J-A21042-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
FRANCIS HAZINSKY :
:
Appellant : No. 2124 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 14, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-23-CR-0002346-2020
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 31, 2024
Appellant, Francis Hazinsky, appeals nunc pro tunc from the aggregate
judgment of sentence of 24 to 60 months’ incarceration, followed by 48
months’ probation, imposed after he pled guilty to one count each of
possession of child pornography, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(d), and criminal use of a
communication facility, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a). On appeal, Appellant challenges
the court’s application of a sentencing guideline enhancement, as well as
other, discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.
A detailed recitation of the facts of Appellant’s case is unnecessary to
our review of his sentencing claims. We need only note that a search warrant
was served at Appellant’s home and technology was seized, revealing “50
unique videos, equivalent to 2,500 images of child pornography.” Trial Court
Opinion (TCO), 2/2/23, at 2 (citation to the record omitted). The
Commonwealth subsequently charged Appellant with 50 separate counts for
J-A21042-23
possession of child pornography, and 50 separate counts for criminal use of a
communication facility.
On January 4, 2021, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to one count
of possession of child pornography and one count of criminal use of a
communication facility. The Commonwealth nol prossed the remaining 98
charges. Notably, at the plea proceeding, the Commonwealth and Appellant’s
trial counsel agreed that the Affidavit of Probable Cause set forth the factual
basis for Appellant’s plea. See N.T. Plea, 1/4/21, at 10. In the Affidavit of
Probable Cause, the affiant explicitly stated that the search of Appellant’s
computer “revealed over 25 unique images and over 50 unique videos
equivalent to over 2,500 images under state law, all depicting child
pornography.” Affidavit of Probable Cause, 7/29/20, at 3.
Appellant’s case proceeded to sentencing on June 14, 2021. There, the
Commonwealth
submitted sentencing guidelines to the court that included an
“Enhancement” element[,] which increased the standard range
[for Appellant’s possession of child pornography offense] from 12-
24 months to 30-42 months. [Appellant’s] counsel did not object
to the enhanced guidelines. The court sentenced [Appellant],
after considering those very guidelines along with the presentence
information in support of [Appellant], to a mitigated range of 24-
60 months[’ incarceration,] and 48 months[’] consecutive
probation.
Appellant’s Brief at 15.
Appellant did not file a timely post-sentence motion, or a direct appeal.
Instead, on February 6, 2022, Appellant (via newly-retained counsel) filed a
petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-
-2-
J-A21042-23
9546, seeking the reinstatement of Appellant’s post-sentence motion rights.
According to Appellant, “[a]fter discussions with [the Commonwealth], it was
stipulated that [Appellant’s] PCRA [petition] was of merit and that the court
would permit the filing of a motion to modify/reconsider sentence….” Id. at
16. On April 27, 2022, the court entered an order stating that, “upon
stipulation of the parties, [Appellant] is granted the right to file a Post[-
]Sentence Motion to modify/reconsider the sentence within ten (10) days of
the filing of this Order.” Order, 4/27/22, at 1.
On May 5, 2022, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to reconsider
his sentence. Therein, Appellant raised, for the first time, that “there appears
to be a discrepancy in the Sentencing Guidelines that were submitted to the
court….” Post-Sentence Motion, 5/5/22, at 5 ¶ 4. Appellant explained: “As
the guidelines form states, with an [offense gravity score] of ‘9’ and a [prior
record score] of ‘0[,’] the standard guidelines should have been 12-24
months, not the 30-42 [months] that are listed.” Id. Appellant contended
that because of this “discrepancy,” the court “was inadvertently directed to a
higher range of sentencing than it should have been.” Id. Appellant also
claimed the court failed to consider certain mitigating factors, such as
Appellant’s health issues and the fact that, as a result of his plea, Appellant
“is now required to register with the [Pennsylvania] State Police … for fifteen
(15) years upon his release from incarceration.” Id. at ¶ 3(c). Accordingly,
Appellant asked the court to reconsider and modify his sentence.
