Vann v. City and County of S.F.

Filed 12/12/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MATTHEW VANN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A165231
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN (San Francisco County
FRANCISCO et al., Super. Ct. No. CGC21596140)
Defendants and Respondents.

Plaintiff and appellant Matthew Vann (appellant), a firefighter with
the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD), was injured when Louis Yu (Yu),
a bus driver with the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency
(SFMTA), drove through an active emergency scene and over a fire hose,
which broke off from a fire engine and struck appellant. He now appeals
from a judgment of dismissal entered in favor of defendants and respondents
City and County of San Francisco (City) and Yu after the trial court
sustained their demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend on the
basis that the action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’
Compensation Act (Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq.).1 We affirm.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.

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 BACKGROUND
The Facts and the General Setting2
On November 2, 2020, appellant, a firefighter with the SFFD,
responded to an emergency on Spear Street between Market Street and
Mission Street in the City and County of San Francisco. Yu, a bus driver
with the SFMTA, then drove a bus through the location of the active
emergency. The bus went over a firehose, which became entangled with the
bus’s wheels and stretched until it broke off the fire engine it was attached to.
When the firehose broke away, it hit appellant’s legs, sweeping him off his
feet and causing him to slam backwards onto the ground. His helmet flew
off, and the back of his head struck the street surface. As a result, appellant
sustained catastrophic injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, a
fractured left clavicle, an internal hemorrhage in his right eye, and damage
to his throat and vocal chords.

2 Our summary of facts is based upon the allegations in appellant’s

complaint, which we accept as true if properly pled. (Amiodarone Cases
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1100 (Amiodarone Cases).) We also rely on
matters that are the subject of judicial notice (Blank v. Kirwan (1985)
39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank)), which, as pertinent here, include the City’s
notice of payment of workers’ compensation benefits to appellant, his
government tort claim presented to the City, and the City’s denial of the
claim. In the trial court, the parties filed separate, unopposed requests to
take judicial notice of these and other documents, including: provisions of the
Charter of the City and County of San Francisco (“City Charter”); the ballot
pamphlet for Proposition E, which was approved by City voters in 1999 and
created the SFMTA (S.F. Voter Information Pamp. (Nov. 2, 1999) (“Prop. E.
Pamphlet”); and the ballot pamphlet for Proposition A, which was approved
by City voters in 2007 and expanded SFMTA’s authority over its operations
and additional funding (S.F. Voter Information Pamp. (Nov. 6, 2007). The
trial court did not rule on these requests. The parties then filed in this court
requests for judicial notice of the same materials for which they sought
judicial notice below, which requests we granted.

2
 On November 4, the City sent appellant a “Notice Regarding Disability
Pay/Labor Code section 4850 benefits.” The notice stated that the “City and
County of San Francisco is handling [appellant’s] workers’ compensation
claim on behalf of SF Fire Dept.,” and that he was receiving workers’
compensation benefits for the injuries he sustained in the November 2, 2020
incident.
On August 18, 2021, appellant submitted an application for leave to
present a late government tort claim to the City pursuant to Government
Code section 910 et seq., along with the proposed claim. In the application,
appellant asserted that he is a “City and County San Francisco[] firefighter”;
that he was “discharging his duties as a firefighter for the City and County of
San Francisco” when responding to the emergency call in November 2020;
and that “the City and County of San Francisco has been on notice of the
illegal conduct of its Muni Bus driver, Yu.” (Italics added.) And on the claim
form, he wrote in Yu’s name where it asked to identify the name and “City
Department of City Employee who allegedly caused injury or loss.” (Italics
added.)
On August 31, the City granted appellant leave to present a late claim,
but denied the claim.
The Proceedings Below
On November 8, appellant filed a form complaint against the City and
Yu (when referred to collectively, respondents), alleging causes of action for
motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, and negligence per se. The
complaint is sparse on detail: it alleges “Defendants negligently operated an
SF Muni Coach 8800,” before briefly describing how the incident caused
appellant’s injuries, and also alleges “Defendants violated [Vehicle Code
sections 21707 and 21708].”

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 On February 2, 2022, respondents filed a demurrer on various grounds,
including that the Workers’ Compensation Act (§ 3200 et seq.) provides the
exclusive remedy for appellant’s claims against the City as his employer
(§§ 3600, subd. (a), 3602, subd. (a)), and against Yu as his coemployee
(§ 3601, subd. (a)). As such, respondents argued, the trial court lacked
subject jurisdiction over this action.
Appellant opposed the demurrer, arguing that workers’ compensation
is not his sole remedy. As to Yu, appellant asserted he and Yu were not
coemployees because (1) appellant was employed by SFFD, while Yu was
employed by SFMTA, and (2) SFFD and SFMTA are separate legal entities
akin to separate businesses within a multiunit corporate enterprise. As to
the City, appellant argued there were no facts at that procedural juncture to
support the conclusion that the City, as opposed to SFFD, was his employer
as a matter of law.
Respondents filed their reply, arguing appellant’s assertion “that
neither he nor Mr. Yu is a City employee is untenable as a matter of law,”
because SFFD and SFMTA, as municipal departments, “have no ‘legal
personality separate from’ the City.” In addition, citing Walker v. City and
County of San Francisco (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 901 (Walker) and Colombo v.
State of California (1991) 3 Cal.App.4th 594 (Colombo), respondents
contended that California courts have rejected appellant’s theory that
government departments are akin to separate business entities and can thus
be subdivided into different entities for purposes of the workers’
compensation law. Thus, respondents maintained that appellant and Yu
share the same employer—the City. Respondents separately asserted that
City Charter provisions establish that the City employed both appellant and
Yu.

