonable
inference that Mr. Taylor had the requisite mens rea to have
committed witness tampering, . . . there was insufficient evidence
for the jury to convict Mr. Taylor of witness tampering.” The State
appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶17 The State contends that the district court erred when it
arrested judgment. “[W]e review the district court’s decision to

20210366-CA 7 2023 UT App 133
 State v. Taylor

arrest judgment for correctness.” State v. Black, 2015 UT App 30,
¶ 12, 344 P.3d 644.

ANALYSIS

¶18 “A district court may arrest a jury verdict when the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of the
crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt as to that element.” State v. Black, 2015 UT App 30, ¶ 12, 344
P.3d 644 (cleaned up); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 23 (“At any time
prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest
judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public
offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good
cause for the arrest of judgment.”). “This standard of review is
highly deferential” to the jury’s determination. State v. Plexico,
2016 UT App 118, ¶ 12, 376 P.3d 1080. “When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction the question
presented is not whether [a court] can conceive of alternative
(innocent) inferences to draw from individual pieces of evidence,
or even whether [it] would have reached the verdict embraced by
the jury.” State v. Stricklan, 2020 UT 65, ¶ 114, 477 P.3d 1251
(cleaned up). The court simply asks “whether the jury’s verdict is
reasonable in light of all of the evidence taken cumulatively,
under a standard of review that yields deference to all reasonable
inferences supporting the jury’s verdict.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶19 The jury in this case found Taylor guilty of witness
tampering. The applicable statute indicates, in relevant part, that
“[a] person is guilty of the third degree felony of tampering with
a witness if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation
is pending or about to be instituted,” the person “attempts to
induce or otherwise cause another person to: (a) testify or inform
falsely” or “(b) withhold any testimony, information, document,
or item.” Utah Code § 76-8-508(1).

20210366-CA 8 2023 UT App 133
 State v. Taylor

¶20 Additionally, a person is guilty of witness tampering only
if the person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. See id.
§ 76-2-102; State v. Whytock, 2020 UT App 107, ¶ 45, 469 P.3d 1150,
cert. denied, 481 P.3d 1043 (Utah 2021). A person acts
(1) intentionally “when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result,” (2) knowingly “when
he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances” or “when he is aware that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result,” and (3) recklessly “when
he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will
occur” and the risk is “of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.” Utah Code
§ 76-2-103(1)–(3). Proof of one of these culpable mental states often
“comes by way of circumstantial evidence, and proof of intent or
knowledge is an inference that may be drawn by the factfinder
both from direct and from circumstantial evidence.” State v.
Mitchell, 2013 UT App 289, ¶ 29, 318 P.3d 238 (cleaned up). “When
the mental state is proven by circumstantial evidence, we examine
whether the State presented any evidence that the defendant had
the requisite intent or knowledge,” along with “whether the
inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in
logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove that
the defendant possessed the requisite intent.” State v. Florez, 2020
UT App 76, ¶ 18, 465 P.3d 307 (cleaned up).

¶21 Here, the district court ultimately concluded that “the
evidence presented” did “not sustain a reasonable inference that
Mr. Taylor had the requisite mens rea to have committed witness
tampering.” We disagree.

I. The Attempt to Induce Colleague to Testify or Inform Falsely

¶22 The text of Taylor’s emails supported a finding that Taylor
was trying to manipulate Colleague into telling a false version of
the facts. The first email was accusatory, and the jury could have

20210366-CA 9 2023 UT App 133
 State v. Taylor

inferred from it Taylor’s intent to create feelings of guilt when he
said, “I can’t believe you lied” and fear when he warned, “You
will now be subpoenaed.” The jury could have inferred an intent
to induce feelings of guilt from the text of Taylor’s third email as
well where it laid the blame for his prosecution at Colleague’s feet
by saying, “Because of your statement, I’m being prosecuted.”
Additionally, because the third email did not explicitly ask
Colleague to tell the truth, the jury could have read it as a bid for
sympathy to convince Colleague that—whatever happened at the
conference—the stakes were so high for Taylor that Colleague
should tell a story she did not believe: “I face 2.5 years in prison,
fines, and a permanent criminal record. None of my interactions
with you warrant this attack nor these consequence[s].” Taylor’s
beseeching use of “[p]lease” immediately following such a bid for
sympathy also comports with an interpretation of the emails as
together constituting an intentional attempt to emotionally
manipulate Colleague into changing her statement because of the
consequences Taylor was facing, not because the statement was
untrue. While alternative inferences might be drawn from the
emails, the jury was “entitled to draw all reasonable inferences
from the facts and from the actions of the defendant,” State v.
Stricklan, 2020 UT 65, ¶ 105, 477 P.3d 1251 (cleaned up), and the
court was required to interpret the emails and the inferences that
could be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the jury’s
verdict, see id. ¶ 114.