-3-
J-A21042-23
The Commonwealth filed a responsive brief. In regard to Appellant’s
challenge to the guideline enhancement, the Commonwealth explained:
The Commonwealth properly applied the sentencing enhancement
to the Possession of Child Pornography charge in this case. Under,
42 Pa.C.S. § 9720.5(a), there is a sentence enhancement in
accordance with the charge of Sexual Abuse of Children (18
Pa.C.S. § 6312) when aggravating circumstances include
variations such as “the age of the child or a determination of
prepubescence, the number of images possessed by the
defendant, if the child depicted is known to the defendant and the
nature and character of the abuse depicted in the images.”
According to 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(e)(1), when an offender has
violated 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312 and possessed more than 500 images,
18 months can be added to the lower and upper limit of the
standard range for the sentence recommendation.
In this case, [Appellant] pled guilty to one count of Possession of
Child Pornography and one count of Criminal Use of
Communication Facility. As part of his plea, [Appellant] also
stipulated to the affidavit of probable cause[,] which states
[Appellant] possessed over 2,500 unique images of child
pornography, well over the 500 image quota for an 18[-]month
enhancement.
The case is distinguishable from Commonwealth v. Christman,
225 A.3d 1104 (Pa. Super. 2019), which holds that the number of
images for separate charges cannot be totaled to meet the criteria
for a higher sentence enhancement, because in that instance, no
such combination took place. Unlike in Christman, in which
“there was no single violation for which defendant possessed more
than 50 images[,”] the single Child Pornography charge in this
case includes all of the discovered photos and videos. Id. at 1109.
The Court had also noted that the Commonwealth could have
solved the combination issue by reducing the number of charges
and increasing the number of videos per charge--the exact action
that took place in this case. Id. at 1110. Thus, the application of
the 18[-]month enhancement for the stipulated 2,500 unique
images was proper in this case.
Commonwealth’s Response to Use of Guideline Enhancements, 7/11/22, at 3.
Additionally, the Commonwealth observed that the sentencing court was
-4-
J-A21042-23
aware of the mitigating circumstances of Appellant’s medical condition and his
registration requirement at the time it fashioned his sentence. Id. at 3-4.
Accordingly, the Commonwealth requested the court deny Appellant’s post-
sentence motion.
On July 21, 2022, the court issued an order denying Appellant’s post-
sentence motion. He filed a nunc pro tunc notice of appeal on August 12,
2022, and he also complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The court filed
a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion on February 2, 2023. Herein, Appellant
states two issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court commit error and abuse its discretion when
it applied the sentencing enhancement of 204 Pa. Code
303.9(a)(3)[1] to the charge of possession of child pornography
____________________________________________
1 That provision states, in pertinent part:
(a) (1) Basic sentence recommendations. Guideline sentence
recommendations are based on the Offense Gravity Score and
Prior Record Score. In most cases, the sentence
recommendations are found in the Basic Sentencing Matrix (§
303.16(a)). The Basic Sentencing Matrix specifies a range of
sentences (i.e.--standard range) that shall be considered by the
court for each combination of Offense Gravity Score (OGS) and
Prior Record Score (PRS).
***
(3) Enhancement sentence recommendations. Guideline sentence
recommendations may include sentence enhancements, which
provide increases to the basic sentence recommendations when
an enhancement factor identified by the Commission is present.
Enhancement sentence recommendations are described in §
303.10. The application of an enhancement is determined by the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-5-
J-A21042-23
when it aggregated all 2500 images to the one (1) count to which
[Appellant] pled guilty?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or commit error
when it failed to apply those same mitigating factors to
[Appellant’s] motion to reconsider sentence that it had found in
its original sentencing of [A]ppellant after being informed it had
incorrectly used an enhancement guideline?
Appellant’s Brief at 10.
Appellant’s issues implicate the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
See Commonwealth v. Christman, 225 A.3d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(considering Christman’s challenges to the court’s application of the
sentencing guideline enhancement of 204 Pa. Code § 303.9(l)(1) as
implicating the discretionary aspects of his sentence); Commonwealth v.