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 On March 23, after holding a hearing, the trial court issued an order
sustaining the demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. Relying
on Walker and Colombo, the court was unpersuaded by appellant’s attempt to
draw an analogy between SFMTA and SFFD as two separate corporate
entities within a large corporation. Instead, the court determined: “In 1999,
the City’s municipal transportation agency was formed to, inter alia, operate
the City’s street cars and buses. However, that agency, along with the City’s
fire department, remains part of ‘a single governmental entity’—the City.”
And the court held, “[appellant] is receiving workers’ compensation and the
City correctly asserts that is his sole remedy.”
Judgment was entered in favor of respondents.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The Standard of Review
As we explained in Amiodarone Cases: “Our standard of review is well-
established. We accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the operative
complaint. (Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 472, 480.) ‘ “ ‘ “We treat the demurrer as admitting all
material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or
conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be
judicially noticed.” [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable
interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.
[Citation.]’ ” [Citation.] We likewise accept facts that are reasonably implied
or may be inferred from the complaint’s express allegations. [Citations.]
‘ “ ‘ “A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint . . . .” [Citations.]
On appeal from a dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer, we review
the order de novo, exercising our independent judgment about whether the

5
complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. [Citations.]’ ” ’ (Ibid.)
“Although our review is de novo, it is plaintiffs’ burden to affirmatively
demonstrate that the demurrer was erroneously sustained as a matter of
law . . . . (Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
1047, 1052.)” (Amiodarone Cases, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1100–1101.)
Further, our Supreme Court has stated that when a complaint “is
sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial
court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no
abuse of discretion and we affirm.” (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)
“[T]he burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the trial court abused its
discretion. [Citations.] Plaintiff must show in what manner he can amend
his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his
pleading.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (Goodman).)
The Workers’ Compensation Exclusive Remedy Rule
Section 3600, subdivision (a) provides that, with exceptions not
relevant here, an employer’s liability to pay compensation under the Workers’
Compensation Act is “in lieu of any other liability whatsoever” if specified
“conditions of compensation3 concur . . . .” (§ 3600, subd. (a); Kuciemba v.
Victory Woodworks, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 993, 1006.) So, when the statutory
conditions for recovery are met, the employer is immune from civil damages
liability for on-the-job injuries because workers’ compensation is the injured

3 There are 10 conditions of compensation, two of which are relevant

here: “Where, at the time of injury, the employee is performing service
growing out of and incidental to his or her employment and is acting within
the course of his or her employment” (§ 3600, subd. (a)(2)), and “[w]here the
injury is proximately caused by the employment, either with or without
negligence.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).)

6
employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600, 3601, 3602, subd. (a).)
A parallel exclusive remedy provision is section 3601, subdivision (a),
which “prohibits actions against coemployees for injuries they cause when
[acting within the scope of their employment.]” (Hendy v. Losse (1991)
54 Cal.3d 723, 730.) “To prevent employees from circumventing the
exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against co-
employees, who in turn would seek indemnity from their employers, the
Legislature . . . provided immunity to co-employees acting within the scope of
their employment. (§ 3601, subd. (a) . . . . ) In other words, the purpose of
the exclusivity rule would be defeated if employees could bring actions
against fellow employees acting in the scope of employment such that the
fellow employees’ negligence could be imputed to their employers. [Citation.]
Therefore, workers’ compensation was also made the exclusive remedy
against fellow employees acting within the scope of employment.” (Torres v.
Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1002 (Torres).) In short,
“[f]or conduct committed within the scope of employment, employees, like
their employers, should not be held subject to suit.” (Ibid.)
“The Workers’ Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of
awarding workers’ compensation benefits. (§ 3202; King v. CompPartners,
Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1039, 1051.) ‘The rule is not altered because a plaintiff
believes that he can establish negligence on the part of his employer and
brings a civil suit for damages.’ (Freire v. Matson Navigation Co. (1941)
19 Cal.2d 8, 10.)” (Reynaud v. Technicolor Creative Services USA, Inc. (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1020.) “If the injury falls within the scope of the act, a
proceeding thereunder constitutes his exclusive remedy.” (Freire v. Matson
Navigation Co., supra, 19 Cal.2d at p. 10.)
The exclusive remedy rule is an affirmative defense to an action at law.

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(See Doney v. Tambouratgis (1979) 23 Cal.3d 91, 96.) “[W]here the complaint
affirmatively alleges facts indicating coverage by the workers’ compensation
laws, if it fails to state additional facts negating application of the exclusive
remedy provision, no civil action will lie and the complaint is subject to a
general demurrer.” (Roberts v. Pup ‘N’ Taco Driveup (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d
278, 284, citing Doney v. Tambouratgis, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 97 and
Iverson v. Atlas Pacific Engineering (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 219, 224.)
The Trial Court Properly Sustained the Demurrer to the
Complaint Without Leave to Amend
Introduction
Appellant reasserts that workers’ compensation is not his exclusive
remedy based on the same theories he asserted below. He presents these
arguments in his opening brief under two main subheadings: (1) “[Appellant]
and Defendant Yu Are Not Co-Employees Because They Are Employed by
Different Entities: the San Francisco Fire Department and the San
Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency,” and (2) “Nor Can It Be Said
That as a Matter of Law, [Appellant] Is Employed by the City and County of
San Francisco.”
Appellant’s arguments treat the City, SFMTA, and SFFD as three
separate legal entities. His position presupposes that for purposes of a
lawsuit for damages, a municipal department can and does possess a legal
identity separate and apart from the municipality by which it was created.
However, appellant does not present any argument in his opening brief to
support this premise.
This omission is curious, considering that respondents and the trial
court treated the issue of whether SFFD and SFMTA are entities
independent from the City as significant to the overarching question of
whether workers’ compensation is appellant’s exclusive remedy. Specifically,