¶23 Moreover, the interpretation we have identified in favor of
the jury’s verdict is bolstered by the broader context in which the
emails were sent. During trial, Colleague was asked, “[B]etween
the time that the defendant had been terminated [by Employer]
and this conference in May, had there been problems between the
defendant and the staff [of Employer]?” She responded, “There
have been some emails that have been received [by] a different
staff member and some ongoing problems.” 1 From this testimony,

1. The court and counsel for both parties discussed in a sidebar at
trial how some related evidence might be inadmissible under rule
(continued…)

20210366-CA 10 2023 UT App 133
 State v. Taylor

the jury could have inferred that Colleague was aware of
troubling emails Taylor had sent to other former coworkers, and
it could have inferred that Taylor became aware of Colleague’s
knowledge on this point when he saw Colleague’s statement
summary included in the Information for his other case. Thus, the
jury ultimately could have inferred that Taylor knew Colleague
would likely feel fearful upon receiving a series of accusatory
emails from him—fearful that she would continue to receive such
emails until she agreed to withhold her testimony or testify as he
wished. See generally id. ¶ 106 (“When intent is proven by
circumstantial evidence, we must determine . . . whether the
inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in
logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove that
[the] defendant possessed the requisite intent.” (cleaned up)). In
this broader context, therefore, Taylor’s very act of sending
repeated emails to Colleague might have reasonably informed the
jury’s understanding of whether he intended “to induce or
otherwise cause” her to testify falsely through emotional
manipulation. Utah Code § 76-8-508(1)(a); see also Stricklan, 2020
UT 65, ¶ 106 (“The criminal intent of a party may be inferred from
. . . conduct before and after the offense.” (cleaned up)).

¶24 Perhaps more importantly, because of the jury’s verdict,
we must also assume that the encounter at the conference
unfolded as Colleague described, and when we do, Taylor’s
subsequent request to Colleague to say that it unfolded differently
is substantial evidence of him knowingly asking her to testify
falsely. The case of State v. Plexico, 2016 UT App 118, 376 P.3d 1080,
is instructive on this point. There a defendant appealed a witness
tampering conviction, arguing that it was not supported by
sufficient evidence. Id. ¶ 11. The witness and the defendant had
reported two plainly incompatible versions of the same event: the

404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. However, Taylor’s counsel
did not raise an objection to the questioning or testimony relayed
here. Moreover, rule 404(b)(2) provides that evidence otherwise
barred by rule 404(b) may be admitted for various purposes,
including to prove intent. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(2).

20210366-CA 11 2023 UT App 133
 State v. Taylor

witness had reported that the defendant had hit the defendant’s
boyfriend, while the defendant had claimed that she did not hit
the boyfriend. See id. ¶¶ 16–17. The witness then testified that the
defendant subsequently asked her to change her story and say
that the defendant had not hit the boyfriend. Id. ¶ 16.

¶25 The Plexico court reasoned that when the jury was asked to
determine whether the defendant was guilty of witness
tampering, it was “implicitly . . . charged with determining
whether [the defendant’s] asking [the witness] to tell the police
officer [that the defendant] did not hit [the] boyfriend was
equivalent to [the defendant] asking [the witness] to inform or
testify falsely.” Id. ¶ 18 (cleaned up). The court then held that
because “there was sufficient evidence that [the defendant] hit
[the] boyfriend and asked [the witness] to testify otherwise,” there
was sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict on the
tampering with a witness charge. Id. (cleaned up). In other words,
where there was evidence that the defendant asked the witness to
testify to one of two plainly incompatible versions of events and
the jury had sufficient evidence to determine that the version the
defendant espoused did not happen, the evidence was sufficient
to support a conviction of witness tampering. See id.