Torres, 223 A.3d 715, 716 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“A claim [that] the trial court
failed to consider mitigating circumstances is a challenge to the discretionary
aspects of sentence.”) (citation omitted).
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v.
Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant
challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke
this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
[the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the]
____________________________________________
court at sentencing, based on a preponderance of the evidence
that the enhancement factor is present. Sentence enhancements
can either be mandated by statute or directly adopted by the
Commission.
204 Pa. Code § 303.9(a)(3).
-6-
J-A21042-23
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006),
appeal denied, … 909 A.2d 303 ([Pa.] 2006). Objections to the
discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they
are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify
the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788,
794 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, … 831 A.2d 599 ([Pa.]
2003).
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul,
925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question
exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument
that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent
with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
Sierra, supra at 912–13.
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
Here, Appellant has met the first two requirements for obtaining review
of his discretionary-aspects-of-sentencing claims. He has also included a Rule
2119(f) statement in his appellate brief, wherein he argues, in totality:
The trial court improperly applied a sentencing guideline
enhancement under 204 Pa. Code [§] 303.9(l)(1) to the charge of
possessing child pornography when it aggregated all of the 2,500
images pertaining to the original 50 counts (50 videos) charged
to the one (1) count that [Appellant] pled guilty to in direct
contradiction to the case of … Christman, … committing error and
abusing its discretion [and] raising a substantial question for
appellate review.
Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellant’s argument that the trial court improperly
applied a sentencing guideline enhancement presents a substantial question
-7-
J-A21042-23
for our review. See Christman, 225 A.2d at 1107 (concluding that
Christman’s claim that the court improperly applied a sentencing guideline
enhancement presents a substantial question for our review). Thus, in terms
of Appellant’s first issue on appeal, he has met the requirements for us to
review the merits of his discretionary aspects of sentencing claim.2
In doing so, we are mindful that,
[s]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of
the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an
abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised
its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Instantly, Appellant contends that the court erred by applying an 18-
month sentencing guideline enhancement under 204 Pa. Code § 303.9. See
Appellant’s Brief at 12. At the outset, we observe that the legislature removed
the at-issue sentencing enhancements from section 303.9(l)(1), and set them
forth in section 303.10(e), effective January 1, 2021. Thus, at the time of
Appellant’s sentencing in June of 2021, the guideline enhancements applicable
to an offense of possession of child pornography, based on the number of
images possessed, were set forth in 204 Pa. Code § 310(e), as follows:
____________________________________________
2 Clearly, Appellant fails to mention his second issue in his Rule 2119(f)
statement. We address Appellant’s omission in this regard, infra.
-8-
J-A21042-23
(e) Sexual Abuse of Children Enhancement, as required by 42
Pa.C.S. § 9720.5.
(1) When the court determines that the offender violated 18
Pa.C.S. § 6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children) and
that the offender possessed more than 50 images, the court
shall consider the sentence recommendations described in
subsection (e)(4). For purposes of this enhancement, the
number of images is defined as follows:
(i) Each photograph, picture, computer generated
image, or any similar visual depiction shall be
considered to be one image.
(ii) Each video, video-clip, movie, or similar visual
depiction shall be considered to have 50 images.
***
(4) The enhancement related to the number of images
possessed by the offender or the nature and character of
the abuse depicted provides the following:
(i) When applying enhancement based on the number
of images possessed by the offender, if the offender
possessed more than 50 images to 200 images, 6
months are added to the lower limit of the standard
range and 6 months are added to the upper limit of
the standard range; if the offender possessed more
than 200 images to 500 images, 12 months are added
to the lower limit of the standard range and 12 months
are added to the upper limit of the standard range; if
the offender possessed more than 500 images, 18
months are added to the lower limit of the standard
range and 18 months are added to the upper limit of
the standard range;
204 Pa. Code § 303.10(e).
In this case, the trial court applied an 18-month enhancement based on
its finding that Appellant possessed more than 500 images of child
pornography. In challenging that decision, Appellant explains that he was
initially charged with 50 counts of possessing child pornography, with each
-9-
J-A21042-23
count purportedly premised on his possession of one video. Therefore, under
section 303.10(e)(1)(ii), each count of possession of child pornography with
which Appellant was originally charged would equal 50 images of child
pornography. Appellant contends that when he decided to plead guilty to one
count of possession of child pornography, “[i]t was [his] understanding that
his plea to [that] one (1) count was for one (1) video[,]” or 50 total images.