8
respondents summarily argued below that appellant’s attempts to divide
SFMTA and SFFD, and SFFD and the City, for workers’ compensation
purposes fail, because SFFD and SFMTA have no legal existence separate
from the City. The trial court agreed with this, finding that SFMTA and
SFFD “remain[ ] part of ‘a single governmental entity’—the City,” before
concluding workers’ compensation is appellant’s sole remedy. We imply from
the court’s order that its reasoning was this: If SFMTA and SFFD have no
legal existence separate from the City, then they are merely two subsidiary
components of the same entity, the City. The conclusion that would follow is
that the City employs both appellant and Yu. In turn, appellant’s theory that
SFMTA and SFFD are separate employers for purposes of the workers’
compensation exclusivity rule would fail. Likewise, his argument that SFFD,
as opposed to the City, is his employer.
It is not until his reply brief that appellant raises the argument that
SFMTA “has a legal existence independent of the City,” an assertion based
largely on a statutory interpretation analysis—namely of the City Charter
and other legislative materials—which appellant argues support that SFMTA
was “plainly intended” to have a separate legal existence.4 Even considering
the arguments in appellant’s reply brief, he fails to persuade us that the trial
court erred in sustaining the demurrer to his complaint without leave to

4 Taken as a whole, appellant’s reply brief reads like a new opening

brief. His opening brief is 40 pages, and much of it appears to be a nearly
verbatim rehash of the opposition he filed below. In contrast, his reply brief
is 58 pages, which, as noted, consists largely of a statutory interpretation
analysis, and discusses a number of authorities not mentioned in his opening
brief. Perhaps appellant might have believed that he did not need to raise
the issue of whether SFMTA is independent of the City until it appeared in
the respondents’ brief. However, we would not find such a belief justified,
given that the issue is key, as explained above.

9
amend.
Analysis
We begin by addressing whether SFMTA and SFFD each has a legal
existence independent of the City, an issue we find significant to the
fundamental question of whether workers’ compensation is appellant’s
exclusive remedy.
As noted, respondents assert that both SFMTA and SFFD have no legal
existence independent of the City. In his reply brief, appellant disputes
respondents’ assertion as to SFMTA, but raises no such challenge as to
SFFD. Indeed, appellant agrees with respondents that SFFD is part of the
City’s executive branch. (S.F. Charter, §§ 4.108, 4.128.) As such, we take
this as appellant’s concession that SFFD is not a legal entity separate from
the City.5
Turning to whether SFMTA is independent from the City, the parties
refer us to a number of authorities for guidance on the issue. One of those is
Government Code section 945, which provides that “[a] public entity may sue
and be sued.” (Gov. Code, § 945.) “Public entity” is defined to include “the
state . . . , a county, city, district, . . . public agency, and any other political
subdivision or public corporation in the State.” (Gov. Code, § 811.2.)
However, the California Law Revision Commission’s comments to
Government Code section 811.2 state that “[t]his definition [of ‘public entity’]
is intended to include every kind of independent political or governmental
entity in the State.” (Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity (Jan.
1963) Cal. Law Revision Com. com., Gov. Code, § 811.2, 1 Cal. Law Revision

5 Based on this, as explained below, we reject appellant’s argument that

SFFD, as opposed to the City, is his employer for purposes of the workers’
compensation laws.

10
Com. Rep. (1963) p. 836, italics added.)
Bauer v. County of Ventura (1955) 45 Cal.2d 276, 288–289 (Bauer),
which both parties cite, is instructive on whether a public entity is
independent or a subsidiary of another entity. In Bauer, the plaintiffs sued
Ventura County (county), the Saticoy Storm Drain Maintenance District
(district), and individual members of the County of Board of Supervisors for
damage to the plaintiff’s property resulting from the overflow of water from
the County’s and District’s storm drain system. (Bauer, at pp. 281–282.) The
trial court entered a judgment of dismissal after it sustained demurrers from
the defendants, and the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the judgment.
(Id. at pp. 282, 291–292.) Among other things, the court held the district was
improperly joined as a party defendant. (Id. at p. 289.) It rejected the
“assumption that the district is a governmental agency separate and distinct
from the county,” reasoning as follows:
“A reading of the Storm Drain Maintenance District Act [(Stats. 1937,
ch. 265, p. 566, as amended by Stats. 1949, ch. 496, p. 854, and Stats. 1953,
ch. 546, § 1, p. 1805)] supports the conclusion that the district is a unit
created for purposes of taxes and administration. The operational powers of
the district are vested in the county board of supervisors and other county
officers. The board creates and governs the district (§ 1), and has power to
enter into contracts for the district, make rules and regulations and do all
things necessary to accomplish the purposes of the act (§ 5). The board of
supervisors is given power to acquire and dispose of property for the district
but only in the name of the county (§ 5). Taxes are levied by the board of
supervisors but they must be levied and collected at the same time and
manner as general county taxes; and when collected are paid into the county
treasury to the credit of the district and may be used only for district