¶26 The same reasoning applies here. Taylor asked Colleague
to give one of two versions of events that the jury could have
found were plainly incompatible. One version was that at the
conference, Taylor, among other things, spoke irately to
Colleague and blocked her path multiple times by placing his
body directly in front of hers as she walked. The other was that
Taylor “[a]bsolutely” did not block Colleague’s path and was not
“irate.” Because the jury had sufficient evidence to determine that
Colleague’s version actually happened and that Taylor asked her
to testify otherwise, we—like the Plexico court—“cannot conclude
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
about the essential elements of the tampering with a witness
charge.” Id. (cleaned up).

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 State v. Taylor

¶27 Taylor essentially argues that his version of events and
Colleague’s version of events were not plainly incompatible but,
rather, demonstrated a mere difference of interpretation
concerning the pair’s interaction at the conference. But this
argument is belied by Taylor’s emails. They do not assert a
difference of interpretation; they flatly contend that Colleague’s
account is “false testimony.” In his first email, Taylor gave a point-
by-point refutation of Colleague’s summarized statement. Where
Colleague said that Taylor approached her and blocked her path,
Taylor claimed, “I did not block your path.” Where she said that
“he sought her out,” Taylor contended, “I did not seek you out.”
Where she stated that he was “irate and unstable,” he insisted, “I
was neither irate nor unstable.” And where she said that she
“tried to get away from [him] multiple times, but he stayed with
her,” he averred that she “did not try to get away multiple times”
and he “did not pursue” her. In the first email, Taylor contended
that he and Colleague “did not have an altercation of any sort.”
Then in his third email, instead of asking Colleague to clarify
aspects of her statement or renounce parts of it, Taylor asked her
to renounce it entirely. Taylor’s emails simply do not present the
possibility of an honest difference of interpretation regarding an
ambiguous encounter but, rather, a version of events that was
plainly incompatible with Colleague’s.

¶28 Moreover, beyond the emails, Colleague testified that in
the main hall at the conference, Taylor blocked her path in that, as
she “tried to move one way, he’d move that way” and that when
she “tried to move another way, he’d move that way” too. In
response, Taylor did not admit to moving side to side in front of
Colleague, nor did he assert that his movements had been
misinterpreted. Instead, he testified that the venue was vast—“[a]
giant room” accommodating “[t]en thousand people”—implying
that Colleague could have walked anywhere she wanted and that
on the whole Colleague’s summary of the interaction “describe[d]
events that did not occur”—not events that occurred but were
ambiguous. (Emphasis added.) Finally, Colleague testified that
she did not believe Taylor viewed their conference interaction
differently than she did; instead, she testified that she thought

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 State v. Taylor

Taylor was simply claiming that he did. In this regard, Taylor’s
counsel asked, “So . . . maybe there’s a car wreck. Someone says
the light’s red. Someone says the light’s green. They just think
different things. So you believe that he viewed that differently?”
And Colleague responded, “I don’t think he did. I think he’s
saying he did.” 2

¶29 In sum, the jury could have reasonably viewed Taylor’s
emails and the other evidence at trial as foreclosing his
defense based on a claimed difference of interpretation
regarding ambiguous facts, and there was sufficient evidence to
support a finding that Taylor knowingly, intentionally, or
recklessly attempted to induce Colleague to testify or inform
falsely.

II. The Attempt to Induce Colleague to Withhold Testimony

¶30 Even if Taylor was convinced of the truth of his version of
events, the jury still could have reasonably determined that he
committed witness tampering by asking Colleague to “renounce”
her statement. While Taylor would have needed to be aware that
he was asking Colleague to testify falsely to satisfy Utah Code
section 76-8-508 subsection (1)(a), see State v. Plexico, 2016 UT App
118, ¶ 13, 376 P.3d 1080 (“[T]he statute explicitly requires the jury
to determine that [a defendant] asked [a witness] to ‘testify or
inform falsely,’ as opposed to testify or inform truthfully.”),
subsection (1)(b) can be satisfied even if a defendant holds a
genuine belief that a witness is lying, as long as the defendant
“attempts to induce or otherwise cause” the witness to “withhold
any testimony,” Utah Code § 76-8-508(1)(b).

2. This testimony, which is essentially an opinion about Taylor’s
truthfulness on a particular occasion, was elicited by Taylor’s
counsel with no objection lodged. We are not expressing an
opinion on its admissibility if it had been objected to. But because
it was admitted without objection, the jury was rightly able to
consider it.