Appellant’s Brief at 15. He stresses that in Christman, this Court “found that
since ‘there was no single violation for which [Christman] possessed more
than 50 images, … the sentencing enhancement set forth in section
303.9(l)(1)[, i.e., the prior version of section 303.10(e)(4)(i),] does not
apply.’” Id. at 18 (quoting Christman, 225 A.3d at 1109). Accordingly,
Appellant insists that under Christman, his single count of possession of child
pornography equated to 50 images and could not trigger the 18-month
sentencing enhancement under section 303.10(e)(4)(i).
We disagree. Initially, we discuss our decision in Christman. There,
Christman pled guilty to 11 counts of possession of child pornography based
on his possession of 11 videos. Christman, 225 A.3d at 1106. At sentencing,
the trial court applied the 18-month sentencing enhancement by “considering
the total number of images [Christman] possessed at all 11 counts (i.e., 550
images)[,]” although “each of the 11 videos possessed by [Christman] …
constitute[ed] 50 images pursuant to section 303.10(e)(ii).” Id. at 1108
(emphasis in original). In challenging the court’s application of that guideline
enhancement on appeal, Christman argued that, “since the Commonwealth
- 10 -
J-A21042-23
charged him separately for each video, the court was required to consider only
the number of images pertaining to each count (i.e., 50 images).” Id. at
1108-09.
We agreed with Christman, pointing to “the explicit language of section
303.10(e)(3), which states: ‘Sexual Abuse of Children Enhancement shall
apply to each violation which meets the criteria above.’” Id. at 1109
(quoting 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(e)(3)) (emphasis added in Christman). We
concluded that, “[p]ursuant to this provision, it is clear that the court must
examine each conviction to determine if it meets the requirement that the
offender possessed more than 50 images before the guideline enhancement
may be applied.” Id. Because “at each of [Christman’s] 11 counts, he was
convicted of possessing one video, or 50 images[,]” we conclude that “there
was no single violation for which he possessed more than 50 images,” and
the sentencing enhancement should not have been applied. Id. (emphasis in
original). Notably, in closing, we observed that “the Commonwealth has
discretion in how it charges criminal offenders[,]” and in Christman’s case, it
“could have reduced the number of charges, and increased the number of
videos underlying each charge, thus triggering application of the sentencing
guideline enhancement.” Id. at 1110.
In this case, Appellant acknowledges that his trial/sentencing counsel
negotiated his plea agreement “to reduce all 50 counts … to one (1) count” of
possession of child pornography. Appellant’s Brief at 14. Although Appellant
claims that “[i]t was [his] understanding that his plea to one (1) count was
- 11 -
J-A21042-23
for one (1) video[,]” id. at 15, he recognizes that the Commonwealth did not
specify, in the charging documents, any “video image totals” pertaining to
each count. Id. at 19. Appellant also admits that, at the plea hearing, his
attorney agreed that the factual basis for Appellant’s single count of
possession of child pornography was the Affidavit of Probable Cause, which
states that Appellant possessed 2,500 total images of child pornography. Id.
at 14.
Given this record, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s reliance
on Christman is unavailing, and his challenge to the application of the
guideline enhancement is meritless. The court explained:
The present case is distinguishable from Christman because
here, the single charge pled to by [Appellant] encompasses all the
discovered photos and videos. In Christman, the defendant was
charged with numerous charges but none of the individual charges
were for possession of more than 50 images. [Christman, 225
A.2d at 1109]. The [C]ourt in Christman indicated that the
prosecution could have avoided this problem by reducing the
number of charges and adding more videos to each charge. Id.
at 1110. Sentencing enhancements can become available by
reducing the number of charges and increasing the number of
photos or videos per charge. Id.