11
purposes (§ 7). Storm drain maintenance districts created pursuant to the
act are not given the power to sue and be sued; nor are they created as
independent public corporations.
“In other acts dealing with water control problems the Legislature
made clear provision for the creation of state instrumentalities with separate
legal personalities. (See acts collected in 1 Water Code, Uncodified Acts.)
The Ventura County Flood Control Act (1 Water Code, Uncodified Acts,
No. 8955, p. 899 et seq.), for example, provides that the ‘Ventura County
Flood Control District is hereby declared to be a body corporate and politic,’
and the district’s powers include: perpetual succession, the power to sue and
be sued, to take title to real and personal property, to incur indebtedness and
issue bonds, to levy taxes, to make contracts and to employ labor (§ 7). The
Storm Drain Maintenance District Act, on the other hand, vests the
defendant district’s much less extensive powers in the county board of
supervisors rather than in the district itself. Neither the legislative intention
nor the stated purposes of the Storm Drain Maintenance District Act requires
the districts created pursuant thereto to enjoy a legal personality separate
from the county. (See Anaheim Sugar Co. v. County of Orange [(1919)] 181
Cal. 212 [(Anaheim Sugar Co.)]; Mortimer v. Acquisition & Imp. Dist. No. 36
[(1951)] 105 Cal.App.2d 298; Mortimer v. Acquisition & Imp. Dist. No. 36
[(1947)] 79 Cal.App.2d 404.) It therefore seems clear that the Saticoy Storm
Drain Maintenance District was improperly joined as a party defendant.”
(Bauer, supra, 45 Cal.2d at pp. 288–289.)
As Bauer illustrates, if an entity is not independent, it is not properly
named as a defendant. (Bauer, supra, 45 Cal.2d at pp. 288–289; accord,
Sheehan v. Board of Police Commissioners (1922) 188 Cal. 525, 532,
disapproved on other grounds in Mass v. Board of Ed. of San Francisco

12
Unified School Dist. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 612 [Board of Police Commissioners
“has no separate existence” from the City and County of San Francisco and
“is incapable of being sued”]; Talbot v. City of Pasadena (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d
271, 274, disapproved of on other grounds in Dillon v. Board of Pension
Commissioners of City of Los Angeles (1941) 18 Cal.2d 427, 431 [citing
Sheehan and reaching the same conclusion as to the fire and retirement
boards of the City of Pasadena].) If an entity is a subsidiary, an action must
be filed against the parent entity. (1 Cal. Governmental Tort Liability
Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. Cal. 2023) (Governmental Tort Liability
Practice) § 3.4, citing Hovd v. Hayward Unified School Dist. (1977)
74 Cal.App.3d 470, 471–472 [holding that a vocational skills center which
was a subdivision of school district was not independent unit of local school
district although operating under fictitious business name and conducting
business away from school district’s premises].)
Factors that may be considered in determining if an entity is
independent include whether there is “[a]n express statutory declaration that
the entity is a body corporate and politic”; whether the entity has “[a]
governing body separate from that of the city, county, or district”; or whether
it has “[s]tatutory power to own property, levy taxes, or incur indebtedness in
its own name.” (Governmental Tort Liability Practice, supra, § 3.5, citing
Bauer, supra, 45 Cal.2d at pp. 288–289; Johnson v. Fontana County Fire
Protection Dist. (1940) 15 Cal.2d 380, 385–387; Elliott v. County of Los
Angeles (1920) 183 Cal. 472, 474–475; Anaheim Sugar Co., supra, 181 Cal. at
pp. 217−220.)
Contrary to appellant’s assertions, our review of the City Charter, City
municipal codes, and other legislative materials leads us to conclude, as a
matter of law, that SFMTA does not have a legal existence separate and

13
apart from the City.
Appellant does not point us to any “express statutory declaration that
[SFMTA] is a body corporate and politic.” (Bauer, supra, 45 Cal.2d at
pp. 288–289.) To the contrary, SFMTA is described throughout the City
Charter and other municipal codes as an agency that is a part of the City.
(See, e.g., S.F. Charter, § 8A.102(h) [SFMTA “shall be subject to the
provisions of this Charter applicable to boards, commissions, and
departments of the City and County”]; S.F. Admin. Code, § 43.13.2 [under
article pertaining to the SFMTA revenue bond law, SFMTA is defined as
“San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency of the City” (italics added)];
id., § 22E.1 [“A number of City departments control fiber-optic facilities that
they use to provide municipal and other services. . . . [T]hese departments
include the Municipal Transportation Agency . . .” (italics added)]; id, § 94A.2
[for purposes of the San Francisco Shared Spaces Program, “ ‘Core City
Agencies’ are the City departments and agencies participating in the . . .
Program: . . . Municipal Transportation Agency” (italics added)]; see also S.F.
Environment Code, § 701 [for purposes of municipal green building
requirements, “ ‘City Department’ means any agency of the City and County
of San Francisco. Any other local, state, or federal agency doing business in
San Francisco is not a City Department, such as the San Francisco Unified
School District, the San Francisco Community College District, the Office of
Community Investment and Infrastructure, and the San Francisco Housing
Authority”; SFMTA not listed (italics added)].)
As to its governance, although appellant correctly notes that SFMTA is
governed by its own board of directors, those directors must be appointed by
the Mayor (the chief executive officer and the official representative of the
City) and confirmed by the Board of Supervisors (the legislative branch of the