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 State v. Taylor

¶31 One possible reading of Taylor beseeching Colleague to
“renounce” her statement is that she should refuse to testify in the
case. The word “renounce” means “to give up, refuse, or resign
usually by formal declaration.” Renounce, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/renounce [https://
perma.cc/KS9C-RDSB]. The timing of Taylor’s request is
important in interpreting Taylor’s meaning. Colleague’s
statement was taken from her report of Taylor’s behavior to the
police. Accordingly, both Taylor and Colleague could have
reasonably believed that Colleague could return to the police,
formally renounce her statement, and refuse to testify in line with
her statement.

¶32 While Colleague could have been subpoenaed and
required to testify if the case went forward, the State could also
have chosen to proceed without her testimony or to drop the
charges against Taylor rather than work with an uncooperative
witness. 3 Taylor’s third email supports a reading that he sought

3. Common sense and a simple online search would inform a
witness that convincing a prosecutor that the witness’s
original report to police was not accurate may result the
case being dropped. See, e.g., Dropping Criminal Charges in Utah,
Stephen W. Howard PC, https://www.howarddefense.com/faq/
can-i-drop-criminal-charges-after-they-have-been-filed.html
[https://perma.cc/7W7M-KLN8]. While the decision to drop
charges ultimately lies with the State, and while there are, of
course, risks for a witness who recants, it is reasonable that a lay
jury could interpret Taylor’s emails as asking Colleague to do this.
Furthermore, if Colleague had refused to testify to any
wrongdoing by Taylor and the State was not able to convince or
compel her to do so, her statement to police may have been
inadmissible as hearsay. See Utah R. Evid. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’
means a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while
testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement.”); id. R. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as
(continued…)

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 State v. Taylor

Colleague’s refusal to testify at all when it stated that he was being
prosecuted “[b]ecause of [her] statement.” (Emphasis added.) This
implies that without her statement, Taylor would not be
prosecuted. So while the first email states that Colleague “will
now be subpoenaed and required to recount the true story” in
court, Taylor’s later email can be read as providing Colleague a
way to avoid that fearful situation. And indeed, Colleague
testified that she interpreted the emails as asking her not to testify.
She responded to Taylor’s counsel’s question, “Did he ever say
‘Don’t answer a subpoena, don’t respond to court’?” with, “That’s
in the third [email], yes,” and the follow-up question, “Where did
he say don’t go to court?” with, “When it says ‘Please renounce
your statement.’” The jury could have reasonably agreed with this
interpretation.

¶33 Therefore, given the facts of this case, it is a reasonable
reading of Taylor’s emails that—even if he believed that his
version of the facts was accurate—he committed witness
tampering by asking Colleague to withhold her testimony. See
State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (“[Trial]
testimony demonstrates that [the defendant] asked [the witness]
to testify that [the witness] . . . knew nothing about [the crime]. By
doing so, [the defendant] not only attempted to induce or
otherwise cause [the witness] to testify falsely, but also attempted
to induce or otherwise cause him to withhold critical testimony

provided by law or by these rules.”); cf. State v. Garrido, 2013 UT
App 245, ¶¶ 17–18, 314 P.3d 1014 (explaining that the exception
in rule 804(b)(1) permitting admission of prior testimony given by
an unavailable witness—including one who “refuses to testify”—
is still subject to confrontation rights and therefore only
“admissible in a criminal trial if the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the witness” (cleaned up)), cert.
denied, 320 P.3d 676 (Utah 2014). If this had happened, Taylor’s
attempt to weaken the State’s case against him would have
succeeded.

20210366-CA 16 2023 UT App 133
 State v. Taylor

about the crime.” (cleaned up)), cert. denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah
1993).

CONCLUSION

¶34 The court erred when it failed to view the evidence “in the
light most favorable to the verdict.” See State v. Black, 2015 UT App
30, ¶ 12, 344 P.3d 644 (cleaned up). Appropriately considered, the
evidence before the jury was sufficient to support its finding that
Taylor had the requisite mental state to commit witness
tampering. Because the evidence was not “so inconclusive or so
inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to
that element,” see id. (cleaned up), the court’s action of arresting
judgment was improper. Therefore, we reverse and remand this
matter to the district court with instruction to reinstate the jury’s
verdict.

20210366-CA 17 2023 UT App 133