Here, the prosecution followed the action described in the
Christman case and consolidated the charges and increased the
number of images per charge. [Appellant] pled guilty to one count
of [p]ossession of [c]hild [p]ornography and one count of
[c]riminal [u]se of a [c]ommunication [f]acility. [Appellant]
stipulated that he possessed over 2,500 images of child
pornography. The number of images stipulated to exceeds the
threshold requirement for [the] sentencing enhancement. Thus,
the application of the 18-month enhancement was proper.
- 12 -
J-A21042-23
TCO at 4. We agree that the trial court acted in accordance with Christman
in the present case.3 Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue is meritless.
Next, Appellant avers that the trial court failed to properly apply
mitigating factors in fashioning his sentence. However, his entire argument
is premised on the false conclusion that “the trial court incorrectly applied an
enhanced guideline[,] which is contrary to law.” Appellant’s Brief at 23. More
____________________________________________
3 To the extent that Appellant contends he did not understand the implications
of his pleading guilty to this single count of possession of child pornography
premised on the facts set forth in the Affidavit of Probable Cause, his issue is
ultimately an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that cannot be litigated
on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013)
(reaffirming the prior holding in Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa.
2002), that, absent certain circumstances, claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel should be deferred until collateral review under the PCRA). Although
Appellant recognizes that the thrust of his argument sounds in ineffective
assistance of counsel, see Appellant’s Brief at 20, he claims that the PCRA
court effectively ruled that his plea/sentencing counsel acted ineffectively in
failing to properly advise Appellant about the sentencing enhancement. See
Appellant’s Brief at 20. The record does not support this claim. In Appellant’s
PCRA petition, he alleged that his trial/sentencing counsel was ineffective
because he “[f]ailed to file any post[-]sentence motions to challenge the
validity of his plea and/or the aspects of his sentence including
reconsideration; … [f]ailed to file an appeal; … [a]llowed without objection
written testimonials from [the] Commonwealth at sentencing; … [and f]ailed
to properly advise [Appellant] of his potential plea consequences and thus
[Appellant’s] plea was not knowing and voluntary.” PCRA Petition, 2/16/22,
at unnumbered 2 ¶¶ 7. Clearly, Appellant did not allege any ineffectiveness
claim explicitly pertaining to the application of the sentencing guideline
enhancement; instead, he only asserted this issue for the first time in his post-
sentence motion. Thus, the PCRA court’s entering the order reinstating
Appellant’s post-sentence motion rights, without any explanation for its
decision to do so, cannot be interpreted as a substantive finding that
Appellant’s counsel acted ineffectively in regard to the sentencing guideline
enhancement, especially where Appellant concedes that the Commonwealth
stipulated to the reinstatement of his post-sentence motion rights. See
Appellant’s Brief at 9.
- 13 -
J-A21042-23
specifically, Appellant rather confusingly argues that because the court
ultimately imposed a mitigated-range sentence under the enhanced-guideline
range, he is entitled to a mitigated-range sentence under the non-enhanced,
standard-guideline range because the sentencing enhancement should not
have been applied at all.
Initially, we note that Appellant did not set forth this claim in his Rule
2119(f) statement and, therefore, he has failed to establish that a substantial
question exists to warrant this Court’s review. Nevertheless, even if Appellant
had demonstrated a substantial question for our review, we would deem his
argument meritless. For the reasons set forth supra, the guideline
enhancement was properly applied. The trial court clearly considered
mitigating circumstances in fashioning Appellant’s sentence under those
enhanced guidelines. Namely, the court took into account “letters about
[Appellant’s] character from family and friends and information about [his]
medical diagnosis through letters and testimony from [Appellant’s] father.”
TCO at 5. Additionally, “[t]he court was aware that [Appellant] was required
… to register as a sex offender with the State Police as part of the terms of
the guilty plea.” Id. Based on these circumstances, the court imposed a
mitigated-range term of incarceration under the enhanced sentencing
guidelines. Therefore, even had Appellant properly raised this issue in his
Rule 2119(f) statement, we would conclude that no relief is due.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
- 14 -
J-A21042-23
Date: 1/31/2024
- 15 -