14
City) after a public hearing. (S.F. Charter, §§ 2.100, 3.100, 8A.102(a).)
Additionally, appellant omits mentioning Article VIIIA of the City Charter,
which states: “this Article is intended to ensure sufficient oversight of
[SFMTA] by, among other things, preserving the role of the City’s Controller
as to financial matters, the City Attorney as to legal matters, and the Civil
Service Commission, as to merit system issues.” (S.F. Charter, § 8A.100€,
italics added.) These provisions confirm that SFMTA does not have a
governing body separate from that of the City.
In addition, the fact that SFMTA’s funding is segregated from other
City funds (S.F. Charter, § 8A.105(a), (b)) does not mean it is “fiscally
separate” from the City, as appellant asserts. (See Anaheim Sugar Co.,
supra, 181 Cal. p. 219 [“It is true that the money collected by means of the
tax provided for in the statute is to be paid into the county treasury ‘for the
use’ of the [road] division [of Orange County]. . . . This, however, is nothing
more than a provision that the money so paid shall constitute a special fund
for a special purpose. The existence of such a fund does not necessarily imply
the existence of a corporate entity separate and distinct from the county as
beneficiary . . .”].) Also undermining appellant’s assertion that SFMTA is
“fiscally separate” are City Charter provisions stating that SFMTA “may not
exercise any powers and duties of the Controller” (S.F. Charter, § 8A.101(f))
and that it must submit a proposed budget every two years for review and
consideration by the Mayor and the Board of Supervisors. (S.F. Charter, §
8A.106(a), (b).)
While SFMTA does have exclusive authority power to acquire control,
and operate property under its jurisdiction, including real and personal
property and financial assets, as well as over contracting, leasing, and
purchasing (S.F. Charter, § 8A.102(b)(1)), it cannot transfer or dispose any

15
property of the City without approval from the Board of Supervisors. (Ibid.)
Moreover, SFMTA may not incur any debt or issue bonds for SFMTA
purposes without the concurrence of the Board of Supervisors. (S.F. Charter,
§ 8A.102(b)(13).) And it may not incur debt on behalf of the City without
certification from the Controller and authorization from the Board of
Supervisors. (Ibid.)
As for legal affairs, the City Charter provides that “[t]he City and
County may appear, sue and defend in all courts in all matters and
proceedings.” (S.F. Charter, § 1.101.) There is not a similar, express
provision as to the SFMTA. Although appellant correctly notes that SFMTA
“is empowered to approve compromises, settlements, or dismissals of ‘any
litigation, legal proceedings, claims, demands or grievances,” he omits
mentioning that this authority is subject to that of the City Attorney, whose
recommendation is required prior to any such compromise, settlement, or
dismissal. (S.F. Charter, § 8A.102(e).) Indeed, the City Charter provides
that SFMTA may not “exercise any power and duties of the . . . City
Attorney” and “shall contract with . . . the City Attorney” for legal matters.
(S.F. Charter, § 8A.101(f).)
Appellant notes that SFMTA is afforded its own personnel/labor
relations office, and assumes powers of the Department of Human Resources
with respect to “service-critical” employees, defined to include those who
operate, dispatch, or maintain a transit vehicle. (S.F. Charter, § 8A.104(a)–
(e).) However, the City’s Department of Human Resources maintains
authority over all other types of employees. (S.F. Charter, § 8A.104(c).)
Based on all of the above, we reject appellant’s assertion that SFMTA
was “plainly intended” to exist independently of the City. While SFMTA
undoubtedly enjoys autonomy over various aspects of its operations, in other

16
significant areas it still must collaborate with, or answer to, other
departments of the City and its elected officials. SFMTA is simply a part of,
and subordinate to, the City it serves.
We are not persuaded otherwise by appellant’s citations to the ballot
pamphlet for Proposition E, which, adopted by City voters in 1999, combined
the San Francisco Municipal Railway and the Department of Parking and
Traffic under a single new entity: SFMTA. (S.F. Charter, § 8A.101(a); Prop.
E. Pamphlet, supra, Digest by Ballot Simplification Committee, p. 81.)
Appellant relies on the paid arguments of certain proponents in favor of the
proposition. For example, the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce stated
that “Prop E provides the comprehensive change needed to give Muni
management the authority to make decisions, implement reforms and
operate the system without the interference of City Hall politics.” (Prop. E.
Pamphlet, supra, p. 84, italics added.) The Building Owners and Managers
Association of San Francisco stated that Proposition E would “give[] MUNI
the resources and operational control it must have . . . .” (Id. at p. 85, italics
added.) The original sponsors of the Muni Reform charter amendment
argued that Proposition E “give Muni the tools it needs to deliver service
[under specific standards] by establishing an autonomous Transportation
Agency with a protected budget.” (Id. at p. 89, italics added.) Also, the San
Francisco Democratic Party stated that the Proposition E would “create an
effective and reliable transit system” “[b]y establishing an independent, fully-
funded Municipal Railway under a new Municipal Transportation Agency.”
(Ibid., italics added.)
We agree with appellant the above excerpts show that Proposition E
intended to give SFMTA greater authority than its predecessor departments
over transit in the City. (See S.F. Charter, § 8A.100(a) & (d).) But we

17
disagree that because SFMTA is afforded some operational autonomy, this
means it was intended to exist independently of the City. Rather, as
discussed, SFMTA functions as a mere instrumentality or subsidiary of the
City it serves.6
Appellant’s reliance on McKee v. Los Angeles Interagency Metropolitan
Police Apprehension Crime Task Force (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 354 (McKee) is
misplaced. In McKee, the court held an intergovernmental crime-fighting
task force was a “local agency” and its board of directors and executive
council were “legislative bodies” as defined by the Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov.
Code, § 54950 et seq.), making them subject to the requirement that their
meetings be public. (McKee, supra, at pp. 357–364.) The agreement creating
L.A. Impact, the crime-fighting task force in question, specified that the
parties intended to create a separate entity. (Id. at p. 359.) L.A. Impact was
“governed by a board of directors and executive council, with operations
conducted under a separate command structure.” (Id. at p. 360.) It was a
“fiscally separate entity” with a $9 million operating budget, funded “through
public grants routed through member cities, through contributions of
personnel and equipment contributed by member cities, and primarily
through the division of the proceeds of seized assets. . . .” (Ibid.) It was

6 Other courts have reached the same conclusion. (E.g., Cornejo v.
Tumlin (N.D.Cal. Oct. 20, 2021, Case No. 20-cv-05813) 2021 WL 4893392 *2
[“Although the Complaint names SFMTA as a defendant . . . , CCSF argues
that SFMTA is not an independent public corporation with the power to sue
or be sued. . . . The Court agrees. . . . SFMTA is not a proper defendant in
this case and is therefore dismissed”]; King v. City and County of San
Francisco (N.D.Cal. July 22, 2021, Case No. 21-cv-02843) 2021 WL 3111633,
at *1, fn. 1 [“King brought this action against CCSF [and] [SFMTA] . . . .
SFMTA, as a department of CCSF, cannot be sued individually. . . . For
purposes of this motion, the Court will construe all claims asserted against
SFMTA to be asserted against CCSF”].)

18
authorized to enter into contracts and in fact had purchased a rotorcraft.
(Ibid.) Additionally, L.A. Impact was expressly created as a “joint powers
authority” under Government Code, section 6500 et seq. (McKee, at p. 357.)
And “L.A. Impact only constitutes a public agency if it was formed under the
Joint Exercise of Powers Act.” (McKee, at p. 359; see Gov. Code, § 6500.)
Here, as discussed, the City Charter does not indicate an intention to
create a separate entity, unlike the agreement in McKee. And contrary to
plaintiff’s assertion, SFMTA is not a “fiscally separate entity” from the City.
We have already explained that the fact that SFMTA’s funding is segregated
from other City funds does not make it “fiscally separate” from the City. (See
Anaheim Sugar Co., supra, 181 Cal. p. 219.)
Nor does Brassinga v. City of Mountain View (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 195
(Brassinga), the case heavily relied on at oral argument, assist appellant.
Brassinga addressed whether a regional special weapons and tactics (SWAT)
team, composed of the SWAT teams of the Mountain View, Palo Alto, and Los
Altos Police Departments, qualified as an “ ‘employer’ ” for workers’
compensation purposes. (Id. at pp. 210–211.) In that case, Officer Brassinga,
a Palo Alto reserve officer who was not a member of its SWAT team, was
accidentally shot to death by Officer Acton, a Mountain View police officer
who was a member of its SWAT team and of the regional team, during one of
the regional team’s training sessions. (Id. at pp. 205–207.) When Brassinga’s
heirs sued, Mountain View claimed Brassinga was either its own or the
regional team’s “special employee” and sought to limit the heirs’ recovery to
amounts payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. (Id. at pp. 208–
209.) The Sixth District held that the regional team did not qualify as an “
‘employer’ ” under Labor Code section 3300, which includes “ ‘[e]ach county,
city, district, and all public and quasi public corporations and public agencies

19
therein.’ ” (See Brassinga at pp. 211–213. The regional team was concededly
not created as a public agency by virtue of any joint powers authority. (Id. at
p. 211.) Also, the undisputed evidence showed that the regional team had no
office, property, employees, letterhead, phone number, or any other indicia
that it functioned as a “ ‘public agenc[y].’ ” (Id. at p. 213.) Thus, the Sixth
District held the regional team was not an employer of anyone within the
meaning of Labor Code section 3300. (Brassinga at p. 213.)
Appellant argues that unlike in Brassinga, the record here contains (or
could potentially contain after conducting discovery) indicia that SFMTA and
SFFD each functions as a “ ‘public agenc[y]’ ” and thus as an “ ‘employer’ ” for
workers’ compensation purposes. However, these purported factual
distinctions between this case and Brassinga do not undermine our analysis
above, because Brassinga does not address the precise issue before us, which
is whether a municipal department exists independently from the
municipality from which it derives.
This leads us to Walker and Colombo, which the trial court relied upon
to conclude that workers’ compensation is appellant’s exclusive remedy. As
respondents observe, “[c]onsistent with the principle that a municipal
department does not exist independent of the municipality,” this court in
Walker “has already determined that . . . firefighters and transit workers are
City employees for workers’ compensation purposes.” And in Colombo,
another appellate court followed the reasoning in Walker to conclude that the
State of California, not its departments, is, as a matter of law, the relevant
employer for workers’ compensation purposes.
As summarized in Colombo, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at page 599: “In
Walker, a firefighter was killed when his fire truck collided with a streetcar
operated by a municipal streetcar employee. Both the firefighter and the

20
streetcar employee were employed by the City and County of San Francisco.
The decedent’s widow and daughters brought a negligence action against the
city and county. On appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, they claimed
that workers’ compensation was not the exclusive remedy because the
municipal railway was operated by San Francisco in its proprietary capacity,
while fire protection is a governmental function. ([Walker, supra,]
97 Cal.App.2d at p. 902.) Thus, they suggested the case presented an analogy
to a large, parent corporation which owns a smaller corporation, and argued
that where an employee of the larger corporation is injured by an employee of
the smaller company, the injured employee should not be relegated solely to
workers’ compensation simply because the smaller company is owned by the
larger corporation. (Id., at pp. 903–904.)
“The Walker court was unpersuaded, seeing a clear distinction between
two separate corporate entities and a single governmental entity. ([Walker,
supra,] 97 Cal.App.2d at pp. 904–908.) Noting that the City and County of
San Francisco was the employer of both the decedent and the allegedly
negligent streetcar operator, the court concluded that workers’ compensation
was the sole remedy. (Ibid.)”
The court in Colombo followed Walker to hold the workers’
compensation exclusivity rule barred the plaintiffs’ claims against the State
of California and its Department of Transportation (DOT). (Colombo, supra,
3 Cal.App.4th at pp. 599–600.) In Colombo, a California Highway Patrol
(CHP) traffic officer was struck by a car traveling on the highway while he
was on duty. (Id. at p. 595.) The officer filed a personal injury action against
the State of California and DOT, alleging DOT was negligent. (Id. at p. 596.)
The officer’s spouse also asserted a claim for loss of consortium. (Ibid.) The
trial court sustained the demurrer of DOT and State of California to the

21
operative complaint without leave to amend, on the grounds that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because workers’ compensation was the plaintiffs’
exclusive remedy against the officer’s employer, the State of California, an
entity which encompasses both the CHP and DOT. (Ibid.)
As in Walker, the plaintiffs on appeal attempted to draw an analogy
between the State of California, with its DOT and CHP, and a multiunit
corporate enterprise. (Colombo, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 598.) Relying on
Gigax v. Ralston Purina Co. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 591 (Gigax), a case also
cited by appellant here, the plaintiffs argued that the CHP and DOT are
separate entities within state government, each with distinct responsibilities.
(Colombo, at p. 598.) The Colombo court disagreed, concluding that “[a]s part
of the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency of state government
[citation], both departments and their employees are agents of the state.
[Citation.] Hence, lawsuits against state agencies are in effect suits against
the state. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) And the court held: “Plaintiff Russell
Colombo was an employee of the State of California, as were the DOT
employees whose alleged negligence purportedly caused his injuries. Because
the state was his employer, Officer Colombo was precluded from bringing an
action at law against the State, via its DOT. [Citations.] Since workers’
compensation is the exclusive remedy, the trial court properly sustained the
state’s demurrer without leave to amend.” (Id. at p. 599.) And because the
officer’s action was barred, so too was his spouse’s claim. (Ibid.)
Applying the reasoning of Walker and Colombo here compels the
conclusion that because SFFD and SFMTA are merely parts of the same
entity, the City, it is the City that effectively employs both appellant and Yu.
It follows that workers’ compensation provides the exclusive remedy for
appellant’s claims against the City as his employer (§§ 3600, subd. (a),

22
3602, subd. (a)), and against Yu as his coemployee (§ 3601, subd. (a)). To the
extent appellant attempts to draw an analogy between SFMTA and SFFD
and two separate business entities within a multiunit corporate enterprise,
such an analogy was rejected in Walker and Colombo. (See Walker, supra,
97 Cal.App.2d at pp. 903–904; Colombo, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 598.) And
we reject it here.
Appellant’s attempts to show that Walker and Colombo are inapplicable
are unavailing. He first contends they are not controlling because they were
decided before the creation of SFMTA in 1999, and thus “ ‘are not authority
for propositions not considered.’ ” But even though Walker and Colombo did
not involve the same public entities as in this case (with Walker in particular
involving SFMTA’s predecessor, the Municipal Railway), appellant offers no
persuasive reason why they should be limited to the public agencies at issue
in those cases. To the contrary, we find the cases’ reasoning persuasive and
conclude they supply the appropriate rule for this case.7
Appellant next attempts to factually distinguish Walker and Colombo.
He argues that “SFMTA operates largely, if not wholly, independently of the
various departments within the City and County of San Francisco, including
the San Francisco Fire Department. There was no similar degree of

7 Walker is consistent with cases from other jurisdictions, as indicated

in Walker itself, as well as in a treatise on workers’ compensation law, which
sets forth the law this way: “Attempts have several times been made to
subdivide [an employer, such] as a municipality, and assert common-law
rights on behalf of an employee of one city department against a different city
department as if it were a stranger. These attempts have been consistently
unsuccessful.” (1 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law (2023), § 113.05
[citing Walker, supra, 97 Cal.App.2d 901; Holody v. City of Detroit (1982)
117 Mich.App. 76 [323 N.W.2d 599]; Spencer v. City of Seattle (1985)
104 Wn.2d 30 [700 P.2d 742]; and Osborne v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1962)
353 S.W.2d 373].)

23
separation between the CHP and Caltrans in Colombo and the Fire
Department and the Municipal Railway (SFMTA’s predecessor) in Walker.”
He goes on, “the Fire Department and the Municipal Transportation Agency
are ‘governed by different [provisions of the San Francisco Charter] and have
different organizations, powers, and duties.’ ” This argument is
unpersuasive. The holdings of those cases did not hinge on the “degree of
separation” between the two entities at issue in each case. It was
acknowledged that the agencies (the Municipal Railway and fire department
in Walker and DOT and CHP in Colombo) were different from each other in
the obvious sense that they were different departments within their
respective City or State government performing different functions. But as
explained in Colombo, the fact that two agencies perform different functions
does not negate that they remain a part of the same entity. (See Colombo,
supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 598.)
Appellant further contends that Walker and Colombo are either
wrongly decided or no longer viable because they predated the decisions of
People ex rel. Lockyer v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1060
(Lockyer) and Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Dept. of Cal. Highway Patrol (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 1129 (Greyhound). The cases are distinguishable.
Lockyer involved a discovery dispute. The court held that “to obtain
documents and witnesses” from non-party state agencies, the defendant had
to “serve subpoenas directly upon” those agencies, rather than the State of
California (the People). (Lockyer, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1080.) The
court recognized that the non-party state agencies were distinct entities for
purposes of discovery requests, noting among other things that each agency
was responsible for maintaining its own records. (Id. at p. 1079.) The court
added, “It would be unduly burdensome if any time the People are a party to

24
litigation they are required to search for documents from any and all state
agencies that the propounding party demands.” (Ibid.) Contrary to
appellant’s suggestion, we do not read Lockyer as standing for the broad
proposition that various state or municipal entities must be treated as
distinct entities for all purposes, much less for purposes of the workers’
compensation laws.
Greyhound relied on Lockyer to conclude that two state agencies were
separate parties for purposes of determining whether the judgment was
appealable under the one final judgment rule. (Greyhound, supra,
213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1134–1135.) CHP and Caltrans were named as
defendants. On appeal, CHP argued that the judgment dismissing it from
the cross-complaint was not appealable because Caltrans was still a party to
the action, and both CHP and Caltrans are departments of the State and
therefore not separate entities for purposes of a judgment. (Id. at p. 1134.)
The Greyhound court disagreed, finding that the parties were separate
parties and therefore that the judgment dismissing CHP was appealable. (Id.
at p. 1135.) The court also explained that allegations against the two
departments were completely different and that they conducted themselves
as separate parties, as each party was represented by its own counsel and
filed a separate responsive pleading to the cross-complaint. (Ibid.)
Appellant asserts that Greyhound’s “recognition that departments or
agencies of a public entity can be ‘distinct and separate government
entities’ . . . extends logically to the workers’ compensation context.”
Greyhound addressed an appealability issue, and it is well settled that the
statutory “ ‘ “right to appeal is remedial and in doubtful cases should be
resolved in favor of the right whenever the substantial interests of a party
are affected by a judgment.” ’ ” (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 537; County

25
of Humboldt v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
298, 310.) The Greyhound court treated CHP as a party distinct from
Caltrans and permitted CHP to pursue its appeal, a determination that
appears consistent with resolving any doubts in favor of the right to appeal.
Here, in contrast, we are dealing with the Workers’ Compensation Act,
which must be liberally construed in favor of awarding workers’
compensation benefits. (§ 3202; King v. CompPartners, Inc., supra, 5 Cal.5th
at p. 1051.) Application of these principles cuts against concluding that
SFMTA and SFFD are distinct entities, and therefore that Yu and appellant
have separate employers. To do so would have the effect of circumventing the
workers’ compensation exclusivity rule, which prevents employees from
bringing actions against fellow employees acting in the scope of employment,
such that the fellow employees’ negligence could be imputed to their
employers. (Torres, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1002.) Further, Greyhound is
factually distinguishable. The complaint here does not contain “completely
different” allegations as to the City and Yu, the allegations directed at both
defendants the same. Also, unlike the two state agencies in Greyhound, the
City and Yu have not conducted themselves as separate parties. To the
contrary, they are represented by the same counsel and together filed the
underlying demurrer.
For these and additional reasons, we reject appellant’s argument that
“Nor Can It Be Said That as a Matter of Law, [Appellant] Is Employed by the
City and County of San Francisco.” In support of this argument, appellant
relies on the “right to control” test used to determine an employer
relationship. Citing Gigax, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d at pages 598 to 601 and
similar cases, appellant argues that the test specifically refers to the ‘“right
to control the manner and means of accomplishing the desired result.’ ”

26
Appellant argues that “to be considered [his] employer, the City . . . must
have the right to control the details of his work as a firefighter,” and here,
there are no allegations or matter subject to judicial notice that the City, as
opposed to SFFD, had the right to control the details of his work. Thus,
appellant contends that the issue cannot be resolved at this procedural
juncture, before discovery has taken place, as a matter of law. We are
unpersuaded.
Initially, to the extent appellant argues the trial court erred in
sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, he bears the burden of
demonstrating how the complaint can be amended to support his theory
(Goodman, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 349)—a burden he has not met. As
respondents aptly put it, “[b]esides vaguely arguing that discovery might
support his separate-employer theory . . . , Appellant fails to identify
anything he could add to his pleadings that would negate the workers’
compensation exclusivity rule. . . . Appellant, therefore, has not satisfied his
burden of proving a ‘reasonable possibility’ that he can cure his defective
Complaint through amendment.” As such, appellant cannot show the court
abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
(Ibid.)
In any event, appellant’s theory that SFFD, not the City, is his
employer is untenable. It rests on the premise that SFFD exists as an entity
separate and apart from the City, a premise that appellant did not attempt to
establish, and we have rejected in any case. Accordingly, it is the City that in
substance employs appellant, and appellant’s attempt to divide the City and
SFFD into separate entities for purposes of the workers’ compensation
exclusivity rule fails.

27
 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on
appeal.

28
 _________________________
Richman, Acting P. J.

We concur:

_________________________
Miller, J.

_________________________
Markman, J. *

Vann v. City and County of San Francisco (A165231)

*Superior Court of Alameda County, Judge Michael Markman, sitting as
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

29
Trial Court: San Francisco County Superior
Court

Trial Judge: Honorable Richard B. Ulmer;

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Abbey, Weitzenberg, Warren &
Appellant Matthew Vann: Emery, P.C., Scott R.
Montgomery; Law Offices of
Tiffany J. Gates, Tiffany J. Gates;

Attorneys for Defendants and David Chiu, City Attorney;
Respondents, City and County of Meredith B. Osborn, Chief Trial
San Francisco, et al.: Deputy; Katherine B. Bearman,
Deputy City Attorney.

30